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 Terms of Reference 
 
Review of equal recognition before the law and legal capacity 
for people with disability 
I, Mark Dreyfus QC MP, Attorney-General of Australia, having regard to: 
 the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, to 
which Australia is a party and which sets out: 
o rights for people with disability to recognition before the law, to legal 
capacity and to access to justice on an equal basis with others, and  
o a general principle of respect for inherent dignity, individual autonomy, 
including freedom to make one’s own choices, and independence of 
persons, and  
 Australian Governments’ commitment to the National Disability Strategy, which 
includes ‘rights protection, justice and legislation’ as a priority area for action.  
REFER to the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) for inquiry and report, 
pursuant to s 20(1) of the Australian Law Reform Commission Act 1996 (Cth): 
 the examination of laws and legal frameworks within the Commonwealth 
jurisdiction that deny or diminish the equal recognition of people with disability 
as persons before the law and their ability to exercise legal capacity, and  
 what if any changes could be made to Commonwealth laws and legal 
frameworks to address these matters. 
For the purposes of the inquiry, equal recognition before the law and legal capacity are 
to be understood as they are used in the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities: including to refer to the rights of people with disability to make decisions 
and act on their own behalf.   
Scope of the reference 
In undertaking this reference, the ALRC should consider all relevant Commonwealth 
laws and legal frameworks that either directly, or indirectly, impact on the recognition 
of people with disability before the law and their exercise of legal capacity on an equal 
basis with others, including in the areas of: 
 access to justice and legal assistance programs 
 administrative law 
 aged care  
 anti-discrimination law 
 board participation 
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 competition and consumer law 
 contracts 
 disability services and supports 
 electoral matters 
 employment 
 federal offences 
 financial services, including insurance 
 giving evidence  
 holding public office 
 identification documents 
 jury service 
 marriage, partnerships, intimate relationships, parenthood and family law 
 medical treatment 
 privacy law 
 restrictive practices 
 social security  
 superannuation, and 
 supported and substituted decision making.   
The review should also have particular regard for the ways Commonwealth laws and 
legal frameworks affect people with disability who are also children, women, 
Indigenous people, older people, people in rural, remote and regional areas, people 
from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds and lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
transgender and intersex people.  
The purpose of this review is to ensure that Commonwealth laws and legal frameworks 
are responsive to the needs of people with disability and to advance, promote and 
respect their rights.  In considering what if any changes to Commonwealth law could 
be made, the ALRC should consider:  
 how laws and legal frameworks are implemented and operate in practice 
 the language used in laws and legal frameworks  
 how decision making by people with impairment that affects their decision 
making can be validly and effectively supported 
 presumptions about a person’s ability to exercise legal capacity and whether 
these discriminate against people with disability 
 use of appropriate communication to allow people with disability to exercise 
legal capacity, including alternative modes, means and formats of 
communication such as Easy English, sign language, Braille, and augmentative 
communications technology 
 how a person’s ability to independently make decisions is assessed, and 
mechanisms to review these decisions  
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 the role of family members and carers and paid supports such as legal or non-
legal advocates in supporting people with disability to exercise legal capacity for 
themselves – both in relation to formal and informal decisions and how this role 
should be recognised by laws and legal frameworks 
 safeguards – are the powers and duties of decision making supporters and 
substituted decision makers effective, appropriate and consistent with 
Australia’s international obligations 
 recognition of where a person’s legal capacity and/or need for supports to 
exercise legal capacity is evolving or fluctuating (where a person with disability 
may be able to independently make decisions at some times and circumstances 
but not others or where their ability to make decisions may grow with time 
and/or support), including the evolving capacity of children with disability, and 
 how maximising individual autonomy and independence could be modelled in 
Commonwealth laws and legal frameworks.  
In conducting this inquiry, the ALRC should also have regard to:  
 initiatives under the National Disability Strategy, including the National 
Disability Insurance Scheme and other services and supports available to people 
with disability, and how these should/could interact with the law to increase the 
realisation of people with disability’s recognition before the law and legal 
capacity  
 how Commonwealth laws and legal frameworks interact with State and 
Territory laws in the areas under review, contemporaneous developments and 
best practice examples within the States and Territories, and 
 international laws and legal frameworks that aim to ensure people with disability 
are accorded equal recognition before the law and legal capacity on an equal 
basis with others, including international work to implement the Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disability.   
Consultation 
In undertaking this reference, the ALRC should identify and consult with relevant 
stakeholders, particularly people with disability and their representative, advocacy and 
legal organisations, including through accessible formats, but also families and carers 
of people with disability, relevant Government departments and agencies in the 
Commonwealth and States and Territories, the Australian Human Rights Commission, 
and other key non-government stakeholders.   
Timeframe 
The Commission should provide its report to the Attorney-General by August 2014.   
Dated 23 July 2013 
 
Mark Dreyfus 
Attorney-General
  
Participants 
 
 
Australian Law Reform Commission  
President  
Professor Rosalind Croucher 
Part-time Commissioners 
The Hon Justice Berna Collier, Federal Court of Australia, until October 2013  
Graeme Innes AM, Disability Discrimination Commissioner, Australian Human Rights 
Commission 
Executive Director 
Sabina Wynn 
Principal Legal Officer 
Bruce Alston 
Acting Senior Legal Officer 
Amanda Alford, until May 2014 
Legal Officers 
Khanh Hoang, Legal Officer, from March 2014 
Sonya Kim, Legal Officer 
Legal Interns 
Andrew Brooks 
Georgie Leahy 
Penelope Marles 
Jane Murray 
Isabella Partridge 
Hagen Sporleder 
Advisory Committee Members 
Emeritus Professor Terry Carney, Sydney Law School, University of Sydney 
Phillip French, Director, Australian Centre for Disability Law  
8 Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws 
Stephen Gianni, Acting CEO, The Australian Federation of Disability Organisations, 
until March 2014 
David Fintan, Corporate Counsel, National Disability Insurance Agency 
Damian Griffis, Executive Director, First People’s Disability Network 
Rosemary Kayess, Visiting Fellow, Australian Human Rights Centre, University of 
New South Wales 
Emeritus Professor Ron McCallum AO, Sydney Law School, University of Sydney 
Christina Ryan, General Manager, Advocacy for Inclusion 
Therese Sands, Co-Chief Executive, People with Disability Australia 
Graeme Smith, Public Guardian, NSW Department of Attorney General & Justice 
Professor Cameron Stewart, Sydney Law School, University of Sydney 
Matthew Wright, CEO, The Australian Federation of Disability Organisations,  
from April 2014 
 
 
 
 Proposals and Questions 
 
 
2. Conceptual Landscape—the Context for Reform 
Proposal 2–1  The Australian Government should review the Interpretative 
Declaration in relation to art 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities with a view to withdrawing it. 
3. National Decision-Making Principles 
Proposal 3–1   Reform of Commonwealth, state and territory laws and legal 
frameworks concerning decision-making by persons who may require support in 
making decisions should be guided by the National Decision-Making Principles and 
Guidelines, set out in Proposals 3–2 to 3–9. 
Proposal 3–2   National Decision-Making Principle 1 
Every adult has the right to make decisions that affect their life and to have those 
decisions respected. 
Proposal 3–3   National Decision-Making Principle 2  
Persons who may require support in decision-making must be provided with the 
support necessary for them to make, communicate and participate in decisions that 
affect their lives. 
Proposal 3–4   Support Guidelines 
(a)  Persons who may require decision-making support should be supported to 
participate in and contribute to all aspects of life. 
(b)  Persons who may require decision-making support should be supported in 
making decisions. 
(c)  The role of families, carers and other significant persons in supporting persons 
who may require decision-making support should be acknowledged and 
respected. 
Proposal 3–5   National Decision-Making Principle 3 
The will, preferences and rights of persons who may require decision-making support 
must direct decisions that affect their lives. 
Proposal 3–6   Will, Preferences and Rights Guidelines 
(a)   Threshold: The appointment of a representative decision-maker should be a last 
resort and not as a substitute for appropriate support.  
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(b)    Appointment: The appointment of a representative decision-maker should be 
limited in scope, be proportionate, and apply for the minimum time. 
(c)    Supporting decision-making:  
     (i)  a person’s will and preferences, so far as they can be determined, must be 
given effect; 
     (ii)  where the person’s will and preferences are not known, the representative 
must give effect to what the person would likely want, based on all the 
information available, including communicating with supporters; and 
     (iii)  if it is not possible to determine what the person would likely want, the 
representative must act to promote and safeguard the person’s human 
rights and act in the way least restrictive of those rights. 
Proposal 3–7   Representative Decision-Making Guidelines 
Any determinations about a person’s decision-making ability and any appointment of a 
representative decision-maker should be informed by the following guidelines: 
(a)  An adult must be presumed to have ability to make decisions that affect their 
life. 
(b)  A person has ability to make a decision if they are able to: 
      (i)  understand the information relevant to the decision and the effect of the 
decision; 
     (ii)  retain that information to the extent necessary to make the decision; 
    (iii)  use or weigh that information as part of the process of making the 
decision; and 
     (iv)  communicate the decision. 
(c)   A person must not be assumed to lack decision-making ability on the basis of 
having a disability. 
(d)   A person’s decision-making ability is to be assessed, not the outcome of the 
decision they wish to make. 
(e)  A person’s decision-making ability will depend on the kinds of decision to be 
made. 
(f)  A person’s decision-making ability may evolve or fluctuate over time. 
(g)  A person’s decision-making ability must be considered in the context of 
available supports. 
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(h)  In communicating decisions, a person is entitled to: 
    (i)  communicate by any means that enables them to be understood; and 
    (ii)  have their cultural and linguistic circumstances recognised and respected. 
Proposal 3–8  National Decision-Making Principle 4 
Decisions, arrangements and interventions for persons who may require decision-
making support must respect their human rights. 
Proposal 3–9  Safeguards Guidelines 
Laws and legal frameworks must contain appropriate safeguards in relation to 
decisions and interventions in relation to persons who may require decision-making 
support to ensure that such decisions and interventions are: 
(a)  the least restrictive of the person’s human rights; 
(b)  subject to appeal; and 
(c)  subject to regular, independent and impartial monitoring and review. 
4. Supported Decision-Making in Commonwealth Laws 
Proposal 4–1  Commonwealth laws and legal frameworks should encourage 
supported decision-making by adopting a model for individual decision-making 
consistent with the National Decision-Making Principles and Proposals 4–2 to 4–9 (the 
‘Commonwealth decision-making model’). 
Question 4–1  In what areas of Commonwealth law, aside from the National 
Disability Insurance Scheme, social security, aged care, eHealth and privacy law, 
should the Commonwealth decision-making model apply?  
Question 4–2  Are the terms ‘supporter’ and ‘representative’ the most appropriate 
to use in the Commonwealth decision-making model? If not, what are the most 
appropriate terms?  
Proposal 4–2  The objects or principles provisions in Commonwealth legislation 
that involves decision-making by people who may require decision-making support 
should reflect the National Decision-Making Principles.  
Proposal 4–3  Relevant Commonwealth laws and legal frameworks should 
include the concept of a ‘supporter’ and provide that an agency, body or organisation 
may establish supporter arrangements. In particular, laws and legal frameworks should 
reflect the National Decision-Making Principles and provide that: 
(a)  a person who requires decision-making support should be able to appoint a 
supporter or supporters at any time; 
(b)  where a supporter is appointed, ultimate decision-making authority remains with 
the person who requires decision-making support; 
(c)  any decision made with the assistance of a supporter should be recognised as the 
decision of the person who requires decision-making support; and 
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(d)  a person should be able to revoke the appointment of a supporter at any time, for 
any reason.  
Proposal 4–4  A Commonwealth supporter may perform the following functions:  
(a)  assist the person who requires decision-making support to make decisions; 
(b)  handle the relevant personal information of the person; 
(c)  obtain or receive information on behalf of the person and assist the person to 
understand information; 
(d)  communicate, or assist the person to communicate, decisions to third parties; 
(e)  provide advice to the person about the decisions they might make; and 
(f)  endeavour to ensure the decisions of the person are given effect. 
Proposal 4–5  Relevant Commonwealth laws and legal frameworks should 
provide that Commonwealth supporters must:  
(a)  support the person requiring decision-making support to make the decision or 
decisions in relation to which they were appointed; 
(b)  support the person requiring decision-making support to express their will and 
preferences in making a decision or decisions; 
(c)  act in a manner promoting the personal, social, financial, and cultural wellbeing 
of the person who requires decision-making support; 
(d)  act honestly, diligently and in good faith; 
(e)  support the person requiring decision-making support to consult with ‘existing 
appointees’, family members, carers and other significant people in their life in 
making a decision; and 
(f)  assist the person requiring support to develop their own decision-making ability. 
For the purposes of paragraph (e), ‘existing appointee’ should be defined to include 
existing Commonwealth supporters and representatives and a person or organisation 
who, under Commonwealth, state or territory law, has guardianship of the person, or is 
a person appointed formally with power to make decisions for the person. 
Question 4–3  In the Commonwealth decision-making model, should the 
relationship of supporter to the person who requires support be regarded as a fiduciary 
one? 
Question 4–4  What safeguards in relation to supporters should be incorporated 
into the Commonwealth decision-making model?  
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Proposal 4–6  Relevant Commonwealth legislation should include the concept of 
a ‘representative’ and provide that an agency, body or organisation may establish 
representative arrangements. In particular, legislation should contain consistent 
provisions for the appointment, role and duties of representatives, and associated 
safeguards, and reflect the National Decision-Making Principles. 
Question 4–5  What mechanisms should there be at a Commonwealth level to 
appoint a representative for a person who requires full decision-making support?  
Proposal 4–7  A Commonwealth representative may perform the following 
functions:  
(a)   assist the person who requires decision-making support to make decisions; 
(b)  handle the relevant personal information of the person; 
(c)  obtain or receive information on behalf of the person and assist the person to 
understand information; 
(d)  communicate, or assist the person to communicate, decisions to third parties; 
(e)  provide advice to the person about the decision they might make; and 
(f)  endeavour to ensure the decisions of the person are given effect.  
Proposal 4–8  Relevant Commonwealth laws and legal frameworks should 
provide that Commonwealth representatives must: 
(a)   support the person requiring decision-making support to express their will and 
preferences in making decisions; 
(b)  where it is not possible to determine the wishes of the person who requires 
decision-making support, determine what the person would likely want based on 
all the information available; 
(c)  where (a) and (b) are not possible, consider the human rights relevant to the 
situation; 
(d)  act in a manner promoting the personal, social, financial and cultural wellbeing 
of the person who requires decision-making support; 
(e)  support the person who requires decision-making support to consult with 
‘existing appointees’, family members, carers and other significant people in 
their life when making a decision; and 
(f)  assist the person who requires support to develop their own decision-making 
ability. 
For the purposes of paragraph (e), ‘existing appointee’ should be defined to include 
existing Commonwealth supporters and representatives and a person or organisation 
who, under Commonwealth, state or territory law, has guardianship of the person, or is 
a person appointed formally with power to make decisions for the person.  
Proposal 4–9  The appointment and conduct of Commonwealth representatives 
should be subject to appropriate and effective safeguards.  
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Question 4–6  How should supporters and representatives under the 
Commonwealth decision-making model interact with state or territory appointed 
decision-makers? 
Proposal 4–10  The Australian Government should develop mechanisms for 
sharing information about appointments of supporters and representatives, including to 
avoid duplication in appointments. 
Proposal 4–11  The Australian Government should ensure that people who may 
require decision-making support, and supporters and representatives (or potential 
supporters and representatives) are provided with information and advice to enable 
them to understand their roles and duties. 
Proposal 4–12  The Australian Government should ensure that Australian Public 
Service employees who engage with supporters and representatives are provided with 
regular, ongoing and consistent training in relation to the roles of supporters and 
representatives.  
5. The National Disability Insurance Scheme 
Proposal 5–1  The objects and principles in the National Disability Insurance 
Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) should be amended to ensure consistency with the National 
Decision-Making Principles.  
Proposal 5–2  The National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) and 
NDIS Rules should be amended to include supporter provisions consistent with the 
Commonwealth decision-making model. 
Proposal 5–3  The National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) and 
NDIS Rules should be amended to include representative provisions consistent with the 
Commonwealth decision-making model. 
Question 5–1  How should the National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 
(Cth) and NDIS Rules be amended to clarify interaction between supporters and 
representatives appointed in relation to the NDIS, other supporters and representatives, 
and state and territory appointed decision-makers?  
Question 5–2  In what ways should the National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 
2013 (Cth) and NDIS Rules in relation to managing the funding for supports under a 
participant’s plan be amended to: 
(a)   maximise the opportunity for participants to manage their own funds, or be 
provided with support to manage their own funds; and 
(b)  clarify the interaction between a person appointed to manage NDIS funds and a 
state or territory appointed decision-maker?  
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6. Supporters and Representatives in Other Areas of 
Commonwealth Law 
Proposal 6–1  The Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) should be 
amended to include supporter and representative provisions consistent with the 
Commonwealth decision-making model. 
Proposal 6–2   The Aged Care Act 1997 (Cth) should be amended to include 
supporter and representative provisions consistent with the Commonwealth decision-
making model. 
Proposal 6–3   The Personally Controlled Electronic Health Records Act 2012 
(Cth) should be amended to include supporter and representative provisions consistent 
with the Commonwealth decision-making model. 
Proposal 6–4   The Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) should be amended to include 
supporter and representative provisions consistent with the Commonwealth decision-
making model. 
Proposal 6–5   The Australian Bankers’ Association should encourage banks to 
recognise supported decision-making. To this end, the ABA should issue guidelines, 
reflecting the National Decision-Making Principles and recognising that: 
(a)   customers should be presumed to have the ability to make decisions about 
access to banking services; 
(b)  customers may be capable of making and communicating decisions concerning 
banking services, where they have access to necessary support; 
(c)  customers are entitled to support in making and communicating decisions; and  
(d)  banks should recognise supporters and respond to their requests, where possible 
and consistent with other legal duties. 
7. Access to Justice 
Proposal 7–1   The Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) should be amended to provide that a 
person is unfit to stand trial if the person cannot: 
(a)   understand the information relevant to the decisions that they will have to make 
in the course of the proceedings; 
(b)  retain that information to the extent necessary to make decisions in the course of 
the proceedings;  
(c)  use or weigh that information as part of the process of making decisions; and 
(d)  communicate decisions in some way. 
Proposal 7–2  The Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) should be amended to provide that 
available decision-making assistance and support should be taken into account in 
determining whether a person is unfit to stand trial. 
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Question 7–1   What other elements should be included in any new test for 
unfitness to stand trial, and why? For example, should there be some threshold 
requirement that unfitness be due to some clinically-recognised mental impairment? 
Proposal 7–3   State and territory laws governing the consequences of a 
determination that a person is unfit to stand trial should provide for limits on the period 
of detention (for example, by reference to the maximum period of imprisonment that 
could have been imposed if the person had been convicted) and for regular periodic 
review of detention orders. 
Proposal 7–4   The rules of federal courts should provide that a person needs a 
litigation representative if the person cannot: 
(a)   understand the information relevant to the decisions that they will have to make 
in the course of the proceedings; 
(b)  retain that information to the extent necessary to make the decisions;  
(c)   use or weigh that information as part of a decision-making process; and 
(d)  communicate the decisions in some way. 
Proposal 7–5  The rules of federal courts should provide that available decision-
making support must be taken into account in determining whether a person needs a 
litigation representative. 
Proposal 7–6  The rules of federal courts should provide that litigation 
representatives: 
(a)   must support the person represented to express their will and preferences in 
making decisions; 
(b)  where it is not possible to determine what are the wishes of the person, must 
determine what the person would likely want based on all the information 
available; 
(c)  where (a) and (b) are not possible, the litigation representative must consider the 
human rights relevant to the situation; and 
(d)  must act in a manner promoting the personal, social and financial and cultural 
wellbeing of the person represented. 
Proposal 7–7  Federal courts should issue practice notes explaining the duties of 
litigation representatives to the person they represent and to the court. 
Question 7–2    Should the Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules and state and 
territory legal professional rules be amended to provide a new exception to solicitors’ 
duties of confidentiality where: 
(a)   the solicitor reasonably believes the client is not capable of giving lawful, proper 
and competent instructions; and 
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(b)  the disclosure is for the purpose of: assessing the client’s ability to give 
instructions; obtaining assistance for the client in giving instructions; informing 
the court about the client’s ability to instruct; or seeking the appointment of a 
litigation representative? 
Proposal 7–8  The Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) should be amended to provide that, in 
assessing whether a witness is competent to give evidence under s 13, the court may 
take the availability of communication and other support into account. 
Proposal 7–9  The Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) should be amended to provide that a 
witness who needs support is entitled to give evidence in any appropriate way that 
enables them to understand questions and communicate answers; and that the court 
may give directions with regard to this. 
Proposal 7–10  The Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) should be amended to provide that a 
witness who needs support has the right to have a support person present while giving 
evidence, who may act as a communication assistant; assist the person with any 
difficulty in giving evidence; or provide the person with other support. The court 
should be empowered to give directions with regard to the provision of support. 
Proposal 7–11   Federal courts should develop bench books to provide judicial 
officers with guidance about how courts may help to assist and support people with 
disability in giving evidence. 
Question 7–3    Should Commonwealth, state and territory laws be amended to 
avoid delays in obtaining consent to the taking of forensic samples from people who 
are incapable of giving consent, and who have been victims of crime? If so, how? 
Proposal 7–12   The Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) should provide that 
a person is qualified to serve on a jury if the person can, in the circumstances of the 
trial for which that person is summoned: 
(a)   understand the information relevant to the decisions that they will have to make 
in the course of the proceedings and jury deliberations; 
(b)  retain that information to the extent necessary to make these decisions; 
(c)  use or weigh that information as part of the jury’s decision-making process; and 
(d)  communicate the person’s decisions to the other members of the jury and to the 
court. 
Proposal 7–13   The Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) should provide that 
decision-making support should be taken into account in determining whether a person 
is qualified to serve on a jury. 
Proposal 7–14    The Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) should be amended 
to provide that the trial judge may order that a communication assistant be allowed to 
assist a juror to understand the proceedings and jury deliberations. 
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Proposal 7–15    The Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) should be amended 
to provide: 
(a)   that communication assistants allowed by the trial judge to assist a juror should 
swear an oath faithfully to communicate the proceedings or jury deliberations; 
(b)  that communication assistants allowed by the trial judge to assist a juror should 
be permitted in the jury room during deliberations without breaching jury 
secrecy principles, so long as they are subject to and comply with requirements 
for the secrecy of jury deliberations; and 
(c)  for offences, in similar terms to those arising under ss 58AK and 58AL of the 
Act, in relation to the soliciting by third parties of communication assistants for 
the provision of information about the jury deliberations, and the disclosure of 
information by communication assistants about the jury deliberations.  
8. Restrictive Practices 
Proposal 8–1   The Australian Government and the Council of Australian 
Governments should facilitate the development of a national or nationally consistent 
approach to the regulation of restrictive practices. In developing such an approach, the 
following should be considered:  
(a)   the need for regulation in relation to the use of restrictive practices in a range of 
sectors, including disability services and aged care;  
(b)  the application of the National Decision-Making Principles; and 
(c)  the provision of mechanisms for supported decision-making in relation to 
consent to the use of restrictive practices. 
9. Electoral Matters 
Proposal 9–1    Section 93(8)(a) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) 
provides that a person of ‘unsound mind’ who is ‘incapable of understanding the nature 
and significance of enrolment or voting’ is not entitled to have their name on the 
electoral roll or to vote in any Senate or House of Representatives election. This should 
be amended to replace the current wording with: ‘does not have decision-making 
ability with respect to enrolment and voting at the relevant election’. 
Proposal 9–2    The Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) should be amended 
to provide that a person lacks decision-making ability with respect to enrolment and 
voting at the relevant election if they cannot: 
(a)   understand the information relevant to decisions that they will have to make 
associated with enrolment and voting at the relevant election;  
(b)  retain that information for a sufficient period to make the decision;   
(c)  use or weigh that information as part of the process of making decisions; and 
(d)  communicate their decision in some way.  
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Proposal 9–3    The Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) should be amended 
to provide that decision-making assistance and support should be taken into account in 
determining whether a person has decision-making ability with respect to enrolment 
and voting at the relevant election.  
Proposal 9–4  The Australian Electoral Commission should develop a guide to 
assessing ability for the purposes of determining whether a person ‘does not have 
decision-making ability with respect to enrolment and voting at the relevant election’ 
consistent with the National Decision-Making Principles. 
Question 9–1    Section 118(4) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) 
provides that a person’s name cannot be removed from the electoral roll unless an 
objection is accompanied by a certificate of a medical practitioner. Should this be 
amended to provide that an objection may also be accompanied by a statement from a 
range of qualified persons, including a psychologist or social worker, concerning an 
elector’s decision-making ability with respect to enrolment and voting? 
Proposal 9–5    The Australian Electoral Commission should collect, and make 
publicly available, information about the operation of s 93(8)(a) of the Commonwealth 
Electoral Act 1918 (Cth), including the number of people removed from the electoral 
roll, the reason, and whether they responded to the objection. 
Proposal 9–6  Section 234(1) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) 
should be amended to provide that ‘if any voter satisfies the presiding officer that he or 
she is unable to vote without assistance, the presiding officer shall permit a person 
appointed by the voter to enter an unoccupied compartment of the booth with the voter, 
and mark, fold, and deposit the voter’s ballot paper’. 
Question 9–2 What further changes, if any, are required to the Commonwealth 
Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) or relevant legal frameworks to facilitate the provision of 
assistance and support to people who require decision-making support to vote, 
including by secret ballot?   
Proposal 9–7  The Australian Electoral Commission should develop or amend 
guidance for Divisional Returning Officers to assist them to determine if a valid or 
sufficient reason for failing to vote exists in circumstances where an elector is a person 
with disability.  
10. Review of State and Territory Legislation 
Proposal 10–1  State and territory governments should review laws that deal with 
decision-making by people who need decision-making support to ensure they are 
consistent with the National Decision-Making Principles and the Commonwealth 
decision-making model. In conducting such a review, regard should also be given to: 
(a)  interaction with any supporter and representative schemes under Commonwealth 
legislation; 
(b)   consistency between jurisdictions, including in terminology; 
(c)  maximising cross-jurisdictional recognition of arrangements; and 
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(d)  mechanisms for consistent and national data collection.  
Any review should include, but not be limited to, laws with respect to guardianship and 
administration; informed consent to medical treatment; mental health; and disability 
services. 
11. Other Issues 
Question 11–1      Should provisions similar to the responsible lending provisions of 
the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) apply to other consumer 
contracts? That is, should businesses have obligations to ensure that a consumer 
contract is suitable for the consumer, including making all reasonable inquiries and 
ensuring that the consumer fully understands the contract terms? 
Question 11–2 Should s 23B(1)(d)(iii) of the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) be 
amended to provide that, instead of a test of mental incapacity, a party who did not 
have the decision-making ability with respect to the marriage, does not give ‘real 
consent’?  
Proposal 11–1     The Guidelines on the Marriage Act 1961 for Marriage Celebrants 
should be amended to ensure they are consistent with the National Decision-Making 
Principles.  
Question 11–3      Should the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) 
and Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulations 1994 (Cth) be amended to 
provide: 
(a)   for supported decision-making regarding a binding death nomination of a 
beneficiary; 
(b)  that a state or territory decision-maker (such as under an enduring power of 
attorney) may nominate a beneficiary on behalf of the member? 
Question 11–4  If a person acting under an enduring power of attorney may make a 
binding death nomination on behalf of a person holding a superannuation interest under 
the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) and Superannuation 
Industry (Supervision) Regulations 1994 (Cth), should they be required to have regard 
to the will, preferences and rights of the member in making the nomination? What 
safeguards need to be in place? 
Proposal 11–2 Sections 201F(2), 915B and 1292(7)(b) of the Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth) should be amended to provide that a person is incapable of acting in the 
particular role if they cannot: 
(a)   understand the information relevant to the decisions that they will have to make 
in performing the role; 
(b)  retain that information to the extent necessary to make those decisions;  
(c)  use or weigh that information as part of the process of making decisions; and 
(d)  communicate the decisions in some way. 
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The Inquiry 
1.1 This Inquiry focuses on legal capacity for people with disability. It reflects the 
commitment expressed in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD), to which Australia is a signatory, signalling  
the movement from viewing persons with disabilities as ‘objects’ of charity, medical 
treatment and social protection towards viewing persons with disabilities as ‘subjects’ 
with rights, who are capable of claiming those rights and making decisions for their 
lives based on their free and informed consent as well as being active members of 
society.1 
1.2 The Inquiry commenced in July 2013, the same month in which a pilot of the 
National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) in Australia was initiated, representing 
‘a new way of providing community linking and individualised support for people with 
permanent and significant disability, their families and carers’.
2
 The focus of the 
scheme is to provide greater choice and control over the disability services support 
received by persons with disability.  
1.3 In considering what changes, if any, should be made to Commonwealth laws, 
the Terms of Reference for this Inquiry require the Australian Law Reform 
Commission (ALRC) to consider ‘how maximising individual autonomy and 
independence can be modelled in Commonwealth laws and legal frameworks’.
3
  
                                                        
1  UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 999 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 2008). 
2  Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs, One Big Difference to 
Lots of Lives: An Introduction to DisabilityCare Australia (2013) 3. 
3  The full Terms of Reference are available on the ALRC website:<www.alrc.gov.au>. 
22 Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws 
1.4 In this Discussion Paper the ALRC proposes a model that includes high level 
principles in relation to decision-making—the National Decision-Making Principles—
to provide a conceptual overlay and framework for reform of Commonwealth laws and 
a basis for review of relevant state and territory laws. The model also includes 
provision for supported decision-making in a formal way in key areas of 
Commonwealth laws—the Commonwealth decision-making model. The remaining 
chapters focus on particular areas identified in the Terms of Reference, demonstrating 
the application of the Principles in a range of Commonwealth laws. 
1.5 The Discussion Paper commences the second stage in the consultation processes 
in this Inquiry. The first stage included the release of the Issues Paper, Equality, 
Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws (IP 44), generating 84 public and 12 
confidential submissions.
4
 Both the Issues Paper and this Discussion Paper may be 
downloaded free of charge from the ALRC website. Hard copies may be obtained on 
request by contacting the ALRC on (02) 8238 6333. 
1.6 In releasing this Discussion Paper, the ALRC again calls for submissions to 
build on the evidence base so far established and to inform the final stage of the 
deliberations leading up to the Final Report, which is to be provided to the Attorney-
General by the end of August 2014.  
How to make a submission 
1.7 With the release of this Discussion Paper, the ALRC invites individuals and 
organisations to make submissions in response to the specific proposals and questions, 
or to any of the background material and analysis.  
1.8 There is no specified format for submissions, although the questions and 
proposals may provide guidance. Submissions may be made in writing, by email or 
using the online submission form. Submissions made using the online submission form 
are preferred.  
1.9 Generally, submissions will be published on the ALRC website, unless marked 
confidential. Confidential submissions may still be the subject of a request for access 
under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth). In the absence of a clear indication 
that a submission is intended to be confidential, the ALRC will treat the submission as 
public. The ALRC does not publish anonymous submissions. 
Submissions using the ALRC’s online submission form can be made at: 
<http://www.alrc.gov.au/content/disability-dp81-make-submission>.  
To ensure consideration for use in the Final Report, submissions must reach the 
ALRC by Monday 30 June 2014. 
                                                        
4  The 84 public submissions are available on the ALRC website: <www.alrc.gov.au>. 
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Framing principles 
1.10 The Issues Paper identified five principles for guiding the recommendations for 
reform in this Inquiry: dignity; equality; autonomy; inclusion and participation; and 
accountability. There was wide support by stakeholders for these principles, which are 
reflected in the model that is developed in this Discussion Paper. 
Dignity 
1.11 The theme of ‘dignity’ emerges clearly in recent literature regarding people with 
disability. Importantly, it is seen as a ‘relational concept’ as it comes into play in 
transactions between individuals and between individuals and the State.
5
 In the 
international context, dignity is one of the guiding principles of the CRPD.
6
 The first 
paragraph in the Preamble recalls ‘the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the 
United Nations which recognize the inherent dignity and worth ... of all members of the 
human family’.
7
 Dignity is also recognised in a number of other international human 
rights instruments.
8
 In the domestic context, the National Disability Strategy (NDS) 
prioritises the concept of dignity in its principles.
9
 Similarly, the Productivity 
Commission identified human dignity as ‘an inherent right’ of persons with disability 
and suggested that dignity as a human being is linked to self-determination, decision-
making and choice.
10
 
Equality 
1.12 The United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(UNCRPD), the treaty-monitoring body of the CRPD, commenced its General 
Comment on art 12 of the CRPD by saying that ‘[e]quality before the law is a basic and 
general principle of human rights protection and is indispensable for the exercise of 
other human rights’.
11
 Similarly, art 5 prohibits all discrimination on the basis of 
disability and requires States to promote equality;
12
 and arts 6 and 7 emphasise equality 
for women and children. The NDS principles emphasise equality of opportunity;
13
 and 
                                                        
5  Lee Ann Basser, ‘Human Dignity’ in Marcia Rioux, Lee Ann Basser and Melinda Jones (eds), Critical 
Perspectives on Human Rights and Disability Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 2010) 21.  
6  UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 999 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 2008) art 3(a).  
7  UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for Signature 30 March 2007, 999 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 2008). 
8  See, eg, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UN GAOR, 3rd Sess, 183rd Plen 
Mtg, UN Doc A/810 (10 December 1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened 
for signature 16 December 1966, UNTS171 (entered into force 23 March 1976); International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered 
into force 3 January 1976). 
9  Australian Government, National Disability Strategy 2010–2020, 22. 
10  Productivity Commission, ‘Review of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth)’ (30 Vol 1, 2004) 
182. 
11  United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No 1 (2014) on 
Article 12 of the Convention—Equal Recognition before the Law [1].  
12  UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 999 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 2008).  
13  Australian Government, National Disability Strategy 2010–2020, 22. 
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a range of Commonwealth laws also protect the equality of people and proscribe 
discrimination on the basis of disability—for example, the Disability Discrimination 
Act 1992 (Cth). The concept of equality is also considered in the discussion of equal 
recognition before the law in Chapter 2. 
Autonomy 
1.13 Autonomy is a significant principle underlying the ability of persons with 
disability to exercise legal capacity. The principle of autonomy is enshrined in the 
general principles of the CRPD
14
 and is a key principle of the NDS.
15
 The objects and 
principles of the NDIS also reflect the notion of autonomy.
16
 
1.14 Autonomy can be understood in a number of distinct senses. While a focus on 
the individual emphasises ideas of self-agency, contemporary theorists argue that 
autonomy needs to be conceptualised as ‘empowerment’; and more than ‘non-
interference’.
17
 This involves seeing an individual in relation to others, in a ‘relational’ 
or ‘social’ sense:  
‘Relational autonomy’ is the label that has been given to an alternative conception of 
what it means to be a free, self-governing agent who is also socially constituted and 
who possibly defines her basic value commitments in terms of inter-personal relations 
and mutual dependencies.18 
1.15 This understanding of autonomy connects to respect for the family as the 
‘natural and fundamental group unit of society’ that is entitled to protection by States 
Parties.
19
 Such a view sits comfortably with a shift in emphasis towards supported 
decision-making, which ‘acknowledges that individuals rely to a greater or lesser 
extent on others to help them make and give effect to decisions’.
20
 
1.16 Autonomy viewed in this sense can be seen in submissions which emphasised 
self-determination and the assistance required to exercise it.
21
 The ALRC considers 
that the ideal of supported decision-making, which is central to the CRPD—as 
discussed in Chapter 2—draws upon this approach. 
                                                        
14  UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 999 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 2008). 
15  Australian Government, National Disability Strategy 2010–2020, 22.  
16  National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) ss 3, 4.  
17  Mary Donnelly, Healthcare Decision-Making and the Law—Autonomy, Capacity and the Limits of 
Liberalism (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 269–272. Donnelly draws, for example, on the work of 
Joseph Raz, eg Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Clarendon Press, 1986). See her discussion 
particularly in ch 1, ‘Autonomy: Variations on a Principle’. 
18  John Christman, ‘Relational Autonomy, Liberal Individualism, and the Social Constitution of Selves’ 
(2004) 117 Philosophical Studies 143, 143. 
19  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, UNTS171 
(entered into force 23 March 1976) art 23(1); Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities for 
Persons with Disabilities, GA Res 48, UN GAOR, 3rd Comm, 48th Sess, Agenda Item 109, UN Doc 
A/RES/48/96 (20 December 1993) rule 9. 
20  Piers Gooding, ‘Supported Decision-Making: A Rights-Based Disability Concept and Its Implications for 
Mental Health Law’ (2013) 20 Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 431, 435.  
21  AFDS, Submission 47; Mental Health Coordinating Council, Submission 07. 
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1.17 At times, tensions may arise between the position of the family in providing 
support to people with disability to build their capacity for autonomy and their often 
protective role, which may limit the individual autonomy of a person with disability. 
The Law Council of Australia noted that ‘legal recognition of supported decision-
making is likely to necessitate an accompanying regime which is intended to promote 
autonomy and accountability’.
22
 The ALRC considers that the principle of 
‘accountability’ is a key counterbalance in developing the reform proposals in this 
Discussion Paper. It is reflected, in particular, in the Safeguards Guidelines, considered 
in Chapter 3. 
Inclusion and participation 
1.18 Closely related to the principles of dignity and equality, the principles of 
inclusion and participation are central to many contemporary perspectives on disability, 
particularly a social model of disability. Such a model emphasises that, ‘whilst a person 
might have an impairment, their disability comes from the way society treats them, or 
fails to support them’.
23
 It has been suggested that promoting inclusion, through legal 
and social mechanisms, is a significant way of reducing these social barriers.
24
 
1.19 Inclusion and participation are active values, consistent with an approach to 
autonomy as empowerment. Children with Disability Australia submitted that it may 
be advantageous to take this idea further and to include ‘citizenship’ as a principle: 
This principle involves consideration of responsibilities and active participation 
within community life whereas the other principles reflect more the rights and legal 
protections of people with disability.25 
1.20 The inclusion and participation of people with disability is a commitment that is 
grounded in both international law and in Australia’s domestic policy aims.
26
 One of 
the principles of the CRPD is ‘full and effective participation and inclusion in 
society’.
27
 At a domestic level, the Australian Government’s social inclusion agenda 
specifically prioritised people with disability in the goal of reducing disadvantage.
28
 An 
emphasis on inclusion has important consequences for education, workforce 
participation and economic security, as people with disability are seen as ‘citizens with 
rights, not objects of charity’.
29
 Further, one of the objects of the National Disability 
Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) is to facilitate greater community inclusion of people 
with a disability.
30
  
                                                        
22  Law Council of Australia, Submission 83. 
23  Productivity Commission, ‘Disability Care and Support’ (July 2011) 54 Vol 1, 98. 
24  Ibid.  
25  Children with Disability Australia, Submission 68.  
26  Productivity Commission, ‘Disability Care and Support’, above n 23, 203.  
27  UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 999 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 2008) art 3(c).  
28  Australian Government Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Social Inclusion Policy (2010). 
29  Australian Government, National Disability Strategy 2010–2020, 16.  
30  National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) s 3.  
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1.21 In the NDS, inclusion is seen to involve a consultative and collaborative 
approach to law reform and policy development:
31
 It recognises the need to include 
people with disability and their carers in consultation with government to develop a 
‘shared agenda’.
32
 Thus, inclusion is also linked with civic participation, voting and 
public office—‘that we all have something to contribute’.
33
  
1.22 The Centre for Rural Regional Law and Justice and the National Rural Law and 
Justice Alliance commented that a principle of inclusion and participation needs to 
acknowledge ‘a right to supports that enable community inclusion’ and that the 
availability of supports is ‘critical’ to persons with disability.
34
 
1.23 The emphasis on supported decision-making developed throughout this 
Discussion Paper reflects the principle of inclusion and participation.  
Accountability 
1.24 The concept of accountability has a number of key components. The first is the 
need for systemic and specific accountability mechanisms and safeguards associated 
with measures that relate to arrangements for the exercise of legal capacity.   
1.25 One important consequence of the shift towards empowering persons with 
disability to exercise their full legal capacity is the need to ensure that any ‘supporters’ 
who fulfil a supportive or assisted decision-making role are properly accountable. 
Article 16(1) of the CRPD stresses the need for States Parties to take 
all appropriate legislative, administrative, social, educational and other measures to 
protect persons with disabilities, both within and outside the home, from all forms of 
exploitation, violence and abuse, including their gender-based aspects. 
1.26 Consequently, an important focus of any reform relating to decision-making 
schemes is to ensure the inclusion of effective accountability mechanisms, both at a 
systemic and practical level. Another important component is the accountability and 
responsibility of people with disability for their decisions, recognising that with rights 
come responsibilities. Active participation carries with it responsibilities.
35
  
                                                        
31  Australian Government, National Disability Strategy 2010–2020, 16.  
32  Australian Government, National Disability Strategy 2010–2020, 15. 
33  Melinda Jones, ‘Inclusion, Social Inclusion and Participation’ in Lee Ann Basser, Marcia Rioux and 
Melinda Jones (eds), Critical Perspectives on Human Rights and Disability Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 2012) 
57. 
34  Centre for Rural Regional Law and Justice and the National Rural Law and Justice Alliance, Submission 
20. The submission noted that the availability of support could be particularly lacking in rural and 
regional communities.  
35  Children with Disability Australia, Submission 68. 
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Summary 
2.1 This Inquiry takes place within a context of a national and international focus on 
the rights of persons with disability. This chapter describes the international human 
rights context and analyses the key concepts in the literature concerning disability and 
issues of ‘capacity’. It provides the essential conceptual structure to present the 
ALRC’s key proposals in this Inquiry. 
2.2 The ‘paradigm shift’ in approaches to persons with disability is discussed, 
outlining the transition from ‘best interests’ approaches to ones that emphasise the will 
and preferences of the individual in models of ‘supported’ rather than ‘substitute’ 
decision-making. The tensions around the meaning and application of art 12 of the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
1
 (CRPD) are 
analysed in the light of the historical development of decision-making models for 
                                                        
1  UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 999 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 2008). 
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people who may require decision-making support. In this context Australia’s 
Interpretative Declaration in relation to art 12 is considered. The ALRC concludes that, 
whatever the correct legal understanding of art 12 and substitute decision-making 
models, the retention of the Interpretative Declaration may act as a handbrake on 
reform. The ALRC therefore proposes that the Australian Government should review 
the Interpretative Declaration with a view to withdrawing it. 
2.3 The chapter concludes by summarising the implications for reform of the 
paradigm shift towards supported decision-making. This provides a prelude to 
Chapter 3, where the ALRC sets out National Decision-Making Principles as the basis 
for modelling supported decision-making in Commonwealth laws. 
International context 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
2.4 Australia was one of the original signatories to the CRPD—the first binding 
international human rights instrument explicitly to address disability—when it opened 
for signature on 30 March 2007.
2
 Australia ratified the CRPD in July 2008 and the 
Optional Protocol in 2009. The CRPD entered into force for Australia on 16 August 
2008,
3
 and the Optional Protocol in 2009.
4
  
2.5 The purpose of the CRPD is to ‘promote, protect and ensure the full and equal 
enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms by all persons with 
disabilities, and to promote respect for their inherent dignity’.
5
 The CRPD consolidates 
existing international human rights obligations and clarifies their application to persons 
with disabilities.
6
 It does not create new rights. 
2.6 Such international instruments do not become part of Australian law until 
incorporated into domestic law by statute.
7
 But, as noted by the High Court in Minister 
for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh, a convention can still assist with the 
interpretation of domestic law: 
The provisions of an international convention to which Australia is a party, 
especially one which declares universal fundamental rights, may be used by the 
courts as a legitimate guide in developing the common law. But the courts should 
                                                        
2  Prior to the CRPD there were a number of non-binding standards specifically related to disability. See, 
eg: Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons, GA Res 2856, UN GAOR, 3rd Comm, 26th 
Sess, UN Doc A/RES/2856 (20 December 1971); Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons, GA Res 
3447, UN GAOR, 3rd Comm, 30th Sess, UN Doc A/RES/3447 (9 December 1975); Standard Rules on 
the Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities, GA Res 48, UN GAOR, 3rd Comm, 48th 
Sess, Agenda Item 109, UN Doc A/RES/48/96 (20 December 1993). 
3  The CRPD entered into force on 3 May 2008, on receipt of its 20th ratification. 
4  The Optional Protocol to the CRPD allows for the making of individual complaints to the Committee 
about violations of the CRPD by States Parties. 
5  UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 999 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 2008) art 1.  
6  Such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 
1966, UNTS171 (entered into force 23 March 1976). 
7 Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273, 286–8, 315. See, eg, Kioa v 
West (1985) 159 CLR 550. 
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act in this fashion with due circumspection when the Parliament itself has not 
seen fit to incorporate the provisions of a convention into our domestic law.8 
2.7 Even when an international convention has been incorporated into domestic law, 
however, its beneficial impact cannot be assumed. Adam Johnston observed that ‘the 
level of adherence and/or enforcement can rely on many factors’: 
The first of these can be political willingness, reflected in the resourcing of 
relevant agencies. Domestic cultural norms can be important and the broad terms 
of many conventions can leave much up to an individual reader’s interpretation 
as to what an Article requires. Judicial views, the lobbying of interest groups and 
the public credibility of international institutions can also play their part.9 
2.8 While implementation can be a multifaceted challenge, a document like the 
CRPD can both reflect and propel shifts in thinking—in this context for persons with 
disability. Family Planning NSW commented that the CRPD is ‘a powerful statement 
of what Australia and the world believe are the fundamental rights of people with 
disability’;
10
 and the ACT Disability, Aged and Carer Advocacy Service said that the 
CRPD ‘represents a cultural, identity and legal shift’.
11
 
2.9 The CRPD reflects a social model of disability, which describes disability in 
terms of the interaction between a person’s disability and the external world.
12
 As the 
Preamble of the CRPD states: 
Disability results from the interaction between persons with impairments and 
attitudinal and environmental barriers that hinders their full and effective 
participation in society on an equal basis with others.13 
2.10 The Office of the Public Advocate (Qld) said that the CRPD incorporates ‘a 
contemporary approach to disability’: 
 recognising that disability is an evolving concept and that disability results 
from the interaction between people with impairments and their 
surroundings as a result of attitudinal and environmental barriers; 
 the right and capacity of people with disability to make valued contributions 
to their communities; and 
 recognising that all categories of rights apply to people with disability, who 
should therefore be supported to exercise those rights.14 
                                                        
8 Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273, 288. 
9  A Johnston, Submission 12. 
10  Family Planning NSW, Submission 04. 
11  ADACAS, Submission 29. 
12  This is distinguished from medical a model of disability, which ‘uses biomedical explanations which 
locate disability within the individual in terms of pathology’: Piers Gooding, ‘Supported Decision-
Making: A Rights-Based Disability Concept and Its Implications for Mental Health Law’ (2013) 20 
Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 431, n 3. 
13  UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 999 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 2008) Preamble. 
14  Office of the Public Advocate (Qld), Submission 05. 
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2.11 As Professor Gwynnyth Llewellyn of the Centre for Disability Research and 
Policy, University of Sydney, submitted: ‘defining disability as an interaction means 
that “disability” is not an attribute of the person’.
15
  
2.12 In addition to the general principles and obligations contained in the CRPD,
16
 
art 12 underpins the ability of persons with disability to achieve many of the other 
rights under the Convention. It recognises the right of persons with disability to enjoy 
legal capacity ‘on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life’.
17
 Article 12 is of 
central importance in this Inquiry. 
2.13 By ratifying the CRPD, Australia accepted the obligation to recognise that 
persons with disability enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects 
of life and to take appropriate measures to provide persons with disability access to the 
support they may require in exercising their legal capacity. It also requires that all 
measures relating to the exercise of legal capacity provide for appropriate and effective 
safeguards to prevent abuse.
18
 
Other international instruments 
2.14 In addition to the CRPD, there are other international instruments of relevance 
to this Inquiry. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirms the inherent 
dignity and the equal and inalienable rights of all people and sets as a common 
standard the protection of these rights by the rule of law.
19
 While the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights makes no specific reference to persons with 
disability, it enshrines rights to self-determination of all people as well as rights to 
physical integrity, liberty and security of the person, equality before the law and non-
discrimination.
20
 Additionally, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights protects the right to work, social security, family life, health, education 
and participation in cultural life;
21
 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child refers 
specifically to disability.
22
 
                                                        
15  G Llewellyn, Submission 82. 
16  UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 999 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 2008) arts 3, 4. 
17  Ibid art 12.  
18  Ibid art 12(4).  
19  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UN GAOR, 3rd Sess, 183rd Plen Mtg, UN 
Doc A/810 (10 December 1948). 
20  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, UNTS171 
(entered into force 23 March 1976). 
21  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 16 December 
1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976). 
22  Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3 (entered 
into force 2 September 1990) art 2. 
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2.15 The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment (CAT)
23
 may also be relevant, as there have been suggestions that the use of 
restrictive practices with respect to persons with disability might contravene the 
CAT.
24
  
2.16 There are also a number of international instruments that specifically protect the 
rights of women,
25
 children
26
 and Indigenous peoples,
27
 which are of relevance in 
considering intersectional discrimination. All of these instruments are reflected in the 
articles of the CRPD. 
Interpretative Declarations 
2.17 An ‘Interpretative Declaration’ is a unilateral statement made by a State or an 
international organisation, in which that State or organisation purports to specify or 
clarify the meaning or scope of a treaty or of certain of its provisions.
28
 Australia has 
made three Interpretative Declarations in relation to the CRPD:
29
  
[Re art 12:] Australia recognizes that persons with disability enjoy legal capacity 
on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life. Australia declares its 
understanding that the Convention allows for fully supported or substituted 
decision-making arrangements, which provide for decisions to be made on behalf 
of a person, only where such arrangements are necessary, as a last resort and 
subject to safeguards; 
[Re art 17:] Australia recognizes that every person with disability has a right to 
respect for his or her physical and mental integrity on an equal basis with others. 
Australia further declares its understanding that the Convention allows for 
compulsory assistance or treatment of persons, including measures taken for the 
treatment of mental disability, where such treatment is necessary, as a last resort 
and subject to safeguards; 
[Re art 18:] Australia recognizes the rights of persons with disability to liberty of 
movement, to freedom to choose their residence and to a nationality, on an equal 
basis with others. Australia further declares its understanding that the Convention 
does not create a right for a person to enter or remain in a country of which he or 
she is not a national, nor impact on Australia’s health requirements for non-
nationals seeking to enter or remain in Australia, where these requirements are 
based on legitimate, objective and reasonable criteria.30 
                                                        
23  Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened 
for signature 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85 (entered into force 26 June 1987). 
24  Manfred Nowak, Special Rapporteur, Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 63rd Sess, UN Doc A/63/175 (28 July 2008) 9. 
25  Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, opened for signature 18 
December 1979, 1249 UNTS 13 (entered into force 3 September 1981). 
26  Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for Signature 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3 (entered 
into force 2 September 1990). 
27  Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res 61/295, UN GAOR, 61st Sess, 107th Plen Mtg, 
Supp No 49, UN Doc A/RES/61/295 (13 September 2007). 
28  International Law Commission, Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties (2011) [1.2]. 
29  Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Declarations and Reservations (Australia), opened 
for signature 30 March 2007, 999 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 2008). 
30  Ibid. 
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2.18 The Interpretative Declarations are intended to outline the Australian 
Government’s understanding of its obligations under the Convention and do not 
purport to exclude or modify the legal effects of the CRPD.
31
  
2.19 For the purpose of this Inquiry, it is the first declaration relating to art 12 and 
decision-making that is of principal concern. There are differing views about the effect 
of this declaration, particularly in relation to the role of substitute decision-making, 
which prompt a reconsideration of its retention. This is considered below.  
Concepts and terminology 
The challenge of language 
2.20 This Inquiry tackles issues of great significance in contributing to the framing of 
legal policy responses for persons with disability. The ALRC recognises the 
importance of careful definition of terms and a need to clarify precisely how certain 
concepts are being described. The language concerning disability has demonstrated 
great shifts over time, for example:  
 the distinction between ‘lunatics’ and ‘idiots’ in William Blackstone’s day in the 
mid-18th century;
32
  
 the language of ‘unsound mind’ of the early 20th century, as evident for 
example in the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth);
33
  
 the use of the terms ‘mentally retarded persons’ and ‘disabled persons’ in United 
Nations Declarations of 1971 and 1975;
34
 and 
 ‘persons with disabilities’ in the CRPD in 2007.  
2.21 As words have become associated with negative connotations, or used 
pejoratively, a new lexicon has been developed.
35
 As the ALRC commented in its 1989 
report, Guardianship and Management of Property: 
There is a problem of language when dealing with people with disabilities. Some 
expressions which used to be common are no longer used by those working in 
the field because they are regarded as having connotations which tend to lower 
the dignity of people with disabilities.36 
                                                        
31  International Law Commission, Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties (2011) [1.1]–[1.3]. An 
Interpretative Declaration can be modified at any time: [2.4.8]. 
32  William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765) vol 1, 292. 
33  For the historical background see, eg, R Croucher, ‘“An Interventionist, Paternalistic Jurisdiction”? The 
Place of Statutory Wills in Australian Succession Law’ (2009) 32 University of New South Wales Law 
Journal 674. 
34  Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons, GA Res 2856, UN GAOR, 3rd Comm, 26th 
Sess, UN Doc A/RES/2856 (20 December 1971). Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons, GA Res 
3447, UN GAOR, 3rd Comm, 30th Sess, UN Doc A/RES/3447 (9 December 1975). 
35  A similar shift is evident in relation to the terms applying to children born out of wedlock: from 
‘bastards’, to ‘illegitimate’ to ‘ex-nuptial’. 
36  Australian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship and Management of Property, Report No 52 (1989) 
[1.3]. 
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2.22 The ALRC therefore took an approach in that report which was to adopt usages 
‘current among people who are disabled and those who work with them’.
37
 
2.23 The present Inquiry takes place 25 years later and the language has shifted 
further in the intervening years. In this Inquiry the ALRC seeks to frame concepts and 
choose terms in ways that reflect the framing principles—in particular that of ‘dignity’. 
Consistent with the approach identified by the ALRC in 1989, words and terms should 
not be used that ‘tend to lower the dignity of people with disabilities’. Even where 
terms have an established usage,
38
 the ALRC considers that the development of a new 
lexicon serves to signal the paradigm shift reflected in the CRPD. This Inquiry 
provides an opportunity to contribute to that process.
39
 
Definitions of disability 
2.24 ‘Disability’ may be defined in different ways and for different purposes. 
Approaches to defining disability have also shifted over time—particularly from a 
‘medical’ to a ‘social’ approach. A ‘medical’ approach is one in which a diagnosis or 
categorisation of condition leads to consequences—for example, the imposition of 
guardianship.
40
  
2.25 The CRPD does not include detailed definitions of ‘disability’ or ‘persons with 
disabilities’ in its definition section. Rather, art 1 states that 
Persons with disabilities include those who have long-term physical, mental, 
intellectual or sensory impairments which in interaction with various barriers 
may hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with 
others.  
2.26 For the purposes of this Inquiry, the ALRC is taking a broad encompassing 
approach to definitions of disability, as reflected in the CRPD.
41
 This definition 
includes: sensory, neurological, physical, intellectual, cognitive and psychosocial 
disability.  
2.27 The social approach to disability, reflected in the CRPD, requires a policy focus 
on the person and their ability, with the support they require to interact with society 
and their environment—placing the policy emphasis not on ‘impairment’ but on 
‘support’. This approach informs the supported decision-making focus of the ALRC’s 
proposals in this Discussion Paper. 
                                                        
37  Ibid. 
38  In the 1989 report the ALRC gave the following example: ‘The problem is complicated by the fact that 
the medical profession has adopted some words as having reasonably precise meanings but the same 
words are used differently by non-medical people or are regarded as inappropriate’: Ibid. 
39  Support for this approach is evident in, eg, ADACAS, Submission 29. 
40  Terry Carney, ‘Guardianship, “Social” Citizenship and Theorising Substitute Decision-Making Law’ in 
Israel Doron and Ann M Soden (eds), Beyond Elder Law (Springer, 2012) 1. See also World Health 
Organisation and World Bank, ‘World Report on Disability’ (2011) 3–4. 
41  Other definitions may be found in, eg, Australian Bureau of Statistics, Disability, Australia, 2009, Cat No 
4446.0 (2011); Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) s 4(1). 
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Recognition as ‘persons’ 
2.28 The Terms of Reference require a consideration of the recognition of people 
with disability ‘as persons before the law’.
42
 This language reflects art 12(1) of the 
CRPD, that ‘States Parties reaffirm that persons with disabilities have the right to 
recognition everywhere as persons before the law’.
43
 
2.29 To be recognised ‘as persons’ is the first question in any consideration of legal 
capacity. Historically, certain people have been denied recognition of their ability to 
act in law, or to have ‘legal standing’, at all.
44
 Professor Bernadette McSherry explains 
that, 
at various times in different societies, certain groups have been viewed as not 
having legal ‘personhood’ or standing. The extinction or suspension of legal 
standing, sometimes referred to as ‘civil death’, was once seen as a necessary 
consequence of conviction. Similarly, women, children under the age of majority 
and those with mental and intellectual impairments have been and continue to be 
viewed in some societies as not having legal standing.45 
2.30 The shift in language from ‘disabled persons’ to persons or people ‘with 
disability’ reflects an emphasis on personhood, rather than disability. It also reflects a 
social model of disability. 
2.31 In its Draft General Comment on art 12, the UNCRPD emphasised that ‘there 
are no circumstances permissible under international human rights law in which a 
person may be deprived of the right to recognition as a person before the law, or in 
which this right may be limited’.
46
 In this Discussion Paper, the ALRC proposes a 
model that emphasises ability and support to exercise legal agency, consistent with a 
full recognition of personhood. In Chapter 3, where the ALRC introduces the National 
Decision-Making Principles, there is a deliberate use of ‘persons’ rather than ‘people’ 
in the phrase ‘persons who may require decision-making support’. The choice reflects a 
number of elements: the direction of the Terms of Reference on recognition ‘as 
persons’; an understanding of legal capacity issues as individualised, task-specific and 
fluctuating; and a focus on an individual’s ability rather than a generic, status-based 
approach. 
‘Equal recognition’ 
2.32 The Terms of Reference state that, for the purposes of this Inquiry, equal 
recognition before the law and legal capacity are to be understood as they are used in 
                                                        
42  The Terms of Reference are set out in full on the ALRC website: <www.alrc.gov.au>. 
43  The term ‘States Parties’ is used in this Discussion Paper to ensure consistency with the terminology in 
the CRPD.  
44  For example, the early laws of marriage in the common law treated the husband and wife as one: the 
wife’s legal personality merged with that of her husband. When the Statute of Wills 1540 granted the 
power to devise real estate, an explanatory statute was passed in 1542 to clarify that this power did not 
extend to married women; nor to infants and ‘lunatics’.  
45  McSherry, Bernadette, ‘Legal Capacity under the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ 
(2012) 20 Journal of Law and Medicine 22, 23. 
46  United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No 1 (2014) on 
Article 12 of the Convention—Equal Recognition before the Law [5]. 
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the CRPD, ‘including to refer to the rights of people with disability to make decisions 
and act on their own behalf’. The concept of equality therefore emphasises independent 
decision-making by persons with disability. 
2.33 Professor Terry Carney stated that equality, in the sense used in art 12, ‘can be 
variously formulated’: 
It can be expressed as a purely formal concept (ie an ‘opportunity’) or in more 
substantive terms, as an achievement of distributive equity. It can be conceived 
as a universal right of citizenship for all, or as a special standard for particular 
groups (such as the disabled aged). And it also raises notoriously complex issues 
about respect for diversity and the right to make poor choices (the so-called 
‘dignity of risk’).47 
2.34 The UNCRPD emphasised that the idea of equality reflected in art 12 is 
essentially about the exercise of human rights: ‘[e]quality before the law is a basic and 
general principle of human rights protection and is indispensable for the exercise of 
other human rights’.
48
 Rather than providing additional rights, art 12 of the CRPD 
‘simply describes the specific elements required to ensure the right to equality before 
the law for people with disabilities on an equal basis with others’.
49
  
2.35 In this Inquiry, the ALRC is considering how equal recognition of persons with 
disability as persons before the law and their ability to exercise legal capacity is denied 
or diminished in laws and legal frameworks within the Commonwealth jurisdiction.  
2.36 The key element in equal recognition, as understood in the CRPD and the 
discourse that has developed around it, is the embracing of a supported decision-
making paradigm so that persons with disability are acknowledged as having the right 
to make decisions on an equal basis with others and are supported in exercising that 
right. The linking of support with equality was made in submissions. For example, 
Hobsons Bay City Council, while supporting the framing principles, said that 
equality should also recognise that in some instances people with disabilities 
need to be treated with equity in order to create equality. For example, needing 
additional assistance with some elements of the law in order to fully participate.50 
Legal capacity 
2.37 The Terms of Reference require consideration of Commonwealth laws and legal 
frameworks that deny or diminish the ability of persons with disability to exercise 
‘legal capacity’. This language reflects art 12(2) of the CRPD, that ‘States Parties shall 
recognize that persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with 
others in all aspects of life’. The Terms of Reference state that, for the purposes of this 
Inquiry, legal capacity is to be understood as it is used in the CRPD. 
                                                        
47  Terry Carney, above n 40, 3. See also Terry Carney, ‘Participation and Service Access Rights for People 
with Intellectual Disability: A Role for Law?’ (2013) 38 Journal of Intellectual and Developmental 
Disability 59, 66.  
48  United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No 1 (2014) on 
Article 12 of the Convention—Equal Recognition before the Law [1].  
49  Ibid.  
50  Hobsons Bay City Council, Submission 44. 
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2.38 Capacity in a general sense refers to decision-making ability. Decisions may 
cover a wide range of choices in everyday life. They may relate to personal matters, 
financial and property matters, and health and medical decisions. The concept of legal 
capacity in the CRPD contains two aspects: ‘legal standing’ and ‘legal agency’. Legal 
standing is the ability to hold rights and duties—to be recognised as legal persons. 
Legal agency is the ability to exercise these rights and duties to perform acts with legal 
effects. Dr Mary Donnelly commented that  
A presumption of agency underlies the liberal conception of autonomy. Our 
choices are autonomous because they are, in a fundamental sense, our choices.51 
2.39 The UNCRPD explains that ‘legal capacity to be a holder of rights entitles the 
individual to the full protection of her rights by the legal system’.
52
 
2.40 Legal capacity sets the threshold for undertaking certain actions that have legal 
consequences. For example, a range of transactions may involve an age threshold as a 
benchmark of when a person is regarded as being able to act independently and with 
binding effect—to have legal agency to make ‘legally effective choices’.
53
 Legal 
capacity goes to the validity, in law, of choices and being accountable for the choices 
made. As Carney states:  
Those who make the choice should be able to provide valid consent, and make 
decisions for which they can be held accountable. They should, in short, be 
legally competent.54 
2.41 There are examples of tests of legal capacity—in terms of levels of 
understanding for particular legal transactions—that have been developed through the 
common law:
55
  
Legal incapacity means that, in law, a person is not competent to enter into legal 
transactions, such as making a contract, executing a will, or giving a legally-
recognised consent, for example to an operation.56 
2.42 The common law starts from a presumption of legal capacity—‘the law’s 
endorsement of autonomy’.
57
 Common law definitions of legal capacity are generally 
                                                        
51  Mary Donnelly, Healthcare Decision-Making and the Law—Autonomy, Capacity and the Limits of 
Liberalism (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 24. 
52   The right to recognition as a legal agent is also reflected in art 12(5) CRPD, which outlines the duty of 
States Parties to ‘take all appropriate and effective measures to ensure the equal right of persons with 
disabilities to own or inherit property, to control their own financial affairs and to have equal access to 
bank loans, mortgages and other forms of financial credit and shall ensure that persons with disabilities 
are not arbitrarily deprived of their property: United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, General Comment No 1 (2014) on Article 12 of the Convention—Equal Recognition before 
the Law [11]. See also Bernadette McSherry, ‘Legal Capacity Under the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities’ (2012) 22 Legal Issues 23. 
53  Terry Carney and David Tait, The Adult Guardianship Experiment—Tribunals and Popular Justice 
(Federation Press, 1997) 3. 
54  Ibid. 
55  Contracts: Blomley v Ryan (1954) 99 CLR 362. Wills: Banks v Goodfellow (1870) LR 5 QB 549. See 
also: Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) ch 7.  
56  Australian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship and Management of Property, Report No 52 (1989) 
[1.4]. 
57  Donnelly, above n 51, 93. 
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invoked after the event, when a transaction is later challenged on the basis of a lack of 
capacity (in the sense of agency) to rebut the presumption of legal capacity.
58
 The 
definitions in these contexts focus on the nature of the transaction and the level of 
understanding required for legal agency. The common law—including doctrines of 
equity—also includes protective doctrines for vulnerable people, such as the doctrines 
concerning undue influence and unconscionable transactions.
59
 Where a lack of the 
required level of understanding is proven in the particular circumstances, the 
transaction may be set aside. Such doctrines focus on a transaction and the 
circumstances surrounding it. They are decision-specific and involve assessments of 
understanding relevant to the transaction being challenged. As Bruce Arnold and Dr 
Wendy Bonython commented,  
It is axiomatic that in some instances differences in capability will be recognised 
in law. Lack of capacity is one [of] those instances, and is not inherently 
discriminatory on the basis of disability.60  
2.43 Capacity assessments have been made as the trigger for formal arrangements for 
decision-making support through the appointment of, for example, guardians and 
administrators—or for the commencement of enduring powers of attorney and advance 
directives. They are also made in the context of a range of health care decisions. 
2.44 The common law presumption is embodied in some guardianship legislation.
61
 
In the Commonwealth context, the National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 
(Cth) includes an assumption of capacity: 
People with disability are assumed, so far as is reasonable in the circumstances, 
to have capacity to determine their own best interests and make decisions that 
affect their own lives.62 
2.45 Legal capacity is a different concept from ‘mental capacity’ and should not be 
confused with it.
63
 The UNCRPD commented that the CRPD ‘does not permit 
perceived or actual deficits in mental capacity to be used as justification for denying 
legal capacity’.
64
  
2.46 Stakeholders emphasised the distinction between legal capacity and mental 
capacity. For example, People with Disability Australia (PWDA), the Australian 
                                                        
58  For example, in the context of wills, a person is presumed to have the legal capacity to make a will and it 
is for those who challenge a testator’s capacity to bring evidence of incapacity: Bull v Fulton (1942) 66 
CLR 295. The presumption of capacity arises if the will is rational on its face and is duly executed. See, 
eg, G E Dal Pont and KF Mackie, Law of Succession (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2013) ch 2. This was 
expressed in the legal maxim ‘omnia praesumuntur rite et somemniter esse acta’: all acts are presumed to 
have been done rightly and regularly.  
59  See, eg, J D Heydon and M J Leeming, Cases and Materials on Equity and Trusts (LexisNexis 
Butterworths, 8th ed, 2011) ch 14. 
60  B Arnold and Dr W Bonython, Submission 38. 
61  See, eg, Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) sch 1 cl 1, (WA) s 4(3).  
62  National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) s 17A(1). See also Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK) 
s 1, which addresses this explicitly by providing that individuals are assumed to have capacity to make 
decisions unless otherwise established.  
63  See, eg, the distinction between medical and legal perspectives in Terry Carney, above n 40. 
64  United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No 1 (2014) on 
Article 12 of the Convention—Equal Recognition before the Law [12]. 
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Centre for Disability Law (ACDL) and the Australian Human Rights Centre (AHRC) 
commented that any proposal for a uniform approach to legal capacity 
must remove any notion that the assessment of mental capacity is also an 
assessment of legal capacity, that assessing mental capacity is a mechanism 
through which to limit legal capacity, and that the existence of a cognitive 
impairment creates a limit to the exercise of legal agency. Concerns with the 
provisions in, and operation of, legislation ...cannot be ameliorated or rectified 
without an acceptance of this premise.65  
2.47 This reflects two concerns: first, that legal capacity assessments should not 
simply be equated with mental capacity; and, secondly, that people with cognitive 
impairment should not be assumed to have limited legal capacity, in the sense of being 
able to exercise legal agency. 
2.48 Similarly, stakeholders pointed to the danger of defining legal capacity on the 
basis of disability—of those who have legal capacity; and those who have not. Such a 
‘binary model’ does not reflect how legal capacity should be represented. Arnold and 
Bonython submitted that  
[Legal capacity] may be context-dependent, and fluctuate, rather than static and 
permanent. In many instances, the primary focus of the law is not whether the 
individual has a disability; rather, it considers whether that disability impairs the 
individual’s ability to act as a legally recognized entity, with the powers and 
obligations such recognition attracts. A person who is physically disabled, 
therefore, is entitled to exactly the same presumption of capacity at law as 
someone without a physical disability. ... For many disabled people, the question 
of capacity is no more relevant to them than it is [to] the remainder of society.66 
2.49 What is clearly not appropriate in the context of the CRPD is a disqualification 
or limitation on the exercise of legal capacity because of a particular status, such as 
disability. As National Disability Services remarked, ‘[t]he crux of the issue is seen in 
historic legal frameworks that place constraints on the exercise of legal capacity based 
solely on disability status’.
67
 The approach should therefore be on the support needed 
to exercise legal agency, rather than an assumption or conclusion that legal agency is 
lacking because of an impairment of some kind.  
2.50 In this Inquiry the ALRC suggests that even the word ‘capacity’ may carry some 
of the connotations of previous times. ‘Capacity’ is regularly confused with ‘legal 
capacity’, and ‘legal capacity’ is regularly conflated with ‘mental capacity’. To avoid 
such confusion and to focus the reform direction towards support in decision-making, 
the ALRC uses ‘ability’.
68
  
                                                        
65  PWDA, ACDL and AHRC, Submission 66. 
66  B Arnold and Dr W Bonython, Submission 38. 
67  National Disability Services, Submission 49. See also PWDA, ACDL and AHRC, Submission 66. 
68  Others talk about ‘capability’, such as Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. See discussion in Amita 
Dhanda, ‘Legal Capacity in the Disability Rights Convention: Stranglehold of the Past or Lodestar for the 
Future’ (2006) 34 Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce 429. 
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Supported and substituted decision-making 
2.51 There is an important distinction between ‘substituted’ and ‘supported’ decision-
making. It is the key issue in the discussion surrounding the meaning and effect of 
art 12 of the CRPD. 
2.52 Decision-making supports and arrangements for persons with disability take 
many forms along a spectrum, including:  
 informal arrangements—usually involving family members, friends or other 
supporters;  
 formal pre-emptive arrangements—anticipating future loss of legal capacity 
through appointment of a proxy, for example in enduring powers of attorney 
(financial/property), enduring guardianships (lifestyle) and advance care 
directives (health/medical);
69
 and  
 formal arrangements—where a court or tribunal appoints a private manager or 
guardian, or a state-appointed trustee, guardian or advocate to make decisions on 
an individual’s behalf (guardians and administrators).
70
 
2.53 For Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people with disability decision-making 
may also have a collective quality.  
2.54 Formal arrangements may also include recognition of support by family, friends 
or others where provision is made for designation of a ‘nominee’ for particular 
purposes, such as ‘correspondence nominees’ in the Centrelink context.
71
 
2.55 The formal appointment of guardians and administrators in Australia occurs 
under state and territory laws. Guardians and administrators are vested with power to 
make decisions on behalf of persons assessed to be unable to make decisions for 
themselves.  
2.56 In the literature discussing support for people who may require decision-making 
assistance there is an evident tension in the way that the labels of ‘supported decision-
making’ and ‘substituted decision-making’ are used. The discourse around art 12, and 
particularly the General Comment on art 12 when published as a draft,
72
 has 
exacerbated this tension. The ALRC considers that it is constructive to summarise the 
development of the use of these terms, and the conflict around them, and to place this 
in the context of formulating legal policy responses in this Inquiry that prioritise 
supported decision-making. 
                                                        
69  Sometimes referred to collectively as ‘living wills’. See, eg, Rosalind Croucher and Prue Vines, 
Succession: Families, Property and Death (LexisNexis Butterworths, 4th ed, 2013) [4.3]. 
70  In some cases, such as emergency medical decisions, there are statutory hierarchies of those who may 
authorise certain actions—‘generic lists of suitable proxies in the legislation’: Carney and Tait, above n 
53, 4.  
71  These are considered in Ch 4. 
72  United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Draft General Comment on Article 
12 of the Convention—Equal Recognition before the Law and Draft General Comment on Article 9 of the 
Convention—Accessibility. 
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The emergence of ‘substitute’ decision-making 
2.57 Decision-making support has a long history, conventionally summarised in the 
evolution and development of guardianship regimes. Professors Carney and David Tait 
describe the history of adult guardianship as comprising three periods: 
The first period was characterised by an emphasis on protecting the property of 
individual family members who were disabled, with the courts stepping in to 
provide this security. The second period was one in which Public Trustee 
organisations took over responsibilities for property management for the whole 
groups of institutionalised people, usually without judicial review (or only token 
review). Medical control was growing, as forms of treatment and care became 
more specialised and sophisticated. Court-ordered guardianship was used 
occasionally, alongside various forms of welfare or mental health guardianship. 
The third stage maintained the ease of access characteristic of the second stage, 
but anchored reforms to a commitment to protecting individual freedoms. The 
state took on new responsibilities to minimise its own role.73 
2.58 The first period was one in which the focus was upon the person who was being 
‘protected’ and what they would have wanted.
74
  
2.59 Guardianship and management of property reveal two broad themes: ‘providing 
appropriate protection for those unable to look after themselves’; and ‘preserving and, 
where possible, enhancing the personal autonomy of such persons’.
75
 However, as 
Sarah Burningham commented, when these themes are articulated in legislative 
regimes, 
there is great potential for conflict between competing values as legislators 
attempt to manufacture statutes that both respect the adult’s autonomy and 
protect the adult from harm. This tension recurs throughout guardianship’s 
history.76 
2.60 There may also be a distinction between law and what happens in practice. 
‘Traditional’ guardianship laws have been described as ‘exceedingly paternalistic’, 
protecting the estate of the person under protection, and not promoting their autonomy, 
especially where ‘plenary’ forms were used involving a complete vesting of authority 
in another person. The disability rights movement of the 1960s led to increasing 
pressure to move away from such models, championing a social, rather than a medical, 
model of disability.
77
  
                                                        
73  Carney and Tait, above n 53, 22. 
74  A good example is Ex Parte Whitbread, in the Matter of Hinde, a Lunatic (1816) 2 Mer 99, 35 ER 878. 
See discussion in Donnelly, above n 51, 178; John Seymour, ‘Parens Patriae and Wardship Powers: Their 
Nature and Origins’ [1994] Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 159; R Croucher, ‘“An Interventionist, 
Paternalistic Jurisdiction”? The Place of Statutory Wills in Australian Succession Law’ (2009) 32 
University of New South Wales Law Journal 674. 
75  Australian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship and Management of Property, Report No 52 (1989) 
[2.1]. This report concerned the ACT. 
76  Sarah Burningham, ‘Developments in Canadian Adult Guardianship and Co-Decision-Making Law’ 
(2009) 18 Dalhousie J. Legal Stud. 119, 128. 
77  Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) [2.8]. 
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The principles of new legislation were fairly consistent: the least restrictive 
option (with guardianship as a last resort), promoting maximum autonomy, 
encouraging habilitation and living as ‘normally’ as possible, and a preference 
for family over state proxies. This meant keeping orders as short and limited as 
possible. Generally ‘private’ arrangements were to be preferred to public ones, 
and a ‘substituted judgement’ principle was to be used rather than a ‘best 
interests’ one, where these came into conflict.78 
2.61 ‘Best interests’ standards, as suggested in this quote, were ones that preceded, 
and were to be contrasted with, a ‘substituted judgement’ approach. The ‘best interests’ 
principle was seen to reflect the idea of ‘beneficence’—a dominant theme in medical 
ethics, in which the ‘primary imperatives were for doing good for the patient, the 
avoidance of harm and the protection of life’.
79
 
2.62 A best interests standard was identified as associated with paternalistic 
approaches to persons with disability; ‘substituted judgment’ was seen as reflective of 
the person and respectful of their autonomy. Describing the emergence of the 
substituted judgment approach in the United States in the context of healthcare 
decision-making, Dr Mary Donnelly said that it was a standard ‘based on what the 
patient would have wished had [they] had capacity notwithstanding, in some cases, 
very limited evidence of [their] likely views or preferences’.
80
 Even in the medical 
context, therefore, the best interests standard had given way to autonomy.
81
 
2.63 In a report in 1995, Robin Creyke described the emergence of a ‘common core 
of principles’ to guide substitute decision-makers as ‘[o]ne of the most remarkable 
developments in this area of law’. It involved an appreciation that disability  
is not an absolute state and that individuals’ capacities to reason and to make 
decisions continue, or can be developed, in some areas, albeit they are lost, or 
cannot be exercised without assistance or training in others. This awareness, 
coupled with the growing focus on people’s rights as individuals, led to the 
notion that the powers given to substitute decision-makers should be restricted 
and tailored to the special needs of the individual for whom assistance is 
needed.82 
2.64 The ‘guiding philosophies’ that became ‘strongly entrenched in Australian laws 
for guardians, financial managers or administrators’ by the 1990s were: the 
presumption of competence; normalisation; the least restrictive option; respect for 
autonomy; and fostering self-management.
83
 Even in a reformed context of being 
committed to advancing individuals’ rights, ‘best interests’ standards were still 
retained.  
                                                        
78  Carney and Tait, above n 53, 17–18. Citations omitted. 
79  Donnelly, above n 51, 11. Donnelly refers to the Hippocratic Oath. 
80  Ibid 176. Donnelly, 185, refers to the ‘first significant application’ of the standard in the decision of the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey in Re Quinlan (1976) 70 NJ 10. 
81  See discussion in Donnelly, above n 51, 14–16. Donnelly refers in particular to the work of Tom 
Beauchamp and James Childress in their pioneering work on medical ethics. 
82  R Creyke, Who Can Decide? Legal Decision-Making for Others, Aged and Community Care Service 
Development and Evaluation Reports, No 19, Department of Human Services and Health, Aged and 
Community Care Division (1995) 38. 
83  Ibid 40. 
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2.65 The Australian Guardianship and Administration Council (AGAC) described the 
approach of state and territory appointments as being ‘governed by three principles, 
variously expressed’, that: 
(a)  an appointment must promote as far as possible the person’s freedom of 
decision and action (sometimes called the ‘least restrictive alternative’ or 
‘autonomy’ principle); and 
(b)  an appointment promotes the person’s best interests; and 
(c)  the person’s wishes are given effect to, wherever possible.84 
2.66 ‘Best interests’ and the person’s wishes are both used. Some ‘best interests’ 
standards have also been expressed in terms of prioritising the wishes and preferences 
of the person. For example, the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK) s 4(6) requires a 
person making a determination of ‘best interests’ to consider, ‘so far as is reasonably 
ascertainable’: 
(a)  the person’s past and present wishes and feelings (and, in particular, any 
relevant written statement made by him when he had capacity), 
(b)  the beliefs and values that would be likely to influence his decision if he had 
capacity, and 
(c)  the other factors that he would be likely to consider if he were able to do 
so.85 
2.67 In addition, s 4(7) requires the decision-maker to take into account, ‘if it is 
practicable and appropriate to consult them’, the views of: 
(a) anyone named by the person as someone to be consulted on the matter in 
question or on matters of that kind, 
(b) anyone engaged in caring for the person or interested in his welfare, 
(c) any donee of a lasting power of attorney granted by the person, and 
(d) any deputy appointed for the person by the court, 
as to what would be in the person’s best interests and, in particular as to the 
matters mentioned in subsection (6). 
2.68 Of such a hybrid standard, Donnelly writes that it ‘attempts to mitigate the 
consequences of a loss of capacity while staying within a best interests framework’.
86
   
Shift towards supported decision-making 
2.69 Although substitute decision-making was a step that was seen as an advance and 
an expression of autonomy for persons with disability, and conceptually linked to the 
disability rights movement of the 1960s, by the second decade of the 21st century it 
                                                        
84  Australian Guardianship and Administration Council, Submission 51. 
85  A similar model is included, for example, in the Mental Health Bill 2013 (WA), pt 2 div 3, ‘Best interests 
of a person’. 
86  Donnelly, above n 51, 203. This approach, she writes, is ‘not without difficulties’: 203. 
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had become the focus of criticism in a new articulation of a standard described as 
‘supported decision-making’.  
2.70 ‘Supported decision-making’ places the person who is being supported at the 
front of the decision-making process. The decision is theirs. As Carney summarises: 
Supported decision-making encompasses a range of processes to support 
individuals to exercise their legal capacity, and these consist of: 
 effective communication, including in the provision of information and 
advice to a person and through ensuring that a person is able to 
communicate their decisions to others; 
 spending time to determine a person’s preferences and wishes; 
 informal relationships of support between a person and members of their 
social networks; 
 agreements or appointments to indicate that a relationship of support exists; 
and 
 statutory relationships of support—whether through private or court/tribunal 
appointment.87 
2.71 In the context of developing ‘supported decision-making’, ‘substitute’ is often 
equated with ‘guardianship’ and both are assumed to represent a standard that is not 
consistent with the rights of persons with disability. However, interwoven in the 
discussion about ‘substitute’ and ‘supported’ decision-making is a lack of conceptual 
clarity about the role that a person’s wishes and preferences play when another acts for 
them as a ‘substitute’ decision-maker; and the role that a ‘supporter’ plays in assisting 
a person to make decisions. Conceptual confusion is also exacerbated when models use 
‘best interests’ language but expressed in terms of giving priority to the person’s 
wishes and preferences. Given the tensions around the usage and understanding about 
‘substituted’ decision-making, the ALRC considers that it might be preferable to move 
away from this language altogether. These tensions are seen in the discussion about the 
meaning and effect of art 12 and submissions from stakeholders in this Inquiry. 
Substitute decision-making and the CRPD 
2.72 An important issue to clarify is whether the CRPD permits substitute decision-
making at all, or in what form. This also begs the question of what is meant by 
substitute decision-making in the CRPD context, how it is different from supported 
decision-making, and the extent to which arguments are ones of substance rather than 
of form. In the context of this Inquiry, the question becomes one of the implications for 
this analysis in informing reform proposals for Commonwealth laws and legal 
frameworks.  
2.73 In September 2013, the UNCRPD focused attention on the distinction made 
between the concepts of substitute and supported decision-making in its Draft General 
                                                        
87  Carney, above n 47, 60. 
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Comment on Article 12.
88
 After submissions were considered, the General Comment 
was finalised in April 2014.
89
 
2.74 What is meant by the distinction? As the Committee explained, ‘support’ is a 
broad term—‘that encompasses both informal and formal support arrangements, of 
varying types and intensity’.
90
 It then spelled out its understanding of the difference 
between a ‘support’ model and a ‘substitute’ one.  
2.75 A supported model comprises ‘various support options which give primacy to a 
person’s will and preferences and respect human rights norms’ and, while supported 
decision-making regimes ‘can take many forms’, ‘they should all incorporate key 
provisions to ensure compliance with article 12’.
91
 Supported decision-making 
processes prioritise personal autonomy and recognise that individuals should be 
empowered with information to make decisions—even bad ones (acknowledging the 
dignity of risk).
92
 
2.76 A substituted decision-making regime has different characteristics and can also 
take many forms. The common defining elements, as understood by the UNCPRD, are 
where 
(i) legal capacity is removed from a person, even if this is just in respect of a 
single decision; (ii) a substitute decision-maker can be appointed by someone 
other than the person concerned, and this can be done against his or her will or 
(iii) any decision made by a substitute decision-maker is based on what is 
believed to be in the objective ‘best interests’ of the person concerned, as 
opposed to being based on the person’s own will and preferences.93 
2.77 The General Comment was prompted by what the UNCRPD described as ‘a 
general misunderstanding of the exact scope of the obligations of States Parties under 
Article 12’.
94
 Australia’s view, as expressed through its Interpretative Declaration in 
respect of art 12, is that the CRPD allows for fully supported or substituted decision-
making arrangements. However, the Declaration notes that such arrangements may 
only be made where they are necessary, as a last resort, and subject to safeguards.
95
  
                                                        
88  United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Draft General Comment on Article 
12 of the Convention—Equal Recognition before the Law and Draft General Comment on Article 9 of the 
Convention—Accessibility. 
89  United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No 1 (2014) on 
Article 12 of the Convention—Equal Recognition before the Law. 
90  United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Draft General Comment on Article 
12 of the Convention—Equal Recognition before the Law and Draft General Comment on Article 9 of the 
Convention—Accessibility [15].  
91  Ibid [25].  
92  Bernadette McSherry, above n 52, 26.  
93  United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No 1 (2014) on 
Article 12 of the Convention—Equal Recognition before the Law [23]. There was a slight change in 
wording between the draft and final versions of this paragraph, but not of significance to the meaning. 
94  Ibid [3].  
95  Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Declarations and Reservations (Australia), opened 
for signature 30 March 2007, 999 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 2008). Canada made a similar 
declaration.  
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2.78 In the General Comment, the UNCRPD suggested that substitute decision-
making regimes should be abolished and replaced by supported decision-making 
regimes and the development of supported decision-making alternatives. Most 
importantly, the Committee commented that ‘[t]he development of supported decision-
making systems in parallel with the retention of substituted decision-making regimes is 
not sufficient to comply with Article 12’.
96
 What is required is ‘both the abolition of 
substitute decision-making regimes and the development of supported decision-making 
alternatives’.
97
  
2.79 The UNCRPD commented about Australia’s Interpretative Declaration in its 
concluding observations on the initial report of Australia to the Committee in 
September 2013. The Committee noted the referral to the ALRC of this Inquiry, but 
expressed concern ‘about the possibility of maintaining the regime of substitute 
decision-making, and that there is still no detailed and viable framework for supported 
decision-making in the exercise of legal capacity’.
98
 
2.80 The ALRC acknowledges that there is considerable tension about what is 
described as ‘substitute decision-making’. As noted above, so-called ‘substitute’ 
regimes were conceptually anchored in the will and preferences of the person. They 
may, in fact, not be proscribed under art 12—so long as the governing standard is not 
‘the objective “best interests” of the person concerned, as opposed to being based on 
the person’s own will and preferences’.
99
 Would a regime that contains elements (i) 
and (ii) of the General Comment, but which has a subjective focus and not an objective 
lens in element (iii), be regarded as an acceptable supported decision-making model, 
and not a substituted decision-making model?  
2.81 Stakeholders pointed to art 12(4) and its requirements of safeguards, implicitly 
acknowledging measures that may be regarded as ‘substitute’ models. The Office of 
the Public Advocate (SA) observed that the protections of art 12(4) ‘make sense as 
protections for substitute decision making as a “measure relating to exercising 
capacity”’.
100
 The Centre for Rural Regional Law and Justice and the National Rural 
Law and Justice Alliance noted that Australia’s Interpretative Declaration reflected this 
safeguards approach in relation to substitute decision-making arrangements, 
where decision-making support may extend to decisions being made by a third 
party on behalf of the person with the impairment, but where such arrangements 
                                                        
96  United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No 1 (2014) on 
Article 12 of the Convention—Equal Recognition before the Law [24]. Emphasis added.  
97  Ibid.  
98  Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disability, ‘Concluding Observations on the Initial Report of 
Australia, Adopted by the Committee at Its Tenth Session (2-13 September 2013)’ (United Nations, 
4 October 2013) 9, [24] <http://www.ncid.org.au/index.php/docman-documents/reports/30-un-report-on-
australia-2013/file>.  
99  United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No 1 (2014) on 
Article 12 of the Convention—Equal Recognition before the Law [23].  
100  Office of the Public Advocate (SA), Submission 17. To similar effect see: Caxton Legal Centre, 
Submission 67. 
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should be put in place only when they are necessary in order to enable to exercise 
of legal capacity and only where there are sufficient safeguards in place.101 
2.82 While substitute decision-making models that reflect the constraints identified in 
such comments may technically not be contrary to the CRPD, ‘[t]here is still 
considerable debate over the significance of the [CRPD] for guardianship’.
102
 Is 
‘guardianship’ compatible with the CRPD? Or is it rather a question of what kind of 
guardianship (or whatever other label is used) is incompatible with it—namely, only 
guardianship where decisions are made without reference to the wishes and preferences 
of the person under protection? John Chesterman states: 
What is clear is that the Convention obliges countries to use guardianship as little 
as possible, and to limit as much as possible the powers that guardians have. 
Moreover, the Convention obliges us to utilise other processes, particularly now 
supported decision-making, wherever possible. In this way, the Convention is 
promoting some degree of uniformity, and will continue to do so as jurisdictions 
review their guardianship systems.103 
2.83 The Office of the Public Advocate (Qld) referred to the ongoing debate about 
guardianship and art 12 of the CRPD. It submitted that, ‘regardless of views about the 
compatibility of guardianship laws with the Convention’, and even though 
guardianship is supposed to be an intervention of last resort, ‘there are concerns that it 
is excessively used and misapplied’: 
The accessibility and low cost of Australian guardianship systems have resulted 
in guardianship applications being sought in preference to other options that are 
less restrictive and do not infringe on people’s rights. Arguably, it has also 
resulted in some guardianship orders being broader than is necessary.104 
Australia’s Interpretative Declarations 
Proposal 2–1 The Australian Government should review the Interpretative 
Declaration in relation to art 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities with a view to withdrawing it. 
2.84 In September 2013, Australia appeared before the 10th session of the 
UNCRPD.
105
 In its concluding observations, the Committee recommended that 
Australia review its Interpretative Declarations in order to withdraw them.
106
 The 
ALRC considers that the Declaration in relation to art 12 may be acting as a handbrake 
on reform and it is timely to reconsider the need for it, and, if retained, its wording. 
                                                        
101  Centre for Rural Regional Law and Justice and the National Rural Law and Justice Alliance, Submission 
20. 
102  John Chesterman, ‘The Future of Adult Guardianship in Federal Australia’ (2013) 66 Australian Social 
Work 26, 31.  
103  Chesterman, above n 102, 31. 
104  Office of the Public Advocate (Qld), Submission 05. Citations omitted. 
105  Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 10th Session of the Committee on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities (12 November 2013) <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/Sessi
on10Old.aspx>. 
106  Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disability, above n 98. 
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2.85 In the Issues Paper, the ALRC asked about the impact the Interpretative 
Declaration in relation to art 12 had on (a) provision for supported or substitute 
decision-making arrangements; and (b) the recognition of people with disability before 
the law and their ability to exercise legal capacity.  
2.86 The submissions revealed distinct themes:  
 the conceptual blurring about supported and substitute decision-making evident 
in the CRPD and surrounding discussions;
107
  
 discomfort with the idea of ‘substitute decision-making’;
108
 and  
 concerns about the Interpretative Declaration in relation to art 12—in terms of 
its wording or in its effect. 
2.87 The OPA (SA), for example, identified some ambiguity in the terms of the 
Interpretative Declaration with respect to art 12—namely in its statement that the 
CRPD ‘allows for fully supported or substituted decision-making arrangements’.
109
 
Does this mean that ‘fully supported’ arrangements are equated with ‘substituted’ 
arrangements? The OPA (SA) found this wording ‘unhelpful’, as ‘implying that fully 
supported and substituted are the same’, which it considered they were not.
110
 
2.88 On the other hand, the Centre for Regional Law and Justice and the National 
Rural Law and Justice Alliance, while agreeing about the ambiguity, submitted that, if 
substitute decision-making is to be understood as ‘fully supported’ decision-making, 
this is 
consistent with the tenor of Article 12, in the sense that the role of any third-
party decision maker should be primarily to enable the exercise of the person’s 
legal capacity on an equal basis with other members of the community. This 
means realising the decisions that the person themselves would make if they 
were able to do so, rather than making the decision that the third party decision 
maker considers in their best interests.111 
2.89 In other words, substitute decision-making should be regarded as consistent with 
art 12, so long as it is not based on a best interests standard; and to the extent that 
Australia’s Interpretative Declaration is only saying this, it is not objectionable. Some 
stakeholders supported the idea reflected in the Interpretative Declaration: that 
substitute decision-making may be appropriate in the limited circumstances identified: 
‘as a last resort and subject to safeguards’.
112
 
                                                        
107  Eg, Office of the Public Advocate (SA), Submission 17; Mental Health Coordinating Council, Submission 
07. 
108  Eg, Caxton Legal Centre, Submission 67. 
109  Office of the Public Advocate (SA), Submission 17. See also Centre for Rural Regional Law and Justice 
and the National Rural Law and Justice Alliance, Submission 20. 
110  Office of the Public Advocate (SA), Submission 17. 
111  Centre for Rural Regional Law and Justice and the National Rural Law and Justice Alliance, Submission 
20. 
112  B Arnold and Dr W Bonython, Submission 38; NSW Council for Intellectual Disability, Submission 33.  
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2.90 The OPA (SA) submitted that the challenge in having such a declaration was not 
only that ‘it fulfils its legal purpose’, but also that it ‘does not unnecessarily slow 
change in giving people with disability equal rights’: 
A declaration can be an impediment if it creates a sense of complacency that our 
existing substitute arrangements already fully meet the expectations of the 
UNCRPD, and there is no need to change practices.113 
2.91 The idea that having such a declaration may be an impediment to reform was 
also highlighted, for example, by the Disability Advocacy Network Australia (DANA), 
which argued that it  
has the effect of protecting the status quo of paternalistic substitute decision 
making regimes, inhibiting reform and slowing exploration and implementation 
of supported decision-making models in Australia.114 
2.92 DANA submitted that ‘reform to the legislative and regulatory framework is 
vital and must be prioritised’ and ‘to retain the Declaration and continue to accept the 
status quo would substantially diminish Australia’s progress in disability rights and 
undermine its position as a State committed to advancing the inclusion, participation 
and wellbeing of people with disabilities, in our country and overseas’.
115
 
2.93 The ALRC considers that there is weight in the argument that the Interpretative 
Declaration may impede reform. This is not to say, however, that it is incorrect in 
law—given that there is considerable ambiguity and confusion in art 12, its 
surrounding discourse and even the wording of the Declaration itself. However, it has 
been identified as a matter of concern by the UNCRPD and by many interested 
stakeholders, which suggests that the timing is opportune to review it.  
Implications for reform 
2.94 A critical evaluation of all assisted decision-making models is called for in light 
of the UNCRPD’s comments and the range of responses by stakeholders in this 
Inquiry. While the CRPD and its surrounding discourse have set a new benchmark of 
expectation, not only in terms of law, but also practice, the themes remain essentially 
those identified by the ALRC in 1989: ‘providing appropriate protection for those 
unable to look after themselves’; and ‘preserving and, where possible, enhancing the 
personal autonomy of such persons’.
116
 There are also dangers in action that is not 
anchored in a strong conceptual framework, and tested in implementation. Caxton 
Legal Centre pointed out that 
A number of writers comment that insufficient research has been done on both 
supported decision making models and guardianship itself, and warn against 
inviting a ‘bricolage’ of experimental models resembling a ‘young child’s 
                                                        
113  Office of the Public Advocate (SA), Submission 17. 
114  Disability Advocacy Network Australia, Submission 36. See also NMHCCF and MHCA, Submission 81. 
115  Disability Advocacy Network Australia, Submission 36. See also Carer’s Alliance, Submission 84; 
WWDA, Submission 58; National Disability Services, Submission 49; Public Interest Advocacy Centre, 
Submission 30. 
116  Australian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship and Management of Property, Report No 52 (1989) 
[2.1]. This report concerned the ACT. 
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pocketful of melted lollies on a hot summer’s day’.117 The task is complex and 
highly nuanced and as Terry Carney suggests, perhaps the best recommendation 
is to marshall the evidence and debate which is the least imperfect of the policy 
options at the disposal of the law.118 
2.95 Two key policy issues are how far ‘support’ can really go without attracting 
criticism of being a legal fiction;
119
 and the need to underpin change in practice by 
evidence. AGAC observed that, while supported decision-making ‘is an excellent 
development and will be extremely successful in avoiding guardianship for many 
people with disabilities’, it was ‘not capable of universal application’.
120
 
Arguments for the total abolition of substituted decision making in favor of 
supported decision making or co-decision making fail to address the question: 
what mechanisms will be in place for the persons who, even with the benefit of 
infinite resources, cannot or will not act to protect their own interests?  
… 
Some decision making impairments may be accommodated or rectified but at the 
end of the spectrum there will be a very small proportion of persons whose 
impairments mean that they lack decision-making ability, even with infinite 
resources available for support. For those persons, the appointment of a 
substitute decision maker becomes a reasonable accommodation to ensure that 
they are afforded basic human rights including the right to exercise legal 
capacity.121 
2.96 The policy impetus is clearly away from models that, in substance, form or 
language, appear as substitute decision-making ones. Although some have queried 
whether reformed law will have the desired effect in practice, and may be understood 
by stakeholders as ‘little different from its predecessor’, a shift to supported decision-
making is to be highly commended’, as Carney states, ‘on the basis of its symbolic 
significance’:
122
 
It can be argued that at the very least a shift towards supported decision making 
sends two important symbolic messages regarding: (i) rejection of avoidable 
paternalism; and (ii) repositioning the state as an adjunct to (or facilitator of) 
civil society.123 
                                                        
117  Citing Terry Carney and Fleur Beaupert, ‘Public and Private Bricolage—Challenges Balancing Law, 
Services and Civil Society in Advancing CRPD Supported Decision-Making’ (2013) 36 University of 
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2.97 The issue for policy reform, and law reform, is how to express this in a way that 
clearly reflects the paradigm shift in approach and thinking to the levels of support 
required for those who require decision-making support. As the Caxton Legal Centre 
submitted: 
The task is a tremendous one. The greatest challenges to ensuring equality before 
the law and the exercise of legal capacity for persons with disability involve the 
political will to endorse change to reflect consistency with a social model of 
disability, to provide sufficient education to the entire community, to 
stakeholders including all levels of employment and management, and to 
institutions and to implement the supply side and demand side reforms to ensure 
that supported decision making can effectively operate.124 
2.98 Legal and policy reform must also include consideration of when support 
amounts to full support—where a person is not able to exercise any decision-making 
ability and may not have access to supporters in their network of family. It is in such 
cases, where the appointment of someone to make decisions is needed, that the 
standard by which they act and the nature of their appointment become the critical 
focus. 
2.99 The NSW Council for Intellectual Disability submitted that 
Even with a comprehensive national strategy there will continue to be a need for 
a backstop of a substitute or fully supported decision-making system. In the 
absence of such a system, there will be no way to resolve many situations: 
 in which people with intellectual disability are being neglected, abused, 
exploited or overprotected on an ongoing basis and are unable to 
recognise these breaches of rights or and assert themselves in responding 
to the breaches. 
 in which there are disputes within families or between families and service 
providers or others about what decisions should be made about where a 
person should live, about health care or services or other lifestyle 
decisions.125 
2.100 The need for support, and appropriate policy responses, is likely to increase 
moreover as Australia’s population ages.
126
 The Caxton Legal Centre submitted that,  
given the projected exponential increase in the ageing population and the 
consequent increase in the incidence of terminal cognitive diseases such as 
dementia and Alzheimer’s, coupled with the factor of social isolation and sparse 
or non-existent support networks for many older people, the retention of a 
process of formal substituted decision making may be essential.127 
                                                        
124  Caxton Legal Centre, Submission 67. 
125  NSW Council for Intellectual Disability, Submission 33. 
126  Demographic shifts were outlined in the ALRC’s report: Australian Law Reform Commission,  Access 
All Ages—Older Workers and Commonwealth Laws, Report No 120 (2013) ch 2. 
127  Caxton Legal Centre, Submission 67. See also Australian Guardianship and Administration Council, 
Submission 51. 
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2.101 But where institutional mechanisms of support cannot be avoided, ‘new 
priorities, processes and language’ are needed.
128
 The legal and policy issues must 
focus on key questions. When is it appropriate to appoint someone to act on behalf of 
another? What test is used to determine when this should happen? What should this be 
called? What standard should guide the actions of a person appointed to act on 
another’s behalf? What accountability mechanisms need to be in place? These 
questions necessarily focus on guardianship laws and the impact of the CRPD in 
moulding future reforms. As Barbara Carter observed: 
Guardianship is the ‘elephant in the room’ of Art 12 and the debate continues to 
rage about whether guardianship is allowable under the Convention. This debate 
is effectively stymying considered discussion of how the Convention, in its 
totality should be implemented in domestic guardianship legislation.129 
2.102 The policy challenge for reform in this context was summed up neatly in the 
Caxton Legal Centre submission: 
Can a guardianship system remain as indicated by Australia’s Interpretative 
Declaration and still provide full recognition of people with disability before the 
law and their ability to exercise legal capacity? The key issue centres around the 
adequacy of support mechanisms to assist persons with disability in decision 
making, so that substitute decision making truly is the last resort.130  
2.103 The ALRC considers that the focus of reform initiatives needs to be towards 
providing clarity around the expectations of persons with disability, their families and 
carers, and the courts and tribunals involved in appointing those to assist in decision-
making where it is required. The policy pressure is clearly towards establishing and 
reinforcing frameworks of support in law and legal frameworks, and through funding 
of support models. The momentum is also towards building the ability of those who 
may require support so that they may become more effective and independent decision-
makers.  
2.104 There will also be a need for thorough research. The Caxton Legal Centre 
submitted that  
models of supported decision making need to be thoroughly researched and 
evaluated particularly given the implications of profound change—the paradigm 
shift—across institutions, agencies, services and the community generally. The 
suggestion has been made that there is little evaluative research into the efficacy 
and acceptability of guardianship systems, and this too should be remedied. At 
the very least, guardianship should not continue on the basis of ‘business as 
usual’. And as a number of writers have observed, legislative change without 
equal attention to supply side and demand side reforms, including adequate 
resourcing of free legal services for persons with disability, will only be as useful 
as the paper it is printed on.131 
                                                        
128  ADACAS, Submission 29. 
129  Barbara Carter, ‘Adult Guardianship: Human Rights or Social Justice?’ (2010) 18 Journal of Law and 
Medicine 143, 145.  
130  Caxton Legal Centre, Submission 67. 
131  Ibid. 
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2.105 The hardest and most challenging policy area will always be in the context of 
those who require the most support: to build law and legal frameworks in ways that 
signal the paradigm shift of the CRPD in practice as well as in form. In this Discussion 
Paper the ALRC puts forward a model that seeks to signal this shift in Commonwealth 
laws and to provide the catalyst towards further reform at the state and territory level. 
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Summary 
3.1 In this chapter the ALRC proposes a set of National Decision-Making Principles 
and accompanying Guidelines that provide the first part of the modelling in 
Commonwealth laws required under the Terms of Reference for this Inquiry. These 
principles should guide reform of Commonwealth laws and legal frameworks and the 
review of state and territory laws and legal frameworks.  
3.2 The Principles reflect the paradigm shift signalled in the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities
1
 (CRPD) to recognise people with 
disabilities as persons before the law and their right to make choices for themselves. 
3.3 The emphasis is on the autonomy and independence of persons with disability 
who may require support in making decisions—their wishes and preferences must 
drive decisions that they make, and that others may make on their behalf. The objective 
of the National Decision-Making Principles is to provide a conceptual overlay, 
consistent with the CRPD, that is applied in a Commonwealth decision-making model 
and provides the basis for review of relevant Commonwealth, state and territory laws. 
                                                        
1  UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Opened for Signature 30 March 2007, 999 
UNTS 3 (entered into Force 3 May 2008). 
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National Decision-Making Principles 
Proposal 3–1 Reform of Commonwealth, state and territory laws and 
legal frameworks concerning decision-making by persons who may require 
support in making decisions should be guided by the National Decision-Making 
Principles and Guidelines, set out in Proposals 3–2 to 3–9. 
3.4 The National Decision-Making Principles are four general principles that reflect 
the key ideas and values upon which the ALRC’s approach in relation to legal capacity 
is based. They are distinct from the framing principles for the Inquiry as a whole 
(dignity, equality, autonomy, inclusion and participation, and accountability), but 
reflect and are informed by those principles. 
3.5 The National Decision-Making Principles provide a conceptual overlay at a high 
level. They are drawn from the CRPD, other international models, stakeholder 
submissions and the work of other bodies and individuals. They are not prescriptive, 
and are of general application. The Principles are supported by four sets of Guidelines, 
with more specific detail in each area. 
3.6 The Terms of Reference require the ALRC to consider ‘how maximising 
individual autonomy and independence could be modelled in Commonwealth laws and 
legal frameworks’.
2
 The focus of the Inquiry is on the ‘ability to exercise legal 
capacity’ and equal recognition before the law of people with disability. The ALRC 
considers this can best be achieved by setting up an overall framework of principles 
and guidelines that can then be used as the template for specific reforms—both in 
Commonwealth areas of responsibility included in the Terms of Reference; and at state 
and territory level, in reviews of guardianship and related regimes. Application of the 
National Decision-Making Principles and Guidelines is then considered in a number of 
the areas set out in the Terms of Reference.  
3.7 The National Decision-Making Principles identify the essential ideas in all 
recent law reform work on capacity. The tendency to suggest lengthy lists of principles 
may, however, distract from these four key ideas. The ALRC considers that identifying 
these four central ideas gives greater sharpness and clarity—and power—to the 
National Decision-Making Principles as reflecting the paradigm shift towards 
supported decision-making. 
3.8 There is also a significant shift in the way these principles are expressed, starting 
with a right to make decisions, rather than a presumption of capacity. 
                                                        
2  The Terms of Reference are set out in full on the ALRC website: <www.alrc.gov.au>. Emphasis added. 
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The right to make decisions 
Proposal 3–2 National Decision-Making Principle 1 
Every adult has the right to make decisions that affect their life and to have 
those decisions respected. 
3.9 The principal idea in any discussion of legal capacity is that adults have the right 
to make decisions for themselves. This is frequently expressed in terms of a 
presumption of legal capacity, which may be rebutted if circumstances demonstrate 
that the requisite level of capacity is lacking in that context.
3
 
3.10 In this Inquiry, the ALRC seeks to reflect the paradigm shift evident in the 
language of, and discourse around, the CRPD, and considers that it is necessary to 
place the emphasis on the right of citizens to make decisions, rather than the 
qualification intrinsic to a presumption. The conceptual difficulty in starting with a 
presumption of legal capacity as an overarching principle is that it already contains a 
binary classification—of those who have legal capacity, and those who do not. 
3.11 This is not to suggest that legal capacity may never be lacking. Rather, it is 
better considered, in principles of general application, as a matter going to the question 
of what support is required and the threshold of appointment of others as supporters or 
representatives in a decision-making process.
4
  
3.12 In terms of who has the right expressed in this principle, the ALRC considered 
whether it should be expressed more generally than applicable to adults. The 
Queensland Law Reform Commission (QLRC) used ‘adult’, but the Victorian Law 
Reform Commission (VLRC) considered the principle could have application to young 
people who are able to satisfy the Gillick ‘mature minor’ test endorsed by the High 
Court in Marion’s case.
5
 The ALRC has sought to avoid confusion in the first general 
principle by confining it to adults. The principles dealing with children involve a ‘best 
interests’ standard—a standard deliberately not used in this Inquiry.
6
 
3.13 This does not mean that the National Decision-Making Principles could not have 
a broader application, but only that for the purposes of this Inquiry the ALRC has 
limited the expression to adults—at least as a starting point of reform. The remaining 
Principles are expressed in terms of ‘persons’. 
                                                        
3  See below.  
4  See below. 
5  Secretary, Department of Health and Community Services v JWB and SMB (Marion’s case) (1992) 175 
CLR 218. 
6  See Ch 2. 
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Support 
Proposal 3–3 National Decision-Making Principle 2  
Persons who may require support in decision-making must be provided with the 
support necessary for them to make, communicate and participate in decisions 
that affect their lives. 
3.14 Support is the central theme in the CRPD. The Terms of Reference require the 
ALRC to consider: 
 ‘how decision making by people with impairment that affects their decision 
making can be validly and effectively supported’; and 
 ‘the role of family members and carers and paid supports ... in supporting people 
with disability ... and how this role should be recognised by law and legal 
frameworks’.  
3.15 There are two elements: how a person can be supported in his or her decision-
making; and how the law can give recognition to those who are providing the support. 
The ALRC’s approach is to place the person who may require decision-making support 
at the forefront—as the decision-maker—and to include recognition in law for the 
position of ‘supporters’, both through a mechanism of appointment set out in relevant 
Commonwealth laws, and through including supporters in ‘information loops’ in 
certain situations. The ‘supporter’ model is considered in Chapter 4. 
3.16 National Decision-Making Principle 2 and the Support Guidelines, set out in 
Proposal 3–4, reflect the ALRC’s model of a spectrum of decision-making, from fully 
independent to supported decision-making, including where a person needs to be fully 
supported. They are underpinned by a conceptualisation of autonomy as empowerment, 
as noted in Chapter 1. 
3.17 This Principle expresses the concept of support at a high level. The ALRC seeks 
to place the emphasis on the person as decision-maker not as a person with an 
impairment affecting their decision-making, but rather as a person who may require 
support in making decisions. Such language reflects art 12(3) of the CRPD: 
States Parties shall take appropriate measures to provide access by persons with 
disabilities to the support they may require in exercising their legal capacity. 
3.18 The ALRC considers that the emphasis on support should be strong, so the word 
‘must’ is used in National Decision-Making Principle 2.
7
 It is not prescriptive by 
                                                        
7  Compare the formulation by the VLRC that people ‘with impaired decision-making ability should be 
provided with the support necessary for them to make, participate in and implement decisions that affect 
their lives’: Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) rec 21(c). See 
also the QLRC formulation, ‘the adult’s right to be given any necessary support and access to information 
to enable the adult to make or participate in decisions affecting the adult’s life’: Queensland Law Reform 
Commission, Queensland Law Reform Commission, Review of Qld Guardianship Laws, Final Report 
(2010) rec 7–14(d).  
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whom, and how, the support may be given. The Principle reflects, as remarked by the 
Office of the Public Advocate (Qld),  
a general recognition that the focus must now move from the challenges facing a 
person with disability to the supports that should be provided to enable them to make 
decisions and exercise their legal capacity.8 
3.19 National Decision-Making Principle 2 includes the recognition of 
communication support.
9
 It also reflects some of the general principles contained in the 
National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) (NDIS Act), that ‘[p]eople with 
disability should be supported to participate in and contribute to social and economic 
life to the extent of their ability’.
10
 
Support Guidelines 
Proposal 3–4 Support Guidelines 
(a)  Persons who may require decision-making support should be supported to 
participate in and contribute to all aspects of life. 
(b)  Persons who may require decision-making support should be supported in 
making decisions. 
(c)  The role of families, carers and other significant persons in supporting 
persons who may require decision-making support should be 
acknowledged and respected. 
3.20 The purpose of support is to enhance the ability of people to make decisions and 
exercise choice and control—as the decision-maker. The Support Guidelines concern 
the support that should be provided to persons with disability, who may need support in 
making decisions.  
3.21 The ALRC’s model includes provision for formal recognition of supporters in 
Commonwealth laws and legal frameworks. This is considered in relation to 
Commonwealth supporters and representatives, discussed separately in Chapter 4.  
3.22 The ALRC’s approach is to provide recognition of supported decision-making. 
This goes beyond general statements about the importance of support in the lives of 
people with disability, to the proposal for a model for individual decision-making at 
Commonwealth level in which supporters can be nominated and recognised. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, there is very strong support for models that reflect supported 
decision-making norms and aspirations. 
                                                        
8  Office of the Public Advocate (Qld), Submission 05.  
9  Compare, eg, Adult Guardianship and Trusteeship Act SA 2008 cA4.2 s 2(b); Victorian Law Reform 
Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) rec 21(g).  
10  National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) s 4(2). 
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3.23 The Support Guidelines reflect the Inquiry’s framing principles of dignity, 
autonomy, and inclusion and participation. They are consistent with the general 
principles of the NDIS Act, that people with disability should be supported to: 
 exercise choice, including in relation to taking reasonable risks;
11
 and 
 receive reasonable and necessary supports, including early intervention 
supports.
12
 
3.24 The Support Guidelines reflects the ALRC’s approach that assumptions about 
ability—and the extent of support—should not be based on a person’s disability. As 
one stakeholder commented, ‘[a]ssumptions should ... not be made that a person with 
physical disability will require supported decision-making or substitute decision 
making assistance’.
13
 
3.25 Stakeholders endorsed the recognition of family as supporters. For example, the 
Mental Health Coordinating Council submitted: 
The role of family members and carers should be recognised in Commonwealth laws. 
The supporting policy frameworks must reflect that those assessing capacity and 
supporting decision-making must listen to, learn from and act upon communications 
from the individual and their carers about what is important to each individual. This 
involves acknowledging each individual is an expert on their own life and that their 
‘recovery’ and care involves working in partnership with individuals and their carers 
to provide support in a way that makes sense to them and that assists them realise 
their own hopes, goals and aspirations.14 
3.26 Paragraph (c) of the Support Guidelines is consistent with the NDIS Act 
principle that: ‘The role of families, carers and other significant persons in the lives of 
people with disability is to be acknowledged and respected’.
15
 
Will, preferences and rights 
Proposal 3–5 National Decision-Making Principle 3 
The will, preferences and rights of persons who may require decision-making 
support must direct decisions that affect their lives. 
3.27 The Terms of Reference direct the ALRC to consider ‘how maximising 
individual autonomy and independence’ can be modelled in Commonwealth laws and 
legal frameworks. The ALRC considers that a principle of general application needs to 
embody this emphasis. 
                                                        
11  Ibid s 4(4). The principle is focused on choice ‘in the pursuit of their goals and the planning and delivery 
of their supports’, which are the focus of the NDIS. 
12  Ibid s 4(5). 
13  Physical Disability Council of NSW, Submission 32. 
14  Mental Health Coordinating Council, Submission 07. 
15  National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) s 4(12). 
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3.28 The emphasis on the will and preferences of a person who may require support 
in making decisions is at the heart of the paradigm shift away from ‘best interests’ 
standards—as discussed in Chapter 2. Given that the focus on will and preferences is 
such a key idea in all the discussions, the ALRC considers that it needs to be identified 
as a general principle. It reflects the framing principles of dignity, equality, autonomy, 
and inclusion and participation.  
3.29 There is a range of formulations of this idea, including those of the VLRC and 
the QLRC in their reports on guardianship. In its list of ‘new general principles’, the 
VLRC included the principle that ‘people with impaired decision-making ability ... 
have wishes and preferences that should inform decisions made in their lives’.
16
 The 
QLRC recommended that emphasis should be placed on promoting and safeguarding 
‘the adult’s rights, interests and opportunities’ and ‘the importance of preserving, to the 
greatest extent practicable, the adult’s right to make his or her decisions’.
17
 
3.30 The ALRC has chosen ‘must’ in the formulation of National Decision-Making 
Principle 3, to signal that this general principle has an important role in modelling 
Commonwealth laws. The word ‘direct’ should also be used, rather than a word like 
‘inform’, as ‘direct’ attaches more weight to their will than does ‘inform’. The ALRC 
also considers that the principle should not be qualified by words such as ‘to the 
greatest extent practicable’, which is contained, for example, in the QLRC formulation.  
3.31 CRPD art 12(4) uses the formulation ‘rights, will and preferences’. The ALRC 
formulation follows the logic of the spectrum of decision-making from the will and 
preferences of a person, underpinned by a human rights focus in circumstances where 
the will and preferences of a person cannot be determined.  
3.32 By placing the emphasis on ‘will and preferences’, the emphasis is clearly 
shifted from ‘best interests’ approaches. Even in those examples of approaches where 
‘best interests’ is defined by giving priority to ‘will and preferences’,
18
 the standard of 
‘best interests’ is still anchored conceptually in regimes that the ALRC is seeking to 
distinguish clearly in the National Decision-Making Principles. 
3.33 The inclusion of ‘rights’ is the crucial backdrop. In cases where it is not possible 
to determine the will and preferences of the person, the default position must be to 
consider the human rights relevant to the situation as the guide for the particular 
decision to be made.  
                                                        
16  Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) rec 21(d). 
17  Queensland Law Reform Commission, A Review of Queensland’s Guardianship Laws, Report No 67, 
2010 recs 7–14 (b), (c). 
18  For example, Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK). See discussion in Ch 2. 
60 Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws 
Will, Preferences and Rights Guidelines 
Proposal 3–6 Will, Preferences and Rights Guidelines 
(a)   Threshold: The appointment of a representative decision-maker should be 
a last resort and not as a substitute for appropriate support.  
(b)    Appointment: The appointment of a representative decision-maker should 
be limited in scope, be proportionate, and apply for the minimum time. 
(c)    Supporting decision-making:  
     (i)  a person’s will and preferences, so far as they can be determined, 
must be given effect; 
     (ii)  where the person’s will and preferences are not known, the 
representative must give effect to what the person would likely want, 
based on all the information available, including communicating 
with supporters; and 
     (iii)  if it is not possible to determine what the person would likely want, 
the representative must act to promote and safeguard the person’s 
human rights and act in the way least restrictive of those rights. 
3.34 The Will, Preferences and Rights Guidelines address the determination of will 
and preferences and what happens when the ‘will and preferences’ of a person who 
needs decision-making support cannot, or no longer can, be ascertained. 
3.35 These Guidelines provide detail around the limits on the appointment and mode 
of operation of representative decision-makers that are consistent with the CRPD. Any 
supported decision-making model should reflect the Guidelines. 
Representative Decision-Making Guidelines 
3.36 Paragraph (a) of the Wills, Preferences and Rights Guidelines contains several 
elements. First, there is an acknowledgment that a person may need to be appointed to 
act for another when that other does not have legal capacity to make decisions for 
themselves. Secondly, the person who is appointed is described as a ‘representative 
decision-maker’. Thirdly, the appointment is expressed in limited terms. 
3.37 By including such a threshold the ALRC acknowledges that there are times 
when a person may need to be appointed to act for another, beyond supporting a person 
who remains as the primary decision-maker. The ALRC has chosen a new term to 
reflect the role of the person appointed, to embody the model being proposed in this 
Discussion Paper. By choosing the word ‘representative’ the ALRC seeks to signal that 
the role is not as a ‘substitute’ for the person who requires support. Whatever the 
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understanding of the concept of ‘substitute decision-maker’,
19
 the ALRC considers that 
it is better to create some distance from any controversy surrounding this usage and to 
find a new term.
20
  
3.38 The limitation of the appointment of a representative decision-maker reflects the 
safeguards provision in art 12(4) of the CRPD.  
3.39 The Terms of Reference require the ALRC to consider ‘presumptions about a 
person’s ability to exercise legal capacity’ and ‘how a person’s ability to independently 
make decisions is assessed’. The ALRC considers that the threshold needs to be 
defined in terms which emphasise the ability of a person and proposes Representative 
Decision-Making Guidelines reflecting this approach.  
Proposal 3–7 Representative Decision-Making Guidelines 
Any determinations about a person’s decision-making ability and any 
appointment of a representative decision-maker should be informed by the 
following guidelines: 
(a)  An adult must be presumed to have ability to make decisions that affect 
their life. 
(b)  A person has ability to make a decision if they are able to: 
      (i)  understand the information relevant to the decision and the effect 
of the decision; 
     (ii)  retain that information to the extent necessary to make the 
decision; 
    (iii)  use or weigh that information as part of the process of making the 
decision; and 
     (iv)  communicate the decision. 
(c)   A person must not be assumed to lack decision-making ability on the 
basis of having a disability. 
(d)   A person’s decision-making ability is to be assessed, not the outcome of 
the decision they wish to make. 
(e)  A person’s decision-making ability will depend on the kinds of decision 
to be made. 
(f)  A person’s decision-making ability may evolve or fluctuate over time. 
                                                        
19  See Ch 2. 
20  ‘Representative’ has some established record of usage in the context of deceased estates, where a legal 
personal representative, as executor or administrator with the will annexed, ‘represents’ the will of the 
deceased and must carry out the terms of the will. See, eg, Rosalind Croucher and Prue Vines, 
Succession: Families, Property and Death (LexisNexis Butterworths, 4th ed, 2013) [16.1]. [16.4]. 
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(g)  A person’s decision-making ability must be considered in the context of 
available supports. 
(h)  In communicating decisions, a person is entitled to: 
    (i)  communicate by any means that enables them to be understood; 
and 
    (ii)  have their cultural and linguistic circumstances recognised and 
respected. 
3.40 The Representative Decision-Making Guidelines sit within the Wills, 
Preferences and Rights Guidelines. They are set at a fairly high, general, level. They 
should guide the assessment of decision-making ability, although the exact definition 
of ability and the way in which it is assessed will vary depending on the particular 
context in which the assessment is being made. More fine-grained assessments will 
depend on the kinds of decision to be made. As one stakeholder commented, a tool is 
needed to assess capacity and it should include 
clear legal definitions to determine capacity, and appropriate training on how to use 
the tool, to reduce the risk of incorrect conclusions relating to an individual’s 
capacity21 
3.41 The ALRC acknowledges that capacity assessments are part of a process of 
‘gatekeeping’—and a complement to respect for autonomy. As Dr Mary Donnelly 
explains, 
Where the right of autonomy is recognised, the law has relied on the requirement for 
capacity to act as gatekeeper for the application of the right. Thus, while respect for 
autonomy provides the principled foundation for the law’s approach to decision-
making, the question of whether or not each individual’s decision will actually be 
respected is dependent on whether she meets the legal standard for capacity in respect 
of the decision in question.22 
3.42 Because assessments of capacity have served this gatekeeping role, they ‘sort’ 
people:  
People with capacity represent the norm. Those who do not are defined in contrast to 
this norm; they are, in this sense, the ‘other’.23  
3.43 Although this sorting has negative connotations, the ALRC recognises that some 
form of ‘sorting’ is inescapable in a number of cases. As Donnelly acknowledged, 
‘[w]hile capacity is a flawed gatekeeper, it is nonetheless probably the best way of 
sorting decisions’.
24
 What the ALRC proposes is, however, that the place of such 
assessments be reconsidered—and, in particular, that it is not a starting point in an 
                                                        
21  Physical Disability Council of NSW, Submission 32. 
22  Mary Donnelly, Healthcare Decision-Making and the Law—Autonomy, Capacity and the Limits of 
Liberalism (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 2. 
23  Ibid 3. 
24  Ibid 273. 
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expression of principle. The starting point, as National Decision-Making Principle 1, is 
the right to make decisions. Any assessment should be seen as much further along a 
spectrum, with the focus being squarely on supporting decisions, rather than assessing 
whether or not a person can make a decision. 
3.44 By proposing Representative Decision-Making Guidelines, the ALRC seeks to 
foster a nationally consistent approach. In the Issues Paper the ALRC asked whether 
there should be a nationally consistent approach to defining capacity and assessing a 
person’s ability to exercise their legal capacity; and, if so, what was the most 
appropriate mechanism and what should the key elements be?
25
 Stakeholders supported 
strongly the idea of a nationally consistent approach. For example, the Mental Health 
Coordinating Council said that it agreed 
with the Law Council of Australia that a nationally consistent approach to the 
assessment of capacity in the context of substitute decision-making ‘is highly 
desirable in order to promote greater clarity and ultimately, to more effectively 
provide protection and foster individual autonomy as circumstances require’.26 
3.45 The Representative Decision-Making Guidelines reflect an approach to ability 
that is functional (ability to make the particular decision in question), not outcome-
based (the result or wisdom of the decision), or status-based (because of a condition). 
A functional approach of this kind ‘seeks to maximise the circumstances in which the 
right of autonomy is protected’.
27
 As the Law Commission of England and Wales 
concluded in a review of ‘mental incapacity’ in 1995, status-based assessments should 
be rejected as being ‘quite out of tune with the policy aim of enabling and encouraging 
people to take for themselves any decision which they have capacity to take’.
28
 In that 
inquiry, the Law Commission received a ‘ringing endorsement’ of the functional 
approach.
29
 
3.46 In its extensive inquiry on Queensland’s guardianship laws, the QLRC 
commented that the functional approach is a ‘widely accepted modern capacity 
model’:
30
 
It has been suggested that one of the advantages of the functional approach is that it 
‘best accommodates the reality that decision-making capacity is a continuum rather 
than an endpoint which can be neatly characterised as present or absent’. In contrast to 
the status model, there is no requirement for the presence of a particular type of 
                                                        
25  Australian Law Reform Commission, Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws, Issues 
Paper No 44 (2013) Question 4. 
26  Mental Health Coordinating Council, Submission 07. The submission refers to The Law Council 
Australia, Submission 056 to the House Standing Committee on Health and Ageing, Inquiry into 
Dementia: Early Diagnosis and Intervention (2012) item 21. 
27 Donnelly, above n 22, 92. In recommending such an approach that was subsequently incorporated in the 
Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK), the Law Commission was deliberately rejecting status-based 
assessments: Law Commission, Mental Incapacity, Report No 231 (1995) [3.5]–[3.6].  
28  Law Commission, Mental Incapacity, Report No 231 (1995) [3.3]. 
29  Ibid [3.6].  
30  Queensland Law Reform Commission, Queensland Law Reform Commission, Review of Qld 
Guardianship Laws, Final Report (2010) [7.105]. 
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disability or condition. The relevant question is whether the adult lacks capacity for 
making a decision about a given matter, for whatever cause and for whatever reason.31 
3.47 The ALRC notes some criticism by the UNCRPD of what it described as a 
functional approach in its General Comment on art 12: 
The functional approach attempts to assess mental capacity and deny legal capacity 
accordingly. ... This functional approach is flawed for two key reasons. The first is 
that it is discriminatorily applied to people with disabilities. The second is that it 
presumes to be able to accurately assess the inner-workings of the human mind and to 
then deny a core human right—the right to equal recognition before the law—when an 
individual does not pass the assessment. In all these approaches, a person’s disability 
and or decision-making skills are taken as legitimate grounds for denying his or her 
legal capacity and lowering his or her status as a person before the law. Article 12 
does not permit such discriminatory denial of legal capacity, but rather requires that 
support be provided in the exercise of legal capacity.32 
3.48 When the General Comment was in draft form, the emphasis in this paragraph 
was softened by a later comment that ‘functional tests of mental capacity, or outcome-
based approaches that lead to denials of legal capacity violate Article 12 if they are 
either discriminatory or disproportionately affect the right of persons with disabilities 
to equality before the law’ (emphasis added).
33
 However, the final form of the General 
Comment dropped these words. The ALRC considers that, with appropriate safeguards, 
and a rights emphasis, there is no ‘discriminatory denial of legal capacity’. 
3.49 The starting point of any list of Representative Decision-Making Guidelines 
needs to include a presumption of ability.
34
 It reflects the object of CRPD art 12(2)—
‘that persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all 
aspects of their lives’. It also reflects the ALRC’s framing principles, particularly of 
equality and autonomy. A presumption of capacity is also the starting point of the 
common law as discussed above. It places the onus on those who wish to contest that a 
person has decision-making ability with respect to a particular transaction, or generally. 
3.50 Legislative statements of this presumption often use the word ‘capacity’ and 
include the rider ‘unless it is established that he or she lacks capacity’. The ALRC 
proposes keeping the rider out of the Guidelines, reflecting the rights emphasis of the 
CRPD, rather than its qualification.  
3.51 Paragraph (b) of the Representative Decision-Making Guidelines focuses on 
having ability, rather than not having it: 
                                                        
31  Ibid [7.103]. Citing Law Reform Commission of Ireland, Vulnerable Adults and the Law, Report No 83 
(2006) [2.28]. 
32  United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No 1 (2014) on 
Article 12 of the Convention—Equal Recognition before the Law [13]. 
33  United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Draft General Comment on Article 
12 of the Convention—Equal Recognition before the Law and Draft General Comment on Article 9 of the 
Convention—Accessibility [21]. 
34  See, eg, Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) rec 26. Examples: 
Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK) s 1(2); Adult Guardianship and Trusteeship Act SA 2008 cA4.2 s 2(a); 
Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) ss 5–7, sch 1; National Disability Insurance Scheme 
Act 2013 (Cth) s 17A. See also: NCOSS, Submission 26; Mental Health Coordinating Council, 
Submission 07; Office of the Public Advocate (Qld), Submission 05.  
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(b)  A person has ability to make a decision if they are able to: 
      (i)  understand the information relevant to the decision and the effect of the 
decision; 
      (ii)  retain that information to the extent necessary to make the decision; 
      (iii) use or weigh that information as part of the process of making the 
decision; and 
      (iv)  communicate the decision. 
3.52 There are many other comparable provisions.
35
 The VLRC, for example, 
includes both ‘Defining Capacity’ and ‘Defining Incapacity’, which are mirror images 
of each other.
36
 The ALRC proposes to keep the focus on the affirmation of ability, 
rather than its converse. 
3.53 The formulation in paragraph (c) of the Representative Decision-Making 
Guidelines is suggested to get away from status-based assessments: 
(c) A person must not be assumed to lack decision-making ability on the basis of 
having a disability. 
3.54 It reflects comments by the UNCRPD in its General Comment on Art 12, and its 
criticism of conflating legal and mental capacity: 
Legal capacity and mental capacity are distinct concepts. Legal capacity is the ability 
to hold rights and duties (legal standing) and to exercise these rights and duties (legal 
agency). It is the key to accessing meaningful participation in society. Mental capacity 
refers to the decision-making skills of a person, which naturally vary from one person 
to another and may be different for a given person depending on many factors, 
including environmental and social factors. ... Under article 12 of the Convention, 
perceived or actual deficits in mental capacity must not be used as justification for 
denying legal capacity.37 
3.55 The ALRC has deliberately omitted any qualification, such as ‘solely on the 
basis of disability’ in the proposed guideline. 
3.56 Arnold and Bonython submitted that stereotyping detracts from equality, and 
prevents the ‘flourishing’ of people with disability: 
Ultimately equality is a pernicious abstraction unless it fosters flourishing. Equality is 
significant because inequality is associated with discrimination, in particular the non-
recognition of capabilities on the basis of stereotypes and the retention of barriers to 
the fulfilment of both people with disabilities and people around them.38 
                                                        
35  See, eg, Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK) s 1(3); New South Wales, Attorney General’s Department, 
Capacity Toolkit: Information for Government and Community Workers, Professionals, Families and 
Carers in New South Wales (2008). 
36  Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) recs 24, 25.  
37  United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No 1 (2014) on 
Article 12 of the Convention—Equal Recognition before the Law [12].  
38  B Arnold and Dr W Bonython, Submission 38. The submission of NCOSS to the NDIS Rules also 
strongly rejected decisions based on stereotyping, referred to in its submission to this Inquiry: NCOSS, 
Submission 26. 
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3.57 Paragraphs (e)–(f) of the Representative Decision-Making Guidelines reflect a 
functional assessment of ability: 
(e)  A person’s decision-making ability will depend on the kinds of decision to be 
made. 
(f)    A person’s decision-making ability may evolve or fluctuate over time. 
3.58 These Guidelines may apply to a decision, or types of decision, depending on 
the circumstances. As NCOSS submitted:  
Determinations about capacity must be made not only on a person-by-person basis, 
but also about every separate decision for each person, because people may have 
different capacity to make different decisions at different times.39 
3.59 Other law reform bodies have reached similar conclusions.
40
 The New South 
Wales Legislative Council Standing Committee on Social Issues recommended, for 
example, that 
the legislative definition in NSW should define ‘capacity’ with reference to the ability 
to understand, retain, utilise and communicate information relating to the particular 
decision that has to be made, at the particular time the decision is required to be made, 
to foresee the consequences of making or not making the decision and to separate the 
concepts of ‘incapacity’ and ‘disability’.41 
3.60 Paragraph (d) of the Representative Decision-Making Guidelines rejects an 
outcomes-based approach: 
(d)   A person’s decision-making ability is to be assessed, not the outcome of the 
decision they wish to make. 
3.61 Paragraph (d) captures what is described as ‘the dignity of risk’, which is 
underpinned by the framing principle of autonomy. As Donnelly explains,  
Respect for the liberal principle of autonomy requires that external factors, including 
the outcome of the decision reached and the degree of risk assumed, are irrelevant to 
the determination of capacity. ... [R]espect for autonomy is premised on allowing each 
individual to determine for herself what is good. Therefore, whether or not a person’s 
decision complies with other people’s perception of ‘the good’ is irrelevant to whether 
the person has capacity. In the words of the Law Commission, according a role to the 
nature of the decision reached is inappropriate because it ‘penalises individuality and 
demands conformity at the expense of personal autonomy’.42 
                                                        
39  NCOSS, Submission 26. 
40  See, eg, Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) rec 27(a); 
Legislative Council Standing Committee on Social Issues, Substitute Decision-Making for People 
Lacking Capacity, NSW Parliament (Report 43, 2010) [4.56]. With respect to para (f), compare, eg, 
Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) rec 27(b); Queensland 
Law Reform Commission, Queensland Law Reform Commission, Review of Qld Guardianship Laws, 
Final Report (2010) rec 7–14(d). See also Legislative Council Standing Committee on Social Issues, 
Substitute Decision-Making for People Lacking Capacity, NSW Parliament (Report 43, 2010) rec 1. 
41  Legislative Council Standing Committee on Social Issues, Substitute Decision-Making for People 
Lacking Capacity, NSW Parliament (Report 43, 2010) [4.57]. 
42  Donnelly, above n 22, 101. Citing Law Commission, Mental Incapacity, Report No 231 (1995) [3.4]. 
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3.62 Paragraph (g) of the Representative Decision-Making Guidelines reflects the 
second of the National Decision-Making Principles concerning support: 
(g)   Decision-making ability must be assessed in the context of available supports. 
3.63 The VLRC recommended, similarly, that a person ‘should not be considered to 
lack the capacity to make a decision if it is possible for them to make that decision with 
appropriate support’.
43
 An assessment of ability in terms of support incorporates the 
encouragement of supporting—and thereby enhancing—a person’s ability. The Mental 
Capacity Act 2005 (UK) s 1(3) provides, for example, that ‘[a] person is not to be 
treated as unable to make a decision unless all practicable steps to help him to do so 
have been taken without success’. Donnelly describes this provision as ‘one of the 
most striking innovations’ in the UK Act.
44
  
3.64 Paragraph (h) of the Representative Decision-Making Guidelines focuses on 
communication:  
(h)  In communicating decisions, a person is entitled: 
    (i)  to communicate by any means that enables him or her to be understood; and 
    (ii)  to have his or her cultural and linguistic circumstances recognised and 
respected. 
3.65 The Terms of Reference require the ALRC to consider ‘the use of appropriate 
communication to allow people with disability to exercise legal capacity’. Comparable 
examples include: 
 for (i), the QLRC recommendation that ‘a person is not to be regarded as unable 
to understand the information relevant to a decision if he or she is able to 
understand an explanation of it given to the person in a way that is appropriate 
to his or her circumstances (using simple language, visual aids or any other 
means)’;
45
 and  
 for (ii), the VLRC recommendation that ‘[p]eople with impaired decision-
making ability ... ‘should have their cultural and linguistic circumstances 
recognised and respected by others’.
46
 
Appointment 
3.66 Paragraph (b) of the Will, Preferences and Rights Guidelines provides that: 
The appointment of a representative decision-maker should be limited in scope, be 
proportionate, and apply for the minimum time 
3.67 This proposed guideline reflects CRPD art 12(4)—a safeguards provision 
stipulating that ‘all measures that relate to the exercise of legal capacity provide for 
                                                        
43  Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) rec 27(e). 
44  Donnelly, above n 22, 113. 
45  Queensland Law Reform Commission, Queensland Law Reform Commission, Review of Qld 
Guardianship Laws, Final Report (2010) rec 7–14(c). 
46  Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) rec 21(j). See, also, 
National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) s 5(d).  
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appropriate and effective safeguards to prevent abuse in accordance with international 
human rights law’. The measures referred to relate to decision-making support, and can 
apply to appointment of representative decision-makers, who must be ‘free of conflict 
of interest and undue influence’. The appointments covered by art 12(4) must also be 
‘proportional and tailored to the person’s circumstances, apply for the shortest time 
possible’. A further aspect of art 12(4) is the provision that the ‘measures’ should be 
‘subject to regular review by a competent, independent and impartial authority or 
judicial body’. The ALRC includes this aspect of art 12(4) in the Safeguards Guideline, 
considered below.  
3.68 The Guideline also reflects that, in some circumstances, another person may be 
needed to act for a person who requires full decision-making support.  
Supporting decisions 
3.69 Paragraph (c) of the Will, Preferences and Rights Guidelines provides: 
(c)  Supporting decision-making:  
     (i) a person’s will and preferences, so far as they can be determined, must be 
given effect; 
     (ii) where the person’s will and preferences are not known, the representative 
must give effect to what the person would likely want, based on all the 
information available, including communicating with supporters; 
     (iii) if it is not possible to determine what the person would likely want, the 
representative must act to promote and safeguard the person’s human 
rights and act in the way least restrictive of those rights. 
3.70 This Guideline is a key element in the National Decision-Making Principles and 
reflects the importance of the autonomy of the individual. Decisions for those who may 
require support in making decisions must be directed by the will and preferences of the 
individual. The Office of Public Advocate (Qld) submitted: 
Regardless of views about the compatibility of guardianship laws with the 
Convention, there is general recognition that the focus must now move from the 
challenges facing a person with disability to the supports that should be provided to 
enable them to make decisions and exercise their legal capacity. This means that the 
appointment of a substitute decision-maker should not preclude efforts to support a 
person to make their own decisions.47 
3.71 The challenge in advancing a supported decision-making approach is, as 
Donnelly suggests, ‘to provide meaningful protection for autonomy notwithstanding 
incapacity’.
48
 She wrote that there are two broad ways ‘to protect the autonomy of a 
person lacking capacity’: 
The first involves the preservation of the autonomy of the once capable person 
(sometimes described as precedent autonomy), either through formal advance 
decision-making mechanisms or the less formal means of taking account of past 
views, preferences and opinions in the decision-making proves. The second involves 
                                                        
47  Office of the Public Advocate (Qld), Submission 05.  
48  Donnelly, above n 22, 192. 
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supporting people lacking capacity so as to enable them to participate to the maximum 
degree possible in decision-making. The first of these is most consistent with the 
traditional liberal approach to decision-making for people lacking capacity while the 
second is more in line with the approach favoured by the CRPD.49 
3.72 The starting point in paragraph (c)(i) of the Will, Preferences and Rights 
Guidelines is necessarily the ability to ascertain the will and preferences of the person 
being supported. Ascertaining the will and preferences of a person is central to the 
paradigm shift signalled in the CRPD. It involves an emphasis on participation and 
communication. In practice, however, there will be a limit: cases where it is not 
possible to determine a person’s will and preferences. In practice there may also be 
situations where the will and preferences of a person are known but are likely to cause 
harm to the person or others. Cases of possible harm are considered under the 
Safeguards Guidelines, Proposal 3–9. 
3.73 Paragraph (c)(ii) of the Will, Preferences and Rights Guidelines provides the 
standard for how a representative should act, in circumstances where the supported 
person’s will and preferences are not known. The representative must seek to ascertain 
what the person would likely have wanted in the particular circumstances. This 
requires a consideration of past information about decision-making choices. A key 
source of such information is likely to be the person’s supporters. For example, the 
Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK) includes a list of those who could provide such 
information.
50
 Similar lists have been included in, for example, the Mental Health Act 
2014 (Vic);
51
 and the Mental Health Bill 2013 (WA).
52
 
3.74 Paragraph (c)(iii) of the Will, Preferences and Rights Guidelines is intended to 
embody a ‘human rights’ approach, where the will and preferences cannot be 
determined by any means: 
    (iii) if it is not possible to determine what the person would likely want, the 
representative must act to promote and safeguard the person’s human rights 
and act in the way least restrictive of those rights. 
3.75 The underlying idea in this guideline is that the default position should not be 
expressed in terms of a ‘best interests’ standard.
53
 There are different ways that this 
could be expressed. The VLRC, for example, recommended the ‘promotion of the 
personal and social wellbeing of the person’ to replace ‘best interests’.
54
 The QLRC 
recommended that powers in the amended legislation should be used in a way that 
                                                        
49  Ibid 193. Donnelly notes that the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK) allows for both of these ways. She then 
analyses ‘some of the practical and normative issues to which these legal mechanisms give rise’. 
50  Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK) s 4(6), (7). See also, Guardianship and Administration Act 1993 (SA) s 
5; Guardianship and Management of Property Act 1991 (ACT) ss 4, 5A; Adult Guardianship and 
Trusteeship Act SA 2008 cA4.2 s 2(d). 
51  For example, s 71(4). 
52  For example, pt 2 div 4, ‘Wishes of a person’. 
53  Some have suggested the retention of the ‘best interests’ approach as a fallback. For example, the NSW 
Council for Intellectual Disability submitted that ‘[t]here should also be caution about completely 
dispensing with the best interests approach—it has weaknesses but it also has the strength of being able to 
flexibly accommodate the unique and fluctuating circumstances of an individual’: NSW Council for 
Intellectual Disability, Submission 33. 
54  Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) 536 n 83. 
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‘promotes and safeguards’ and is ‘least restrictive’ of the adult’s ‘rights, interests and 
opportunities’.
55
  
3.76 The kinds of human rights embraced by this guideline include the various 
matters set out in the CRPD, including: 
 respect for inherent dignity—preamble and art 3; 
 non-discrimination—art 5; 
 liberty and security—art 14; 
 freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment—
art 15; 
 physical and mental integrity—art 17; 
 liberty of movement—art 18; 
 independent living—art 19; 
 respect for privacy—art 22; 
 respect for home and family—art 23; and 
 participation in political and public life—art 29. 
3.77 Hence where a representative decision-maker is appointed, the standard to be 
applied in decision-making is to give priority to the will and preferences of the 
person—these must direct the decision or types of decision to be made—but if these 
cannot be determined, decision-making must emphasise the human rights of the person, 
particularly as articulated in the CRPD. Decisions must also be made on the basis of 
the least restrictive option—a point that is also included specifically in the Safeguards 
Principle.
56
  
3.78 While autonomy is a key principle of the CRPD, a human rights approach places 
autonomy in a much wider context. As Donnelly suggests, a human rights framework 
‘provides a mechanism within which to deal with questions of limitations on the right 
of autonomy’: 
The contribution of the CRPD is likely to be most significant in providing human 
rights support for the development of legal obligations to empower patients, in the 
context of capacity assessment, decision-making on behalf of people lacking capacity 
and treatment for a mental disorder.57 
                                                        
55  Queensland Law Reform Commission, Queensland Law Reform Commission, Review of Qld 
Guardianship Laws, Final Report (2010) [5]. 
56  See, eg, Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK) s 1(6); Adult Guardianship and Trusteeship Act SA 2008 cA4.2 s 
2(c); NSW Trustee and Guardian Act s 39(b). See also Mental Health Coordinating Council, Submission 
07; Office of the Public Advocate (Qld), Submission 05.  
57  Donnelly, above n 22, 277. 
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Safeguards 
Proposal 3–8 National Decision-Making Principle 4 
Decisions, arrangements and interventions for persons who may require 
decision-making support must respect their human rights. 
3.79 The Terms of Reference require the ALRC to consider safeguards in asking: ‘are 
the powers and duties of decision-making supporters and substituted decision-makers 
effective, appropriate and consistent with Australia’s international obligations’. The 
Terms of Reference also ask the ALRC to consider mechanisms to review decisions 
about the assessment of a person’s ability ‘to independently make decisions’.
58
 Both 
these matters are included within the Safeguards Guidelines. 
3.80 The Safeguards Guidelines build upon the requirements of art 12(4) of the 
CRPD and reflects the Inquiry’s framing principle of ‘accountability’. As the Caxton 
Legal Centre submitted,  
Key factors in considering models should include monitoring of arrangements, 
provisions for accountability and regular and unscheduled review as safeguards 
against exploitation and abuse.59 
Safeguards Guidelines 
Proposal 3–9 Safeguards Guidelines 
Laws and legal frameworks must contain appropriate safeguards in relation to 
decisions and interventions in relation to persons who may require decision-
making support to ensure that such decisions and interventions are: 
(a) the least restrictive of the person’s human rights; 
(b) subject to appeal; and 
(c) subject to regular, independent and impartial monitoring and review. 
3.81 These Guidelines are expressed in very general terms. They capture the essential 
elements of safeguards that should be incorporated in Commonwealth laws and legal 
frameworks about decision-making support.  
3.82 Paragraph (a) reflects the fact that some decisions and interventions may be 
made contrary to what a person wants—particularly if the wishes and preferences of a 
person may cause harm to themselves or to others. A limitation based on harm puts a 
‘hard edge’ on giving effect to a person’s wishes and preferences. It also tests the limits 
of autonomy, where the limitation concerns harm to oneself. Examples of limitations of 
                                                        
58  The full Terms of Reference are set out on the ALRC website: <www.alrc.gov.au>. 
59  Caxton Legal Centre, Submission 67. 
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this kind are seen usually in the context of mental health legislation: to save a patient’s 
life, or to prevent a patient from seriously injuring themselves or others.
60
 Safeguards 
may be included in terms of ensuring that the course of action proposed is the ‘least 
restrictive’ option.
61
 
3.83 Whenever a limit is included, considerable care will be needed in translating it 
into practice. A provision that a person’s will and preferences may be overridden, 
based on the outcome of that decision—in this case, harm—runs contrary to a focus on 
ability that is not outcomes-based.
62
 But it is not necessarily inconsistent with a 
principle of autonomy. 
3.84 Autonomy is not an absolute. The classical conceptualisation of autonomy, by 
John Stuart Mill, recognised some limit—that it may be limited in order ‘to prevent 
harm to others’.
63
 He gave the example of a wayfarer, summarised by Donnelly as 
follows: 
Mill describes a wayfarer approaching a dangerous bridge in circumstances in which 
it is uncertain whether she is aware of the danger. He states that it is permissible to 
stop the wayfarer and warn her of the dangers ahead but if, following the warning, the 
wayfarer still wishes to proceed, she should be permitted to do so. Mill also 
recognised that interference with individual freedom could be justified in order ‘to 
prevent harm to others’. However, this justification does not allow a wholesale 
overriding of individual freedom. While acknowledging that ‘no person is an entirely 
isolated being’, Mill argued that a person can be stopped from doing something only 
if, in doing that thing, she would ‘violate a distinct and assignable obligation’ to 
others.64 
3.85 Arnold and Bonython defended the need to make decisions on behalf of people 
in some contexts and suggested that this is consistent with human rights law and with 
‘accepted bioethical standards and with the practicalities of both health care and social 
activity’: 
It is axiomatic that all Australians, with or without disabilities, may experience life-
threatening circumstances in which a decision should be made by a medical 
practitioner or other recognised decision-maker within a coherent and transparent 
legal framework to preserve the life of the individual. From a human rights 
perspective it is also axiomatic that interventions that are contrary to the will of some 
individuals will be necessary in order to both preserve the life of those individuals and 
the lives of the intimates or other associates of those individuals.65  
3.86 One of the challenging areas in practice, for applying a limitation based on 
harm, is in the context of restrictive practices, particularly for people with mental 
                                                        
60  See, eg, Mental Health Bill 2013 cl 199(2)(a) regarding the administration of electroconvulsive therapy 
on an involuntary patient. 
61  See, eg, Mental Health Act 2014 (Vic) s 71(3) concerning treatment decisions for patients who either do 
not have capacity to give informed consent, or who do not give informed consent. 
62  See above. 
63  John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (London, 1859) in John Gray (ed) On Liberty and Other Essays (Oxford 
University Press, 1991) 14. 
64  Donnelly, above n 22, 21. Citing John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (London, 1859) in John Gray (ed) On 
Liberty and Other Essays (Oxford University Press, 1991) 107, 14, 88 respectively. 
65  B Arnold and Dr W Bonython, Submission 38. 
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disorders. Restrictive practices are discussed in Chapter 8. At a principle-based level, 
some limitation is appropriate, and is broadly consistent with the framing principles for 
this Inquiry. The challenge in practice, however, is the development of appropriate 
assessment and monitoring tools that are also consistent with the principles on an 
ongoing basis.
66
  
3.87 The ALRC is interested in hearing how best to express the ‘least restrictive’ 
Safeguard Guideline, consistent with a human rights approach and the supported 
decision-making model proposed in this Discussion Paper. 
 
 
                                                        
66  See, eg, the discussion in Donnelly, above n 22, esp ch 6. 
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Summary 
4.1 To encourage the adoption of supported and fully supported decision-making at 
a Commonwealth level, the ALRC proposes a new model for decision-making (the 
Commonwealth decision-making model). This chapter outlines the proposed model, 
the basis of which is the concept of a ‘supporter’ and ‘representative’. The role of both 
supporters and representatives is to support people who may require decision-making 
support to make decisions in the relevant area of Commonwealth law. 
4.2 This chapter first describes the Commonwealth decision-making model and 
discusses the potential application of the model in areas of Commonwealth law, and 
the chosen terminology. 
4.3 The chapter then addresses the key elements of the model. It makes a number of 
proposals and asks questions about: the objects and principles of relevant legislation; 
the appointment, recognition, role and duties of supporters; and appropriate and 
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effective safeguards. The ALRC also proposes introducing the concept of a 
representative, outlines the possible roles and duties of representatives; and asks 
questions about appropriate mechanisms for their appointment and the interaction with 
state and territory appointed decision-makers. 
4.4 Finally, the ALRC makes a number of complementary proposals with respect to 
information sharing and the need for training and guidance. 
Supported decision-making at a Commonwealth level  
Proposal 4–1 Commonwealth laws and legal frameworks should 
encourage supported decision-making by adopting a model for individual 
decision-making consistent with the National Decision-Making Principles and 
Proposals 4–2 to 4–9 (the ‘Commonwealth decision-making model’). 
4.5 In the ALRC’s view, it is desirable to introduce statutory mechanisms for formal 
supported decision-making at a Commonwealth level. A range of stakeholders 
expressed support for the introduction of supported decision-making and its 
introduction in statutory form.
1
  
4.6 The ALRC proposes introducing mechanisms for the appointment of 
‘supporters’ for adults who may require decision-making support, in a number of areas 
of Commonwealth law. The introduction of provisions relating to ‘representatives’ to 
address circumstances in which a person may desire, or require, fully supported 
decision-making, is also proposed.  
4.7 The proposed Commonwealth decision-making model represents a significant 
shift and would require reconfiguration of decision-making approaches. The question 
of how the ALRC’s model interacts with decision-making regimes under state and 
territory law is also discussed below.  
Levels of support 
4.8 Article 12 of the CRPD and National Decision-Making Principle 2 contain the 
key idea of decision-making support. The central idea underlying the Commonwealth 
decision-making model is, therefore, that all adults, except in very limited 
circumstances, have some level of decision-making ability and should be entitled to 
make decisions expressing their will and preferences, but may require varying levels of 
support to do so. The Office of the Public Advocate (Queensland) observed: 
                                                        
1  See, eg, MHCA, Submission 77; Office of the Public Advocate (SA), Submission 17; Office of the Public 
Advocate (Vic), Submission 06. See also, Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final 
Report No 24 (2012) [7.73]–[7.82], which adopted the view that formalisation of supported decision-
making arrangements would be desirable. 
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supported decision‐making ... reflects efforts to provide better ways of recognising 
and meeting the needs of adults who have difficulty with certain areas of 
decision‐making but who could make their own decisions ‘with a little friendly help’.2 
4.9 Rather than starting by questioning whether a person has the capacity to make 
decisions— reflecting a binary view of capacity and decision-making
3
—the preferable 
approach is to ask what level of support, or what mechanisms are necessary, to support 
people to express their will and preferences. This recognises that the ability of a person 
who may require decision-making support ‘to exercise legal agency is dependent on 
the integrity, quality and appropriateness of support available’.
4  
4.10 There are a number of levels of support that a person may require to make a 
decision: 
 No or minimal support—for example, a person may require no support, or 
require some assistance obtaining information, but when provided with the 
information is then able to make the necessary decision. Similarly, the person 
may only require support to communicate to a third party a decision they have 
made. 
 Low to medium support—for example, a person may require support to obtain 
information, have the information explained to them in an appropriate way, and 
receive advice about the possible decisions they might make.  
 High support—for example, a person may require support to obtain information, 
have the information explained to them in an appropriate way, receive advice 
about the possible decisions they might make, communicate their decision, and 
to ensure their decision is given effect to.  
4.11 At each of these levels of support, under the Commonwealth decision-making 
model, a person could appoint a supporter or supporters to assist them to make a 
decision in the particular area of Commonwealth law.  
4.12 There is one other category of support—full support. In such circumstances a 
person may choose fully supported decision-making, or it may be necessary to appoint 
someone to provide that support. Under the Commonwealth decision-making model, a 
representative would support the person to express their will and preferences in order 
to make a decision. Where it is not possible to determine the person’s will and 
preferences, the representative would make a decision based on the person’s will and 
preferences as constructed using the information available, or on the basis of the 
human rights relevant to the situation. This is discussed further in Chapter 3 under the 
Will, Preferences and Rights Guidelines and is consistent with National Decision-
Making Principle 3.  
                                                        
2  Office of the Public Advocate (Qld), Submission 05. The OPA (Qld) referred to Robert M Gordon, ‘The 
Emergence of Assisted (supported) Decision-Making in the Canadian Law of Adult Guardianship and 
Substitute Decision-Making’ (2000) 23 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 61, 71.  
3  See Ch 2.  
4  PWDA, ACDL and AHRC, Submission 66.  
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4.13 Fully supported decision-making differs from substitute decision-making 
because it is ‘based on facilitating access to the enjoyment of existing rights, rather 
than on making decisions on behalf of a person based on a subjective assessment of 
their best interest’.
5
 Importantly, representatives are not intended to replicate nominees 
under existing Commonwealth law. Stakeholders expressed concerns about the 
potential risks arising from a combination of supported and substitute decision-making. 
In particular, there was concern that substitute decision-making could become 
predominant—what Professor Terry Carney and Fleur Beaupert refer to as ‘net 
widening’.
6
 The concept of fully supported decision-making and its development is 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.  
Operation and effect of the model  
Operation 
4.14 The Commonwealth decision-making model provides for formal supported 
decision-making along a spectrum. At one end is a supporter appointed by a person 
who requires decision-making support to assist them to make a decision or category of 
decisions. At the other is fully supported decision-making, which involves the 
appointment of a representative, either by the person who requires decision-making 
support or a court, tribunal or other body. 
4.15 The development of the Commonwealth decision-making model differs from, 
but builds on, the examination and articulation of approaches to supported decision-
making by bodies such as the Victorian Law Reform Commission (VLRC), the Office 
of the Public Advocate (SA), as well as a number of international models.
7
 
4.16 The ALRC intends that a supporter and representative scheme would be 
provided for in particular areas of Commonwealth law, tailored to suit the legislative 
context. However, it would ideally incorporate a number of key elements based on the 
model outlined below. This approach was supported in submissions which suggested, 
for example, that the ALRC ‘explore the idea of consolidating Commonwealth ... 
decision systems or at least having one consistent structure that each system hangs 
off’.
8
 
4.17 The ALRC focuses on a number of key elements of the model, rather than being 
overly prescriptive about the mechanics of its application. For example, the ALRC 
does not intend to outline the formal requirements that may be necessary to facilitate 
the appointment of a supporter, or the way in which a particular Commonwealth 
                                                        
5  Ibid.  
6  Terry Carney and Fleur Beaupert, ‘Public and Private Bricolage—Challenges Balancing Law, Services 
and Civil Society in Advancing CRPD Supported Decision-Making’ (2013) 36 University of New South 
Wales Law Journal 175.  
7  See, eg, Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012); Office of the 
Public Advocate (SA), Submission 17, attachment 1 ‘Stepped Model of Supported and Substitute 
Decision-Making’. See, also, Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK); Michael Bach and Lana Kerzner, ‘A New 
Paradigm for Protecting Autonomy and the Right to Legal Capacity’ (Law Commission of Ontario, 
October 2010); Amnesty International and the Centre for Disability Law and Policy, National University 
of Ireland, Galway, Essential Principles: Irish Legal Capacity Law, 2001. 
8  NSW Council for Intellectual Disability, Submission 33.  
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department or agency might record the appointment, other than to highlight the need 
for information sharing between Commonwealth departments and agencies.  
Effect  
4.18 The implementation of the Commonwealth decision-making model is likely to 
have a number of important outcomes. First, it would ensure that people with disability 
retain decision-making power in areas of Commonwealth law in order to express their 
will and preferences and exercise legal capacity on an equal basis with others. 
4.19 Secondly, formalisation of support relationships would, as emphasised by the 
VLRC in its guardianship report, ‘provide important legal acknowledgment of the fact 
that mechanisms other than substitute decision making can be used to help people 
engage in activities requiring legal capacity’.
9
  
4.20 Thirdly, formalisation of support arrangements in the way envisaged by the 
model is likely to create greater certainty for third parties about the role of supporters 
and facilitate the provision of decision- making support to persons who may require 
it.
10
 This is likely to allow third parties to interact with supporters about decision-
making with greater confidence.  
4.21 A related point is that, by formalising support relationships, the model also 
provides a mechanism for acknowledging and respecting the role of family, carers and 
other supporters in the lives of people with disability, one of the key elements of the 
ALRC’s Support Guidelines.
11
 This may help address some of the difficulties and 
frustrations expressed by stakeholders in the course of this Inquiry.
12
 Such recognition 
may also have the added effect of decreasing applications for state and territory 
guardianship and administration orders initiated primarily for the purposes of engaging 
with Commonwealth Government systems.
13
 As Pave the Way highlighted, 
families are less likely to seek a guardianship or administration order in relation to 
their loved one when government agencies and other organisations recognise their 
role in their family member’s lives.14 
4.22 Finally, if implemented across a range of Commonwealth areas of law, support 
provided in accordance with the model may also facilitate navigation of the 
                                                        
9  Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012), [8.62]. See also: UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Opened for Signature 30 March 2007, 999 UNTS 
3 (entered into Force 3 May 2008). 
10  See, eg, Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012); Disability 
Services Commissioner Victoria, Submission to the Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship 
Inquiry, May 2011 5. In a state and territory context see, eg, Queensland Law Reform Commission, A 
Review of Queensland’s Guardianship Laws, Report No 67, 2010. 
11  See Ch 3.  
12  See, eg, Carer’s Alliance, Submission 84; Carers NSW, Submission 23; Centre for Rural Regional Law 
and Justice and the National Rural Law and Justice Alliance, Submission 20; Office of the Public 
Advocate (SA), Submission 17; Carers Queensland Australia, Submission 14. See also more generally in 
relation to family and carers: G Llewellyn, Submission 82; NMHCCF and MHCA, Submission 81; 
Children with Disability Australia, Submission 68; B Arnold and Dr W Bonython, Submission 38; Office 
of the Public Advocate (SA), Submission 17; Mental Health Coordinating Council, Submission 07. 
13  See, eg, Australian Guardianship and Administration Council, Submission 51.  
14  Pave the Way, Submission 09.  
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‘labyrinth’
15
 of Commonwealth systems by people who require decision-making 
support. 
4.23 In order to guide the adoption of supported decision-making at a 
Commonwealth level, the ALRC makes a range of proposals below that, considered 
together, form the proposed Commonwealth decision-making model.  
4.24 In outlining the model, there are a number of areas and issues in relation to 
which the ALRC seeks further stakeholder input prior to making final law reform 
recommendations. For example, the ALRC asks a question about the most appropriate 
approach to the complex interaction of Commonwealth decision-making structures and 
state and territory appointed decision-makers—an issue highlighted by a range of 
stakeholders in the course of the Inquiry.
16
  
Application of model 
Question 4–1 In what areas of Commonwealth law, aside from the 
National Disability Insurance Scheme, social security, aged care, eHealth and 
privacy law, should the Commonwealth decision-making model apply?  
4.25 It may be beneficial to have consistent decision-making structures across 
Commonwealth law for people who may require decision-making support. However, 
given the significant shift the proposed model represents, and the views of some 
stakeholders and commentators who have emphasised the need for a fuller analysis of 
supported decision-making before wholesale implementation,
17
 the ALRC limits its 
proposals to a number of key areas. 
4.26 The following chapters of this Discussion Paper discuss the potential application 
of the model in a number of areas of Commonwealth law. Chapter 5 discusses the 
application of the model in the context of the NDIS. Chapter 6 discusses its possible 
application in other areas of Commonwealth law, including those that have existing 
decision-making provisions which will require amendment. 
4.27 There are other areas of Commonwealth law to which the Commonwealth 
decision-making model could apply, including for example, Medicare and tax. The 
ALRC is interested in stakeholder comment in relation to these, or other areas of 
Commonwealth law. 
                                                        
15  Youngcare, Submission 34. 
16  See, eg, Financial Services Council, Submission 35; Australian Guardianship and Administration Council, 
Submission 51.  
17  See, eg, Carney and Beaupert, above n 6; Nina Kohn, Jeremy Blumenthal and Amy Campbell, ‘Supported 
Decision-Making: A Viable Alternative to Guardianship’ (2013) 117 Penn State Law Review 1111.  
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Terminology  
Question 4–2 Are the terms ‘supporter’ and ‘representative’ the most 
appropriate to use in the Commonwealth decision-making model? If not, what 
are the most appropriate terms?  
4.28 As outlined in Chapter 2, in light of the often contested nature of terminology, 
and the potential need for a new lexicon in the context of capacity and decision-
making, the ALRC is asking a number of questions about the appropriateness of 
particular terminology. In the context of this chapter, the ALRC is interested in 
stakeholder views on the appropriateness of the terms ‘supporter’ and ‘representative’, 
and suggestions for alternative terms. 
4.29 The term ‘supporter’ is used in the ALRC’s model to reflect the role played by 
an individual or organisation that provides a person with the necessary support to make 
a decision or decisions. The term reflects the nature of the role, and that ultimate 
decision-making power and responsibility remains with the person, with support being 
provided to assist them to make the decision themselves. The term supporter is used in 
a number of jurisdictions, including in a model recommended by the VLRC in its 
guardianship inquiry.
18
 
4.30 The term ‘representative’ is used to signal that the role of a representative is to 
support and represent the will, preferences and rights of the person who requires 
decision-making support.
19
 Representative is preferred over nominee in order to signal 
the shift from existing decision-making arrangements in a number of areas of 
Commonwealth law, including the NDIS and social security, both of which use the 
term nominee. Further, in circumstances where a person who may require decision-
making support has not chosen or ‘nominated’ the person, the term nominee does not 
appropriately reflect the nature of the appointment.  
Objects and principles of Commonwealth legislation 
Proposal 4–2 The objects or principles provisions in Commonwealth 
legislation that involves decision-making by people who may require decision-
making support should reflect the National Decision-Making Principles.  
4.31 The first key component of the ALRC’s proposed approach to reform of 
Commonwealth laws and legal frameworks is the inclusion of supported decision-
making principles under relevant legislation. As a result, the ALRC proposes 
amendment of existing objects or principles provisions contained in relevant 
                                                        
18  Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) rec 30.  
19  A formulation currently used under the Personally Controlled Electronic Health Records Act 2012 (Cth). 
The term representative is also used in other jurisdictions: eg Representation Agreement Act RSBC 1996 
c405 1996. 
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legislation, or where there are no such provisions, their inclusion, to reflect the 
National Decision-Making Principles. This would ensure the National Decision-
Making Principles guide the application and interpretation of the legislation as a whole, 
or the particular division or part that deals with supporters and representatives. This 
approach was supported by a number of stakeholders. For example, the Disability 
Advocacy Network Australia (DANA) submitted that  
it should be an explicit object of legislation in the disability area ... to promote the 
decision making capacity of people with disability, to build the capacity of people 
with disability to make decisions and participate in decision making, and to enable 
access to decision making support for all people with disability whose decision 
making capacity is impaired.20  
Supporters 
4.32 The Commonwealth decision-making model proposed by the ALRC introduces 
the concept of formal supported decision-making at a Commonwealth level. At the 
core of supported decision-making is the idea that people, except in very limited 
circumstances, have some level of decision-making ability and that, with the 
appropriate support, they can be supported to make a decision. The nature and level of 
the support may vary, however the decision remains that of the person who requires the 
decision-making support.  
4.33 A supporter under the model is an individual or organisation appointed by a 
person who may require decision-making support to enable them to make a decision. 
Ultimate decision-making power and responsibility remains with the person who 
requires decision-making support. Supporters should be entitled to support people to 
make any decision relevant to the area of Commonwealth responsibility in relation to 
which they have been appointed, including in relation to financial decisions.  
4.34 A person may appoint whomever they wish as their supporter and may appoint 
more than one. For example, a person may appoint a family member, friend or carer. A 
supporter may play a range of roles, including in relation to information, advice or 
communication. The ALRC does not consider that there should be a requirement that a 
supporter be unpaid.
21
 For example, there may be circumstances in which a paid carer 
may be appointed as a supporter, particularly where the person does not have family 
support or is socially isolated.
22
 Advocacy organisations, which may not be directly 
paid by the person, but which receive funding from government or other sources, may 
in certain instances also be appropriately appointed as a supporter.
23
 A person may also 
appoint, or revoke their appointment of, a supporter at any time.  
                                                        
20  Disability Advocacy Network Australia, Submission 36.  
21  Compare Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) rec 38; Office of 
the Public Advocate (SA), Submission 17 Attachment 1. 
22  See, eg, MHCA, Submission 77; Caxton Legal Centre, Submission 67; ADACAS, Submission 29. See 
also Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) recs 62, 63. 
23  See, eg, discussion of importance of advocates in decision-making regimes: Disability Advocacy 
Network Australia, Submission 36. See also MDAA, Submission 43 in relation to advocates’ authority to 
engage with Centrelink.  
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4.35 There is currently no provision for a supporter, or supporter-type role, which 
reflects the ideas of supported decision-making, in Commonwealth legislation. The 
mechanisms closest to the role of a supporter are Centrelink correspondence 
nominees
24
 and nominated representatives in relation to eHealth.
25
 However, as 
outlined below, these roles differ significantly, particularly with respect to the duties 
owed to the person who may require decision-making support.
26
  
What about informal supporters?  
4.36 Informal supporters and support networks play a vital role in decision-making of 
people with disability. Support under art 12 of the CRPD ‘encompasses both informal 
and formal support arrangements, of varying types and intensity’.
27
 As the VLRC 
stated: 
supported decision making recognises the interdependent nature of most people’s 
lives. Most people make important decisions with personal support (such as advice 
from family, friends or mentors), or sometimes with professional support (for 
example, doctors or accountants).28  
4.37 A number of stakeholders emphasised the important role informal supporters 
play in decision-making and that entitlement to support should include informal 
support.
29
 The Multicultural Disability Advocacy Association of NSW highlighted the 
effect of culture on decision-making and noted ‘the differences in ways decisions are 
made in various cultures’: 
in some cultures decisions are made by individuals, whereas in others, all important 
decisions may be made by the head of the family, or collectively by the local elders, 
or in consultation with other significant members of the family or community 
concerned.30 
4.38 Consistent with these observations, some stakeholders have expressed concerns 
about the potential for over-formalising existing support mechanisms and support 
networks that assist people with disability to make decisions.
31
 In the ALRC’s view, 
the introduction of Commonwealth supporters should not diminish the involvement of, 
or respect for, informal support, including in relation to decision-making.  
4.39 A number of the elements of the Commonwealth decision-making model 
recognise the important role played by informal supporters. For example, the ALRC 
proposes that formal supporters have an obligation to support a person in consulting 
family members, carers and other significant people in their life in the process of 
                                                        
24  Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) ss 123C, 123H. See, also, Department of Social Services, 
Guide to Social Security Law (2014) [8.5.1], [8.5.2].  
25  Personally Controlled Electronic Health Records Act 2012 (Cth) s 7. 
26  See the discussion of social security and eHealth in Ch 6.  
27  United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No 1 (2014) on 
Article 12 of the Convention—Equal Recognition before the Law [15]. 
28  Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) [8.5]. 
29  See, eg, Carers NSW, Submission 23; Office of the Public Advocate (Qld), Submission 05. 
30  MDAA, Submission 43. 
31  See, eg, Law Council of Australia, Submission 83; Queensland Advocacy Incorporated, Submission 45. 
See also in relation to ‘net widening’: Carney and Beaupert, above n 6.  
84 Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws 
making decisions. A similar duty is proposed for representatives. There are also 
specific mechanisms in some areas of Commonwealth law considered in following 
chapters. 
4.40 Importantly, however, the ALRC also makes a number of proposals in relation 
to safeguards, as some informal arrangements are ‘in fact more restrictive ... because 
decisions [are] made informally on a substitute basis by others’.
32
 The formalisation of 
such arrangements and associated safeguards may ensure people are able to exert 
choice and control over decision-making in their lives.  
Appointment and recognition  
Proposal 4–3 Relevant Commonwealth laws and legal frameworks should 
include the concept of a ‘supporter’ and provide that an agency, body or 
organisation may establish supporter arrangements. In particular, laws and legal 
frameworks should reflect the National Decision-Making Principles and provide 
that: 
(a) a person who requires decision-making support should be able to appoint 
a supporter or supporters at any time; 
(b) where a supporter is appointed, ultimate decision-making authority 
remains with the person who requires decision-making support; 
(c) any decision made with the assistance of a supporter should be recognised 
as the decision of the person who requires decision-making support; and 
(d) a person should be able to revoke the appointment of a supporter at any 
time, for any reason.  
4.41 To introduce the concept of formal supported decision-making at a 
Commonwealth level, the ALRC proposes that relevant laws and legal frameworks 
should include the concept of a supporter. The ALRC also proposes that such laws and 
legal frameworks should reflect the National Decision-Making Principles and specifies 
a number of key elements relating to the appointment and recognition of a supporter or 
supporters that should be incorporated into any supporter scheme.  
4.42 The most important elements of the proposal are recognition that, where a 
supporter is appointed, ultimate decision-making authority remains with the person 
who requires decision-making support, and that any decision made with the assistance 
of a supporter must be recognised as the decision of the person who requires that 
support.
33
 These elements are intended to ensure that decisions are made by the people 
                                                        
32  Office of the Public Advocate (SA), Submission 17 attachment 1, 31. See, also, Australian Guardianship 
and Administration Council, Submission 51. 
33  The VLRC made a similar recommendation: Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final 
Report No 24 (2012) rec 46.  
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who require support, but also that support may be required to make or convey a 
decision, which in turn maximises autonomy, and allows for dignity of risk. 
4.43 The other two elements of the proposal relate to ensuring that a person is able to 
exercise choice and control in relation to the appointment, or revocation of the 
appointment, of their supporter or supporters. There does not appear to be an 
equivalent power under existing Commonwealth decision-making regimes. For 
example, s 123E of the Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth), which relates 
to suspension and revocation of nominee appointments, does not make provision for 
the person who has a nominee appointed to request suspension or revocation.
34
 The 
importance of this power was emphasised by stakeholders.
35
 
Role and duties  
Potential roles of a supporter 
Proposal 4–4 A Commonwealth supporter may perform the following 
functions:  
(a) assist the person who requires decision-making support to make 
decisions; 
(b) handle the relevant personal information of the person; 
(c) obtain or receive information on behalf of the person and assist the person 
to understand information; 
(d) communicate, or assist the person to communicate, decisions to third 
parties; 
(e) provide advice to the person about the decisions they might make; and 
(f) endeavour to ensure the decisions of the person are given effect. 
4.44 A supporter may perform a number of roles for a person who requires decision-
making support. The ALRC proposes that relevant Commonwealth laws and legal 
frameworks should provide that supporters may exercise some or all of the roles 
outlined in Proposal 4–4. 
4.45 For example, a supporter may need to obtain relevant information and explain it 
to the person they are supporting in a way that is easily understood, or provide advice 
to the person about the decisions the person might make. This role in the collection and 
                                                        
34  Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) s 123E.  
35  See, eg Physical Disability Council of NSW, Submission 32. See also Victorian Law Reform 
Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) rec 54.  
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explanation of information is provided for under a number of existing and proposed 
models of supported decision-making.
36
 
4.46 A related role is the handling of relevant personal information of the person 
being supported. In view of stakeholder submissions highlighting the difficulties that 
family members and carers often face in attempting to access information, it is 
important that supporters are able to handle the relevant personal information of the 
person they are supporting. The operation of the Privacy Act 1998 (Cth) and the 
possible need for supporters under that Act is discussed in Chapter 6.  
4.47 In circumstances where a person who may require decision-making support 
experiences difficulty communicating, the supporter may either assist them to 
communicate a decision, or in some circumstances may communicate the person’s 
decision to third parties. Where a supporter is purportedly communicating a person’s 
decision, it may be necessary for the relevant Commonwealth department or agency to 
include additional safeguards to ensure that there is no abuse of the supporter’s role or 
duties. This communication-related role is currently provided for under a number of 
models.
37
 
4.48 A supporter may also play a role in endeavouring to ensure that the decision of 
the person is given effect. They may, for example, contact the relevant Commonwealth 
department or agency to follow up on the information provided, or the decision, or 
provide assistance for the person to seek review of a decision which they consider does 
not appropriately reflect their will and preferences. However, it would be a matter for 
individual supporters to determine the extent to which they are able to play this role, 
depending on the circumstances of the person who requires decision-making support 
and the particular decision. This role is also provided for currently under some 
decision-making models.
38
 
Supporter duties 
Proposal 4–5 Relevant Commonwealth laws and legal frameworks should 
provide that Commonwealth supporters must:  
(a)  support the person requiring decision-making support to make the 
decision or decisions in relation to which they were appointed; 
(b)  support the person requiring decision-making support to express their will 
and preferences in making a decision or decisions; 
                                                        
36  See, eg, Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) rec 43; Adult 
Guardianship and Trusteeship Act SA 2008 cA4.2 div 1, s 4(2); Decision Making, Support and Protection 
to Adults Act SY 2003 c21 sch A, pt 1, s 5(1). 
37  See, eg, Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) rec 43; Adult 
Guardianship and Trusteeship Act SA 2008 cA4.2 div 1, s 4(2); Decision Making, Support and Protection 
to Adults Act SY 2003 c21 sch A, pt 1, s 5(1).  
38  Decision Making, Support and Protection to Adults Act SY 2003 c21 sch A, pt 1, s 5(1); Mental Capacity 
Act 2005 (UK) s 36(3). 
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(c)  act in a manner promoting the personal, social, financial, and cultural 
wellbeing of the person who requires decision-making support; 
(d)  act honestly, diligently and in good faith; 
(e)  support the person requiring decision-making support to consult with 
‘existing appointees’, family members, carers and other significant people 
in their life in making a decision; and 
(f)  assist the person requiring support to develop their own decision-making 
ability. 
For the purposes of paragraph (e), ‘existing appointee’ should be defined to 
include existing Commonwealth supporters and representatives and a person or 
organisation who, under Commonwealth, state or territory law, has guardianship 
of the person, or is a person appointed formally with power to make decisions 
for the person.  
4.49 The duties of supporters should be set out in the legislation relevant to the area 
of Commonwealth law. 
4.50 The first duty should be to act only within the scope of their appointment. This 
does not preclude supporters acting informally, or a person appointing a supporter in 
relation to a broader range of decisions than initially envisaged. 
4.51 Supporters should be required to act in a manner that promotes the personal, 
social, financial, and cultural wellbeing of the person who requires decision-making 
support.  
4.52 This duty is similar to the duty imposed on nominees under the National 
Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) (NDIS Act) to act in a manner that 
promotes personal and social wellbeing,
39
 but adds elements relating to financial and 
cultural wellbeing. Given the potential role of supporters in supporting people to make 
decisions which relate to finances, the ALRC considers financial wellbeing to be an 
important inclusion. In addition, the importance of cultural wellbeing and sensitivity 
was highlighted by a number of stakeholders.
40
 The exact nature and content of this 
duty is likely to require further articulation, including in supporting material in specific 
areas of Commonwealth law.  
4.53 Should supporters have any personal liability for decisions made by the person 
being supported? The VLRC commented that the extent to which supporters should be 
liable in such circumstances is ‘challenging’. While it can be argued ‘that the supported 
person should be responsible for the consequences of any decisions made within a 
supported arrangement because they retain decision-making authority’, the VLRC 
concluded that the law the law should ‘recognise that the support relationship is one of 
                                                        
39  National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) s 80(1).  
40  See, eg, MDAA, Submission 43.  
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special trust and confidence, and the supported person is likely to be in a position of 
vulnerability relative to their supporter’: 
Therefore, to avoid doubt, the law should designate the relationship between a 
supporter and the supported person as fiduciary. Supporters who fail to comply with 
their fiduciary obligations will leave themselves open to the full range of equitable 
remedies that are available in these circumstances.41  
4.54 The ALRC acknowledges that the issue of the potential liability of supporters 
(and representatives) is a difficult one. In the case of supporters, ultimate decision-
making authority rests with the person who requires decision-making support, and 
therefore why should a supporter be held liable for any consequences arising from the 
decision or decisions? The ALRC is interested in stakeholder views on the question of 
the standard of the duty of supporters. 
Question 4–3 In the Commonwealth decision-making model, should the 
relationship of supporter to the person who requires support be regarded as a 
fiduciary one? 
4.55 The ALRC also proposes a duty to facilitate consultation. A number of 
stakeholders highlighted the importance of ensuring supporters (and representatives) 
consult family members, carers and other significant people in the life of the person 
who may require decision-making support.
42
 However, these submissions were 
primarily responding to decision-making circumstances involving substitute decision-
making. Rather than imposing a duty on supporters to consult, the ALRC considers it 
may be more appropriate to propose a duty to facilitate desired consultation, between a 
person requiring decision-making support and with family, carers and other significant 
people in the life of the person.  
4.56 In order to facilitate the appropriate interaction of supporters with existing state 
and territory appointed decision-makers, discussed in more detail later in the chapter, a 
supporter should have a duty to facilitate consultation with existing appointees. The 
description of ‘existing appointee’ is similar to the one in the NDIS Act.
43
 This duty 
may, in part, address concerns such as those expressed by the Financial Services 
Council about the need for ‘access to critical and relevant information, by a [state or 
territory] duly appointed decision-maker’.
44
 
4.57 Finally, the ALRC is interested in stakeholder views on the appropriateness of 
imposing an obligation on supporters to develop the capacity of the person being 
supported to make their own decisions. This would mirror an obligation imposed on 
nominees under the National Disability Insurance Scheme (Nominee) Rules 2013 
                                                        
41  Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) [8.128]–[8.130]. See Ibid 
recs 59–61. 
42  See, eg, Carers Queensland Australia, Submission 14. 
43  National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) s 88(4).  
44  Financial Services Council, Submission 35. 
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(Cth).
45
 The nature and content of the obligation is likely to vary according to the 
circumstances of the appointment. For example, the identity of the supporter will affect 
their ability to develop the person’s capacity, as will resource constraints.  
4.58 The ALRC welcomes stakeholder feedback on the duties contained in the 
proposal, and whether there should be any additional duties of supporters. The ALRC 
considers a high level of responsibility and the imposition of particular duties is 
important. However, there may be concerns about unintended consequences, including, 
for example, people being deterred from acting as supporters. 
Safeguards  
Question 4–4 What safeguards in relation to supporters should be 
incorporated into the Commonwealth decision-making model?  
4.59 As outlined in Chapter 3, art 12(4) of the CRPD requires that all measures 
relating to the exercise of legal capacity provide for appropriate and effective 
safeguards. The balance between ensuring supporters and decisions made under 
support arrangements are subject to appropriate safeguards, and avoiding over-
regulation of supporters is a delicate one. Excessive regulation may 
discourage honest people from accepting an appointment as a supporter. Too much 
regulation would also have a tendency to undermine the important relationship of trust 
between a supporter and a supported person.46 
4.60 There needs to be a number of safeguards and recognition of the different 
purposes of safeguards. For example, some are designed to protect the person who may 
require decision-making support from abuse, neglect or exploitation; others may be 
required to ‘ensure that a decision made under a supported decision making 
arrangement truly expresses and effects the wishes of the person with disability’.
47
  
4.61 The Office of the Public Advocate (Vic) highlighted that ‘supported decision-
making does open up the possibility of conflict, undue influence, abuse and 
exploitation’.
48
 Similarly, Bruce Arnold and Dr Wendy Bonython submitted that 
factors such as undue, or inappropriate, influence are not specific to decision-making 
by disabled people; nonetheless steps should be taken to ensure that their decision-
making—particularly decision-making with serious consequences, such as extensive 
or potentially high risk medical treatment, or decisions about care—are not a 
consequence of inappropriate consideration of factors of this type.49 
                                                        
45  National Disability Insurance Scheme (Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth) r 5.10. See also Mental Capacity Act 
2005 (UK) s 4(4). 
46  Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012). [8.120]  
47  Caxton Legal Centre, Submission 67.  
48  Office of the Public Advocate Victoria, Supported Decision-Making: Background and Discussion Paper 
(2009) 25.  
49  B Arnold and Dr W Bonython, Submission 38. 
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4.62 The Australian Guardianship and Administration Council (AGAC) observed 
that: 
Supported decision making schemes must ‘value-add’ to informal decision making 
schemes by providing accountability structures and transparency. Like guardianship 
systems, supported decision making systems must also have clear systems for 
avoiding, so far as possible, the inclusion of supported decision makers who may use 
that position to abuse a person with a disability.50  
4.63 While it is difficult to protect people who may require decision-making support 
from abuse and neglect in all instances, there are a number of potential safeguards with 
respect to supporters under the Commonwealth decision-making model. The key 
safeguards include:  
 the proposed duties of supporters;  
 the ability of the person who requires decision-making support to revoke the 
appointment at any time;  
 provision for appointment of more than one supporter; and  
 the provision of guidance and training to people who require decision-making 
support, supporters and Commonwealth departments and agencies interacting 
with supporters.  
4.64 The ALRC would be interested in stakeholder feedback about what other 
safeguards may be appropriate for supporters. For example, in British Columbia to 
safeguard against financial abuse a monitor must be appointed to oversee the person 
providing support except in certain circumstances.
51
 Other suggestions made to the 
VLRC in its guardianship inquiry included: registration of arrangements; police checks 
on appointments; and appointment of monitors.
52
  
Representatives  
Proposal 4–6 Relevant Commonwealth legislation should include the 
concept of a ‘representative’ and provide that an agency, body or organisation 
may establish representative arrangements. In particular, legislation should 
contain consistent provisions for the appointment, role and duties of 
representatives, and associated safeguards, and reflect the National Decision-
Making Principles. 
4.65 In certain circumstances, a person may require full support in decision-making. 
The ALRC proposes the introduction of Commonwealth representatives as a 
                                                        
50  Australian Guardianship and Administration Council, Submission 51.  
51  Representation Agreement Act RSBC 1996 c405 1996 ss 12(1), (2).  
52  Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012), [8.57].  
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mechanism for the provision of fully supported decision-making in areas of 
Commonwealth law.  
4.66 A representative should only be appointed as a last resort and in limited 
circumstances. A representative under the model is an individual or organisation 
appointed by a person who requires decision-making support, or through some other 
mechanism (discussed below). A representative would support a person to make 
decisions and express their will and preferences in making decisions; determine the 
person’s will and preferences and give effect to them; or consider the human rights 
relevant to the situation in making a decision. 
4.67 As with supporters, the introduction of representatives would occur under 
specific Commonwealth legislation and needs to be tailored to suit the particular 
legislative context. The ALRC proposes a number of key core elements of any 
Commonwealth representative regime. 
4.68 The ALRC does not intend to make proposals with respect to different 
categories of representatives. However, consistent with the ALRC’s approach to 
ensuring that fully supported decision-making is the least restrictive alternative and the 
scope of the appointment is as narrow in scope as possible, consideration will need to 
be given to possible categories or types of representatives in implementing the 
Commonwealth decision-making model.  
Appointment 
Question 4–5 What mechanisms should there be at a Commonwealth level 
to appoint a representative for a person who requires full decision-making 
support?  
4.69 There are a number of ways a representative may be appointed. The most 
straightforward mechanism involves a person appointing their own representative. A 
person may choose to appoint a representative—including in circumstances where they 
have decision-making ability but would prefer to appoint a representative, or in 
anticipation of losing decision-making ability.
53
  
4.70 It may also be necessary or appropriate to incorporate other appointment 
mechanisms into the model to account for circumstances where a person may not be in 
a position to appoint their own representative, but requires fully supported decision-
making in an area of Commonwealth law. The ALRC would be interested in 
stakeholder feedback on what mechanisms there should be at a Commonwealth level to 
appoint a representative for a person who requires full decision-making support.  
4.71 There are a number of other potential options for appointment, either through a 
central Commonwealth mechanism, or in a specific area of Commonwealth law. For 
example, it may be appropriate to confer jurisdiction on a court, tribunal or other body 
                                                        
53  This is like the appointment of enduring or lasting powers of attorney. 
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to appoint representatives. In some senses appointment by a court, tribunal or other 
body might operate similarly to current appointment of state and territory guardians 
and administrators. However, given the different nature of the role, any court, tribunal 
or body conferred with such jurisdiction would need to be guided by considerations 
different from those currently provided for under Commonwealth, state and territory 
law. AGAC suggested a mechanism along these lines, submitting that the 
Commonwealth could develop ‘a single scheme for assessment of the need for a 
representative in these decision making areas, with a system for impartial appointment 
and review’.
54
 AGAC also submitted that an alternative may be ‘a more fully 
developed symbiosis with State and Territory substitute decision making schemes’.
55
  
4.72 Another option may be to provide for the appointment of a representative by the 
relevant Commonwealth department or agency, as is currently permitted in the context 
of the NDIS and social security. For example, the Social Security (Administration) Act 
1999 (Cth) provides for appointment of a ‘nominee’, as does the NDIS Act. However, 
stakeholders expressed significant concerns about an agency head or their delegate 
having the power to make such an appointment,
56
 and about the considerations relevant 
to making an appointment.  
4.73 In light of such concerns, the ALRC is interested in stakeholder views on 
whether there should be a very confined power for an agency head to appoint a 
representative in some limited circumstances, and about what considerations should be 
taken into account. For example, should the desirability of appointing an existing 
Commonwealth supporter or representative, or a state or territory appointed decision-
maker, be a factor that must be considered?
57
 
4.74 In addition to possible appointment by a court, tribunal or other body, or in 
limited circumstances by an agency head, the ALRC is interested in stakeholder views 
on possible mechanisms at a Commonwealth level for the appointment of a 
representative for a person who requires full decision-making support. 
Role and duties 
Potential roles of a representative 
Proposal 4–7 A Commonwealth representative may perform the following 
functions:  
(a) assist the person who requires decision-making support to make 
decisions; 
(b) handle the relevant personal information of the person; 
                                                        
54  Australian Guardianship and Administration Council, Submission 51.  
55  Ibid.  
56  See, eg, Children with Disability Australia, Submission 68; Disability Advocacy Network Australia, 
Submission 36; Physical Disability Council of NSW, Submission 32. 
57  For example, an amended form of the considerations under r 3.14 of the National Disability Insurance 
Scheme (Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth). See also considerations as recommended in the Victorian Law 
Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012). 
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(c) obtain or receive information on behalf of the person and assist the person 
to understand information; 
(d) communicate, or assist the person to communicate, decisions to third 
parties; 
(e) provide advice to the person about the decision they might make; and 
(f) endeavour to ensure the decisions of the person are given effect.  
4.75 The ALRC proposes that a representative may perform the same roles as a 
supporter in supporting a person who requires decision-making support to make a 
decision or decisions. These roles are discussed in more detail below. 
Representative duties 
Proposal 4–8 Relevant Commonwealth laws and legal frameworks should 
provide that Commonwealth representatives must: 
(a) support the person requiring decision-making support to express their will 
and preferences in making decisions; 
(b) where it is not possible to determine the wishes of the person who 
requires decision-making support, determine what the person would 
likely want based on all the information available; 
(c) where (a) and (b) are not possible, consider the human rights relevant to 
the situation; 
(d) act in a manner promoting the personal, social, financial and cultural 
wellbeing of the person who requires decision-making support; 
(e) support the person who requires decision-making support to consult with 
‘existing appointees’, family members, carers and other significant people 
in their life when making a decision; and 
(f) assist the person who requires support to develop their own decision-
making ability. 
For the purposes of paragraph (e), ‘existing appointee’ should be defined to 
include existing Commonwealth supporters and representatives and a person or 
organisation who, under Commonwealth, state or territory law, has guardianship 
of the person, or is a person appointed formally with power to make decisions 
for the person.  
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4.76 A representative should have the same duties as a supporter, as well as a number 
of additional duties. It is important that representatives owe duties under the relevant 
Commonwealth legislation, even where they are an existing state or territory appointed 
decision-maker and are subject to duties under state and territory legislation.  
4.77 The ALRC has outlined, in the context of supporters, some of the duties that a 
representative should have. The ALRC seeks stakeholder input on the appropriateness 
of these duties applying to both supporters and representatives. For example, in relation 
to the duty to develop the decision-making ability of the person being supported, the 
nature and content of the obligation should probably vary, according to the 
circumstances of the appointment. It would be unreasonable to expect a representative 
to fulfil this duty in circumstances where a person does not, and is unlikely ever to 
have, the ability to make decisions. 
4.78 The key additional duties the ALRC considers may be appropriate for 
representatives include the duty to support the person who requires decision-making 
support to express their ‘will, preferences and rights’. The ALRC prefers this 
obligation to the objective ‘best interests’ test which currently applies to nominees 
under existing Commonwealth legislation and to state and territory appointed decision-
makers.
58
 This shift away from the best interests test received significant support from 
a wide range of stakeholders
59
 and is discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, including in 
relation to the corresponding principle of the National Decision-Making Principles.  
4.79 In circumstances in which a representative is providing full support and needs to 
determine the will and preferences of the person because they are unable to 
communicate that will and those preferences, the representative must determine what 
the person would likely want based on all the information available. This may, for 
example, involve consideration of decisions the person has made in the past. If that is 
not possible, consideration should turn to the human rights relevant to the situation. 
Ultimately, however, this approach requires decision-making ‘based on facilitating 
access to the enjoyment of existing rights, rather than on making decision on behalf of 
a person based on a subjective assessment of their best interest’.
60
 
Safeguards 
Proposal 4–9 The appointment and conduct of Commonwealth 
representatives should be subject to appropriate and effective safeguards.  
4.80 Consistent with National Decision-Making Principle 4 and art 12(4) of the 
CRPD, the ALRC proposes that the appointment and conduct of Commonwealth 
representatives be subject to appropriate and effective safeguards. 
                                                        
58  See, eg, Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) s 123O. 
59  See, eg, PWDA, ACDL and AHRC, Submission 66; Qld Law Society, Submission 53. 
60  PWDA, ACDL and AHRC, Submission 66. 
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4.81 Article 12(4) of the CRPD requires that all measures relating to the exercise of 
legal capacity provide for appropriate and effective safeguards. In particular, it requires 
that such safeguards: 
 respect the rights, will and preferences of the person; 
 are free of conflict of interest and undue influence; 
 are proportional and tailored to the person’s circumstances; 
 apply for the shortest time possible;  
 are subject to regular review by a competent, independent and impartial 
authority or judicial body; and 
 are proportional to the degree to which such measures affect the person’s rights 
and interests.
61
 
4.82 There needs to be a number of safeguards and recognition of the different 
purposes of safeguards with respect to representatives. For example, some safeguards 
are designed to protect the person who may require decision-making support from 
abuse, neglect or exploitation. Other safeguards are designed to protect the appointed 
representative.  
4.83 The ALRC does not intend to be overly prescriptive with respect to the nature or 
operation of the safeguards which should apply to the appointment and conduct of 
representatives. However, the ALRC considers the elements outlined in art 12(4) 
represent the key safeguard elements of any Commonwealth representative scheme. In 
light of those elements, it may be necessary for the Australian Government to consider 
the following in implementing the Commonwealth decision-making model in areas of 
Commonwealth law: 
 mechanisms for review and appeal of the appointment of representatives, 
including on the application of any interested party; 
 the potential for representatives to be periodically required to make declarations 
regarding compliance with their duties;
62
 
 reporting obligations on representatives with respect to decisions, for example 
provision of a report, inventory or accounts;
63
  
                                                        
61  UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Opened for Signature 30 March 2007, 999 
UNTS 3 (entered into Force 3 May 2008) art 12(4). 
62  Note, however the VLRC did not favour this form of compliance requirement: Victorian Law Reform 
Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) [18.105].  
63  See, eg, National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) s 84; Social Security (Administration) Act 
1999 (Cth) s 123L; Department of Social Services, Guide to Social Security Law (2014) [8.5.3]; Victorian 
Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) recs 297–302. 
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 considering the powers of any Commonwealth body conferred with jurisdiction 
to appoint a representative to ensure it is capable of responding to instances of 
abuse, neglect or exploitation; 
 considering the role of Commonwealth departments and agencies in monitoring, 
auditing and investigating the conduct of representatives;
64
 and 
 considering the broader applicability of safeguards envisaged under any NDIS 
quality assurance and safeguards framework.  
Interaction with other appointed decision-makers  
Question 4–6 How should supporters and representatives under the 
Commonwealth decision-making model interact with state or territory appointed 
decision-makers? 
4.84 One of the key difficulties in applying the Commonwealth decision-making 
model is determining the appropriate interaction of supporters and representatives with 
other supporters and representatives and state and territory appointed decision-makers, 
such as guardians and administrators.  
4.85 Stakeholders such as the Financial Services Council submitted that ‘harmony 
between State and Territory Guardianship and Administration laws and 
Commonwealth laws is highly desirable so as to enhance the effectiveness of disability 
services on a national level’.
65
 
4.86 There are a number of possible approaches to the issue of interaction between 
supporters and representatives, and state or territory appointed decision-makers. The 
ALRC is interested in stakeholder feedback on this issue, including on two possible 
approaches outlined below.  
4.87 Under the first approach, which reflects the current position, it is possible to 
have a Commonwealth supporter or representative and a state or territory appointed 
decision-maker. 
4.88 Under a second possible approach, where a state or territory decision-maker has 
been appointed, a new assessment of the support needs of the participant should be 
undertaken for Commonwealth purposes.  
Possible approaches 
4.89 Under the first approach, it is possible to have a Commonwealth supporter or 
representative and a state or territory appointed decision-maker. In circumstances 
where they are appointed in relation to different decisions or areas of decision-making, 
                                                        
64  See, however, Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) [18.106]–
[18.107].  
65  Financial Services Council, Submission 35. See, also, Law Council of Australia, Submission 83. 
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this should operate without difficulty and may be facilitated by amendment of state and 
territory legislation to ensure state and territory appointments are as confined in scope 
and time as possible and, therefore, less likely to overlap with any Commonwealth 
appointment.  
4.90 In circumstances where there is some overlap between the areas of decision-
making in relation to which they have been appointed, there is a need to ensure that the 
authority of the state and territory decision-maker ‘is recognised under the 
Commonwealth Scheme’.
66
  
4.91 As a result, there is also a need to consider mechanisms for resolving any 
conflict between the two. In some circumstances, s 109 of the Australian Constitution 
may operate to ensure that the responsibility of a state or territory appointed decision-
maker extends only to those areas not covered by the decision-making powers of the 
Commonwealth representative. 
4.92 Where the scope of state or territory decision-making powers are not 
inconsistent with those of a Commonwealth decision-maker, harmonisation 
mechanisms may need to be considered. Stakeholders submitted that, to the greatest 
extent possible,  
where there are several systems in which a person may have an appointed 
decision‐maker, those systems must integrate and, where appropriate, allow the same 
decision‐maker to act in all systems.67 
4.93 The ALRC suggests that it may be beneficial to propose a duty to facilitate 
consultation between Commonwealth, state and territory appointees, and to permit, but 
not require, that one person act under all systems. Importantly, under the ALRC model, 
representatives and state or territory appointed decision-makers will be subject to the 
relevant duties arising from the legislation under which they were appointed, which 
may differ. 
4.94 Under a second possible approach, where a state or territory decision-maker has 
been appointed, a new assessment of the support needs of the participant should be 
undertaken for Commonwealth purposes. If the person requires fully supported 
decision-making, then a representative should be appointed, either by the person, or 
using a Commonwealth appointment mechanism. Under this approach, the ALRC 
considers that the appointment of the existing state or territory appointed decision-
maker as a representative should be permitted and encouraged, but not automatic. 
4.95 A number of stakeholders expressed the view that it would desirable for people 
to have one Commonwealth representative, who is also the relevant state or territory 
appointed decision-maker.
68
 For example, the Financial Services Council submitted 
                                                        
66  Australian Guardianship and Administration Council, Submission 51.  
67  Office of the Public Advocate (Qld), Submission 05. 
68  See, eg, Australian Guardianship and Administration Council, Submission 51; Financial Services Council, 
Submission 35. 
98 Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws 
that, in the context of the NDIS, state and territory appointed decision-makers should 
be the default nominee.
69
  
4.96 This approach would make provision for the recognition of existing state and 
territory appointed decision-makers but would also provide sufficient flexibility to 
allow for circumstances where it is not appropriate for a state or territory appointed 
decision-maker to be a representative for Commonwealth purposes.  
4.97 Even where an existing representative or state or territory appointed decision-
maker was appointed, the appointee would be subject to the provisions of the particular 
Commonwealth legislation relating to their role and duties, and associated safeguards.  
Information sharing  
Proposal 4–10 The Australian Government should develop mechanisms for 
sharing information about appointments of supporters and representatives, 
including to avoid duplication of appointments. 
4.98 The appointment of supporters and representatives in accordance with the 
Commonwealth decision-making model would represent a significant reform to current 
Commonwealth decision-making arrangements. As outlined earlier in this chapter, one 
of the key effects is likely to be to provide greater certainty for third parties about the 
role of supporters and facilitate their provision of support to the person who may 
require decision-making support.
70
 This will allow third parties, such as 
Commonwealth departments and agencies, to interact with those providing decision-
making support with greater confidence. 
4.99 It may also address the frustrations expressed by stakeholders such as the Carers 
Alliance, who submitted that ‘there should be seamless sharing of information (by prior 
consent) to avoid the continuous and interminable requirements to complete forms’.
71
  
4.100 In order to have such an effect, there is a need for information sharing between 
Commonwealth departments and agencies, and potentially also state and territory 
bodies, with respect to the appointment of supporters, representatives and state and 
territory appointed decision-makers.  
4.101 Accordingly, the ALRC proposes that the Australian Government, through its 
departments and agencies, develop methods of sharing information about such 
appointments. Information sharing could take a number of forms and serve a number of 
different roles. For example, at one end of the spectrum it could serve the function 
envisaged under the VLRC’s supporter model, which recommended that supported 
                                                        
69  Financial Services Council, Submission 35. 
70  See, eg, Disability Services Commissioner Victoria, Submission to the Victorian Law Reform 
Commission, Guardianship Inquiry, May 2011; Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final 
Report No 24 (2012) [8.66]. In a state and territory context see, eg, Queensland Law Reform 
Commission, A Review of Queensland’s Guardianship Laws, Report No 67, (2010). 
71  Carer’s Alliance, Submission 84.  
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decision-making arrangements and orders should be registered on an online register 
and should not come into force until they are registered.
72
 Development of a register of 
this type could act as a centralised source of information about the appointment of 
supporters and representatives in particular areas of Commonwealth law and facilitate 
the appointment of existing appointees or representatives as a supporter or 
representative.  
4.102 Alternatively, departments and agencies could develop or revise existing 
memorandums of understanding with respect to information sharing in relation to 
individuals.  
4.103 There is also a need for exchange of information between the Commonwealth 
and state and territory appointed decision-makers. The ALRC understands informal 
arrangements are already in place between some Commonwealth departments and 
agencies and public trustees and guardians in some jurisdictions. This should be 
considered in the development of any information sharing method.  
4.104 The ALRC would be interested in stakeholder views on the most appropriate 
approach to information sharing in this context, including in relation to types of 
information shared, storage, access and associated costs.  
Guidance and training 
Proposal 4–11 The Australian Government should ensure that people who 
may require decision-making support, and supporters and representatives (or 
potential supporters and representatives) are provided with information and 
advice to enable them to understand their roles and duties. 
Proposal 4–12 The Australian Government should ensure that Australian 
Public Service employees who engage with supporters and representatives are 
provided with regular, ongoing and consistent training in relation to the roles of 
supporters and representatives.  
4.105 The ALRC considers that consistent information and advice, and targeted 
training and guidance for all parties involved in the Commonwealth decision-making is 
of vital importance in ensuring the effective operation of the proposed Commonwealth 
decision-making model.  
4.106 In addition to being central to the successful implementation of the model, as the 
model aligns Commonwealth decision-making structures with art 12 of the CRPD, 
such education, training and guidance may also contribute to the fulfilment of 
Australia’s obligations under art 4 of the CRPD.
73
 It may also respond to the 
recommendations made by the UNCRPD that Australia  
                                                        
72  Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) [8.123], [8.124]. 
73  UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Opened for Signature 30 March 2007, 999 
UNTS 3 (entered into Force 3 May 2008) art 4(1)(i). See also art 8.  
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provide training, in consultation and cooperation with persons with disabilities and 
their representative organizations, at the national, regional and local levels for all 
actors, including civil servants, judges and social workers, on recognition of the legal 
capacity of persons with disabilities and on the primacy of supported decision-making 
mechanisms in the exercise of legal capacity.74 
4.107 The ALRC considers the complementary proposals with respect to training, 
awareness raising and guidance material are important because, as the Office of the 
Public Advocate (SA) noted in its submission, 
while supported decision-making interventions might notionally address a person’s 
impairments, most of the work is in tackling attitudinal and environmental barriers. In 
particular, overcoming attitudinal beliefs that a person with disability cannot make a 
decision, and addressing environmental barriers, such as a lack of practical decision-
making assistance and support.75  
4.108 Similarly, Queenslanders with Disability Network emphasised that  
for any changes to be effective, accessible information and services must be provided, 
and free access to additional supports (advocacy, translation and interpretation) must 
be available. It is also critical that if systemic changes are made, these must be 
communicated to all stakeholders including people with disability.76 
4.109 The ALRC considers it is necessary to develop and deliver accessible and 
culturally appropriate information and training for: 
 supporters and representatives, and potential supporters and representatives;
77
 
 people who require decision-making support;
78
 and 
 the employees of Commonwealth departments and agencies which operate 
under the proposed model, as well as associated experts and third parties.  
4.110 This approach was strongly encouraged by a range of stakeholders. For 
example, the Mental Health Council of Australia emphasised the need for  
capacity building measures, programs or processes at the individual or community 
levels to empower consumers and communities to actively participate in supported 
decision-making. These could include programs to educate consumers and carers.79 
4.111 In relation to supporters and representatives, the OPA (SA) noted that, in 
delivering its Supported Decision-Making Pilot Project, it established that ‘a key 
element in educating supporters is that they have a support role only: the supporter is 
                                                        
74  Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, ‘Concluding Observations on the Initial Report of 
Australia, Adopted by the Committee at Its Tenth Session (2–13 September 2013)’ (United Nations, 4 
October 2013) 26.  
75  Office of the Public Advocate (SA), Submission 17. 
76  QDN, Submission 59. 
77  Carers NSW, Submission 23; Disability Services Commissioner Victoria, Submission to the Victorian 
Law Reform Commission, Guardianship Inquiry, May 2011. 
78  Office of the Public Advocate (SA), Submission 17; Disability Services Commissioner Victoria, 
Submission to the Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship Inquiry, May 2011. 
79  MHCA, Submission 77.  
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not the decision maker, and is educated as such on support strategies, and how not to 
inadvertently become a substitute decision maker in this role’.
80
 Carers NSW 
emphasised the need for carers taking on either supported or substitute decision-
making roles ‘should have access to an easy to read document outlining the definition 
of capacity and any expectations and requirements involved with their role’.
81
 
4.112 In addition, some stakeholders emphasised the need to develop the capacity of 
people with disability to make decisions. Stakeholders such as the DSC (Vic) has also 
emphasised the need for ‘training and support being provided for people with 
disabilities to enhance their own decision making skills and their understanding of the 
various options for assistance’.
82
 The NSW Council for Intellectual Disability 
submitted that for some people with intellectual disability,  
in ideal circumstances they may be able to make their own decisions. However, they 
may not be in those circumstances in that they have had very limited exposure to 
alternatives to current deprived lifestyles and/or are in entrenched relationships of 
control (benevolent or malevolent) by family members or other long-standing people 
in their lives.83 
4.113 The ALRC welcomes stakeholder feedback on these proposals, either generally 
or in relation to specific areas of Commonwealth law.  
                                                        
80  Office of the Public Advocate (SA), Submission 17. 
81  Carers NSW, Submission 23. 
82  Disability Services Commissioner Victoria, Submission to the Victorian Law Reform Commission, 
Guardianship Inquiry, May 2011 6. 
83  NSW Council for Intellectual Disability, Submission 33.  
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Summary 
5.1 The National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) represents a significant new 
area of Commonwealth responsibility and expenditure with respect to people with 
disability in Australia. The focus of this chapter is on decision-making by participants 
in the NDIS. It outlines existing structures that facilitate decision-making by 
participants; illustrates how decision-making might operate if the Commonwealth 
decision-making model were implemented; discusses possible approaches to issues 
concerning interaction between NDIS supporters and representatives with state and 
territory appointed decision-makers; examines appropriate safeguards within the 
context of the NDIS; and proposes education, training and guidance in relation to 
decision-making and the NDIS.  
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The NDIS  
5.2 The introduction of the NDIS followed long-term concern about the inefficiency 
and inequitable nature of disability support arrangements in Australia and calls for the 
introduction of a new mechanism for funding support for people with disability. The 
NDIS represents a significant new area of Commonwealth responsibility and 
expenditure. The NDIS represents 
a significant step toward addressing the deficiencies of the current disability 
service systems that exist across Australia, and to advancing cultural change and 
genuine social inclusion.1 
5.3 While not all people with disability are eligible for the NDIS, it represents a key 
area of Commonwealth law in which the Commonwealth decision-making model 
should apply. The NDIS was designed to empower people with disability and to 
facilitate their choice and control.
2
 With respect to decision-making, while the National 
Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) (NDIS Act) contains some provisions 
which facilitate supported decision-making, it ultimately retains a substitute decision-
making model, through the use of ‘nominees’.
3
  
5.4 As outlined below, the NDIS is still in its early stages with roll-out at several 
trial sites. However, the ALRC considers that the ongoing roll-out of the NDIS and the 
scheduled reviews, outlined briefly below, provide useful opportunities for evaluating 
any supported decision-making model and making any necessary changes to ensure the 
model is working effectively.  
Background  
5.5 In August 2011, the Productivity Commission released its report, Disability 
Care and Support.
4
 The Report found that ‘current disability support arrangements are 
inequitable, underfunded, fragmented and inefficient, and give people with a disability 
little choice’.
5
 The Productivity Commission recommended the establishment of a new 
National Disability Insurance Scheme to provide insurance cover for all Australians in 
the event of significant disability. It suggested that the main function of the NDIS 
would be to fund long-term high quality care and support for people with significant 
disabilities.  
5.6 In response, the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) recognised the 
need for major reform of disability services through an NDIS. At a meeting of the 
Select Council on Disability Reform in October 2011, all Select Council Ministers 
agreed to lay the foundations for the NDIS by mid-2013.
6
 In December 2012, COAG 
                                                        
1  Office of the Public Advocate (Qld), Submission 05.  
2  See, eg, National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) s 3(1). See also discussion in Ch 2.  
3  Ibid pt X.  
4  Productivity Commission, ‘Disability Care and Support’ (July 2011) 54 Vol 1; Productivity Commission, 
‘Disability Care and Support’ (July 2011) 54 Vol 2. 
5  Productivity Commission, ‘Disability Care and Support’, above n 4, 2.  
6  Select Council on Disability Reform, Meeting Communiqué (October 2011).  
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signed an Intergovernmental Agreement for the NDIS launch.
7
 The Commonwealth 
and several states and territories also signed bilateral agreements confirming the 
operational and funding details for the roll-out of the NDIS.
8
 
5.7 In March 2013, the NDIS Act was enacted.
9
 The Act is supplemented by a 
number of NDIS Rules, which address the more detailed operational aspects of the 
scheme.
10
 There are also a number of Operational Guidelines, including about 
nominees and supporting participants’ decision-making.
11
 The scheme is administered 
by the National Disability Insurance Agency (NDIA) (formerly DisabilityCare 
Australia).  
5.8 Implementation of the NDIS began in July 2013 with roll-out in four trial 
sites—South Australia, Tasmania, the Hunter Area in New South Wales, and the 
Barwon area of Victoria.
12
 In July 2014, the NDIS will commence in the ACT, the 
Barkly region of the Northern Territory, and in the Perth Hills area of Western 
Australia. Roll-out of the full scheme in all states and territories except Western 
Australia is scheduled to commence progressively from July 2016.
13
  
Reviews and evaluations  
5.9 There are a number of completed, current and planned reviews of the NDIS and 
NDIA of potential relevance to this Inquiry, including: 
 a review of the capabilities of the NDIA;
14
 
 a COAG report on cost drivers of the NDIS;
15
 
 consideration of the NDIS in the course of the National Commission of Audit;
16
 
                                                        
7  Intergovernmental Agreement on the NDIS Launch, 7 December 2012.  
8  Ibid schs A–E.  
9  National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth).  
10  See, eg, National Disability Insurance Scheme (Children) Rules 2013 (Cth); National Disability 
Insurance Scheme (Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth); National Disability Insurance Scheme (Plan 
Management) Rules 2013 (Cth); National Disability Insurance Scheme (Protection and Disclosure of 
Information) Rules 2013 (Cth); National Disability Insurance Scheme (Registered Providers of Supports) 
Rules 2013 (Cth); National Disability Insurance Scheme (Becoming a Participant) Rules 2013 (Cth). 
11  National Disability Insurance Agency, Nominees–Overview, Operational Guideline (2013); National 
Disability Insurance Agency, Nominees–Whether a Nominee Is Necessary, Operational Guideline (2013); 
National Disability Insurance Agency, General Conduct-Supporting Participant’s Decision-Making, 
Operational Guideline (2013).  
12  While initially referred to as launch sites, the sites are now referred to as ‘trial sites’. See, eg, Tony 
Abbott on ABC AM program, NDIS ‘launch’ Sites Now ‘trial’ Sites <www.abc.net.au/ 
am/content/2013/s3911647.htm>. 
13  See, eg, National Disability Insurance Scheme, Roll out of the NDIS <www.ndis.gov.au/roll-out-national-
disability-insurance-scheme>.  
14  J Whalan AO, P Acton and J Harmer AO, ‘A Review of the Capabilities of the National Disability 
Insurance Agency’ (January 2014). 
15  Requested by COAG Disability Reform Council: COAG Disability Reform Council, Meeting 
Communique, 18 December 2013.  
16  See, ‘Towards Responsible Government, Phase One’ (National Commission of Audit, February 2014); 
‘Towards Responsible Government, Phase Two’ (National Commission of Audit, March 2014).  
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 an evaluation of the trial of the NDIS being led by the National Institute of 
Labour Studies;
17
  
 an independent review of the operation of the NDIS Act;
18
 and 
 a review of the Intergovernmental Agreement by the Ministerial Council.
19
  
5.10 A Joint Parliamentary Standing Committee on the NDIS was also established in 
December 2013, tasked with reviewing the implementation, administration and 
expenditure of the NDIS.
20
 
5.11 While many of these reviews and evaluations will be conducted following the 
conclusion of the ALRC’s Inquiry, the ALRC’s Final Report may inform part of their 
work. In the same manner, the ALRC will consider relevant outcomes of these reports 
and evaluations, as well as the work of the Joint Standing Committee, in making 
recommendations in its Final Report.  
Decision-making under the NDIS  
5.12 Decision-making under the NDIS Act incorporates elements of both supported 
and substitute decision-making, as well as informal and formal decision-making. There 
appear to be three key decision-making mechanisms operating in the context of the 
NDIS: autonomous decision-making by participants; informal supported decision-
making; and substitute decision-making by nominees.  
5.13 One of the key objects of the NDIS Act is to ‘enable people with disability to 
exercise choice and control in the pursuit of their goals and the planning and delivery 
of their supports’.
21
 As a result, the focus of many aspects of the NDIS Act, NDIS 
Rules and Operational Guidelines is on facilitating participants to make their own 
decisions. However, some of the general principles which guide action under the NDIS 
Act and other mechanisms under the Act, such as the nominee provisions, may limit 
the scope for autonomous decision-making by participants.  
5.14 The emphasis on the role of family, carers and others, and their involvement in 
providing informal support to participants, is an important element of the NDIS. The 
ALRC has heard that the appointment of nominees in trial sites has been low, with far 
greater involvement by family, carers and others as informal supporters.
22
  
                                                        
17  See, eg, NDIS Evaluation, Information about the Evaluation of the Trial of NDIS 
<http://www.ndisevaluation.net.au/>. 
18  Due to commence in 2015: National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) s 208(1). 
19  Due to commence in 2015: Intergovernmental Agreement on the NDIS Launch, 7 December 2012 [121]. 
See J Whalan AO, P Acton and J Harmer AO, above n 14, attachment C.  
20  Parliamentary Joint Standing Committee on the National Disability Insurance Scheme, Homepage 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/National_Disability_Insurance_Sche
me>. 
21  National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) s 3(1)(e). 
22  See discussion of informal supporters in Ch 4.  
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Nominees 
5.15 The NDIS Act provides for a nominee scheme which, while incorporating some 
provisions designed to encourage supported decision-making (such as the duty of 
nominees not to act if a participant is capable of acting) in many ways reflects the 
existing scheme under social security law upon which it was modelled (essentially still 
a substitute decision-making scheme). 
5.16 There are two types of nominees under the NDIS—‘plan nominees’ and 
‘correspondence nominees’. A plan nominee may be appointed to prepare, review or 
replace a participant’s plan, or manage the funding for supports under the  plan.
23
 The 
role of a correspondence nominee is narrower. A correspondence nominee may be 
appointed to do any other act that may be done by a participant under, or for the 
purposes of, the NDIS Act,
24
 but in practice is confined to making requests to the 
NDIA or receiving notices from the NDIA on behalf of the participant.  
Appointment  
5.17 The NDIS Act provides that the CEO of the NDIA may appoint a plan nominee 
or a correspondence nominee either at the request of the participant, or on their own 
initiative.
25
  
5.18 The National Disability Insurance Scheme (Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth) 
(Nominee Rules) provide further detail about whether a nominee should be appointed, 
who should be appointed as a nominee, duties of nominees, and cancellation and 
suspension of nominees.
26
 For example, r 3.1 provides: 
people with disability are presumed to have capacity to make decisions that 
affect their own lives. This is usually the case, and it will not be necessary to 
appoint a nominee where it is possible to support, and build the capacity of, 
participants to make their own decisions for the purposes of the NDIS.27 
5.19 The Nominee Rules also acknowledge that the NDIS Act recognises and makes 
provision for the appointment of a nominee to ‘act on behalf of, or make decisions on 
behalf of, a participant’. The Rules state that  
appointments of nominees will be justified only when it is not possible for 
participants to be assisted to make decisions for themselves. Appointments of 
nominees usually come about as a result of a participant requesting that a 
nominee be appointed. 
                                                        
23  National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) s 78. 
24  Ibid s 79. See also: National Disability Insurance Scheme (Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth) rr 3.9, 3.10. 
25  National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) ss 66, 67. See also National Disability Insurance 
Scheme (Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth) rr 3.11—3.15. 
26  A number of other rules are also relevant, including for example, National Disability Insurance Scheme 
(Children) Rules 2013 (Cth).  
27  National Disability Insurance Scheme (Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth) r 3.1.  
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It is only in rare and exceptional cases that the CEO will find it necessary to 
appoint a nominee for a participant who has not requested that an appointment be 
made.28 
5.20 In appointing a nominee, the CEO must take into consideration ‘the wishes (if 
any) of the participant regarding the making of the appointment’
29
 and have regard to a 
number of other matters.
30
 In determining whether to appoint a particular nominee, 
there are also a range of matters the CEO must take into account.
31
 Appointment of a 
nominee may be indefinite or for a particular period.
32
 
5.21 Where requested by the participant, the CEO must cancel the appointment of a 
nominee who was appointed at a participant’s request.
33
 However, where a nominee 
was appointed on the initiative of the CEO, the CEO may cancel the appointment, but 
is not obliged to do so.
34
 
Duties 
5.22 Nominees owe a duty to a participant ‘to ascertain the wishes of the participant 
and act in a manner that promotes the personal and social wellbeing of the 
participant’.
35
 Nominees also have a number of other duties, including a duty to: 
 consult; 
 develop the capacity of the participant; and 
 avoid or manage conflicts of interest.
36
 
5.23 Importantly, a plan nominee appointed on the initiative of the CEO is ‘able to do 
an act on behalf of the participant only if the nominee considers that the participant is 
not capable of doing the act’.
37
 A plan nominee appointed at the request of the 
participant has a duty to refrain from doing an act unless satisfied that: ‘it is not 
possible for the participant to do, or to be supported to do, the act himself or herself’; 
or it is possible, but the participant does not want to do the act himself or herself.
38
 
5.24 To a certain degree, the duties of nominees reflect those of supporters and 
representatives under the Commonwealth decision-making model, but require some 
amendment. For example: 
                                                        
28  Ibid rr 3.1, 3.4. 
29  National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) s 88(2)(b).  
30  National Disability Insurance Scheme (Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth) r 3.14. See also National Disability 
Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) s 88(4). 
31  National Disability Insurance Scheme (Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth) rr 4.5–4.8. 
32  Ibid rr 4.9–4.11. 
33  National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) s 89. See also National Disability Insurance 
Scheme (Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth) pt 6. 
34  National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) s 90. See also National Disability Insurance 
Scheme (Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth) pt 6. 
35  National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) s 80. See also National Disability Insurance 
Scheme (Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth) rr 5.3, 5.4. 
36  National Disability Insurance Scheme (Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth) rr 5.8–5.14.  
37  Ibid r 5.5.  
38  Ibid r 5.6. 
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 duty to ascertain the wishes of the participant
39
—the ALRC proposes a duty to 
support the participant to express their will and preferences in making decisions; 
 duty to develop the capacity of the participant to make their own decisions, 
where possible to a point where a nominee is no longer necessary
40
—this duty 
should complement the ALRC’s proposed duty to support the participant to 
make their own decisions; 
 duty to consult in relation to doing acts under, or for the purposes of, the NDIS 
Act
41
—to reflect the supported rather than substitute decision-making role 
played by supporters and representatives, this duty might be modified to be a 
duty to facilitate consultation, rather than to consult per se.  
5.25 The need for amendment of some of these duties and the potential application of 
other duties to the roles of supporter and representative is discussed in more detail later 
in this chapter.  
Reform of decision-making under the NDIS  
5.26 In order to ensure consistency with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities (CRPD) and the National Decision-Making Principles, and given 
concerns about the current nominee provisions, the ALRC proposes that the NDIS Act 
and Rules be reviewed and amended.  
5.27 The ALRC proposes amendment of the objects and principles provisions of the 
NDIS Act and that the existing NDIS nominee scheme be replaced with the proposed 
Commonwealth decision-making model in Chapter 4. This would encourage the 
implementation of supported decision-making in this key area of Commonwealth law. 
5.28 Many of the ideas underlying supported decision-making have already been 
incorporated in some respects into the NDIS Act, Rules and Operational Guidelines. 
However, in order to implement the proposed model, these should be reviewed to 
reflect the idea that all participants, with the appropriate level of support, should be 
entitled to make decisions expressing their will and preferences in the context of the 
NDIS.  
5.29 Accordingly, the NDIS Act, Rules and Operational Guidelines should be 
amended to provide a mechanism for the appointment of supporters by participants. In 
circumstances where a participant may desire, or require, fully supported decision-
making, there should also be provision for the appointment of a representative.  
5.30 Stakeholders strongly endorsed the need for supported decision-making in the 
NDIS to enable participants ‘to obtain support to make and implement their own 
                                                        
39  National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) s 80. See also National Disability Insurance 
Scheme (Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth) rr 5.3, 5.4. 
40  National Disability Insurance Scheme (Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth) r 5.10.  
41  National Disability Insurance Scheme (Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth) rr, 5.8, 5.9.  
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decisions’.
42
 This is likely to be of particular significance for a number of groups of 
people with disability. The Centre for Rural Regional Law and Justice and the National 
Rural Law and Justice Alliance emphasised, for example, the importance of supported 
decision-making arrangements ‘for people living in regional and rural communities, 
where local family and neighbourhood networks can be particularly strong and 
supportive’.
43
  
5.31 The application of the Commonwealth decision-making model may go some 
way to avoiding the appointment of guardians and other substitute decision-makers ‘in 
lieu of appropriate support, assistance, information or case management’.
44
 The 
interaction between supporters and representatives and state and territory appointed 
decision-makers is discussed in more detail below.  
5.32 Importantly, providing mechanisms for the appointment of formal supporters 
and representatives under the NDIS Act should not diminish the involvement of and 
respect for, informal support, including in relation to decision-making. Provisions 
which recognise and facilitate the involvement of informal supporters in the NDIS are 
important, and are consistent with the National Decision-Making Principles.
45
 
However, as outlined in Chapters 2 and 3, the ALRC considers there are significant 
benefits to making provision for formal supported decision-making.  
5.33 The ALRC does not intend to be overly prescriptive about how the 
Commonwealth supporter model might operate in the context of the NDIS. For 
example, while proposing that participants should be entitled to appoint a supporter or 
representative, the ALRC does not intend to prescribe practice.  
5.34 The ALRC has not examined funding mechanisms or practical matters involving 
funding and resources. Whether there is a general duty to provide support and, if so, 
who should bear the cost of support are significant issues. In the context of the NDIS, 
one potential option, which might address the issue of funding for supporters and 
representatives, may be to include funding for these decision-making arrangements as 
part of participant packages of support.
46
 On the one hand, it may be inappropriate to 
use individual participant funding for decision-making support, which should arguably 
be provided by the NDIA or Government in order to ensure compliance with 
                                                        
42  Office of the Public Advocate (Vic), Submission 06. See also: MHCA, Submission 77; NSW Public 
Guardian, Submission 50; NCOSS, Submission 26; Centre for Rural Regional Law and Justice and the 
National Rural Law and Justice Alliance, Submission 20. 
43  Centre for Rural Regional Law and Justice and the National Rural Law and Justice Alliance, Submission 
20.  
44  Office of the Public Advocate (Qld), Submission 05. 
45  See, eg, National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) principles (e), (f). National Disability 
Insurance Scheme (Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth) rr 3.14(b)(iv), 3.14(b)(v), 4.8(b)(ii)(A), 4.8(c), 5.8(b). 
46  Participants develop a plan with the NDIA which must include a participant’s statement of goals and 
aspirations and a statement of participant supports. The statement of participant supports sets out the 
supports that will be provided or funded by the NDIS. There are two types of supports—general supports 
that will be provided to, or in relation to, the participant, and reasonable and necessary supports. There are 
a range of criteria and tests for determining whether something is a reasonable and necessary support and 
should be funded by the NDIS: National Disability Insurance Scheme (Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth) r 5.11. 
See also, National Disability Insurance Scheme (Supports for Participants) Rules 2013 (Cth); and various 
NDIS, Operational Guidelines on Planning and Assessment—Supports in the Plan.  
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international obligations under the CRPD with respect to the provision of supports. The 
Nominee Rules provide that ‘it is expected that the Agency will assist nominees in 
fulfilling’ a duty to develop the capacity of participants,
47
 may provide a basis for 
arguing such responsibility was envisaged to a certain extent in the drafting of the 
NDIS Rules. On the other hand, provision of support to make decisions with respect to 
the NDIS might be exactly the type of reasonable and necessary support that should 
appropriately be independently funded under the NDIS.  
5.35 The next section outlines how decision-making could and should work under the 
NDIS. In particular, the ALRC makes a number of proposals and asks questions in 
relation to: 
 amendment of the objects and principles in the NDIS Act; 
 supporters; 
 representatives; 
 safeguards; and 
 education, training and guidance.  
Objects and principles  
Proposal 5–1 The objects and principles in the National Disability 
Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) should be amended to ensure consistency with 
the National Decision-Making Principles.  
5.36 The ALRC proposes amendment of the existing objects and principles clauses 
contained in ss 3–5 of the NDIS Act to reflect the National Decision-Making 
Principles. This would ensure the National Decision-Making Principles guide the 
application and interpretation of the legislation as a whole, and to the particular 
division with respect to supporters and nominees.  
5.37 Stakeholders such as the Disability Advocacy Network Australia expressed the 
view that 
it should be an explicit object of legislation in the disability area, such as the  
NDIS Act, to promote the decision making capacity of people with disability, to 
build the capacity of people with disability to make decisions and participate in 
decision making, and to enable access to decision making support for all people 
with disability whose decision making capacity is impaired.48  
5.38 Section 3 of the NDIS Act contains general objects of the Act. Section 4 
contains general principles guiding actions under the Act, including that: 
                                                        
47  Ibid. 
48  Disability Advocacy Network Australia, Submission 36.  
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 ‘people with disability should be supported to participate in and contribute to 
social and economic life to the extent of their ability’; 
 ‘people with disability should be supported to exercise choice, including in 
relation to taking reasonable risks, in the pursuit of their goals and the planning 
and delivery of their support’; 
 ‘people with disability have the same right as other members of Australian 
society to be able to determine their own best interests, including the right to 
exercise choice and control, and to engage as equal partners in decisions that 
will affect their lives, to the full extent of their capacity’; 
 ‘people with disability should be supported in all their dealings and 
communications with the Agency so that their capacity to exercise choice and 
control is maximised in a way that is appropriate to their circumstances and 
cultural needs’; and 
 ‘the role of families, carers and other significant persons in the lives of people 
with disability is to be acknowledged and respected’.
49
 
5.39 Section 5 of the NDIS Act contains general principles guiding action of people 
who may do acts or things on behalf of others, including:  
 people with disability should be involved in decision making processes that 
affect them, and where possible make decisions for themselves; and 
 the judgements and decisions that people with disability would have made for 
themselves should be taken into account.
50
 
5.40 While the spirit and intent of the objects and principles provisions in many ways 
reflect the CRPD and National Decision-Making Principles, the ALRC suggests some 
amendment is required.  
5.41 The ALRC does not intend to be overly prescriptive about necessary changes. 
However, by way of example, the focus under s 4(8) of the NDIS Act should be on the 
right of participants to express their will and preferences and to exercise choice and 
control with respect to decision-making. This would require removal of references to 
people with disability being ‘able to determine their own best interests’, and being 
‘equal partners in decisions’. Such amendments would reflect the proposed shift from 
substitute decision-making to supported decision-making; the shift away from ‘best 
interests’ towards ‘will and preferences’; and the idea that decision-making authority 
should remain with the participant. 
5.42 The ALRC welcomes stakeholder feedback on this proposal and on other 
changes necessary to the objects and principles under the NDIS Act to give effect to 
the National Decision-Making Principles. 
                                                        
49  National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) s 4.  
50  Ibid s 5. 
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Supporters  
Proposal 5–2 The National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) 
and NDIS Rules should be amended to include supporter provisions consistent 
with the Commonwealth decision-making model. 
5.43 The Commonwealth decision-making model proposed by the ALRC would 
introduce the concept of formal supported decision-making in the NDIS. While there is 
currently no provision for the nomination of formal supporters under the NDIS Act, the 
model would, in part, formalise the informal role already recognised and played by the 
people most likely to be nominated as supporters, such as family members. 
5.44 As articulated in Chapters 2 and 3, the central idea is that participants should be 
supported to make their own decisions in the context of the NDIS. A participant would 
be entitled to appoint a supporter to support them to make NDIS-related decisions. 
Importantly, even where a participant appoints a supporter, ultimate decision-making 
authority remains with the participant. Where a participant chooses to appoint more 
than one supporter, it would be a matter for the participant to determine what specific 
roles each supporter might play. 
Appointment 
5.45 The NDIS represents a significant shift in funding for, and provision of, 
disability services in Australia. In addition to existing mechanisms such as the Sector 
Development Fund,
51
 the ALRC considers that supporters would play a key role in 
ensuring prospective participants and participants receive appropriate support to 
engage with the NDIS.  
5.46 A participant or prospective participant should be able to appoint a supporter or 
supporters at any time during their engagement with the NDIS. Appointment by a 
participant is the only mechanism by which a supporter may be appointed.
52
 Making 
provision for the appointment of supporters may also limit instances of carers, family 
members, service providers or others seeking appointment of a nominee or guardian 
under state or territory law because they incorrectly assume it is necessary, or simply to 
facilitate registration as a participant with the NDIS.
53
  
5.47 As discussed in Chapter 4, the most important elements of the proposed 
supporter regime are recognition that where a supporter is appointed, ultimate decision-
making authority remains with the participant; and that any decision made by a 
                                                        
51  ‘The Sector Development Fund helps people with disability, families and carers, service providers, and 
the disability workforce to transition to the NDIS. A wide range of activities will be funded during the 
launch period and in the lead up to national roll out of the Scheme’: National Disability Insurance 
Scheme, Sector Development Fund <www.ndis.gov.au/sector-development-fund>. 
52  See discussion in Ch 4 in relation to potential alternative mechanisms for appointment of a representative.  
53  See, eg, Australian Guardianship and Administration Council, Submission 51. 
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participant with the support of a supporter is recognised by the NDIA, service 
providers and others as the decision of the participant.  
5.48 The other two elements of the Commonwealth decision-making model relevant 
to appointment is that it suggests the NDIS Act and Rules should be amended to 
provide for the appointment of a supporter by a prospective participant or participant at 
any time. The ALRC is interested in stakeholder feedback on the appropriateness of 
permitting prospective participants appoint a supporter for the purposes of engaging 
with the NDIA.  
5.49 The ALRC suggests that a participant should be entitled to appoint whomever 
they wish as their supporter. Given many stakeholders emphasised the importance of 
independent advocacy in supporting participants in the context of the NDIS,
54
 there 
may be no reason why individual advocates or advocate organisations could not be 
appointed as a participant’s supporter. Only a participant would have the authority to 
appoint a supporter and must have the power to suspend or revoke the appointment at 
any time.  
Role and duties  
Potential roles of a supporter  
5.50 Under existing arrangements, a plan nominee’s role may encompass decisions 
relating to the preparation, review or replacement of the participant’s plan; or 
management of funding for supports under the plan.
55
 The scope of the role of a 
correspondence nominee is narrower and more closely reflects the role potentially 
played by a supporter in that they may make requests to the NDIA or receive notices 
from the NDIA, on behalf of the participant.
56
  
5.51 The ALRC suggests that the potential roles of a supporter under the NDIS might 
include those set out in Proposal 4–4. For example, a supporter should be able to liaise 
with the NDIA on behalf of the participant or prospective participant to obtain 
information relevant to assessment, planning, or the management of NDIS funds. A 
supporter may attend planning meetings and support the participant to make decisions 
about what their goals and aspirations are, and what supports are required. A supporter 
should also endeavour to ensure the participant’s decisions are given effect to.  
Supporter duties  
5.52 The proposed duties of a supporter amend and expand upon the duties of 
nominees under the existing system.  
5.53 The key duty currently owed by nominees, which the ALRC considers should 
apply to supporters, is the duty to develop the capacity of the participant. The Nominee 
Rules provide that nominees are required to ‘apply their best endeavours to developing 
                                                        
54  See, eg, MHCA, Submission 77; Disability Advocacy Network Australia, Submission 36. 
55  National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) s 78; National Disability Insurance Scheme 
(Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth) r 3.7.  
56  The matters the correspondence nominee is able to deal with cannot be limited further by the instrument 
of appointment: National Disability Insurance Scheme (Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth) r 3.8. 
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the capacity of the participant to make their own decisions, where possible to a point 
where a nominee is no longer necessary’.
57
 The ALRC welcomes stakeholder 
submissions on the appropriateness of imposing such a duty on supporters, recognising 
that the identity of the supporter is likely to affect their ability to fulfil this duty.  
5.54 In addition, the Nominee Rules currently provide that ‘it is expected that the 
Agency will assist nominees in fulfilling this duty’
58
 and the ALRC suggests that the 
NDIA should also play a role in assisting supporters to fulfil any such duty.  
5.55 The duties currently owed by nominees that should apply to supporters, but 
require some amendment, include the duty to: 
 ascertain the wishes of the participant;  
 act in a manner that promotes the personal and social wellbeing of the 
participant;  
 consult; and 
 act only where a participant is unable to do so.
59
  
5.56 Nominees currently owe a duty to ascertain the wishes of the participant. The 
ALRC proposes that this duty extend to supporting the participant to express their will 
and preferences in making a decision or decisions in relation to the NDIS.  
5.57 Nominees owe a duty to act in a manner that promotes the personal and social 
wellbeing of the participant. The ALRC considers that it is appropriate to add financial 
and cultural wellbeing to this list, reflecting the potential role supporters may play in 
supporting participants to make decisions relating to NDIS funds, and the importance 
of culturally sensitive and appropriate support.
60
 This idea of sensitivity to cultural and 
linguistic circumstances is not currently a duty owed by nominees. However, in 
deciding who to appoint as a nominee, the CEO is to have regard to the degree to 
which the proposed nominee is ‘sensitive to the cultural and linguistic circumstances of 
the participant’.
61
 
5.58 A nominee currently has a duty to consult ‘any court-appointed decision-maker 
or any participant-appointed decision-maker’ and ‘any other person who assists the 
participant to manage their day-to-day activities and make decisions (for example, a 
person who cares for the participant)’ in relation to doing acts under, or for the 
purposes of, the NDIS Act.
62
 If more than one person is appointed as plan nominee, 
each of them also owes a duty to consult with the others.
63
 In order to reflect the 
supported rather than substitute decision-making role played by supporters, the ALRC 
                                                        
57  Ibid r 5.10. 
58  Ibid r 5.11. 
59  National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) s 80. National Disability Insurance Scheme 
(Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth) rr 5.3–5.6, 5.8–5.14. 
60  See, eg, MDAA, Submission 43. 
61  National Disability Insurance Scheme (Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth) r 4.8(b)(iv). 
62  Ibid r 5.8. 
63  Ibid r 5.9. 
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considers this duty might be appropriately modified to be a duty on supporters to 
facilitate consultation with these same categories of people.  
5.59 The new duties supporters should owe include the duty to support the participant 
to make the decision or decisions in relation to which they were appointed and to 
express their will and preferences, and to act honestly, diligently and in good faith. As 
discussed below, safeguards should be in place to ensure, for example, that supporters 
do not abuse their position for their own self-interest. 
5.60 While there is currently no duty of nominees to support the participant to make 
decisions, this type of duty may have been intended under the NDIS Rules. That is, in 
deciding who to appoint as a nominee, the CEO is to have regard to the degree to 
which the proposed nominee is willing and able to ‘involve the participant in decision-
making processes’, and ‘assist the participant to make decisions for himself or 
herself’.
64
 It is important that there be a duty of supporters to support a participant to 
make decisions and to express their will and preferences. 
5.61 The other new duty proposed is the duty to act honestly, diligently and in good 
faith.
65
 The ALRC welcomes stakeholder feedback on the proposed supporter roles and 
duties articulated above as well as in relation to whether there should be additional 
duties placed on supporters in the context of the NDIS.  
Representatives  
Proposal 5–3 The National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) 
and NDIS Rules should be amended to include representative provisions 
consistent with the Commonwealth decision-making model. 
5.62 In certain circumstances, a participant may require fully supported decision-
making. While this should only occur in line with the National Decision-Making 
Principles, as a last resort, the ALRC proposes the introduction of Commonwealth 
representatives as a mechanism for the provision of fully supported decision-making 
under the NDIS. 
5.63 A representative under the Commonwealth decision-making model is an 
individual or organisation appointed by a participant, or through some other 
mechanism to support a participant to make a decision or decisions in relation to their 
participation in the NDIS. The role of a representative is to support a participant to 
express their will and preferences in making decisions; where necessary, to determine 
the will and preferences of a participant and give effect to them or, as a last resort, 
consider the human rights relevant to the situation in making a decision. Such decisions 
may relate to the planning process, the participant’s plan, supports funded by the 
NDIS, interaction with service providers, or similar matters. 
                                                        
64  Ibid rr 4.8(b)(C), 4.8(b)(D).  
65  See Ch 4. 
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5.64 Many of the elements contained in the proposed model are already incorporated 
into the NDIS Act, Rules or Operational Guidelines. For example, consistent with the 
ALRC’s approach, nominees are appointed as a last resort, and there are duties on 
nominees to ascertain the wishes of the participant and to act in a manner that promotes 
the personal and social wellbeing of the participant. 
Appointment  
5.65 The NDIS Act provides that the CEO of the NDIA may appoint a plan nominee 
or a correspondence nominee at the request of the participant, or on the initiative of the 
CEO.
66
 There are a range of matters the CEO of the NDIA must take into account in 
determining whether to appoint a particular nominee.
67
 In addition, the CEO has the 
power to make an appointment for a particular period
68
 and power to limit the scope of 
the appointment.
69
 
5.66 Stakeholders expressed particular concern about provisions which enable the 
CEO of the NDIA or their delegate to appoint a nominee on the initiative of a delegate, 
as distinct from at the request of the participant.
70
 For example, the Physical Disability 
Council of NSW submitted that the provision ‘is not consistent with person centred 
practice’.
 71
 The Disability Advocacy Network Australia expressed concern that power 
is ‘largely unfettered’ and gives the CEO or delegate 
considerable freedom to appoint or cancel appointment of a nominee with or 
without the agreement of the participant or respect for the participant’s wishes, 
with or without regard for any existing guardianship, power of attorney or other 
substitute decision-making arrangement for the participant, and most importantly 
with or without first seeking to support and enable the participant to make the 
required decisions for him/her-self. This appointment power appears to give little 
regard to enabling the decision-making capacity of participants.72 
5.67 Children with Disability Australia submitted that the CEO of the NDIA should 
not have power to appoint a representative, and ‘if the circumstances exist where the 
CEO believes a nominee should be appointed other than at the participant’s initiative it 
should be dealt with by the relevant systems for obtaining administration or 
guardianship orders’.
73
  
5.68 The preferable appointment method for a representative is appointment by a 
participant. However, as discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, there are a number of 
other potential options for appointment, including appointment by a court, tribunal or 
                                                        
66  National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) ss 66, 67. See also National Disability Insurance 
Scheme (Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth) rr 3.11–3.15. 
67  National Disability Insurance Scheme (Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth) rr 4.5–4.8.  
68  Ibid rr 4.9–4.11. 
69  Ibid r 3.8. 
70  See, eg, Disability Advocacy Network Australia, Submission 36; Physical Disability Council of NSW, 
Submission 32. A similar concern was expressed in relation to child’s representatives: Children with 
Disability Australia, Submission 68. 
71  Physical Disability Council of NSW, Submission 32. 
72  Disability Advocacy Network Australia, Submission 36. 
73  Children with Disability Australia, Submission 68. 
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other body with Commonwealth jurisdiction, and retaining the CEO’s power to 
appoint, but in more limited circumstances than at present.  
5.69 Regardless of the way in which a representative is appointed, if there is an 
external mechanism for appointment, stakeholders such as OPA (Vic) submitted that  
the participant’s preference of nominee should be respected unless there are very 
good reasons for not doing so (such a reason would be that the appointment of 
the person would jeopardise the personal and social wellbeing of the 
participant).74  
5.70 The ALRC is interested in stakeholder feedback on the most appropriate 
mechanisms in the context of the NDIS to appoint a representative for a person who 
requires full decision-making support. 
Role and duties 
Potential roles of a representative 
5.71 Under the current nominee provisions, the role of a plan nominee may 
encompass decisions relating to the preparation, review or replacement of the 
participant’s plan; or management of funding for supports under the plan. However, the 
Nominee Rules provide for limitations on the matters that a plan nominee is appointed 
to deal with: 
For example, the appointment might be restricted so as to prevent the nominee 
from specifying the goals, objectives and aspirations of the participant. In such a 
case, the nominee might still have authority with respect to the management of 
funding under a plan. Alternatively, the CEO might appoint 2 or more plan 
nominees, and, in each instrument of appointment, limit the matters in relation to 
which each person is the plan nominee.75 
5.72 Despite this provision, some stakeholders have expressed concern about the 
existing role played by plan nominees which tends to be ‘a global appointment’, and 
relies on the discretion of the nominee to limit the use of their power; in particular the 
power to make substitute decisions when a person cannot be supported to make their 
own decisions’.
76
 
5.73 The scope of the role of a correspondence nominee is narrower and more closely 
reflects the role potentially played by a supporter. For example, a correspondence 
nominee may make requests to the NDIA or receive notices from the NDIA, on behalf 
of the participant.
77
  
5.74 The ALRC considers that a representative should perform some or all of the 
roles articulated in Proposal 4–7. These mirror the potential role of supporters and are 
discussed in more detail below.  
                                                        
74  Office of the Public Advocate (Vic), Submission 06.  
75  Ibid. 
76  Office of the Public Advocate (SA), Submission 17.  
77  The matters the correspondence nominee is able to deal with cannot be limited further by the instrument 
of appointment: National Disability Insurance Scheme (Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth) r 3.8. 
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5.75 In line with the National Decision-Making Principles, the ALRC suggests that in 
introducing the concept of representative under the NDIS, consideration be given to 
potential categories of representatives and ensuring that any appointment is decision-
specific and limited in scope and time. For example, it may be appropriate to separate 
representative roles between those who provide general support in relation to 
interaction with the NDIA and planning, and those who are involved in financial 
decisions.
78
  
Representative duties 
5.76 Representatives under the NDIS will play a key role in providing support to 
participants requiring full decision-making support. As a result, representatives should 
be subject to the duties and responsibilities articulated in Proposal 4–8. The ALRC 
considers that a representative should have the same duties as a supporter, and a 
number of additional duties. It is important that representatives owe specific additional 
duties under the NDIS Act and Rules, even where they are an existing state or territory 
appointed decision-maker (an issue discussed further below) and are therefore subject 
to duties under state and territory legislation.  
5.77 The key duties the ALRC proposes that a representative should owe under the 
NDIS Act and Rules include:  
 providing of support to a participant to express their will and preferences in 
making decisions; 
 where it is not possible to determine what the wishes of the participant, 
determining what the person would likely want based on all the information 
available; 
 where the first two dot points are not possible, considering the human rights 
relevant to the situation; 
 acting in a manner promoting the personal, social, financial and cultural 
wellbeing of the person who requires decision-making support; 
 providing of support to the participant to consult with ‘existing appointees’, 
family members, carers and other significant people in their life when making a 
decision; and 
 developing the capacity of the person who requires decision-making support to 
make their own decisions. 
5.78 The application of many of these duties to support is discussed above. There are 
a number of additional duties appropriate for NDIS representatives, who provide fully 
supported decision-making support. One such duty is to support the participant to 
express their will and preferences. This is not currently reflected in the duties of 
nominees to ‘ascertain the wishes of the participant’, which does not necessarily 
require provision of support to express will and preferences. However, there is some 
                                                        
78  As suggested by Office of the Public Advocate (SA), Submission 17. 
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suggestion that this type of duty was intended under the NDIS Rules, as in deciding 
who to appoint as a nominee, the CEO is to have regard to the degree to which the 
proposed nominee is willing and able to: ‘involve the participant in decision-making 
processes’, ‘assist the participant to make decisions for himself or herself’ and 
‘ascertain what judgements and decisions the participant would have made for him or 
herself’.
79
 Nonetheless, the ALRC considers it is necessary for a representative to have 
an explicit duty to support a participant to express their will and preferences. 
5.79 While the focus of supported decision-making under the NDIS should be on 
supporting a participant to express their will and preferences, there is a need to make 
provision for circumstances in which a representative is providing fully supported 
decision-making. In such circumstances, the representative must determine what the 
person would likely want based on all the information available. This may require 
engagement with NDIA, service providers, family members and others to establish 
things such as the nature of decisions the participant has made in the past, and their 
values and beliefs. Where this is not possible, the representative must consider the 
human rights relevant to the situation.  
Interaction with state and territory systems  
Question 5–1 How should the National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 
2013 (Cth) and NDIS Rules be amended to clarify interaction between 
supporters and representatives appointed in relation to the NDIS, other 
supporters and representatives, and state and territory appointed decision-
makers?  
5.80 One of the key difficulties in applying the Commonwealth decision-making 
model to the NDIS is determining the appropriate interaction between NDIS supporters 
and representatives, supporters and representatives in other areas of Commonwealth 
responsibility, and state and territory appointed decision-makers.  
5.81 This issue is of particular relevance given the ongoing roll-out of the NDIS. 
AGAC provided a scenario which highlights the potentially difficult interaction 
between the NDIS and state and territory appointed decision-makers under the existing 
scheme: 
A person who is the subject of an administration (financial management) order 
appointing a Public Trustee makes an application for NDIS support themselves 
or through a nominee for funding a particular matter. The operators of the NDIS 
scheme are unaware that the person has been found to have a decision-making 
disability by a Tribunal and is incapable of managing their own financial and 
property affairs. The result has been that money has been paid out to such 
applicants directly to their bank accounts which the Public Trustee is under order 
to manage. Without the knowledge and intervention by the Public Trustee, this 
                                                        
79  National Disability Insurance Scheme (Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth) rr 4.8(b)(C), 4.8(b)(D), 4.8(b)(E).  
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may be seen as a windfall by the applicant and spent for purposes other than that 
for which the grant was paid.80 
5.82 It is also important to address stakeholder concerns about an increase in 
applications for the appointment of state or territory decision-makers since the 
introduction of the NDIS. For example, AGAC submitted that  
the introduction of the NDIS creates a number of decision making ‘events’ and a 
greater degree of scrutiny of informal substitute decision-makers or supporters 
and leads to an increase in the number of applications under guardianship 
legislation. In these and other hearings there have been discussions about the 
increased number and complexity of decisions that will need to be made as a 
result of the introduction of the NDIS. AGAC anticipates a commensurate 
increased call on the advocacy functions of the Public Advocates and Public 
Guardians and on the financial management role of the Public Trustees as well as 
on the Tribunals.81  
5.83 This was echoed by the OPA (Qld): 
there are a number of points in the process of becoming and being a participant 
that may prompt the appointment of a guardian or other substitute 
decision‐maker if appropriate support and assistance is not provided.82 
5.84 The general issue of interaction under the NDIS is discussed below. Interaction 
involving management of NDIS funds is discussed separately later in the chapter. The 
ALRC is interested in stakeholder comment on the interaction issues which arise in the 
context of the NDIS, the two possible approaches discussed below, and other possible 
approaches.  
Current interaction  
5.85 Under the NDIS Act and Rules there is limited recognition of state and territory 
appointed decision-making arrangements. The key points of interaction relate to the 
appointment of a nominee at the initiative of the CEO, the duty of nominees to consult, 
and the obligations of nominees who are also state or territory or participant appointed 
decision-makers.  
5.86 The provision of the Nominee Rules requiring a plan nominee to act is stated as 
not being intended  
to affect any obligations or restrictions that impact on a plan nominee and which 
apply under State or Territory law (including obligations or restrictions that 
impact on them in their capacity as a court-appointed decision-maker or a 
participant-appointed decision-maker).83 
5.87 Under s 88(4) of the NDIS Act, the CEO of the NDIA must, in considering 
whether to appoint a nominee, have regard to whether there is a person under 
Commonwealth, state or territory law who ‘has guardianship of the participant’, or ‘is a 
                                                        
80  Australian Guardianship and Administration Council, Submission 51. 
81  Ibid.  
82  Office of the Public Advocate (Qld), Submission 05.  
83  National Disability Insurance Scheme (Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth) r 5.7.  
122 Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws  
person appointed by a court, tribunal, board or panel (however described) who has 
power to make decisions for the participant and whose responsibilities in relation to the 
participant are relevant to the duties of a nominee’.
84
 The Nominee Rules further 
provide that in such circumstances, the CEO must have regard to a number of things, 
including ‘whether the participant has a court-appointed decision-maker or a 
participant-appointed decision-maker’; and any relevant views of a ‘court-appointed 
decision-maker or a participant-appointed decision-maker’.
85
  
5.88 The matters the CEO must have regard to in deciding who to appoint as nominee 
include ‘whether the participant has a court-appointed decision-maker or a participant-
appointed decision-maker’, and their views.
86
 The CEO is also to have regard to  
the presumption that, if the participant has a court-appointed decision-maker or a 
participant-appointed decision-maker, and the powers and responsibilities of that 
person are comparable with those of a nominee, that person should be appointed 
as nominee.87 
5.89 The OPA (Qld) submitted that, while there is currently a ‘presumption’ that an 
existing guardian would also be appointed as a nominee for a participant, this is not 
sufficient.
88
  Similarly, the OPA (Vic) said that  
it is expected that state/territory-appointed guardians and administrators would 
be appointed as nominees under the NDIS where this would be appropriate, but a 
review is required to ascertain the extent to which this is happening in practice in 
the launch sites.89 
5.90 Nominees also have a duty to consult with ‘any court-appointed decision-maker 
or any participant-appointed decision-maker’.
90
 
5.91 Section 207 of the NDIS Act deals with the concurrent operation of state and 
territory laws with the Act and states that ‘it is the intention of the Parliament that this 
Act is not to apply to the exclusion of a law of a State or Territory to the extent that 
that law is capable of operating concurrently with this Act’.
91
 
5.92 The OPA (Qld) submitted that, 
given this position of nominees as ‘de facto substitute decision makers’ it is also 
important that the interaction between the [NDIS Act], the NDIS Rules and the 
state‐based guardianship and administration legislation is further clarified.92   
                                                        
84  National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) s 88(4).  
85  National Disability Insurance Scheme (Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth) rr 3.14(b)(iii), 3.14(b)(v)(C).  
86  Ibid r 4.6(c). See also National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) ss 88(2), 88(4). 
87  National Disability Insurance Scheme (Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth) r 4.8(a). 
88  Office of the Public Advocate (Qld), Submission 05. 
89  Office of the Public Advocate (Vic), Submission 06. 
90  National Disability Insurance Scheme (Nominee) Rules 2013 (Cth) r 5.8(a). 
91  National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) s 207.  
92  Office of the Public Advocate (Qld), Submission 05. 
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Possible models of interaction 
5.93 There appear to be a range of possible approaches to interaction issues. In this 
section the ALRC discusses the possible application, in the context of the NDIS, of the 
two approaches outlined in Chapter 4. 
First approach 
5.94 Under the first approach, which reflects the current position, it is possible to 
have an NDIS supporter or representative and a state or territory appointed decision-
maker.  
5.95 In circumstances where appointments of an NDIS supporter or representative do 
not overlap with that of a state or territory appointed decision-maker—for example, 
because they are appointed in relation to different decisions or areas—there is unlikely 
to be any conflict. Reducing the possibility of conflict with Commonwealth 
appointments may be strengthened by amendment of state and territory legislation to 
ensure state and territory appointments are, as much as possible, confined in scope and 
time.
93
  
5.96 In circumstances there may still be some overlap in the areas of decision-making 
covered by the appointments. If there is conflict, s 109 of the Australian Constitution 
may require that the responsibility of a state or territory appointed decision-maker 
extend only to those areas not covered by the decision-making power of the 
Commonwealth representative.  To facilitate this interaction, information sharing 
arrangements may be necessary for the representative and state or territory appointed 
decision-maker to fulfill their particular roles.  
5.97 This could occur either as a result of formal mechanisms, or more informally.
94
 
The ALRC considers this aspect of the approach may address some concerns expressed 
by stakeholders in relation to the appointment of different individuals or 
organisations.
95
 
5.98 The ALRC welcomes stakeholder comment on mechanisms to ensure sharing of 
information between Commonwealth representatives and state and territory appointed 
decision-makers where they are different.  
Second approach 
5.99 Under a second possible approach, where a state or territory decision-maker has 
been appointed, a new assessment of the support needs of the participant should be 
undertaken for NDIS purposes. If the person requires fully supported decision-making, 
then a representative should be appointed, either by the person, or using a 
Commonwealth appointment mechanism.
96
 The appointment of the existing state or 
                                                        
93  See Proposal 10–1 (state and territory proposal).  
94  As the ALRC understands is currently the case—with the sharing of information between the NDIA and 
the NSW Trustee and Guardian. 
95  Financial Services Council, Submission 35. 
96  See discussion of possible appointment mechanisms for representatives in Ch 4.  
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territory decision-maker as representative should be permitted and encouraged, but 
would not be automatic.  
5.100 As suggested in Chapter 4, one of the considerations a decision-maker could 
have regard to in appointing a Commonwealth representative should be the desirability 
of appointing an existing Commonwealth representative or state or territory appointed 
decision-maker where one exists. This is likely to encourage appointment of state and 
territory decision-makers as representatives for NDIS purposes where appropriate. 
However, even where an existing representative or state or territory appointed 
decision-maker is appointed, the appointee would be subject to the provisions of the 
NDIS Act and Rules relating to their role and duties, as well as associated safeguards.  
5.101 This model appears to be most consistent with the views of stakeholders such as 
the FSC which submitted that where a state or territory decision-maker has been 
appointed, they should automatically be the NDIS representative.
97
 Similarly, the NSW 
Council for Intellectual Disability submitted that, 
if a guardian has been appointed with authority to make decisions about services, 
then that person should automatically be recognised as NDIS nominee. Similarly, 
if there is a nominee and a different person is appointed as guardian, the guardian 
should automatically take over as nominee.98 
Management of NDIS funds 
Question 5–2 In what ways should the National Disability Insurance 
Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) and NDIS Rules in relation to managing the funding for 
supports under a participant’s plan be amended to: 
(a) maximise the opportunity for participants to manage their own funds, or 
be provided with support to manage their own funds; and 
(b) clarify the interaction between a person appointed to manage NDIS funds 
and a state or territory appointed decision-maker?  
5.102 Under the NDIS Act, a participant may request that NDIS funds be self-
managed by the participant, the participant’s plan nominee, a plan management 
provider nominated by the participant, or the NDIA.
99
 Different options can be chosen 
for different supports. If a plan nominee has been appointed, then funding for supports 
must be managed in accordance with the terms of the appointment.
100
 There are also 
currently a number of circumstances under which a participant must not manage plan 
funds, including if the CEO is satisfied that management of the plan would present an 
‘unreasonable risk to the participant’.
101
  
                                                        
97  Financial Services Council, Submission 35. 
98  NSW Council for Intellectual Disability, Submission 33.  
99  National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) ss 42(2), 43(1). 
100  Ibid s 43(2). 
101  Ibid s 44. 
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5.103 If a participant does not make a plan management request, outlining how they 
would like their NDIS funds managed, the funding for supports under the plan is 
managed by either a registered plan management provider specified by the NDIA, or 
the NDIA.
102
 If this occurs, the CEO of the NDIA ‘must, so far as reasonably 
practicable, have regard to the wishes of the participant in specifying who is to manage 
the funding for supports under the plan’.
103
  
5.104 The introduction of supporters and representatives under the NDIS is likely to 
reduce the circumstances in which a participant does not make, or is not supported to 
make, a plan management request. However, in circumstances where they do not, these 
provisions may require amendment to remove the power of the CEO of the NDIA to 
determine who should manage the funding for supports. Alternatively, the provisions 
could be amended to remove the qualifier and require that, in such circumstances, the 
CEO is required to give effect to the will, preferences and rights of the participant.  
5.105 Under the existing provisions of the NDIS, Queenslanders with Disability 
Network observed that 
the capacity of an individual to manage their own funds is a potentially 
contentious issue ... An individual with a disability may wish to manage their 
own supports, but the CEO may deem the person incapable of discharging this 
responsibility. These decisions may not be consistent with guardianship 
decisions made at a state level, and consequently the potential for appeal is 
high.104 
5.106 The preferable approach is for participants to self-manage their funding for 
supports to the greatest extent possible, and that the NDIS legislation should be 
amended to reflect this.  
5.107 Where the scope of the appointment of a state or territory appointed decision-
maker does not cover management of NDIS funds, a participant should be able to self-
manage their funds, or to appoint a supporter or representative to support them in 
making decisions about fund management. Participants should also be entitled to 
nominate a plan management provider, or the NDIA to manage their funds. 
5.108 However, where a state or territory order which covers the management of 
finances is in place, some stakeholders have submitted that it should not be possible for 
participants to self-manage NDIS funds. For example, the FSC argued that where a 
state or territory decision-maker has been appointed, they should ‘automatically be the 
person or entity responsible for managing the funding for supports’
105
 and that ‘the 
NDIS should pay amounts directly to product/service providers after due consultation 
with the relevant appointed decision-maker’.
106
 
                                                        
102  Ibid s 43(4).  
103  Ibid s 43(5). 
104  Queenslanders with Disability Network, Submission 59. 
105  Financial Services Council, Submission 35.  
106  Ibid.  
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5.109 The ALRC is interested in stakeholder comments on ways in which the NDIS 
Act and Rules could be amended to maximise the opportunity for participants to 
manage their own funds, or be provided with support to manage their own funds; and 
clarify the interaction between Commonwealth supporters or representatives and state 
and territory appointed decision maker, in relation to the management of NDIS funds.  
Safeguards  
General safeguards 
5.110 In Proposal 4–9, the ALRC proposes that the appointment and conduct of 
Commonwealth representatives should be subject to appropriate and effective 
safeguards.  
5.111 The ALRC does not intend to make a proposal with respect to the specific 
safeguards that may be required in the context of the NDIS, or comment on systemic 
issues relating to safeguards under the NDIS raised by stakeholders, including the 
provision of funding to support participants to seek review of NDIA decisions.
107
 
5.112 However, a number of stakeholders, including the Disability Services 
Commission of Victoria, strongly advocated the development of independent oversight 
of the NDIS, consisting of a body or bodies with complaint handling and investigative 
powers, legislative responsibilities to conduct monitoring, review and inquiry 
functions; and responsibility for promoting access to advocacy and supported decision-
making.
108
  
5.113 There are a number of existing complaint, review and appeal mechanisms under 
the NDIS. For example, participants may seek internal review of a reviewable 
decision,
109
 make a complaint to the Commonwealth Ombudsman, or seek review of a 
reviewable decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT).
110
  
5.114 In the trial sites, existing state and territory quality assurance frameworks and 
safeguards also apply.
111
 The Department of Social Services is currently developing a 
number of proposed options for a national quality assurance and safeguards framework 
or approach as part of the NDIS. It is anticipated that when the NDIS is fully rolled out, 
safeguards will include:  
o individualised strategies built into participant plans to help the participant, 
their family and support network to reduce the risk of harm, through 
mechanisms such as advocates, guardians and nominees; 
o arrangements that organisations put in place to protect participants, such 
as: staff supervision; internal complaints processes; quality frameworks; 
                                                        
107  See, eg, Law Council of Australia, Submission 83; NCOSS, Submission 26. 
108  See, eg, MHCA, Submission 77; Disability Services Commissioner Victoria, Submission 39. 
109  National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) s 99, 100.  
110  Ibid s 103. 
111  ‘Intergovernmental Agreement, Schedule A: Bilateral Agreement for NDIS Launch between the 
Commonwealth and New South Wales’ (7 December 2012). 
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o system level safeguards such as:  
 external review of decisions and actions that directly impact on 
a person, such as access to relevant tribunals or commissions; 
community visitors schemes; and police checks and working 
with children checks 
 community based safeguards that are available to all members 
of the community, such as: practitioner registration 
requirements; ombudsman offices; and anti-discrimination, 
human rights and consumer protection law.112 
5.115 The ALRC suggests that the safeguard issues outlined in this Discussion Paper 
be considered in the course of developing the national quality assurance and safeguards 
framework or approach as part of the NDIS. 
Education, training and guidance 
5.116 Education, training and guidance for all people involved in the decision-making 
under the NDIS is vitally important to ensure the effective operation of the supported 
decision-making model.  
5.117 The NDIA has developed a number of approaches to education, training and 
community engagement (including through video, quotes, cameos, stories, and 
webinars) and has produced a range of guidance material for people with disability, 
family and carers, service providers, and participants.
113
 
5.118 The NDIA also offers disability support organisations capacity building strategy 
grants to ‘provide and promote local mutual support activities for people with 
disability’ with the aim of leading to ‘increased capacity of people with disability and 
their families to exercise choice and control, engage with the NDIS and other 
community supports as well as actively participate economically and socially’.
114
 
5.119 In terms of decision-making mechanisms stakeholders such as the Office of the 
Public Advocate (SA) have emphasised the need to ensure the NDIS Act and NDIS 
Rules are applied appropriately in practice: 
Close attention will need to be applied to the implementation of the NDIS 
Nominees Rules, and the extent that they encourage support to enable people’s 
capacity as opposed to potentially disempowering participants by transferring 
effective decision making to plan nominees. NDIS itself can play a role in 
educating nominees on their role so that this does not happen, and expecting 
nominees to attempt to support a participant make their own decision before 
taking on a substitute role.115 
                                                        
112  National Disability Insurance Scheme, Safeguards <www.ndis.gov.au/participants-0>. 
113  See, eg, National Disability Insurance Scheme, Homepage <www.ndis.gov.au>. 
114  National Disability Insurance Scheme, Disability Support Organisations—Capacity Building Strategy 
Grants <http://www.ndis.gov.au/document/759>.  
115  Office of the Public Advocate (SA), Submission 17. 
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5.120 National Disability Services suggested that it also be timely 
to develop and provide education material to NDIA staff, families, guardians and 
participants about the principles of supported decision-making and the law 
around legal capacity.116 
5.121 The Mental Health Council of Australia highlighted the need for 
capacity building measures, programs or processes at the individual or 
community levels to empower consumers and communities to actively 
participate in supported decision-making. These could include programs to 
educate consumers and carers about the NDIS.117 
5.122 Accordingly, consistent with Proposal 4–11, people who may require decision-
making support, and supporters and representatives (or potential supporters and 
representatives) should be provided with information and advice to enable them to 
understand their roles and duties. In addition, the ALRC proposes that Australian 
Public Service employees who engage with supporters and representatives are provided 
with regular, ongoing and consistent training in relation to the roles of supporters and 
representatives. The ALRC notes that NDIA employees, service providers, plan 
management providers, and other experts and third parties engaged in the NDIS would 
benefit from such training.  
5.123 The focus of training and guidance could include topics such as: the introduction 
of the supporter and representative model under the NDIS and differences between the 
new model and existing nominee provisions; interaction with state and territory 
decision-making systems; and supported decision-making in the context of the NDIS.  
Issues outside the scope of this Inquiry 
5.124 Stakeholders raised a range of other concerns about the NDIS, some of which 
extend beyond the Inquiry’s scope. They are nonetheless important and indicate 
systemic and practical concerns with the structure and operation of the NDIS. These 
include, for example: 
 eligibility and becoming a participant under the NDIS;
118
  
 the operation of the NDIS for people with particular types of disability, for 
example psychosocial disability;
119
 
 the interaction between the NDIS and other systems, particularly with respect to 
funding responsibility;
120
  
                                                        
116  National Disability Services, Submission 49.  
117  MHCA, Submission 77. 
118  See, eg, Women’s Legal Services NSW, Submission 57; Physical Disability Council of NSW, Submission 
32; Mental Health Coordinating Council, Submission 07; MHCA, Submission 77.  
119  See, eg, MHCA, Submission 77. See also, Mental Health Council of Australia, Providing Psychological 
Support through the NDIS, March 2014. 
120  See, eg, Office of the Public Advocate (Qld), Submission 05. 
 5. The National Disability Insurance Scheme 129 
 registration and oversight of providers of support;
121
 and 
 issues in relation to decreased funding of state and territory services, and 
potential gaps where people with disability are not eligible for the NDIS.
122
  
5.125 While these concerns are important, the issues do not relate directly to the 
concepts of legal capacity of decision-making ability and the ALRC does not intend to 
make proposals in these areas.  
 
                                                        
121  See, eg, Ibid. 
122  See, eg, MHCA, Submission 77. 
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Summary 
6.1 In Chapter 4, the ALRC proposes a new model for supported and fully 
supported decision-making in areas of Commonwealth legislative responsibility (the 
Commonwealth decision-making model). Chapter 5 discussed the application of the 
model to the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS).  
6.2 This chapter discusses how the Commonwealth decision-making model might 
be applied to other existing legislative schemes that already contain some decision-
making mechanism or make some provision for supporters and representatives, 
(however they are described). These schemes concern individual decision-making in 
relation to: 
 social security, specifically under the Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 
(Cth); 
 aged care, under the Aged Care Act 1997 (Cth); and 
 eHealth records, under the Personally Controlled Electronic Health Records Act 
2012 (PCEHR Act). 
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6.3 The chapter also discusses how the model might be applied to individual 
decision making in relation to personal information under the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth); 
and the provision of banking services. 
6.4 In most of these areas, the ALRC proposes that legislation should be amended to 
include supporter and representative provisions consistent with the Commonwealth 
decision-making model and suggests how this might be done. In relation to banking, 
the ALRC proposes that banks should be encouraged to recognise supporters, including 
through new guidelines reflecting supported decision-making principles. 
6.5 As discussed with respect to the Commonwealth decision-making model and the 
NDIS, one overarching issue is the interaction between the various Commonwealth 
decision-making schemes and state and territory appointed decision-makers. In each 
area, the interaction of supporters and representatives, recognised under specific 
Commonwealth legislation with other Commonwealth supporters and representatives 
and with state and territory appointed decision-makers will have to be considered.
1
 
Social security 
6.6 The legislative, policy and administrative framework for social security in 
Australia is set out in the Social Security Act 1991 (Cth), the Social Security 
(Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) and the Social Security (International Agreements) Act 
1999 (Cth).
2
 This section discusses how the Commonwealth decision-making model 
may be applied in social security law. 
Individual decision-making in social security  
6.7 There are three key decision-making mechanisms in the context of social 
security law: autonomous decision-making by social security payment recipients; 
informal supported decision-making; and substitute decision-making by nominees. 
6.8 In many circumstances, family members, friends and others may provide 
informal support to people with disability to make social security-related decisions 
without any formal recognition or appointment. The significant role of ‘informal and 
supportive decision-making arrangements’ in the context of social security was 
emphasised by a number of stakeholders.
3
  
6.9 Importantly, providing mechanisms for the appointment of formal supporters 
and representatives under the Social Security (Administration) Act should not diminish 
the involvement or respect for, informal support, including in relation to decision-
making. 
                                                        
1  See Ch 10.  
2  Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) s 3 defines social security law to include these three Acts. 
There are equivalent provisions for family assistance (family tax benefit, child care) in A New Tax System 
(Family Assistance) (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) Pt 8 ss 219TA—219TR. 
3  Centre for Rural Regional Law and Justice and the National Rural Law and Justice Alliance, Submission 
20. 
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6.10 The Social Security (Administration) Act contains a nominee scheme, and was 
the model for the nominee scheme under the National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 
2013 (Cth). Specifically, the Act makes provision for a ‘principal’
4
 to authorise another 
person or organisation to enquire or act on the person’s behalf when dealing with the 
Department of Human Services (DHS).
5
 There are two types of arrangements:  
 correspondence nominees—a person or organisation authorised to act and make 
changes on the principal’s behalf;
6
 and 
 payment nominees—a person or organisation authorised to receive a principal’s 
payment into an account maintained by the nominee.
7
 
6.11 Only one person can be appointed for each arrangement; however the same 
person can be appointed as both correspondence and payment nominee.
8
  
6.12 A principal may appoint their own nominee, however where a question arises in 
relation to a principal’s capacity to consent to the appointment of a nominee, or any 
concerns arise in relation to an existing arrangement, DHS must ‘investigate the 
situation’.
9
 The Guide to Social Security Law
10
 provides that in circumstances where ‘a 
principal is not capable, for example, due to an intellectual/physical constraint…of 
consenting to the appointment of a nominee’, a delegate may appoint one.
11
 The Guide 
also provides that ‘where a principal has a psychiatric disability, a nominee can be 
appointed in these instances where there is a court-appointed arrangement such as a 
Guardianship Order’.
12
 
6.13 Nominees have a range of functions and responsibilities.
13
 The primary duty of 
nominees is to ‘act at all times in the best interests of the principal’.
14
  
6.14 With respect to issues of liability, a principal is protected against liability for the 
actions of their correspondence nominee, and correspondence nominees are not subject 
to any criminal liability under the social security law in respect of: any act or omission 
of the principal; or anything done, in good faith, by the nominee in his or her capacity 
                                                        
4  A ‘principal’ for the purposes of the nominee provisions is a social security payment recipient who has 
had a nominee appointed to receive either correspondence and/or payments on their behalf: Social 
Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) s 123A.  
5  Social security law is administered by the Department of Human Services (DHS) through Centrelink. 
6  Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) ss 123C, 123H; see also, Department of Social Services, 
Guide to Social Security Law (2014) [8.52], [8.53]. 
7  Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) ss 123B, 123F; Department of Social Services, Guide to 
Social Security Law (2014) [8.5.1], [8.5.3]. 
8  Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) s 123D(1). 
9  Department of Social Services, Guide to Social Security Law (2014) [8.5.1], [8.5.2].  
10  The Guide to Social Security Law, produced by the Department of Social Services provides guidance to 
decision-makers in implementing this legislation: Department of Social Services, Guide to Social Security 
Law (2014). 
11  ‘In these cases, a delegate may appoint a nominee on behalf of the principal, with attention to supporting 
evidence, and where the delegate is fully satisfied that the nominee is required and will act in the 
principal’s best interests. The decision made by the delegate to appoint a nominee in these circumstances 
must be fully documented’: Ibid [8.5.1], [8.5.2]. 
12  Ibid. 
13  Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) ss 123H–123L, 123O. 
14  Ibid s 123O. 
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as nominee.
15
 However, if a correspondence nominee fails to satisfy a particular 
requirement, the principal is taken to have failed to comply with that requirement. This 
may then have adverse consequences in terms of compliance and payments.
16
  
The Commonwealth model and social security law 
Proposal 6–1 The Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) should 
be amended to include supporter and representative provisions consistent with 
the Commonwealth decision-making model.  
6.15 To ensure compliance with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) and the National Decision-Making Principles, and 
given concerns about the current nominee provisions,
17
 the ALRC proposes that the 
Social Security (Administration) Act be amended in the light of the National Decision-
Making Principles and the Commonwealth decision-making model.  
6.16 The application of the Commonwealth decision-making model in social security 
law would contribute to the development of consistent decision-making structures 
across key Commonwealth areas of law. The desirability of such consistency was 
encouraged by stakeholders such as the Law Council of Australia.
18
  
6.17 Importantly, providing mechanisms for the appointment of formal supporters 
and representatives under the Social Security (Administration) Act should not diminish 
the involvement or respect for, informal support, including in relation to decision-
making. However, as outlined in Chapter 4, the ALRC considers there are significant 
benefits to making provision for formal supported decision-making—a view shared by 
a range of stakeholders both broadly and in the context of social security law.
19
 
6.18 While, broadly speaking, the role played by correspondence nominees is 
analogous to the role envisaged for supporters under the Commonwealth decision-
making model, the existing nominee system does not make provision for formal 
supported decision-making. Accordingly, significant amendments would need to be 
made to the Social Security (Administration) Act to incorporate the Commonwealth 
decision-making model. 
6.19 The ALRC does not intend to prescribe a comprehensive new decision-making 
scheme for social security law. However, the ALRC outlines below some key ways in 
which the Commonwealth decision-making model might operate in the context of 
social security.  
                                                        
15  Ibid ss 123M, 123N. 
16  See, eg, Ibid s 123J.  
17  See, eg, Centre for Rural Regional Law and Justice and the National Rural Law and Justice Alliance, 
Submission 20. 
18  Law Council of Australia, Submission 83.  
19  See, eg, in relation to supported decision-making and social security law: Centre for Rural Regional Law 
and Justice and the National Rural Law and Justice Alliance, Submission 20. 
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Objects and principles 
6.20 Section 8 of the Social Security (Administration) Act contains general principles 
of administration. However, there are no principles relating to decision-making. The 
ALRC suggests that s 8 could be amended to incorporate principles relating to 
decision-making and supported decision-making, or that principles could be inserted 
into the part of the Act which will contain provisions relating to supporters and 
representatives.  
Supporters  
6.21 Under the Commonwealth decision-making model, a principal would be entitled 
to appoint one or more supporters to support them to make social security-related 
decisions. Ultimate decision-making power and responsibility would remain with the 
principal. Centrelink would need to recognise any decision made by a principal with 
the assistance of a supporter as being the decision of the principal.  
6.22 A principal may appoint whomever they wish as their supporter, including for 
example a family member, friend or carer. In the context of social security, the ability 
to appoint a supporter may also assist advocacy organisations to support people with 
disability. For example, stakeholders such as the Multicultural Disability Advocacy 
Association of NSW emphasised the need for an ‘authority form’ to facilitate provision 
of support to clients from culturally and linguistically diverse or non-English speaking 
backgrounds to engage with Centrelink.
20
 It may also address some of the privacy-
related difficulties encountered by those who support people with disability, given one 
of the potential roles of a supporter is to handle the relevant personal information of the 
principal. 
6.23 In many respects, correspondence nominees under the current system reflect the 
role potentially played by a supporter, including making enquiries and obtaining 
information to assist the principal, completing forms, and receiving mail. The key 
difference under the model would be that the principal formally retains ultimate 
decision-making responsibility. The role of a supporter is to support the principal to 
make a decision, rather than the supporter themselves making a decision.  
6.24 As a result, rather than having a duty to act in the best interests of the principal, 
supporters would have duties to: support the principal to express their will and 
preferences; act in a manner promoting the personal, social, financial, and cultural 
wellbeing of the principal; act honestly, diligently and in good faith; support the 
principal to consult with other relevant people; and develop the capacity of the 
principal to make their own decisions. These duties may address concerns expressed by 
stakeholders that the current nominee provisions ‘are generally disempowering of the 
person with the disability, as they place no obligation on a nominee to act in ways that 
genuinely involve the person or that assist them to exercise their legal capacity’.
21
 
                                                        
20  MDAA, Submission 43.  
21  Centre for Rural Regional Law and Justice and the National Rural Law and Justice Alliance, Submission 
20.  
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6.25 In addition, a principal would be entitled to revoke the appointment of a 
supporter at any time. This differs from the current system, under which there does not 
appear to be legislative provision for a principal to request cancellation of a nominee 
arrangement, an issue raised with concern by a number of stakeholders.
22
  
Representatives  
6.26 Consistent with the Commonwealth decision-making model, a principal would 
also be entitled to appoint a representative to support them to make social security 
related decisions.  
6.27 There may also be other circumstances in which a representative might be 
appointed—for example, where a person may not be in a position to appoint their own 
representative, but requires fully supported decision-making.  
6.28 Chapter 4 discusses possible alternative appointment mechanisms in these 
circumstances, including appointment by a court, tribunal or other body at a 
Commonwealth level or, in limited circumstances, by Centrelink. However, concerns 
expressed in relation to the powers of the CEO of the National Disability Insurance 
Agency to appoint a nominee may also apply to the similar powers of Centrelink 
delegates.
23
 
6.29 The key amendment to the Social Security (Administration) Act, applying the 
Commonwealth decision-making model with respect to representatives, would be to 
provide that representatives have a duty to consider the will, preferences and rights of 
the principal. This would replace the current duty of nominees to act in the best 
interests of the principal. 
6.30 Finally, the ALRC proposes that the appointment and conduct of representatives 
should be subject to appropriate and effective safeguards. The ALRC does not intend 
to be overly prescriptive in proposing what safeguards should apply under social 
security law. However, these safeguards might include: mechanisms for review and 
appeal of the appointment of representatives; potential monitoring or auditing of 
representatives by Centrelink; and the adoption of existing safeguards. For example, 
one of the existing safeguards that could apply to representatives is the power of DHS 
to require provision of a statement from payment nominees outlining expenditure of 
the principal’s payments by the nominee.
24
  
Education, training and guidance  
6.31 The ALRC considers education, training and guidance for all parties involved in 
the decision-making under social security law is of vital importance in ensuring the 
effective operation of this model of decision-making. This is particularly important in 
                                                        
22  Section 123E of the Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) outlines the specific power to revoke 
a nominee appointment, but does not appear to make provision for a request by a principal. See, eg, Law 
Council of Australia, Submission 83. 
23  For powers see, Department of Social Services, Guide to Social Security Law (2014) [8.5.1], [8.5.2]. 
24  Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) s 123L. It is a strict liability offence not to comply which 
attracts a penalty of 60 penalty units. See also Department of Social Services, Guide to Social Security 
Law (2014) [8.5.3]. 
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light of stakeholder concerns about existing difficulties in navigating the social security 
system, interacting with Centrelink, and obtaining information.  
6.32 Accordingly, the ALRC considers it is necessary for Centrelink to develop and 
deliver consistent, regular and targeted education and training as well as associated 
guidance for: 
 supporters and representatives, and potential supporters and representatives; 
 Centrelink payment recipients who require decision-making support; and 
 Centrelink employees and others involved decision-making or engagement with 
Centrelink customers.  
6.33 The focus of education, training and guidance could include topics such as: the 
introduction of the supporter and representative model under social security law and 
differences between the new model and existing nominee provisions; interaction with 
state and territory decision-making systems; and supported decision-making in the 
context of social security. 
Other issues 
6.34 Stakeholders also raised a range of systemic issues concerning social security. 
Briefly, stakeholders consistently emphasised the complexity of the social security 
system and the difficulties people with disability face in navigating the system; 
difficulties arising in relation to eligibility, participation requirements and the 
consequences of breach of certain requirements; and appeal and review processes. 
Stakeholders also highlighted the particular difficulties for people with disability who 
are Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander, from a culturally and linguistically diverse 
community, or who live in a rural, regional or remote community.
25
 
6.35 While these are important issues in the lives of people with disability, the issues 
do not relate directly to individual decision-making, and the ALRC does not intend to 
make proposals in these areas. 
Aged care 
6.36 The following section outlines how the National Decision-Making Principles 
and the Commonwealth decision-making model may apply to aged care. Aged care is 
an increasingly important area of federal responsibility in the context of Australia’s 
ageing population. The Australian Government is responsible for the funding and 
regulation of most residential aged care and home care packages,
26
 under the Aged 
                                                        
25  See, eg, Legal Aid Qld, Submission 64; Vicdeaf, Submission 56; Central Australian Legal Aid Service, 
Submission 48; MDAA, Submission 43; Equal Opportunity Commission of South Australia, Submission 
28; Centre for Rural Regional Law and Justice and the National Rural Law and Justice Alliance, 
Submission 20. See also: National People with Disabilities and Carers Council, Shut Out: The Experience 
of People with Disabilities and Their Families in Australia (2009).  
26  On 1 July 2012, the Australian Government assumed full funding, policy and operational responsibility 
for the Home and Community Care services for older people in all states and territories except Victoria 
and WA. The state and territory governments will continue to fund and administer HACC services for 
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Care Act,
27
 as well as social security payments, such as the age pension and the carer 
payment.  
6.37 Dementia related policy imperatives and elder abuse concerns have produced a 
raft of reports on aged care issues.
28
 The Australian Government has responded to them 
with the Living Longer Living Better reforms to aged care.
29
 Changes starting from 1 
July 2014 include income testing for home care packages, new accommodation 
payment arrangements for residential aged care, and the removal of the distinction 
between high and low care in residential care.
30
 Consultation on the exposure drafts of 
subordinate legislation slated for commencement on 1 July 2014 began in March 
2014.
31
 
6.38 In referring to the Living Longer Living Better reforms, Caxton Legal Centre 
submitted that it is concerned about the ‘omission of the CRPD’ as well as the 
weakening of human rights principles through the exclusion of the Residents’ Lifestyle 
Principle in the new Quality of Care Principles.
32
  
6.39 The Commonwealth decision-making model answers the calls in academic 
commentary, reports and in the submissions to the Inquiry for clear, national guidance 
for substitute decision-making in aged care that is compliant with the CRPD.
33
  
Individual decision-making in aged care  
6.40 At present, decisions in aged care, ranging from personal care and visitation to 
accommodation and medical treatment are made in various ways: by the aged care 
recipients themselves; informally by their families or carers; or by formally appointed 
substitute decision-makers like guardians.  
6.41 Informal decision-making for an aged care recipient seems to be widespread and 
accepted in aged care. The Victorian Law Reform Commission report on guardianship 
                                                                                                                                             
people under the age of 65 or under 50 for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people. In May 2013, 
Victoria has agreed to transition responsibility for HACC for older people to the Commonwealth from 
1 July 2015 and in August 2013, WA has agreed to do the same from 2016–2017. 
27  From 1 July 2014, the Australian Aged Care Quality Agency (instead of the Department of Social 
Services) will be responsible for the quality review of home care services. The Quality Agency was 
established by the Australian Aged Care Quality Agency Act 2013 (Cth). From 1 January 2014, the 
Australian Aged Care Quality Agency has replaced the Aged Care Standards and Accreditation Agency 
to take on the accreditation of residential aged care homes. Accreditation is conducted in accordance with 
the Quality Principles 2013 (Cth), Quality Agency Reporting Principles 2013 (Cth) and other legislative 
instruments issued pursuant to the Aged Care Act 1997 (Cth). 
28  ‘Caring for Older Australians’ (Inquiry Report No 53, Productivity Commission, 2011); Senate 
Committee on Community Affairs, Parliament of Australia, Care and Management of Younger and Older 
Australians Living with Dementia and Behavioural and Psychiatric Symptoms of Dementia (2014). 
29  See Aged Care (Living Longer Living Better) Act 2013 (Cth) and associated legislation.  
30  Department of Social Services, Reform Overview <http://www.dss.gov.au/our-responsibilities/ageing-
and-aged-care/aged-care-reform/reform-overview>.  
31  Department of Social Services, Get Involved <http://www.dss.gov.au/our-responsibilities/ageing-and-
aged-care/aged-care-reform/get-involved>.  
32  Caxton Legal Centre, Submission 67. 
33  John Chesterman, ‘The Future of Adult Guardianship in Federal Australia’ (2013) 66 Australian Social 
Work 26; ‘Caring for Older Australians’, above n 28, rec 15.10; Office of the Public Advocate (Qld), 
Submission 05; Centre for Rural Regional Law and Justice and the National Rural Law and Justice 
Alliance, Submission 20; Law Council of Australia, Submission 83. 
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noted that many people with impaired decision-making capacity live in facilities like 
nursing homes with only the informal consent of a family member or carer.
34
 The 
Australian Guardianship and Administration Council (AGAC) submitted such 
‘informal decision making’ or ‘de facto arrangements’ were initially approved as ‘less 
restrictive alternatives’ when compared to formal guardianship appointments but that 
informal decision-making lacks safeguards against abuse as required by art 12(5) of the 
CRPD.
35
 
6.42 On the other hand, government agencies and service providers prefer the 
formality of legal arrangements for aged care decisions. AGAC’s experience has been 
that Commonwealth agencies tend to assume that most people with disability have 
formally appointed guardians and when forms are designed on this basis, state and 
territory tribunals have been periodically ‘inundated by applications for appointment of 
guardians or administrators’ to meet the specific purposes of asset assessment
36
 or an 
application under the Continence Aids Payment Scheme.
37
  
6.43 The Aged Care Act is ambiguous about informal and formal substitute decision-
making for people who may require decision-making support with respect to aged care. 
Section 96–5 of the Act provides for a person, other than an approved provider to 
represent an aged care recipient who, because of any ‘physical incapacity or mental 
impairment’ is unable to enter into agreements relating to residential care, home care, 
extra services, accommodation bonds and accommodation charges. Section 96–6 states 
that in making an application or giving information under the Act, a ‘person authorised 
to act on the care recipient’s behalf’ can do so.  
6.44 There seems to be a distinction between ‘representation’ for binding contracts 
and ‘authorisation’ for informal correspondence. However, there is inconsistency in the 
use of the ‘representative’ throughout the Commonwealth laws and legal frameworks 
for aged care recipients. The Act contains references to a ‘legal representative’ to imply 
a guardianship arrangement;
38
 ‘representative’ to refer to an advocate;
39
 and an 
undefined ‘appropriate person’.
40
  
6.45 Stakeholders emphasised the right to autonomy of aged care consumers, and the 
importance of supporting them in decision-making. The Centre for Rural and Regional 
Law and Justice, and the National Rural Law and Justice Alliance stressed the value of 
supported and co decision-making arrangements in aged care, which is particularly 
relevant in the regional and rural context.
41
  
                                                        
34  Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) ch 15, 318. 
35  Australian Guardianship and Administration Council, Submission 51. 
36  As part of an application for residential aged care. 
37  Australian Guardianship and Administration Council, Submission 51. 
38  Aged Care Act 1997 (Cth) s 52F–2. 
39  Ibid s 81.1(1)(c)(ii). 
40  Ibid s 44.8A. 
41  Centre for Rural Regional Law and Justice and the National Rural Law and Justice Alliance, Submission 
20. The submission also drew attention to the difficulties in accessing in-home support and respite 
services, which can greatly exacerbate the ‘disabling effects of ageing’ and, thereby, create greater 
difficulties for the person in the exercise of legal capacity. 
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6.46 Stakeholders reflected on the need to balance duty of care and the dignity of risk 
in aged care decision-making. The Illawarra Forum recommended change to the 
legislation so that ‘risk management strategies’ do not result in older people with 
dementia being ‘locked up’ in aged care.
42
  
6.47 The Mental Health Coordinating Council expressed concern about the chemical 
restraint of people with mental illness who are deemed to be ‘challenging’ in aged care 
facilities. The Council argued, 
Supported decision-making is extremely important for this group of particularly vulnerable 
people, who the system characteristically ‘medicates’ and ‘manages’. It is critical that the 
mental health and age care services work closely together so that a vulnerable and isolated 
person does not fall between service gaps and that older people are appropriately cared for in 
mental health and age care facilities using principles of recovery and enablement.43  
6.48 The Office of the Public Advocate (SA) suggested an amendment of the User 
Rights Principles 1997 (Cth), made under the Aged Care Act, to minimise and 
eliminate the use of restrictive practices in aged care.
44
 OPA (SA) recommended a 
clear definition of each restrictive practice, a requirement that non-coercive measures 
be considered and a distinct authority for restrictive practices to be used. Restrictive 
practices are discussed in more detail in Chapter 8. 
The Commonwealth model and aged care  
Proposal 6–2 The Aged Care Act 1997 (Cth) should be amended to 
include supporter and representative provisions consistent with the 
Commonwealth decision-making model. 
6.49 The ALRC proposes that the Aged Care Act be amended in the light of the 
National Decision-Making Principles and the Commonwealth decision-making model.  
6.50 While the ALRC does not intend to prescribe a comprehensive new decision-
making scheme for aged care, some key ways in which the Commonwealth decision-
making model might operate in this area are outlined below. 
Objects  
6.51 Division 2 of the Aged Care Act lists the objects of the Act, in providing for the 
funding of aged care. These objects include such matters as encouraging aged care 
services that ‘facilitate the independence of, and choice available to’ recipients and to     
help recipients ‘to enjoy the same rights as all other people in Australia’. The extensive 
set of objects does not, however, make any direct reference to decision-making.  
6.52 The ALRC suggests s 2–1 of the Act could be amended to incorporate principles 
relating to decision-making and supported decision-making, or that a principles 
                                                        
42  The Illawarra Forum, Submission 19. 
43  Mental Health Coordinating Council, Submission 07. 
44  Office of the Public Advocate (SA), Submission 17. 
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provision could be inserted into the part of the Act which will contain provisions 
relating to supporters and representatives.  
Supporters and representatives 
6.53 The definition of ‘representative’ in the User Rights Principles appears to 
conflate a decision-maker chosen by the care recipient, for example, a partner (a 
supporter) with a formally appointed decision-maker, such as a holder of an enduring 
power of attorney (representative).
45
 
6.54 The proposed model will provide new approaches for the involvement and 
regulation of representatives in decisions by aged care consumers. Supported decision-
making in the aged care context means that people who may require decision-making 
support can make as many of their own decisions as possible, with the assistance of a 
‘supporter’, whether it is about where they live or what services they receive. For fully 
supported decision-making in aged care, the ‘will, preferences and rights’ standard 
would replace the existing ‘best interests’ test, in compliance with the CRPD.  
6.55 The Commonwealth decision-making model would apply from the first trigger 
for decision-making by an aged care consumer. Under the framework, a potential aged 
care consumer of residential or home care services who has impaired decision-making 
ability would make decisions about assessment of his or her care needs by the Aged 
Care Assessment Team
46
 with the assistance of a supporter or in consultation with a 
representative. 
6.56 Often, the decision to undergo assessment of care needs is made under pressure 
when a crisis has arisen for the potential aged care consumer. There are likely to be 
benefits for both consumers and service providers, where the consumer has a supporter 
with whom to make a decision. 
6.57 The next significant decision for the aged care consumer may be whether to 
enter a Resident agreement or Home care package agreement. These agreements are 
legally binding documents that outline the services to be provided, fees charged, and 
the rights and responsibilities of both parties.  
6.58 It will be important for the Commonwealth decision-making model to augment 
existing state and territory systems with a clear, structured approach to decision-
making that will mirror the rights and responsibilities of consumers and service 
providers of aged care.
47
 Advocacy and safeguarding of rights are critical to preventing 
elder abuse. Under an effective, nationally coordinated model, the aged care consumer 
will receive assistance from supporters whose role and duties are specified. They will 
know that they are ultimately responsible for the decision made with the assistance of a 
supporter. Where a representative makes a decision for the aged care consumer, the 
                                                        
45  User Rights Principles 1997 (Cth) para 23.25. 
46  The Aged Care Assessment Service (ACAS) in Victoria. 
47  See, Australian Government Department of Social Security, Charter of Residents Rights and 
Responsibilities; Australian Government Department of Social Security, Charter of Rights and 
Responsibilities for Home Care. 
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decision will be based on the will and preferences of the person requiring support and 
the representative will be subject to safeguards in the system.  
6.59 Where the rights and responsibilities of the aged care consumer are clearly set 
out under such a model, the service provider will be assured that a consumer who has a 
supporter, will have had the agreement explained to them in an appropriate manner and 
understand what is signed. If a representative signs an agreement, the service provider 
will know that the contract is in accordance with the wishes of the consumer and that it 
is legally binding. 
6.60 A suite of accreditation standards and guidelines made under the Aged Care Act 
would need to be revised to specifically acknowledge and implement the supporter and 
representative model. For instance, the Resident Care Manual states that a 
representative may be a guardian or a person nominated by the care recipient as his or 
her representative.
48
 Currently, the accredited provider must be satisfied that the 
nominated person has a connection with the resident, and is concerned for the ‘safety, 
health and well-being’ of the resident.
49
 The inclusion of the supporter and 
representative scheme in the Act would apply the more specific and subjective standard 
of the ‘will, preferences and rights’ of the person to these aged care decisions. 
6.61 The Home Care Packages Program Guidelines provide that shared decision-
making between the consumer, an appointed representative and the home care provider 
should take place where the consumer has ‘cognitive impairment’.
50
 The 
Commonwealth decision-making model would give structured and consistent guidance 
so that an aged care consumer is presumed to have the ability to make decisions, is 
entitled to support in making those decisions; and, if a representative is appointed, to 
have a representative make decisions that accord with the will, preferences and rights 
of the consumer. 
eHealth records 
6.62 The following section discusses the PCEHR Act, which contains provisions 
dealing with decision-making concerning the collection, use and disclosure of 
personally controlled electronic health records—referred to as ‘eHealth records’. 
6.63 An eHealth record is an electronic summary of a person’s health records, which 
the individual and their healthcare providers can access online when needed. The 
eHealth record system was rolled out nationally in July 2012, allowing people seeking 
health care in Australia to register for an eHealth record. Healthcare Provider 
Organisations can also register to participate in the eHealth record system, and 
authorise their healthcare providers to access the eHealth record system. 
6.64 As the system develops over time, having an eHealth record will give healthcare 
providers access to a summary of key health information, as long as the person gives 
initial consent when confirming access settings for the eHealth record. This will 
                                                        
48  Department of Social Services, ‘The Residential Care Manual’ (2014) 6. 
49  Ibid. 
50  Department of Health and Ageing, ‘Home Care Packages Program Guidelines’ (August 2013) 3.1.4. 
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include information such as medications, hospital discharge summaries, allergies and 
immunisations.
51
 
Individual decision-making and eHealth records 
6.65 Under the legislative framework for eHealth, there are protections against the 
mishandling of information.
52
 Individuals can control their own eHealth record by 
choosing to restrict which healthcare providers can access it and what information is 
included through exercising ‘access controls’.
53
 Unauthorised collection, use or 
disclosure of eHealth record information is both a contravention of the PECHR Act and 
an interference with privacy under the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth).
54
 
6.66 The PCEHR Act contains detailed schemes for ‘nominated representatives’ and 
‘authorised representatives’. In the terminology used by the ALRC, the former are 
analogous to ‘supporters’ and the latter to ‘representatives’.  
‘Nominated representatives’ 
6.67 The nominated representative provisions are intended to support the 
involvement of people other than healthcare professionals in assisting consumers in 
managing their healthcare. Nominated representatives may be family members, carers, 
neighbours or any other person nominated by a consumer.
55
  
6.68 For a person to be a nominated representative, there must be an agreement 
between the consumer and the proposed nominated representative. This agreement 
does not have to be in writing. The consumer must also notify the System Operator that 
the other person is her or his nominated representative.
56
  
6.69 Consumers remain able to access and control their eHealth record themselves, 
and access by a nominated representative is subject to any access controls set by the 
consumer.  
6.70 For example, in some cases a nominated representative may have ‘read-only’ 
access to a consumer’s eHealth record. In other cases, a consumer may allow a 
nominated representative to do anything the consumer can do, including setting access 
controls, and granting access to healthcare provider organisations.  
This flexibility in setting access controls is designed to take into account the many 
circumstances where a person may not be able to, or may not wish to, manage their 
own [eHealth record] but where they do not have a formal legally recognised 
representative to act on their behalf.57 
                                                        
51  See Department of Health, EHealth–General Individuals FAQs <http://www.ehealth.gov.au/internet/ 
ehealth/publishing.nsf/Content/faqs-individuals-gen>. 
52  Personally Controlled Electronic Health Records Act 2012 (Cth) pt 4. 
53  See, eg, Ibid s 61. 
54  Ibid s 73. 
55  Explanatory Memorandum, Personally Controlled Electronic Health Records Bill 2011 (Cth) 10. 
56  Personally Controlled Electronic Health Records Act 2012 (Cth) s 7. 
57  Explanatory Memorandum, Personally Controlled Electronic Health Records Bill 2011 (Cth) 10. 
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6.71 A nominated representative must always act in the ‘best interests’ of the 
consumer, subject to the consumer’s directions.
58
 
‘Authorised representatives’ 
6.72 People who may have impaired decision-making ability are able to have an 
eHealth record. To facilitate this, an authorised representative is able to register a 
consumer for an eHealth record and manage the access controls on behalf of the 
consumer. 
6.73 A person may be an authorised representative of a person over 18 years old if 
the System Operator is satisfied that a consumer is not capable of making decisions for 
themselves, and that another person is authorised by an Australian law, or by a decision 
of an Australian court or tribunal, to act on behalf of the consumer.
59
  
6.74 If there is no such person, the System Operator may appoint someone else if 
satisfied that person an appropriate person to be the authorised representative.
60
 This 
provision is said to allow the System Operator, in making appointments, to ‘take into 
account a range of other circumstances for people without capacity, or with only 
limited capacity’.
61
 
6.75 For the purposes of the PCEHR Act and the eHealth system, an authorised 
representative is treated as if she or he were the consumer. That is, the authorised 
representative can do anything authorised or required of the consumer, and anything 
done by an authorised representative in relation to the system is taken as if it were done 
by the consumer.
62
 
6.76 An authorised representative must always act in the best interests of the 
consumer, having regard to any directions from the consumer expressed when they had 
capacity to act on their own behalf.
63
 A consumer may have more than one authorised 
representative.
64
 
The Commonwealth model and eHealth records 
Proposal 6–3 The Personally Controlled Electronic Health Records Act 
2012 (Cth) should be amended to include supporter and representative 
provisions consistent with the Commonwealth decision-making model. 
6.77 The existing scheme for authorised and nominated representatives contained in 
the PCEHR Act is detailed and tailored to the operation of the voluntary national 
system for the provision of access to electronic health information. 
                                                        
58  Personally Controlled Electronic Health Records Act 2012 (Cth) s 7(6). 
59  Ibid s 7(4). 
60  Ibid s 6(4)(b). 
61  Explanatory Memorandum, Personally Controlled Electronic Health Records Bill 2011 (Cth) 10. 
62  Personally Controlled Electronic Health Records Act 2012 (Cth) s 6(7). 
63  Ibid s 6(9). 
64  Ibid s 6(8). 
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6.78 The scheme is designed, among other things, to ensure that people who have 
impaired decision-making ability are able to have an eHealth record; and to enable 
people to share their health information with those who need it. For example, an older 
person may want their son or daughter to be able to view key health information, such 
as currently prescribed medications and test results, in order to provide care and 
assistance to them. 
6.79 The ALRC does not intend to prescribe a comprehensive new decision-making 
scheme for the PCEHR Act. Individual decision-making under the PCEHR Act is 
relatively limited—being confined to decisions about the collection, use and disclosure 
of health information—as compared to, for example, decision-making under the Aged 
Care Act, which often involves significant decisions about the provision of residential 
and home care services and the entering of contractual arrangements. 
6.80  However, the existing PCEHR Act provisions concerning nominated and 
authorised representatives should be reviewed and amended in the light of the decision-
making principles and the Commonwealth decision-making model. 
6.81 Broadly, nominated representatives under the PCEHR Act are analogous to 
‘supporters’ in the Commonwealth decision-making model. They are nominated by the 
person concerned, and are subject to directions by the consumer, who may also 
continue to make decisions under the PCEHR Act.  
6.82 Apart from adopting consistent terminology, possible changes to these 
nominated representatives provisions might include providing that, in making 
decisions, supporters have obligations to:  
 consider the will, preferences and rights of the person represented (rather than 
the current best interests test);  
 consult with existing appointees, family members, carers and other significant 
people;  
 perform the role diligently and in good faith. 
6.83 Authorised representatives provide substitute decision-making concerning 
eHealth records and, therefore, perform a role analogous to that of ‘representatives’ in 
the proposed Commonwealth supporter and nominee model. Changes to these PCEHR 
Act provisions may include incorporating the ‘will, preferences and rights’ approach to 
decision making; the proposed guidelines for determining decision-making ability; and 
the proposed factors for determining whether a person or organisation is suitable for 
appointment. 
6.84 The NSW Council for Intellectual Disability (NSWCID) observed that  
so far as possible, people with intellectual disability should be supported to make their 
own decisions in relation to the creation of and access to their e-health record. Where 
146 Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws 
maximum support proves inadequate, there needs to be a system of authorised 
representatives.65  
6.85 The Council cautioned that if it were ‘unduly time-consuming or complex to 
create an authorised representative for an individual, the strong likelihood would be 
that families and doctors would be deterred from taking this course and the person with 
disability would be denied the considerable advantages to their health of having an e-
health record’.
66
  
6.86 There may be arguments that no change to existing provisions of the PCEHR 
Act is necessary because the system already strikes a balance between safeguards for 
the privacy and related rights of the person and allows representatives to be appointed 
without undue administrative complexity.  
6.87 In the ALRC’s view, it is important to encourage the implementation of 
supported decision-making in this area of Commonwealth responsibility. There is, 
however, no intention to create unnecessary formality. Decisions under the PCEHR 
Act involve only the handling of personal information. Therefore, there may be a case 
for supporter and representative provisions that are more minimal than those proposed 
in the Commonwealth decision-making model. 
Information privacy 
6.88 The Privacy Act is Australia’s key information privacy law. The Act is 
concerned with the protection of personal information held by certain entities, rather 
than with privacy more generally. Personal information is defined in s 6(1) of the Act 
as information or opinion about an identified individual, or an individual who is 
reasonably identifiable, whether or not true and whether or not in material form. 
6.89 The Privacy Act provides 13 ‘Australian Privacy Principles’ (APPs) that set out 
the broad requirements on collection, use, disclosure and other handling of personal 
information.
67
 The APPs bind only ‘APP entities’—primarily Australian Government 
agencies and large private sector organisations with a turnover of more than $3 million. 
Certain small businesses are also bound, such as those that provide health services and 
those that disclose personal information to anyone else for a benefit, service or 
advantage.
68
 Generally, individuals are not bound by the Privacy Act.
69
 
6.90 Privacy of health information may be a special concern for people with 
disability. Health and genetic information is ‘sensitive information’ that is subject to 
                                                        
65  NSW Council for Intellectual Disability, Submission 33. 
66  Ibid. 
67  Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) sch 1. 
68  ‘APP entity’ is defined in Ibid s 6(1). Small businesses are not, in general, APP entities, with some 
exceptions as set out in s 6D. 
69  There are some exceptions. For example, an individual who is a reporting entity under the Anti-Money 
Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth), will be treated as an APP entity under the 
Privacy Act 1988 (Cth). 
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stronger protection under the APPs.
70
 Separate Commonwealth legislation protects 
healthcare identifiers
71
 and eHealth records.
72
 
6.91 The major issue for stakeholders was to ensure that personal information is able 
to be shared appropriately in order to support people with disability. National 
Disability Services, for example, stated: 
The key challenge is often to transfer sufficient personal information (such as 
medication requirements or worker safety issues) that will enable the provision of 
high quality, tailored and safe support, while also protecting the right to privacy.73 
6.92 There is a public interest in families and friends being involved in the care and 
treatment of people with a mental illness, for example, and this clearly involves the 
sharing of information.
74
 The NSWCID observed that, for a person with an intellectual 
disability, there may be ‘numerous times in a month when an agency needs to obtain 
information about the person from a range of sources and provide information to a 
range of agencies or individuals’.
75
 The ACT Disability, Aged and Carer Advocacy 
Service noted:  
If [supported decision-making] frameworks are to reduce or replace the use of 
guardianship, consideration needs to be given to how relevant information can be 
shared with decision supporters while balancing the right of people with disability to 
privacy.76 
Individual decision-making and the Privacy Act 
6.93 The Privacy Act makes no express provision for supporters or representatives to 
be recognised as acting on behalf of an individual in relation to decisions about the 
handling of personal information held by APP entities. 
6.94 Some state privacy legislation does provide for representatives. The Health 
Records and Information Privacy Act 2002 (NSW), for example, provides for the 
position of an ‘authorised representative’ to act on behalf of an individual who is 
‘incapable of doing an act authorised, permitted or required’ by the Act.
77
  
6.95 An authorised representative may not do an act on behalf of an individual who is 
capable of doing that act, unless the individual expressly authorises the authorised 
representative to do that act.
78
 
                                                        
70  Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 6(1).  
71  Healthcare Identifiers Act 2010 (Cth). 
72  Personally Controlled Electronic Health Records Act 2012 (Cth). 
73  National Disability Services, Submission 49. 
74  Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 41. 
75  NSW Council for Intellectual Disability, Submission 33. 
76  ADACAS, Submission 29. 
77  Health Records and Information Privacy Act 2002 (NSW) s 7. An individual is defined as incapable ‘if 
the individual is incapable (despite the provision of reasonable assistance by another person) by reason of 
age, injury, illness, physical or mental impairment of: (a) understanding the general nature and effect of 
the act, or (b) communicating the individual’s intentions with respect to the act’. 
78  Ibid s 8(3). 
148 Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws 
6.96 An ‘authorised representative’ for these purposes means a person appointed 
under an enduring power of attorney, a guardian, a person having parental 
responsibility (if the individual is a child), or person who is ‘otherwise empowered 
under law to exercise any functions as an agent of or in the best interests of the 
individual’.
79
 Essentially, therefore, the Health Records and Information Privacy Act 
2002 provides recognition for representatives, but not for supporters, as those terms are 
used in this Discussion Paper. 
6.97 The ALRC has considered previously whether the Privacy Act should include 
provision for representatives. In its 2008 report, For Your Information: Australian 
Privacy Law and Practice, the ALRC recommended that the Privacy Act should be 
amended to include the concept of a ‘nominee’. An agency or organisation would be 
able to establish nominee arrangements and then ‘deal with an individual’s nominee as 
if the nominee were the individual’.
80
 The ALRC recommended that nominee 
arrangements should include, at a minimum, the following elements: 
(a)   a nomination can be made by an individual or a substitute decision maker 
authorised by a federal, state or territory law; 
(b)  the nominee can be an individual or an entity; 
(c)  the nominee has a duty to act at all times in the best interests of the individual; 
and 
(d)  the nomination can be revoked by the individual, the nominee or the agency or 
organisation.81 
6.98 The ALRC concluded that establishing nominee arrangements would ‘provide 
flexibility for individuals to decide who can act as their “agent” for the purposes of the 
Privacy Act, and also operate as a useful mechanism in situations where an individual 
has limited, intermittent or declining capacity’.
82
  
6.99 The rationale for the original ALRC recommendations was to address problems 
faced by individuals and their representatives in gaining access to benefits and services 
due to perceived or real conflicts with the Privacy Act. That is, organisations refusing 
to provide information or deal with supporters ‘because of the Privacy Act’. Similar 
concerns were expressed in this Inquiry.
83
 
6.100 The ALRC’s 2008 recommendations would have provided recognition for both 
supporters and representatives.  
6.101 The ALRC envisaged that a nominee could be either nominated by the 
individual or a substitute decision-maker appointed under some other law. While it 
would not be necessary for an authorised substitute decision-maker to be registered as a 
nominee for the agency or organisation to recognise that person, the nominee 
                                                        
79  Ibid s 8. 
80  ALRC, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, Report 108 (2008) Rec 70–1. 
81  Ibid Rec 70–2. 
82  Ibid [70.96]. 
83  See, eg, NSW Council for Intellectual Disability, Submission 33; ADACAS, Submission 29. 
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arrangements were seen as a convenient way for the decision-maker to be recognised 
for ongoing dealings with the agency or organisation.
84
 
The Commonwealth model and the Privacy Act 
Proposal 6–4 The Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) should be amended to include 
supporter and representative provisions consistent with the Commonwealth 
decision-making model. 
6.102 Successive Australian Governments have not responded to the ALRC’s 
recommendations concerning decision-making arrangements under the Privacy Act.
85
 
There seems good reason to revisit this issue in the context of the present Inquiry. 
6.103 The Privacy Act does not prevent a supporter from providing assistance to the 
individual where this is done with the consent of the individual. Where the assistance 
requires the supporter to have access to the personal information of the individual, the 
individual can provide consent for the agency or organisation to disclose the 
information to the supporter. Sometimes it should be quite clear, for example, that a 
requested disclosure of personal information would be covered by APP 6.
86
  
6.104 There are concerns, however, that such arrangements are not implemented 
consistently, or recognised by agencies and organisations.
87
 The NSWCID submitted: 
So far as possible, people with intellectual disability should be given the support that 
they need to make their own privacy decisions. If this is not adequate, there needs to 
be a legislative system of substitute consent and/or administrative safeguards that 
provides reasonable safeguards on the privacy of the individual whilst also 
recognising that other rights of the individual may be imperilled if personal 
information cannot be gathered and promptly used as occasions arise.88 
6.105 If the privacy rules covering this sort of information exchange are ‘cumbersome 
or complex’, then optimal support of people with intellectual disabilities will not 
occur.
89
 Other stakeholders referred to the desirability of uniform Commonwealth, 
state and territory privacy regulation.
90
 
                                                        
84  ALRC, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, Report 108 (2008) [70.101]. 
85  Many other recommendations made in the 2008 privacy report were implemented following the 
enactment of the Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy Protection) Act 2012 (Cth). 
86  That is, the disclosure is for the purpose the information was collected, or the individual has consented to 
the disclosure of the information: Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) sch 1, cl 6.  
87  ALRC, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, Report 108 (2008) [70.104]. 
88  NSW Council for Intellectual Disability, Submission 33. 
89  The NSWCID referred to the Health Records and Information Privacy Act 2002 (NSW) as a good model 
for dealing with ‘incapacity issues’: Ibid. 
90  See, eg, Mental Health Coordinating Council, Submission 07. The ALRC has previously recommended 
an intergovernmental cooperative scheme that provides that the states and territories should enact 
legislation regulating the handling of personal information in the state and territory public sectors that is 
consistent with the Privacy Act: ALRC, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, 
Report 108 (2008) Recs 3–4, 3–5. 
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6.106 The advantages of recognising supporters in Commonwealth laws are discussed 
in Chapter 4. In particular, formalisation of support is likely to create greater certainty 
for third parties about the role of supporters, and facilitate the provision of support to 
people who need it. In the context of information privacy, this is likely to allow third 
parties to interact with supporters with greater confidence, allowing for timely 
collection, use and disclosure of information.  
6.107 There is a downside to this approach, in that legislative arrangements may work 
against flexible practices by encouraging the perception that a supporter must be 
formally appointed in order to be recognised. However, more informal arrangements 
may not be implemented consistently or recognised by APP entities. Some form of 
legislative underpinning may be more effective in establishing recognition of 
supporters. 
6.108 In the ALRC’s view, the Privacy Act should be amended to include supporter 
and representative provisions consistent with the Commonwealth decision-making 
model. The new provisions would apply potentially to an individual’s relationships 
with the full range of APP entities—Commonwealth government agencies and private 
sector organisations.  
6.109 The Privacy Act should permit APP entities to establish a supporters and 
representatives scheme, but this should not be mandatory. APP entities need to retain 
the flexibility to develop practices and procedures consistent with their broader 
operations. Agencies and organisations also may be subject to other obligations—such 
as the bankers’ duty of confidentiality or particular legislative provisions—which place 
limits on decision-making by supporters. Each agency and organisation must consider 
the extent to which it is able to recognise and act upon decisions made by a supporter. 
6.110 Incorporating the Commonwealth decision-making model within the Privacy 
Act may facilitate assistance for people in making and communicating decisions 
concerning control of their personal information by recognising supporters, including 
family and carers, as being able to act on their behalf. At the least, supporters should be 
recognised and be made subject to a duty to support an individual’s will and 
preferences in relation to the handling of their personal information. 
6.111 However, some circumstances will require a more rigorous process for 
appointment and verification than others, due to the potential consequences of the 
disclosure of personal information or the transaction involved. For example, a bank or 
other financial institution might establish an arrangement that has effect for the 
purposes of disclosing account balances and banking transactions, but does not extend 
to a supporter withdrawing funds from an account on behalf of the individual, without 
putting further integrity measures in place. 
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Banking services 
6.112 Banking is another area of Commonwealth legislative responsibility,
91
 in 
relation to which the application of the decision-making model might be considered.  
6.113  Article 12(5) of the CRPD requires States Parties to take all appropriate and 
effective measures to ensure the equal right of persons with disabilities to control their 
own financial affairs and to have equal access to bank loans, mortgages and other 
forms of financial credit.
92
  
6.114 In practice, a tension emerges between these rights and the need to protect 
people from financial abuse and exploitation in conducting their banking and financial 
activities. There is also a need to ensure the legal validity of financial transactions.  
6.115 An issue in relation to banking is the refusal of some banks to allow people with 
disability to access or operate a bank account independently, and hesitancy in 
recognising informal supporters. Such refusals may reflect bank concerns about 
capacity or financial exploitation.
93
 In this context, the Australian Bankers’ Association 
(ABA) has commented that 
Financial exploitation of a vulnerable person is a deeply challenging area for banks. 
Every customer’s situation is unique and banks have an obligation to protect their 
customers’ privacy, maintain the bank’s duty of confidentiality, and to not 
unnecessarily intrude into their customers’ lives.94 
6.116 The ABA issues non-binding industry guidelines that are relevant to the ability 
of people with disability to engage with the banking industry and to make decisions in 
that context.
95
 In particular, the ABA has issued guidelines on responding to requests 
from a power of attorney or court-appointed administrator (the ABA guidelines). 
6.117 The ABA guidelines explain how powers of attorney and court-appointed 
administrator arrangements apply to banks’ relationships with their customers; and 
outline a framework that banks can use to consistently deal with requests from 
attorneys and administrators.
96
 
6.118 The ABA guidelines note that it ‘is not the role of bank staff (or a bank) to 
determine a customer’s capacity’.
97
 They outline the roles of administrators and 
                                                        
91  See, eg, Banking Act 1959 (Cth); Australian Prudential Regulation Authority Act 1998 (Cth); Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth). 
92  UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 999 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 2008) art 12(5). 
93  See, eg, Disability Rights Now, Civil Society Report to the United Nations on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, (2012) 190.  
94  Australian Bankers’ Association, Financial Abuse Prevention (12 November 2013) <http://www.bankers 
.asn.au/Consumers/Financial-abuse-prevention>.  
95  ABA industry guidelines provide assistance to banks in recognising financial abuse, advocate raising 
awareness among bank employees about this risk, and outline strategies for dealing with a situation of 
potential financial abuse: Australian Bankers’ Association Industry Guideline, Protecting Vulnerable 
Customers from Potential Financial Abuse, June 2013.  
96  Australian Bankers’ Association Industry Guideline, Responding to Requests from a Power of Attorney or 
Court-Appointed Administrator, June 2013, 1. 
97  Ibid 2. 
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guardians, how to recognise their authority, and highlight differences in the role, 
authority and responsibilities of guardians and administrators between jurisdictions.
98
 
Encouraging supported decision making  
Proposal 6–5 The Australian Bankers’ Association should encourage 
banks to recognise supported decision-making. To this end, the ABA should 
issue guidelines, reflecting the National Decision-Making Principles and 
recognising that: 
(a) customers should be presumed to have the ability to make decisions about 
access to banking services; 
(b) customers may be capable of making and communicating decisions 
concerning banking services, where they have access to necessary 
support; 
(c) customers are entitled to support in making and communicating 
decisions; and 
(d) banks should recognise supporters and respond to their requests, where 
possible and consistent with other legal duties. 
6.119 There may be some reluctance on the part of banks to allow people who need 
decision-making support to access banking services independently and to recognise the 
role of supporters. Banks may tend to recognise only formal, substitute decision-
making appointments. The ABA guidelines state, for example: 
Banks have a contractual obligation to act in accordance with the customer’s mandate. 
If a customer has set up a power of attorney, or a court has appointed an administrator 
to represent a customer’s interests, then these authorities are considered to be in line 
with the customer’s mandate. It is important to recognise and respond to requests 
from these authorities as if they were made from the customer themselves.99 
6.120 In the ALRC’s view, people who need decision-making assistance should not 
necessarily have to access banking services only through an administrator or the holder 
of a power of attorney. 
6.121 Submissions referred to difficulties faced by people with disability in obtaining 
access to banking services, including because supporters are not recognised. Pave the 
Way, for example, stated that banks often refuse to allow people with disability to have 
their own bank account: 
This is a problem that is regularly experienced by families who are trying to open an 
ordinary bank account for their family member who has a disability. We are aware of 
numerous examples of banks being willing to open an account for a child without 
disability but refusing to open an account for a child with disability. Similarly banks 
                                                        
98  Ibid 4–5, 7.  
99  Ibid 6. 
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regularly refuse to open accounts for adults with disability. While it appears that there 
is no actual legal impediment to banks offering this service, some banks express 
concern about capacity and others cite an obligation to protect vulnerable people. 
When facing this problem some families decide to seek an administration order.100 
6.122 The Equal Opportunity Commission of South Australia referred to a decision of 
the Equality Opportunity Tribunal (SA), which found that a finance company had 
discriminated against a loan applicant on the basis of disability. The Commission stated 
that the decision is ‘a reminder of the risk that service providers may take in making 
assumptions about a person based on a disability, without adequately assessing a 
person’s capacity’.
101
 
6.123 The Centre for Rural Regional Law and Justice and the National Rural Law and 
Justice Alliance submitted that recognition of supported decision-making arrangements 
could better enable people with disabilities to ‘exercise equal legal capacity in their use 
of financial services’. While the reluctance of banks to recognise informal 
arrangements was said to be understandable, provision for supported decision-making 
could help provide certainty for banks, while still ensuring that ‘support for people 
with disabilities in the exercise of legal capacity is tailored to their needs, as required 
by Article 12 of the [CRPD]’.
102
 
6.124  Banking may not be an area in which the full Commonwealth decision-making 
model can easily be applied. It may not be practical, for example, to impose any 
legislative requirement on banks to set up their own systems for recognising supporters 
and responding to requests from these supporters.  
6.125 The nomination of a supporter does not involve the limitations and protective 
formalities of, for example, a power of attorney.
103
 As discussed in Chapter 2, the 
‘paradigm shift’ towards encouraging supported, rather than substitute, decision-
making, is a relatively new development. Fully recognising supported decision-making 
arrangements would constitute a break with existing banking practices, which are 
based on contract and agency law, with potentially unforeseen legal consequences.  
6.126 Nevertheless, here may be room to encourage a more flexible approach on the 
part of banks, without being prescriptive, and recognising that banks bear risks in 
relation to voidable transactions. 
6.127 The ALRC proposes that the ABA provide additional guidance on how banks 
may meet the needs of people who require decision-making support to access banking 
services. This would be consistent with the ABA’s Code of Banking Practice, which 
states that banks ‘recognise the needs of older persons and customers with a disability 
                                                        
100  Pave the Way, Submission 09. 
101  Equal Opportunity Commission of South Australia, Submission 28. (Referring to Jackson v Homestart 
Finance [2013] SAEOT 13). 
102  Centre for Rural Regional Law and Justice and the National Rural Law and Justice Alliance, Submission 
20. 
103  Eg, in relation to an appointment by written instrument, independent witnesses and so on. 
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to have access to transaction services, so we will take reasonable measures to enhance 
their access to those services’.
104
  
6.128 The new guidance should reflect the National Decision-Making Principles, 
including the Representative Decision-Making Guidelines.
105
 In particular, banks 
should be encouraged to recognise that customers: 
 should be presumed to have the ability to make decisions about access to 
banking services; 
 may remain capable of making and communicating decisions concerning 
banking services, where they have access to necessary support; and 
 are entitled to support in making and communicating decisions and banks 
should, where possible and consistent with other duties, recognise supporters 
and respond to their requests. 
 
 
                                                        
104  Australian Bankers’ Association, Code of Banking Practice (2013) [7]. 
105  See ch 3. 
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Summary 
7.1 This chapter discusses issues concerning decision-making ability that have 
implications for access to justice. People with disability may be involved in court 
processes in a number of different roles, including as parties and witnesses in criminal 
and civil proceedings. The issues discussed include those affecting people with 
disability as: 
 defendants in criminal proceedings—the concept of unfitness to stand trial; 
 parties to civil proceedings—the appointment and role of litigation guardians; 
 witnesses in criminal or civil proceedings—in giving evidence as a witness; and 
 potential jurors—qualification for jury service. 
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7.2 In each of these areas there are existing tests of a person’s capacity to exercise 
legal rights or to participate in legal processes that the ALRC proposes should be 
reformed consistently with the National Decision-Making Principles, based on art 12 of 
the CRPD and other sources.
1
 
Access to justice issues 
7.3 The Issues Paper observed that a range of personal and systemic issues may 
affect the ability of people with disability to participate fully in court processes. These 
include: 
 communication barriers; 
 difficulties accessing the necessary support, adjustments or aids to participate in 
the justice system; 
 issues associated with giving instructions to legal representatives and capacity to 
participate in litigation;  
 the costs associated with legal representation; and 
 misconceptions and stereotypes about the reliability and credibility of people 
with disability as witnesses.
2
  
7.4 Article 13 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD) stipulates that States Parties must ensure effective access to justice 
for persons with disabilities on an equal basis with others, including by: 
 providing procedural and age-appropriate accommodations to facilitate their role 
as direct and indirect participants, including as witnesses, in all legal 
proceedings; and 
 promoting appropriate training for those working in the field of administration 
of justice, including police and prison staff.  
7.5 In its 2014 report, Equal Before the Law: Towards Disability Justice Strategies,
3
 
the Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) identified the barriers people with 
disabilities face in achieving equality before the law. It recommended that each 
jurisdiction in Australia, in addressing these barriers, should develop a Disability 
Justice Strategy, incorporating the following core set of principles and actions: 
 Appropriate communications—Communication is essential to personal 
autonomy and decision-making. Securing effective and appropriate 
communication as a right should be the cornerstone of any Disability Justice 
Strategy. 
                                                        
1  See Ch 3. 
2  IP 44 (2013), citing Abigail Gray, Suzie Forell and Sophie Clarke, ‘Cognitive Impairment, Legal Need 
and Access to Justice’, (2009) Justice Issues, Law and Justice Foundation, Paper No 10. 
3  Australian Human Rights Commission, ‘Equal Before the Law: Towards Disability Justice Strategies’ 
(2014). 
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 Early intervention and diversion—Early intervention and wherever possible 
diversion into appropriate programs can both enhance the lives of people with 
disabilities and support the interests of justice. 
 Increased service capacity—Increased service capacity and support should be 
appropriately resourced. 
 Effective training—Effective training should address the rights of people with 
disabilities and prevention of and appropriate responses to violence and abuse, 
including gender-based violence. 
 Enhanced accountability and monitoring—People with disabilities, including 
children with disabilities, are consulted and actively involved as equal 
partners in the development, implementation and monitoring of policies, 
programs and legislation to improve access to justice. 
 Better policies and frameworks—Specific measures to address the intersection 
of disability and gender should be adopted in legislation, policies and 
programs to achieve appropriate understanding and responses by service 
providers.4 
7.6 The access to justice issues addressed in the context of this ALRC Inquiry are 
narrower in scope. The focus of the Inquiry is on laws and legal frameworks affecting 
people who may need decision-making support.  
7.7 In this chapter, the ALRC examines how a range of Commonwealth laws and 
legal frameworks affecting people involved in court proceedings might be reformed to 
reflect the National Decision-Making Principles.
5
 By providing models in 
Commonwealth laws, the ALRC also seeks to inform and provide a catalyst for reform 
of state and territory laws. 
7.8 One theme is the tension between laws that are intended to operate in a 
‘protective’ manner—including in order to ensure, for example, a fair trial—and 
increasing demands for equal participation, in legal processes, of people who may 
require decision-making support.  
Unfitness to stand trial 
7.9 At common law, a person who is considered ‘unfit’ to stand trial cannot be tried. 
The justification for this rule has been stated in various ways, including as being to: 
 avoid inaccurate verdicts—forcing the defendant to be answerable for his or her 
actions when he or she is incapable of doing so could lead to an inaccurate 
verdict; 
                                                        
4  Ibid 7. 
5  Administrative tribunals are another important element of the federal civil justice system. However, the 
issues discussed in this chapter do not arise in the same way in tribunal proceedings, which involve merits 
review of government decisions, and are generally less formal and adversarial than in the courts. There is 
no equivalent, for example, of rules about the competency of witnesses: see Matthew Groves, ‘Do 
Administrative Tribunals Have to Be Satisfied of the Competence of Parties Before Them?’ (2013) 20 
Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 133. 
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 maintain the ‘moral dignity’ of the trial process—requiring that a defendant is fit 
to stand trial recognises the importance of maintaining the moral dignity of the 
trial process, ensuring that the defendant is able to form a link between the 
alleged crime and the trial or punishment and be accountable for his or her 
actions; and 
 avoid unfairness—it would be unfair or inhumane to subject someone to the trial 
process who is unfit.
6
 
7.10 In addition to avoiding incorrect verdicts, the UK Law Commission expressed 
the rationale for the unfitness to stand trial rules as being that it would be ‘an abuse of 
the process of the law to subject someone to a trial when he or she is unable to play any 
real part in that trial’.
7
 
7.11 At common law, there is a ‘presumption’ of fitness to stand trial. That is, if the 
defence raises the issue, the onus is on the defence to prove, on the balance of 
probabilities, that the defendant is unfit to stand trial.
8
 If the issue is raised by the 
prosecution, and contested, then the issue must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
9
 In 
addition, some Australian jurisdictions have enacted express statutory presumptions of 
fitness.
10
 
The test of unfitness 
7.12 The presumption of fitness means that it is more correct to refer to a test of 
‘unfitness’ to stand trial.
11
 The test may arise as an issue before or during the trial. 
When the defendant is present for trial, it may appear that he or she is unfit to plead. 
Alternatively, he or she may enter a plea and thereafter, it may appear that he or she is 
unfit to be tried. All Australian jurisdictions have enacted legislation dealing with 
fitness to stand trial.
12
 
7.13 At common law, the test of unfitness to stand trial is, simply stated, whether an 
accused has sufficient mental or intellectual capacity to understand the proceedings and 
                                                        
6  Victorian Law Reform Commission, Review of the Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to Be 
Tried) Act 1997, Consultation Paper (2013) 52. See also Law Commission of England and Wales, 
Unfitness to Plead, Consultation Paper No 197 (2010) 3–5. 
7  ‘This goes further than merely requiring that a person understands the trial process; it is concerned with 
whether or not he or she can meaningfully engage in the trial’: Law Commission of England and Wales, 
Unfitness to Plead, Consultation Paper No 197 (2010) 4. 
8  R v Podola [1960] 1 QB 325. Queensland Advocacy observed that the diversion scheme under ch 7, pt 2 
of the Mental Health Act 2000 (Qld) ‘presumes incapacity’ in relation to people on existing Forensic 
Orders or Intensive Treatment Orders and ‘therefore (some would argue positively) discriminates against 
people with mental illness and intellectual disability’: Queensland Advocacy Incorporated, Submission 
45. 
9  R v Robertson (1968) 3 All ER 557. 
10  Eg, Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to Be Tried Act) 1997 (Vic) s 7(1); Criminal Law 
Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 269I; Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 312. The Commonwealth has not enacted 
such a statutory presumption: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 20B. 
11  See, eg, Victorian Law Reform Commission, Review of the Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to 
Be Tried) Act 1997, Consultation Paper (2013) 53. 
12  See, Thomson Reuters, The Laws of Australia [9.3.1960]. 
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to make an adequate defence.
13
 The Victorian Supreme Court in R v Presser set out six 
factors relevant to the test: 
 an understanding of the nature of the charges; 
 an understanding of the nature of the court proceedings; 
 the ability to challenge jurors; 
 the ability to understand the evidence; 
 the ability to decide what defence to offer; and 
 the ability to explain his or her version of the facts to counsel and the court.
14
 
7.14 The common law test of unfitness to stand trial has been criticised in a number 
of recent inquiries in Australia and overseas. In particular, the common law may place 
an undue emphasis on a person’s intellectual ability to understand specific aspects of 
the legal proceedings and trial process,
15
 and too little emphasis on a person’s decision-
making ability. The rules on unfitness to stand trial are characterised as ‘protective’
16
—
ensuring that a person cannot be tried for a crime unless capable of defending 
themselves.  
7.15 However, in practice, the rules can lead to adverse outcomes for the individuals 
concerned, who may be subject to detention, for an uncertain period, in prison or in 
secure hospital facilities—although most jurisdictions have legislated to divert such 
people away from the criminal justice system.
17
 The risk is that incentives exist for 
innocent people to plead (or be advised to plead) guilty, in order to avoid the 
consequences of unfitness.  
7.16 The Anti-Discrimination Commissioner (Tasmania) observed that as a result of 
being determined unfit to stand trial, a person may ‘end up in a secure mental health 
facility for periods well in excess of those expected if their case had progressed 
through the courts’. They ‘will often find themselves in a situation where they are not 
able to exercise legal capacity, even when the circumstances surrounding the making of 
the order have changed’.
18
 
Once a person is issued with a forensic order that follows a finding of being unfit 
to plead it is extremely difficult to be discharged from the order. This is due in 
                                                        
13  In R v Pritchard, the test was stated as being whether the defendant is ‘of sufficient intellect to 
comprehend the course of proceedings on the trial, so as to make a proper defence—to know that he 
might challenge any of [the jury] to whom he may object—and to comprehend the details of the evidence 
...’: R v Pritchard (1836) 173 ER 135, [304]. 
14  R v Presser (1958) 45 VR.  
15  But is not comprehensive in this regard—eg, there is no reference in common law tests to the defendant’s 
ability to give their own evidence: Law Commission of England and Wales, Unfitness to Plead, 
Consultation Paper No 197 (2010) 29. 
16  Thomson Reuters, The Laws of Australia [9.3.1950]. 
17  See, Ibid [9.3.2010]–[9.3.2030]. 
18  Anti-Discrimination Commissioner (Tasmania), Submission 71. 
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part to a medical approach to disability and a view that if you have an illness for 
life, you will have an order for life.19 
7.17 In some cases, the defendant’s interests may not be served in being found unfit 
to stand trial if the outcome is that he or she is put on a supervision order, particularly 
for less serious offences. Such defendants may later be unable to have their supervision 
orders revoked because they continue to breach the conditions of the order or commit 
offences. Further, they remain at risk of the order being varied from non-custodial to 
custodial if they continue to pose a danger to the community.
20
 
A person who is able to understand the process involved in a plea of guilty will 
often be better off being dealt with by a criminal sanction, rather than being 
placed on an indefinite supervision order.21 
7.18 The key criticisms raised in recent inquiries into this issue have included that: 
 the test, by focusing on intellectual ability, generally sets too high a threshold 
for unfitness and is inconsistent with the modern trial process;
22
 
 the test is difficult to apply to defendants with mental illness because the criteria 
were not designed for them;
23
 
 a defendant may not be unfit to stand trial even where the court takes the view 
that he or she is not incapable of making decisions in his or her own interests.
24
 
7.19 Stakeholders raised concerns about the test of unfitness to stand trial. Brain 
Injury Australia observed that, in practice, the threshold for standing trial is low and 
‘practitioners regularly take instructions from clients with mild mental illness or 
intellectual disabilities’. On the other hand, people with an acquired brain injury may 
fail to meet the test:  
This could be due to some typical effects of [acquired brain injury], including: 
difficulty processing information; inability to understand abstract concepts; 
impaired decision-making ability; memory loss or impairment (which may 
impede not only the defendant's ability to recall the events the subject of the 
charge, but also their ability to follow the trial); deficits in spoken or received 
language; problems learning new information; and dependence (the failure to 
assume responsibility for one’s actions).25 
7.20 The Victorian Law Reform Commission (VLRC) is conducting a review of the 
Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to Be Tried) Act 1997 (Vic) (CMI Act).
26
 
                                                        
19  Ibid. 
20  Office of Public Prosecutions Victoria, Submission to Victorian Law Reform Commission Review of the 
Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to Be Tried) Act 1990 (Vic).  
21  Ibid. For such people, a higher threshold of unfitness to stand trial may therefore be advantageous. 
22  Law Commission of England and Wales, Unfitness to Plead, Consultation Paper No 197 (2010) 27.  
23  Rather, it was developed through experience with defendants who were deaf and mute and, by extension, 
defendants with an intellectual disability: Victorian Law Reform Commission, Review of the Crimes 
(Mental Impairment and Unfitness to Be Tried) Act 1997, Consultation Paper (2013) 59. 
24  Law Commission of England and Wales, Unfitness to Plead, Consultation Paper No 197 (2010) 28. 
25  Brain Injury Australia, Submission 02. 
26  The VLRC is due to report in June 2014. 
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This review includes consideration of the Presser test, which is incorporated in the 
CMI Act.
27
 In relation to the criticisms highlighted above, the VLRC observed: 
An accused person with a mental illness, for example, may have no trouble 
having a factual or an intellectual understanding of their right to challenge a 
juror, but their delusional beliefs may hinder them from making decisions to 
exercise that right (or having a ‘decision-making capacity’). On the other hand, 
an accused person with a cognitive impairment or intellectual disability may 
have more trouble than an accused person with a mental illness to understand this 
right. This raises the question of whether the current criteria are suitable for 
people with a mental illness and whether the threshold for unfitness to stand trial 
is currently set at the right level for these people.28 
7.21 In its Consultation Paper, the VLRC asked, among other things, whether the test 
for unfitness to stand trial should include a consideration of a defendant’s decision-
making capacity, effective participation in the trial, or capacity to be rational.
29
 
7.22 Similar questions were examined by the Law Commission of England and 
Wales (Law Commission) in its 2010 Consultation Paper, Unfitness to Plead.
30
 The 
Law Commission made provisional proposals for reform of the test of unfitness. These 
proposals would replace the current test with a new legal test which assesses whether 
the defendant ‘has decision-making capacity for trial’ and takes into account ‘all the 
requirements for meaningful participation in the criminal proceedings’:
31
 
The legal test should be a revised single test which assesses the decision-making 
capacity of the accused by reference to the entire spectrum of trial decisions he or 
she might be required to make. Under this test an accused would be found to 
have or to lack decision-making capacity for the criminal proceedings.32 
7.23 In determining the defendant’s decision-making capacity, the court would be 
required to take account of the ‘complexity of the particular proceedings and gravity of 
the outcome’ and, in particular, how important any disability is likely to be in the 
context of the decisions the defendant must make in the proceedings.
33
 
7.24 The Law Commission proposed that a defendant should be found unfit to stand 
trial if he or she is unable: 
(1)  to understand the information relevant to the decisions that he or she will 
have to make in the course of his or her trial, 
(2)  to retain that information, 
                                                        
27  Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to Be Tried Act) 1997 (Vic) s 6. 
28  Victorian Law Reform Commission, Review of the Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to Be 
Tried) Act 1997, Consultation Paper (2013) 59. 
29  Ibid Questions 1–7. 
30  Law Commission of England and Wales, Unfitness to Plead, Consultation Paper No 197 (2010). A final 
report on this topic is expected towards the end of 2014. 
31  Ibid Proposal 1. 
32  Ibid Proposal 3. 
33  Ibid Proposal 4. 
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(3)  to use or weigh that information as part of decision making process, or 
(4)  to communicate his or her decisions.34 
7.25 The formulation of this test was based on provisions of the Mental Capacity Act 
2005 (UK), which defines capacity for the purposes of decisions about a person’s 
personal welfare, property and financial affairs and the appointment of substitute 
decision-makers.
35
  
7.26 The Law Commission anticipated that if a person meets its proposed test, the 
person would also satisfy the requirements of the existing test,
36
 because the common 
law criteria set a higher threshold for unfitness to stand trial than a test based on 
decision-making ability.
37
 
7.27 In contrast, the New South Wales Law Reform Commission (NSWLRC) has 
recommended that the common law criteria for unfitness to stand trial, represented by 
the Presser standards, should not be fundamentally changed. In response to stakeholder 
concerns, the NSWLRC recommended that the standards simply be updated and 
incorporated into statute,
38
 as in most Australian jurisdictions.
39
 
7.28 However, as part of this reform, the NSWLRC recommended that the test for 
unfitness to stand trial should expressly refer to a person’s ability to use information as 
part of a ‘rational’ decision-making process.
40
 
7.29 While the criminal justice system rightly places weight on ‘the right of 
defendants to make their own decisions (even if those decisions might appear 
misguided to an impartial observer)’, the NSWLRC said that defendants cannot be said 
to be effectively participating in a trial if they are unable to make rational decisions, for 
example ‘because they cannot distinguish between delusion and reality’.
41
 
7.30 The NSWLRC also recommended that the test for unfitness to stand trial should 
include reference to the ‘overarching principle’ that the defendant must be able to have 
a fair trial. This was said to be the ‘touchstone’ for assessing whether or not the 
defendant’s degree of incapacity is sufficient to do those things required by the test.
42
  
7.31 This approach could be a significant step away from the common law because 
the defendant would not necessarily be required to be meet all the criteria in the test: 
                                                        
34  Ibid 54.  
35  Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK) s 3. 
36  Based on the criteria in R v Pritchard (1836) 173 ER 135. 
37  Law Commission of England and Wales, Unfitness to Plead, Consultation Paper No 197 (2010) 62. 
38  In the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 (NSW). 
39  New South Wales Law Reform Commission, People with Cognitive and Mental Health Impairments in 
the Criminal Justice System: Criminal Responsibility and Consequences, Report 138 (2013) xv–xvi. 
40  In the UK, the Law Commission considered, but rejected, the idea that it should be required that any 
decision made by the defendant be rational: Law Commission of England and Wales, Unfitness to Plead, 
Consultation Paper No 197 (2010) Proposal 2. 
41  New South Wales Law Reform Commission, People with Cognitive and Mental Health Impairments in 
the Criminal Justice System: Criminal Responsibility and Consequences, Report 138 (2013) 31. 
42  Ibid xvi. 
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If the defendant was unable, for example, to give evidence effectively, he or she 
might still be fit for trial if it is possible for a fair trial to be held. Conversely, the 
list of considerations need not be comprehensive. If the court considers that the 
defendant lacks an essential capacity that is not listed in the statutory 
considerations, and cannot be afforded a fair trial, then the defendant can be 
found unfit.43 
Assistance and support 
7.32 Existing tests of unfitness to stand trial do not consider the possible role of 
assistance and support for defendants. Law reform bodies have, however, considered 
the role of such assistance and support, and the possible implications for assessments 
of whether a person is unfit to stand trial. 
7.33 The Law Commission proposed that decision-making capacity should be 
assessed with a view to ascertaining whether a defendant could stand trial ‘with the 
assistance of special measures and where any other reasonable adjustments have been 
made’.
44
 It explained: 
The inclusion of the consideration of special measures as part of the test will 
serve to further the development of special measures on a case by case basis and 
ensure that the courts adapt to the needs of a particular defendant.45 
7.34 The Law Commission observed that, if the possibility of having ‘special 
measures’ to assist the defendant, were to be a factor in a reformed test of unfitness, 
this would ‘presumably increase the prospects of some defendants who would currently 
be found unfit to plead being able to stand trial’.
46
 
7.35  The NSWLRC made a similar recommendation about modifications to trial 
processes. It recommended that, in determining whether a person is unfit for trial, the 
matters that a court must consider should include: 
(a)   whether modifications to the trial process can be made or assistance 
provided to facilitate the person’s understanding and effective participation 
(b)   the likely length and complexity of the trial, and 
(c)   whether the person is legally represented.47 
                                                        
43  Ibid 26. 
44  Law Commission of England and Wales, Unfitness to Plead, Consultation Paper No 197 (2010) Proposal 
5. 
45  Ibid. 
46  Ibid 88. 
47  New South Wales Law Reform Commission, People with Cognitive and Mental Health Impairments in 
the Criminal Justice System: Criminal Responsibility and Consequences, Report 138 (2013) rec 2.2. 
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Reform of the test 
Proposal 7–1 The Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) should be amended to provide 
that a person is unfit to stand trial if the person cannot: 
(a) understand the information relevant to the decisions that they will have to 
make in the course of the proceedings; 
(b) retain that information to the extent necessary to make decisions in the 
course of the proceedings;  
(c) use or weigh that information as part of the process of making decisions; 
and 
(d) communicate decisions in some way. 
Proposal 7–2 The Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) should be amended to provide 
that available decision-making assistance and support should be taken into 
account in determining whether a person is unfit to stand trial. 
Question 7–1 What other elements should be included in any new test for 
unfitness to stand trial, and why? For example, should there be some threshold 
requirement that unfitness be due to some clinically-recognised mental 
impairment? 
7.36 The common law test of unfitness to stand trial is based primarily on a person’s 
intellectual ability to understand specific aspects of the legal proceedings. The Law 
Commission described the existing criteria as placing ‘emphasis on an ability to 
understand rather than the ability to function or to do something (in other words, 
mental capacity)’. At common law, fitness to stand trial is 
a global concept which can be said to cover a general state, and is not context-
specific or time-specific. It has tended to be construed as being about the 
accused’s cognitive ability which is, to all intents and purposes, seen in the 
abstract.48 
7.37 This comes close to requiring that a person must be considered as lacking 
decision-making ability on the basis of having an (intellectual) disability—and, on that 
basis, is inconsistent with the approach taken by the CRPD and the National Decision-
Making Principles. 
7.38 Rather, in the ALRC’s view, any test for unfitness to stand trial should be based 
on a person’s decision-making ability in the context of the particular criminal 
proceedings which he or she faces.  
                                                        
48  Law Commission of England and Wales, Unfitness to Plead, Consultation Paper No 197 (2010) 38. 
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7.39 The proposal above would introduce a new test of unfitness to stand trial into the 
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), based on the guidelines for determining decision-making 
ability proposed by the ALRC in Chapter 3. 
7.40 Interestingly, similar conclusions about the primary importance of decision-
making ability have been reached by other law reform bodies that have considered the 
issues—even though these bodies were not expressly informed by the approach 
reflected in art 12 of the CRPD. The focus of these inquiries was more on the need to 
ensure fair trials
49
 and the effective participation of defendants.
50
 
7.41 The way in which the new test might operate in practice for people with 
disability was explained by the VLRC:
51
  
The new test would require an accused person to: 
 Understand the information relevant to the decisions that they will have to 
make in the course of the trial—for example, an accused person with an 
acquired brain injury who has very low cognitive ability and is unable to 
understand new or unfamiliar information would be unfit to stand trial. 
 Retain that information—for example, someone with Attention-Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) who cannot focus and finds it almost 
impossible to remember any new information given to them would be unfit to 
stand trial. 
 Use or weigh that information as part of a decision-making process—for 
example, an accused person who suffers from paranoid schizophrenia who has 
a factual understanding of the charge, but indicates to the court that he wants 
to plead guilty because he sees no point in pleading not guilty as everyone in 
court is part of a conspiracy, would be unfit to stand trial. 
 Communicate their decisions—for example, an accused person with autism 
who is able to understand information and process it but does not 
acknowledge others, may be unfit to stand trial.52 
7.42 The ALRC recognises the proposed new test of unfitness to stand trial raises 
many issues that may need to be resolved before implementation. For example, the 
VLRC has observed that such a formulation may operate too widely because it has the 
potential to include defendants who have ‘no recognised mental illness but are unable 
to use or weigh information as part of a decision-making process, for example, because 
of stress, overwhelming tiredness or poor education or social background’.
53
  
7.43 For this reason, some commentators have suggested that the test should include 
some threshold requirement that, for example, impaired decision-making ability is due 
                                                        
49  Eg, New South Wales Law Reform Commission, People with Cognitive and Mental Health Impairments 
in the Criminal Justice System: Criminal Responsibility and Consequences, Report 138 (2013) 25–26. 
50  Eg, Victorian Law Reform Commission, Review of the Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to Be 
Tried) Act 1997, Consultation Paper (2013) 59. 
51  Referring to the similar criteria in the Law Commission’s provisional proposal: Law Commission of 
England and Wales, Unfitness to Plead, Consultation Paper No 197 (2010) 54. 
52  Victorian Law Reform Commission, Review of the Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to Be 
Tried) Act 1997, Consultation Paper (2013) 60. 
53  Ibid 61. 
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to ‘mental or physical illness, whether temporary or permanent’
54
 or some clinically 
recognised condition.
55
 
7.44 The second proposal also reflects an element of the National Decision-Making 
Principles—that decision-making ability must be assessed in the context of available 
supports.  
7.45 At present, the test for unfitness does not allow for this. The fact that a person 
may be able to be supported in understanding trial processes, and making decisions 
about, and participating in, the proceedings cannot affect their fitness to stand trial. 
From one perspective:  
the introduction of support measures to potentially increase the level of fitness of 
an accused person is desirable… the provision of support and education about 
court processes to an accused person who falls ‘just short’ of meeting the test for 
fitness is a humane option that may ultimately enable them to participate fully in 
their trial.56  
7.46 On the other hand, in practice, there may be limited options for supporting a 
defendant who needs decision-making support through a criminal trial. Providing that 
available support should be taken into account in determining unfitness to stand trial 
may work against equality before the law—in that a person with support may be able to 
stand trial but another, with similar ability but without support, may not be tried.
57
 
Modelling in Commonwealth law 
7.47 The ALRC proposes that the reformed test of unfitness to stand trial be 
modelled in Commonwealth law through amendments to the existing legislative 
provisions in the Crimes Act, which set out the processes for finding federal offenders 
unfit to be tried, and the consequences of such a finding.
58
 
7.48 The ALRC recognises that, in practice, such a provision would have limited 
application. First, most criminal prosecutions occurring in Australia fall within the 
responsibilities of the states and territories. Secondly, most federal offenders are tried 
in state and territory courts.
59
 
                                                        
54  Helen Howard, ‘Unfitness to Plead and the Vulnerable Defendant: An Examination of the Law 
Commission’s Proposals for a New Capacity Test’ (2011) 75 Journal of Criminal Law 194, 201–202 
cited in Victorian Law Reform Commission, Review of the Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to 
Be Tried) Act 1997, Consultation Paper (2013) 61. 
55  Scottish Law Commission, Insanity and Diminished Responsibility, Discussion Paper No 122 (2003) 49. 
56  Victorian Institute of Forensic Mental Health, Submission to Victorian Law Reform Commission Review 
of the Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to Be Tried) Act 1990 (Vic). 
57  Of course, as discussed below, it may or may not be in the interests of the defendant to be found unfit to 
stand trial. 
58  Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) ss 20B–20BI. 
59  The use of state courts is made possible by ss 71 and 77(iii) of the Australian Constitution. The judicial 
power of the Commonwealth is vested in the High Court, in such other federal courts as the Parliament of 
Australia creates, and in such other courts as it invests with federal jurisdiction: Australian 
Constitution s 71. Parliament may make laws investing state courts with federal jurisdiction: Ibid s 77(iii). 
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7.49 The Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) invests state courts with federal jurisdiction in 
both civil and criminal matters, subject to certain limitations and exceptions.
60
 The Act 
makes specific provision for the exercise of federal criminal jurisdiction by both state 
and territory courts.
61
 Importantly, under the Act, state and territory laws, including 
those relating to ‘procedure, evidence and the competency of witnesses’ are applied to 
federal prosecutions in state and territory courts.
62
 
7.50 Essentially this means that, even if the Crimes Act were amended to introduce a 
new test of unfitness to stand trial, if the matter is being heard in a state or territory 
court, the issue of unfitness would still be determined in accordance with the 
procedures applicable under state or territory law.
63
 
7.51 The ALRC nevertheless considers that modelling a new approach to unfitness to 
stand trial in Commonwealth law will provide an opportunity to guide law reform at 
state and territory level, to reflect a new approach to determining decision-making 
ability in criminal justice settings. 
Limits on detention 
Proposal 7–3 State and territory laws governing the consequences of a 
determination that a person is unfit to stand trial should provide for limits on the 
period of detention (for example, by reference to the maximum period of 
imprisonment that could have been imposed if the person had been convicted) 
and for regular periodic review of detention orders. 
7.52 A wide range of concerns have been raised about the processes and outcomes of 
unfitness determinations. These include concerns about the availability or otherwise of 
appropriate accommodation, support services, and diversion from the criminal justice 
system. For example, Queensland Advocacy Incorporated expressed a range of 
concerns about the scheme for diverting offenders to the Mental Health Court under the 
Mental Health Act 2000 (Qld).
64
 Many of these issues do not directly concern decision-
making or are too particular to a state or territory jurisdiction to be a focus of this 
Inquiry.
65
 
                                                        
60  Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39(2). 
61  Ibid s 68(2). 
62  Ibid ss 68(1), 79. 
63  Kesavarajah v R (1994) 181 CLR 230. 
64  Queensland Advocacy Incorporated, Submission 45. 
65  Eg, concerns that Queensland law makes no provision for unfitness to stand trial in relation to summary 
offences: Qld Law Society, Submission 53.  
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7.53 Some outcomes of unfitness to stand trial rules have generated significant public 
concern, including, for example, in the cases of Marlon Noble and Rosie Anne 
Fulton.
66
 These concerns have led the AHRC to call for a national audit of people held 
in prison after being found unfit to stand trial.
67
 
7.54 The Safeguards Guidelines proposed by the ALRC state that decisions, 
arrangements and interventions in relation to people who need decision-making 
support should be least restrictive of the person’s human rights; subject to mechanisms 
of appeal; and subject to monitoring and review. Some aspects of the limits on 
detention, and review of detention orders in relation to persons found unfit to stand trial 
are discussed below. 
7.55 The consequences of a determination that a federal offender is unfit are set out 
in the Crimes Act.
68
 These provisions apply to federal offenders being dealt with by 
state or territory courts—despite the operation of the Judiciary Act discussed above. In 
relation to proceedings for federal offences, the provisions of state or territory law give 
way to provisions of the Crimes Act to the extent of any inconsistency.
69
 While state or 
territory law regulates the mode of determination of unfitness to stand trial, the 
consequences flowing from the determination will be regulated by Commonwealth 
law.
70
 
7.56 Under the Crimes Act, where the issue of unfitness is raised on commitment for 
trial, the proceedings must be referred to the court to which the proceedings would 
have been referred had the defendant been committed for trial. If that court finds the 
defendant unfit to be tried, it must determine whether a prima facie case exists. Where 
no prima facie case exists, the person must be discharged.
71
  
7.57 If a prima face case exists, the court must dismiss the charge if satisfied that it is 
inappropriate to inflict any punishment, or any punishment other than nominal 
punishment, having regard to the defendant’s ‘character, antecedents, age, health or 
mental condition’, the triviality of the offence and the extent of any mitigating 
circumstances.
72
 Otherwise, the court must determine, after considering medical 
                                                        
66  Marlon Noble was charged in 2001 with sexual assault offences that were never proven. A decade after 
he was charged, the allegations were clearly shown to have no substance. Marlon spent most of that 
decade in prison, because he was found unfit to stand trial. Rosie Anne Fulton was held in Kalgoorlie 
prison for over 18 months after being charged with crimes related to a motor vehicle and being found 
unfit to stand trial due to her cognitive impairment. She was sent to Kalgoorlie prison because no other 
suitable accommodation was available for her: Australian Human Rights Commission, ‘Send Rosie Anne 
Home’ <www.humanrights.gov.au/news/stories/send-rosie-anne-home>. 
67  Australian Human Rights Commission, Jailed without Conviction: Commissioners Call for Audit 
<https://www.humanrights.gov.au/news/stories/jailed-without-conviction-commissioners-call-audit>. 
68  Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) pt IB div 6. 
69  Australian Constitution s 109. 
70  R v Ogawa [2011] 2 Qd R 350, [89]–[114]. The Queensland Law Society suggested that consideration be 
given to the adoption of state procedures for dealing with defendants charged with indictable 
Commonwealth offences, so that consistency of process is achieved: Qld Law Society, Submission 53. 
71  Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 20B(1). 
72  Ibid s 20BA(2). 
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reports whether, on the balance of probabilities, the person will become fit to be tried 
within 12 months.
73
 
7.58 The court may order a person who is likely to become fit to be tried within 12 
months to be detained in a hospital, otherwise the proceedings must resume as soon as 
practicable. If the court finds that the defendant is not likely to become fit, it must 
determine whether the defendant is ‘suffering from a mental illness, or a mental 
condition, for which treatment is available in a hospital’ and, if so, whether he or she 
objects to being detained in hospital.
74
  
7.59 The court must order detention in hospital if the person is found to be mentally 
ill and does not object to being detained in hospital, or in prison or some other place. 
However, this period of detention must not exceed the maximum period of 
imprisonment that could have been imposed if the person had been convicted of the 
offence charged.
75
 Further, before that time, the court may order the person’s release 
from custody, either unconditionally or subject to conditions lasting not more than 
three years, if in the court’s opinion this is more appropriate than continuing 
detention.
76
 
7.60 Under the Crimes Act, where a person is found unfit to stand trial, the Attorney-
General of Australia must, at least once every six months, consider whether or not the 
person should be released from detention based on medical or other reports.
77
 The 
Attorney-General must not order release unless satisfied that the person is not a threat 
or danger either to himself or herself or to the community.
78
 
7.61 These provisions of the Crimes Act were inserted in 1989.
79
 While the ALRC 
has no detailed information about how the provisions operate in practice, or the 
outcomes they produce for federal offenders who are found unfit to stand trial, the 
Crimes Act appears to provide safeguards that do not exist in all state and territory 
jurisdictions. 
7.62 Some jurisdictions do not provide statutory limits on the period of detention for 
those found unfit to stand trial. For example: 
 in Western Australia, the Criminal Law (Mentally Impaired Defendants) Act 
1996 (WA), does not place limits on the period of custody orders for persons 
detained after being found not mentally fit to stand trial;
80
 
 in the Northern Territory, the Criminal Code (NT) provides that supervision 
orders for persons found not fit to stand trial are ‘for an indefinite term’;
81
 and 
                                                        
73  Ibid s 20BA(4)–(5). 
74  Ibid s 20BB(2). 
75  Ibid s 20BC(2). 
76  Ibid s 20BC(5). 
77  Ibid s 20BD. 
78  Ibid s 20BE. 
79  Crimes Legislation Amendment Act (No 2) 1989 (Cth). 
80  Criminal Law (Mentally Impaired Defendants) Act 1996 (WA) s 19. 
81  Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) sch 1, s 43ZC. 
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 in Victoria, custodial supervision orders are for an indefinite period,
82
 although 
the Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to Tried) Act 1997 (Vic) also 
requires the court to set a ‘nominal term’ for the purposes of review.
83
  
7.63 The Anti-Discrimination Commissioner (Tasmania) provided data from 
Tasmania’s Forensic Tribunal, which illustrates that, for forensic patients placed on a 
mental health order for offences other than murder, the period of detention under an 
order is substantially more than it would have been if they had been found guilty of the 
offence.
84
 
7.64 All jurisdictions have review mechanisms for people held in detention because 
they are unfit to stand trial, to determine whether a person should be released. Reviews 
are conducted by different bodies, including courts, mental health and other tribunals 
and, in the case of the Commonwealth, the Attorney-General. 
7.65 However, some jurisdictions may have inadequate review mechanisms for those 
detained. For example, in Western Australia, the Criminal Law (Mentally Impaired 
Defendants) Act 1996 (WA), does not provide for review. Rather, the person is 
essentially detained at the ‘Governor’s pleasure’.
85
  
7.66 In the ALRC’s view, state and territory legislation governing the consequences 
of a determination that a person is unfit to stand trial should provide for limits on the 
period of detention. This would at least ensure that a person is no longer a forensic 
prisoner after some reasonable maximum period. If he or she is a threat or danger to 
themselves or the public at that time, they should be the responsibility of mental health 
authorities, not the criminal justice system.
86
 
7.67 Regular periodic review of detention orders is also essential. For example, in 
Victoria, the Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to Tried) Act 1997 (Vic) 
provides judges with the flexibility to decide how often to review, or further review, 
custodial supervision orders. The VLRC has recommended that legislation should 
require regular, automatic review of each custodial supervision order at an interval of 
no longer than every two years.
87
 
Conducting civil litigation 
7.68 At common law, the capacity test for a person to participate in civil proceedings 
is the same as that required for a person to enter into legal transactions.
88
 There is a 
presumption of capacity ‘unless and until the contrary is proved’.
89
 
                                                        
82  Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to Be Tried Act) 1997 (Vic) s 27. 
83  Ibid s 28. The nominal terms are generally equivalent to the maximum term of imprisonment available for 
the offence. 
84  Anti-Discrimination Commissioner (Tasmania), Submission 71. 
85  Criminal Law (Mentally Impaired Defendants) Act 1996 (WA) s 35. 
86  In this context, the Crimes Act requires state or territory mental health authorities to be notified when a 
person is due to be released because the period of that person’s detention has ended: Crimes Act 1914 
(Cth) s 20BH. 
87  Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) rec 431. 
88  Goddard Elliot v Fritsch [2012] VSC 87, [555]. 
89  L v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (2006) 233 ALR 432, [26]. 
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7.69 The focus of the test is on the capacity of the person to understand they have a 
legal problem, to seek legal assistance about the problem, to give clear instructions to 
their lawyers and to understand and act on the advice which they are given.
90
 
7.70 The test is issue-specific. That is, capacity must be considered in relation to the 
particular proceedings and their nature and complexity. This contrasts with the test of 
unfitness to stand trial in criminal law.  
The civil test takes a functional approach to capacity in that it assesses a person’s 
ability to make a particular decision at a particular moment in time, and not a 
person’s ability to make decisions more generally.91 
7.71 The test is able to take into account the level of legal representation. In 
particular, the level of capacity required to be a litigant in person is higher than where 
the person is required to instruct a lawyer because a litigant in person has to manage 
court proceedings in an unfamiliar and stressful situation. Therefore, ‘a person who 
does not have the mental capacity to represent themselves may have sufficient capacity 
to be able to give instructions to a lawyer to represent them’.
92
 
Litigation representatives 
Proposal 7–4 The rules of federal courts should provide that a person 
needs a litigation representative if the person cannot: 
(a) understand the information relevant to the decisions that they will have to 
make in the course of the proceedings; 
(b) retain that information to the extent necessary to make the decisions;  
(c) use or weigh that information as part of a decision-making process; and 
(d) communicate the decisions in some way. 
Proposal 7–5 The rules of federal courts should provide that available 
decision-making support must be taken into account in determining whether a 
person needs a litigation representative. 
7.72 Where a person does not have capacity to conduct litigation, a litigation 
representative may be appointed. A litigation representative may also be known as a 
litigation guardian, case guardian, guardian ad litem, next friend, tutor or special 
representative.
93
 In broad terms, a litigation representative acts in the place of the 
person and is responsible for the conduct of the proceedings.
94
 
                                                        
90  Goddard Elliot v Fritsch [2012] VSC 87, [557]. 
91  Law Commission of England and Wales, Unfitness to Plead, Consultation Paper No 197 (2010) 52. 
92  Goddard Elliot v Fritsch [2012] VSC 87, [558]. 
93  The term ‘litigation guardian’ is used in the High Court and Federal Circuit Court, ‘litigation 
representative’ in the Federal Court and ‘case guardian’ in the Family Court. 
94  The ALRC has chosen to use the term litigation representative, which is also used by the Federal Court, 
because the current duties of people acting in this role are consistent with the ALRC’s usage of the term 
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7.73 The circumstances in which a litigation representative may be appointed are set 
out in rules of court. In general, a litigation representative is appointed by the court, on 
the application of a party or an interested person, such as a parent or guardian or, 
sometimes, the person’s own lawyer.  
7.74 Litigation representatives can also be removed or substituted by the court, on the 
application of a party or on its own motion. There are no other review mechanisms for 
the conduct of a litigation representative, except to the extent that the representative’s 
conduct may be reviewed under state and territory guardianship laws, if the 
representative is also a guardian or administrator. 
7.75 Under federal court rules, a person may be assessed as needing a litigation 
representative if the person: 
 is ‘under disability’ (High Court);
95
 
 is ‘under a legal incapacity’ because of being a ‘mentally disabled person’ and 
‘not capable of managing the person’s own affairs in a proceeding’ (Federal 
Court);
96
 
 is ‘with a disability’ and ‘does not understand the nature or possible 
consequences of the case; or is not capable of adequately conducting, or giving 
adequate instruction for the conduct of, the case’ (Family Court);
97
 
 ‘does not understand the nature and possible consequences of the proceeding or 
is not capable of adequately conducting, or giving adequate instruction for the 
conduct of, the proceeding’ (Federal Circuit Court).
98
 
7.76 The way in which some of these federal court rules are drafted is clearly 
inappropriate and inconsistent with contemporary conceptualisations of capacity and 
disability. In particular, some rules adopt elements of a ‘status-based’ approach that is 
inconsistent with the CRPD. 
7.77 While the common law capacity test for civil proceedings may be used to 
interpret the application of rules of court dealing with the appointment of litigation 
representatives, the rules could more closely reflect the common law—and its focus on 
capacity in relation to the particular transaction or proceedings, rather than ‘disability’. 
7.78 The ALRC proposes that—as with the new test in criminal proceedings 
proposed above—the rules of federal courts concerning the appointment of litigation 
representatives should reflect the guidelines for determining decision-making ability in 
the National Decision-Making Principles.  
                                                                                                                                             
‘representative’ elsewhere in this Discussion Paper—notably, in relation to ‘supporters’ and 
‘representatives’ in Ch 4. 
95  High Court Rules 2004 (Cth) r 20.08. 
96  Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 9.61, Dictionary. 
97  Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) r 6.08, Dictionary. 
98  Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) r 11.08. 
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7.79 Arguably, there is little difference between the proposal and the position that 
applies at common law in determining whether a person has capacity to conduct civil 
litigation.
99
  
7.80 The National Decision-Making Principles recognise that there is a spectrum of 
decision-making ability—and that ability should be assessed by reference to the 
decision to be made—and that ability may evolve or fluctuate over time. In contrast, 
the existing test for capacity to conduct litigation is ‘once and for all’ (that is, for the 
course of the proceedings)—except to the extent that a person represented can apply to 
the court to have their litigation representative removed. However, this may be sensible 
administratively and for practical reasons concerning the efficient resolution of 
disputes. 
7.81 A more major change than the proposed test of decision-making ability is to 
require courts to consider the available decision-making support in determining 
whether a person needs a litigation representative. 
7.82 Existing rules do not expressly enable the availability of support to be taken into 
account in assessing whether a litigation representative should be appointed. However, 
in some ways this is simply a manifestation of the existing approach of assessing 
capacity in the context of the particular transaction or proceedings.  
7.83 Implementation of these proposals is more likely than not to result in more 
people being involved in civil litigation without having a litigation representative 
formally appointed. 
7.84 An overarching purpose of federal civil practice and procedure provisions is to 
facilitate the just resolution of disputes, according to law, and ‘as quickly, 
inexpensively and efficiently as possible’.
100
 From some perspectives this reform may 
be seen as making the resolution of some disputes less ‘efficient’.  
7.85 Arguably, lawyers and courts need to know from whom they should take 
instructions and applications—that is, for the interests of a party to be represented by 
one voice. Facilitating and ensuring the participation of litigants with impaired 
decision-making ability may be considered too complex for lawyers and courts to 
manage. 
7.86 Another relevant factor is that, under an adversarial system, courts are not easily 
able to facilitate the participation of persons with impaired decision-making ability in 
legal proceedings. The problems unrepresented litigants face in civil justice settings 
have been well documented over the years.
101
 
                                                        
99  The Law Commission of England and Wales has made this point in relation to the similarity between the 
capacity test under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK) and that which applies at common law: Law 
Commission of England and Wales, Unfitness to Plead, Consultation Paper No 197 (2010) 51. 
100  Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 37M. 
101  See, eg, Australian Law Reform Commission, Managing Justice: A Review of the Federal Civil Justice 
System, Report No 89 (2000) [5.148]–[5.157]; Productivity Commission, ‘Access to Justice 
Arrangements’, Draft Report. (2014) Ch 14. 
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7.87 However, in the ALRC’s view, such concerns are outweighed by the need to 
promote the dignity, equality, autonomy, inclusion and participation of all people 
involved in civil proceedings. 
The role of litigation representatives 
Proposal 7–6 The rules of federal courts should provide that litigation 
representatives: 
(a) must support the person represented to express their will and preferences 
in making decisions; 
(b) where it is not possible to determine the wishes of the person, must 
determine what the person would likely want based on all the information 
available; 
(c) where (a) and (b) are not possible, must consider the human rights 
relevant to the situation; and 
(d) must act in a manner promoting the personal, social, financial and cultural 
wellbeing of the person represented. 
Proposal 7–7 Federal courts should issue practice notes explaining the 
duties of litigation representatives to the person they represent and to the court. 
7.88 Under federal court rules, a person who is found to need a litigation 
representative may only conduct proceedings through that representative. Relevant 
rules of court provide as follows:  
 ‘A person under disability shall commence or defend a proceeding by litigation 
guardian’ (High Court);
102
 
 ‘A person under a legal incapacity may start, or defend, a proceeding only by the 
person’s litigation representative’ (Federal Court);
103
 
 ‘A person with a disability may start, continue, respond to, or seek to intervene 
in, a case only by a case guardian’ (Family Court);
104
  
 ‘A person who needs a litigation guardian may start, continue, respond to or 
seek to be included as a party to a proceeding only by his or her litigation 
guardian’. (Federal Circuit Court).
105
 
7.89 There is no obligation under common law or court rules for a litigation 
representative to make decisions that reflect the will, preferences and rights of the 
person represented. Rather, at common law, a litigation representative has a ‘duty to 
                                                        
102  High Court Rules 2004 (Cth) r 21.08.1. 
103  Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 9.61. 
104  Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) r 11.09. 
105  Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) Rule 6.08. 
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see that every proper and legitimate step for that person’s representation is taken’
106
—
which seems akin to a ‘best interests’ test.  
7.90 A litigation representative has no obligation to consult or facilitate the 
participation of the person represented, except to the extent that such duties may be 
imposed by state or territory guardianship legislation (if the person is also a guardian or 
administrator). 
7.91 In her submission, the Hon Chief Justice Diana Bryant AO observed that the 
role of a litigation representative has been described as: 
an invidious one in the sense that the person is taking on the decision-making 
responsibilities of the litigant whilst having to ensure that their own interests do 
not conflict with those of the litigant. That means that the case guardian has to 
make decisions which are often unpalatable to the individual litigant.107 
7.92 Clearly, this is far from the preferred will and preferences approach to supported 
decision-making proposed by the ALRC. Further, case law makes it clear that the role 
of a litigation representative is not only to ‘protect’ the person represented. The Full 
Court of the Federal Court has held that the purpose of the power to appoint a litigation 
representative is ‘to protect plaintiffs and defendants who would otherwise be at a 
disadvantage, as well as to protect the processes of the court’.
108
 
7.93 Case law also emphasises concerns about protecting the rights of the other 
parties in the litigation. It has been said that requiring litigation representatives helps to 
ensure, in some cases, that ‘parties to litigation are not pestered by other parties who 
should be to some extent restrained’ and that a ‘defendant is entitled to expect that he 
will not be required to defend proceedings brought against him by a person of unsound 
mind acting without a next friend’.
109
 
7.94 In the ALRC’s view, litigation representatives should be required to act, so far 
as is practicable, in accordance with the National Decision-Making Principles.
110
 To 
this end, the rules of federal courts should provide, among other things, that in making 
decisions, litigation representatives have a duty to consider the will, preferences and 
rights of the person represented; to promote their personal, social and financial 
wellbeing; and to consult with others. 
7.95 The ALRC recognises that, in practice, other problems relating to litigation 
representatives may be of equal or greater significance, but are not a focus of this 
Inquiry. For example, submissions raised concerns about: 
                                                        
106  Read v Read [1944] SASR 26, 28. 
107  Quoting Anton & Malitsa [2009] FamCA 623, [2]: D Bryant, Submission 22 (emphasis added). 
108  L v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (2006) 233 ALR 432, [25]. 
109  Masterman-Lister v Brutton & Co (Nos 1 and 2) [2003] 1 WLR 1511, [31], [65]. 
110  As discussed in Ch 3, the Inquiry is only concerned with issues surrounding the decision-making ability 
of adults. The ALRC is not, for example, making any proposals with respect to the duties of case 
guardians representing children in Family Court proceedings. 
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 the cost and availability of litigation guardians for people who are unable to 
instruct legal counsel;
111
  
 the lack of funding to meet the legal costs of case guardians in Family Court 
proceedings;
112
  
 the difficulties in securing the nomination by the Attorney-General of case 
guardians in Family Court proceedings where another suitable person is not 
available;
113
 
 the availability of legal representatives who are independent of guardians 
appointed by state tribunals.
114
  
Solicitors’ duties 
Question 7–2 Should the Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules and state 
and territory legal professional rules be amended to provide a new exception to 
solicitors’ duties of confidentiality where: 
(a) the solicitor reasonably believes the client is not capable of giving lawful, 
proper and competent instructions; and 
(b) the disclosure is for the purpose of: assessing the client’s ability to give 
instructions; obtaining assistance for the client in giving instructions; 
informing the court about the client’s ability to instruct; or seeking the 
appointment of a litigation representative? 
7.96 The National Decision-Making Principles require that people should be 
provided with the support necessary for them to make, communicate and participate in 
decision-making. In some cases, this support will include the appointment of a 
litigation representative. The barriers to obtaining this support may include solicitors’ 
duties to their clients.
115
  
7.97 Solicitors have a duty to act in the best interests of their clients,
116
 and to follow 
a client’s lawful, proper and competent instructions.
117
 A solicitor who has concerns 
about his or her client’s decision-making ability may be unwilling to act for a client 
who refuses, or is unable to agree to, investigations in relation to their ability or an 
application for the appointment of a litigation representative. 
                                                        
111  Office of the Public Advocate (Vic), Submission 06. 
112  D Bryant, Submission 22. 
113  Ibid. 
114  Queensland Advocacy submitted that ‘a conflict of interest arises when a QCAT-appointed guardian 
(wrongly, although lawfully, in our view) rejects an adult’s request to litigate a matter simply because in 
the Guardian’s view it is not in that person’s best interests’: Queensland Advocacy Incorporated, 
Submission 45. 
115  See, eg, Lauren Adamson, Mary-Anne El-Hage and Julianna Marshall, ‘Incapacity and the Justice System 
in Victoria’ (Discussion Paper, Public Interest Law Clearing House, 2013). 
116  Law Council of Australia, Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules (2011) r 4.1.1. 
117  Ibid r 8.1. 
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7.98 Solicitors must not disclose any information which is confidential to a client and 
acquired by the solicitor during the client’s engagement, subject to limited 
exceptions—which do not include seeking decision-making support.
118
 
7.99 However, the duty of solicitors to the court and the administration of justice is 
paramount.
119
 Once proceedings are commenced, solicitors have a clear and 
unambiguous duty to raise with the court any concerns about a client’s capacity to 
conduct litigation.
120
 
7.100 There is some case law establishing that concerns about a client’s capacity may 
ground an exception to duties of confidentiality. In R v P, a solicitor had sought the 
appointment of a public guardian to have control of his client’s estate and existing 
court proceedings, independently of his client’s wishes. The New South Wales Court 
of Appeal held that: 
the solicitor’s concern for the interest of the client, so long as it is reasonably 
based and so long as it results in no greater disclosure of confidential information 
than absolutely necessary, can justify the bringing of proceedings and such 
disclosure of confidential information as is absolutely necessary for the purpose 
of such proceedings.121 
7.101 The Court also stated that the bringing of such actions is extremely undesirable 
because it involves the solicitor in a conflict between the duty to do what the solicitor 
considers in the client’s best interests and the duty to follow the client’s instructions 
(and maintain confidentiality).
122
  
7.102 It has been suggested that, if there is no clear exception to solicitors’ duties of 
confidentiality, they may ‘cease acting for disadvantaged clients’ resulting in clients 
‘moving from lawyer to lawyer or worse, being left unrepresented’.
123
 However, there 
are also arguments against reform, including on the basis that, if a statutory exception 
were to be introduced, 
there may be a risk that lawyers would more readily make applications for the 
appointment of a substitute decision maker. Applications could potentially be 
made without the lawyer first trying to adequately support the client to enable the 
client to provide instructions themselves.124 
7.103 One option for reform would be new legal professional rules to make it clear 
that solicitors may disclose information when there is reason to believe the client lacks 
                                                        
118  Ibid r 9. 
119  Ibid r 3.1. 
120  Pistorino v Connell & Ors [2012] VSC 438, [6]. ‘Once the matter is raised the court will inquire into the 
question ... In the exercise of jurisdiction the court is acting both to protect the interests of the person with 
a relevant disability and to protect the court’s own processes’. 
121  R v P [2001] NSWCA 473, [66]. The Law Society of NSW has stated that R v P is ‘an important 
qualification to the duty of confidentiality owed by solicitors to clients’: see ‘When a Client’s Capacity Is 
in Doubt: A Practical Guide for Solicitors’ (Law Society of NSW, 2009) 9, App E. 
122  R v P [2001] NSWCA 473, [64]. ‘It is therefore preferable, if possible, if a family or health care 
professional makes the application [for the appointment of a substitute decision-maker]’: ‘When a 
Client’s Capacity Is in Doubt: A Practical Guide for Solicitors’, above n 121, 9.  
123  Adamson, El-Hage and Marshall, above n 115, 3. 
124  Ibid. 
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the ability to instruct. This would at least ensure that disclosure is not grounds for 
professional disciplinary action, but would not remove doubts about liability for breach 
of confidence or other liability under the general law. 
7.104 One model is provided by the American Bar Association’s Model Rules for 
Professional Conduct. These provide that: 
When the lawyer reasonably believes that the client has diminished capacity, is at 
risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm unless action is taken and 
cannot adequately act in the client’s own interest, the lawyer may take 
reasonably necessary protective action, including consulting with individuals or 
entities … and, in appropriate cases, seeking the appointment of a guardian ad 
litem, conservator or guardian.125 
7.105 The Queensland Law Society submitted that such rules could ‘provide greater 
clarity for practitioners along with professional certainty of being able to act to protect 
client’s interests’.
126
  
Witnesses 
7.106 People with disability face a range of barriers that may limit their ability to 
participate as witnesses. In relation to court processes, the barriers include rules on the 
competency of witnesses, and difficulties in accessing the necessary support and 
assistance in giving evidence. Aspects of these issues are discussed below. 
7.107 More generally, the Judicial Commission of NSW has observed: 
People with intellectual disabilities are vulnerable to prejudicial assessments of 
their competence, reliability and credibility because judicial officers and juries 
may have preconceived views regarding a person with an intellectual disability. 
For example, they may fail to attach adequate weight to the evidence provided 
because they doubt that the person with intellectual disability fully understands 
their obligation to tell the truth. In addition, people with an intellectual disability 
are vulnerable to having their evidence discredited in court because of 
behavioural and communication issues associated with their disability.127 
7.108 In 2012, Disability Rights Now reported to the United Nations that, in Australia, 
the ‘capacity of people with cognitive impairments to participate as witnesses in court 
proceedings is not supported and this has led to serious assault, sexual assault and 
abuse crimes going unprosecuted’.
128
  
7.109 In particular, it was said that people with cognitive disability face barriers to 
establishing credibility when interacting with the justice system because of the 
assumptions ‘constantly made by police and court officers, such as prosecutors, judges 
                                                        
125  American Bar Association, Model Rules of Professional Conduct, r 1.14.  
126  Qld Law Society, Submission 53. See also Andrew Taylor, ‘Representing Clients with Diminished 
Capacity’ Law Society Journal (February 2010) 56, 58. 
127  ‘Equality before the Law Bench Book’ (Judicial Commission of New South Wales, 2006) 5301. 
128  Disability Rights Now, Civil Society Report to the United Nations on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, August 2012, 71. 
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and magistrates’.
129
 In this Inquiry, the Anti-Discrimination Commissioner (Tasmania) 
submitted: 
The perception that a person with disability lacks credibility as a witness to or 
victim of crime often leads to the decision not to prosecute alleged perpetrators. 
This heightens the vulnerability of people with disability to further harm because 
the perpetrator is aware that charges are less likely be brought or prosecuted than 
if the victim were a person without disability.130 
Competency 
Proposal 7–8 The Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) should be amended to provide 
that, in assessing whether a witness is competent to give evidence under s 13, 
the court may take the availability of communication and other support into 
account. 
7.110 At common law, as a general rule, all witnesses who are able to comply with 
testimonial formalities—such as the giving of oaths—are competent to give evidence. 
There is no other common law test of physical or psychological competence, but a 
judge has discretion, in exceptional cases, to refuse to permit a witness to testify where 
the evidence is likely to be unreliable. Otherwise, matters of competence are relevant 
only to the witness’s credibility and the weight that may be placed on the evidence 
given.
131
 
7.111 The AHRC has observed that people with disabilities frequently experience 
prejudicial assessments of their competency to give evidence as a witness to criminal 
proceedings.
132
 This is despite research suggesting that ‘contrary to public perception, 
most people with intellectual disabilities are no different from the general population in 
their ability to give reliable evidence’ (as long as communication techniques are used 
that are appropriate for the particular person).
133
  
7.112 In Commonwealth law, the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) deals with the competence 
of witnesses. Similar or identical provisions apply in the other jurisdictions that have 
adopted the Uniform Evidence Acts.
134
 Section 13 of the Evidence Act provides  
                                                        
129  Ibid 78. 
130  Anti-Discrimination Commissioner (Tasmania), Submission 71. The Commissioner also observed that 
‘the best way to ensure prosecution of the charge is to ensure that a person with disability receives 
adequate support to participate in the process’. 
131  Thomson Reuters, The Laws of Australia [16.4.280]. 
132  ‘Equal Before the Law: Towards Disability Justice Strategies’, above n 3, 21. 
133  ‘Equality before the Law Bench Book’, above n 127, 5301. The Bench Book cites Mark Kebbell, 
Christopher Hatton and Shane Johnson, ‘Witnesses with Intellectual Disabilities in Court: What 
Questions Are Asked and What Influence Do They Have?’ (2004) 9 Legal and Criminological 
Psychology 23. 
134  That is, NSW, Victoria, Tasmania, the ACT and the Northern Territory: Evidence Act 1995 (NSW); 
Evidence Act 2008 (Vic); Evidence Act 2001 (Tas); Evidence Act 2011 (ACT); Evidence (National 
Uniform Legislation) Act 2011 (NT).  
180 Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws 
(1)  A person is not competent to give evidence about a fact if, for any reason  
(including a mental, intellectual or physical disability): 
  (a)  the person does not have the capacity to understand a question about 
the fact; or 
  (b)  the person does not have the capacity to give an answer that can be 
understood to a question about the fact; 
  and that incapacity cannot be overcome. 
7.113 A person who is competent to give evidence about a fact is not competent to 
give sworn evidence about the fact, if the person does not have the capacity to 
understand that, in giving evidence, he or she is under an obligation to give truthful 
evidence.
135
 However, the person may give unsworn evidence after being informed by 
the court about the importance of telling the truth (and certain other matters set out in 
the Act).
136
 
7.114 In this way, the test for competence to give evidence amounts to the capacity to 
understand the obligation to give truthful evidence.
137
 The probative value of an 
unsworn statement will be assessed and the court may refuse to admit evidence that 
may be unfairly prejudicial to a party, misleading or confusing, or result in undue 
delays.
138
  
7.115 The wording of s 13(3) implies that a person’s lack of capacity may be 
overcome by forms of support or assistance being provided to them in giving evidence. 
The ALRC proposes that the Evidence Act—consistently with the National Decision-
Making Principles—should expressly provide that competence must be determined in 
the context of the available support. 
7.116 There may be concerns about fairness to parties in legal proceedings if 
competence is determined by reference to available support—the practical extent and 
effectiveness of which may be difficult to determine at the point in time that the court 
must rule on the competence of a potential witness. Another criticism of the ALRC 
proposal may be that, without some obligation being placed on courts to provide 
support, reform may have no practical effect. 
Assistance in giving evidence 
Proposal 7–9 The Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) should be amended to provide 
that a witness who needs support is entitled to give evidence in any appropriate 
way that enables them to understand questions and communicate answers; and 
that the court may give directions with regard to this. 
                                                        
135  Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 13(3). 
136  Ibid ss 13(4)–(5). 
137  NSW Law Reform Commission, People with an Intellectual Disability and the Criminal Justice System, 
Report No 80 (1996) ch 7. 
138  Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 135. 
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Proposal 7–10 The Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) should be amended to provide 
that a witness who needs support has the right to have a support person present 
while giving evidence, who may act as a communication assistant; assist the 
person with any difficulty in giving evidence; or provide the person with other 
support. The court should be empowered to give directions with regard to the 
provision of support. 
7.117 Concerns about the extent to which existing laws and legal frameworks facilitate 
support for witnesses were expressed in submissions. The Office of the Public 
Advocate (Qld) submitted that the Commonwealth and Queensland state governments 
should consider implementing new practices to facilitate the giving of evidence by 
people with disability, ‘by allowing questions to be explained and assistance to be 
given in communicating the answers’.
139
 The Office of the Public Advocate (Vic) 
considered that greater ‘witness support’ should be provided to assist people with 
cognitive impairments and mental illness to navigate the justice system.
140
   
7.118 Sections 30 and 31 of the Evidence Act provide examples of the assistance that 
may currently be provided ‘to enable witnesses to overcome disabilities’.
141
 Section 30 
provides that a witness may give evidence about a fact through an interpreter and s 31 
relates to ‘deaf and mute witnesses’.  
7.119 Section 31 states that a witness who cannot hear adequately may be questioned 
in ‘any appropriate way’; and that a witness who cannot speak adequately may give 
evidence by ‘any appropriate means’ and the court may give directions concerning this.  
7.120 Deaf Australia expressed concerns about the dated language
142
 and drafting of 
s 31 and observed that the phrase ‘may be questioned in any appropriate way’ is open 
to interpretation and does not specify that the person’s communication needs must be 
taken into consideration. It also suggested that use of the term ‘communication 
support’ should be considered, so as to include modes of support such as live-
captioning and hearing loops.
143
  
7.121 The Anti-Discrimination Commissioner (Tas) stated that the Evidence Act 2001 
(Tas) does not make adequate ‘provision for regulating or adjusting court processes to 
accommodate people with disability’. For example, ‘communication by way of 
gestures is not viewed as a witness statement, despite this being the only way some 
people can communicate’. The Commissioner observed that the existing provisions, 
                                                        
139  The OPA (Qld) referred to laws in NSW, Western Australia and the UK as providing suitable models, 
referring to provisions of the Civil Procedure Act 1986 (NSW); Evidence Act 1906 (WA); and Youth 
Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (UK): Office of the Public Advocate (Qld), Submission 05. 
140  Office of the Public Advocate (Vic), Submission 06. 
141  Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 13 (note). 
142  The word ‘mute’ refers to inability to speak. The current appropriate term is ‘speech impaired’: Deaf 
Australia, Submission 37. 
143  Ibid. See also AFDS, Submission 47. 
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including ss 30–31, ‘highlight that it is not easy for people with disability to have the 
process modified to increase their participation’.
144
 
7.122 At the least, the ALRC considers that there is no reason to limit the application 
of provisions such as ss 30–31 to particular categories of witnesses needing support. 
Arguably, there should be express provision for any witness who needs support to give 
evidence in any appropriate way that enables them to understand questions and 
communicate answers. 
7.123 More broadly, witnesses who need support in order to give evidence should be 
entitled to the assistance of a supporter. At the Commonwealth level, the Crimes Act 
does provide an extensive range of provisions protecting ‘vulnerable persons’ in their 
interactions with the justice system.
145
  
7.124 These include provisions allowing vulnerable persons to choose someone to 
accompany them while giving evidence in a proceeding.
146
 In relation to adults, the 
right applies only to ‘vulnerable adult complainants’
147
 and ‘special witnesses’. A 
special witness includes a person who is ‘unlikely to be able to satisfactorily give 
evidence in the ordinary manner’, including ‘because of a disability’.
148
 
7.125  Section 15YO of the Crimes Act states only that the person chosen ‘may 
accompany the person’ and must not prompt the person or otherwise influence the 
person’s answers; or disrupt the questioning of the person. Any words spoken by the 
accompanying person must be able to be heard by the judge and jury (if any) in the 
proceeding. It is unclear how much the person can support or assist the witness, beyond 
simply ‘moral’ or emotional support. 
7.126 Some state and territory criminal procedure legislation makes broader provision 
for supporting witnesses. For example, in New South Wales, under the Criminal 
Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), vulnerable persons have a right to the presence of another 
person while giving evidence. A vulnerable person for the purposes of these provisions 
means ‘a child or a cognitively impaired person’.
149
 
7.127 The Criminal Procedure Act states that, in criminal and certain other 
proceedings, a vulnerable person ‘is entitled to choose a person whom the vulnerable 
person would like to have present near him or her when giving evidence’.
150
 The 
supporter ‘may be with the vulnerable person as an interpreter, for the purpose of 
assisting the vulnerable person with any difficulty in giving evidence associated with 
                                                        
144  Anti-Discrimination Commissioner (Tasmania), Submission 71. 
145  Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) pt IAD.  
146  Ibid s 15YO. 
147  A vulnerable adult complainant is a person who is a victim of slavery or human trafficking: Ibid 
s 15YAA.  
148  Ibid s 15YAB(1). 
149  Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s 306M. ‘Cognitive impairment’ is defined to include: (a) an 
intellectual disability; (b) a developmental disorder (including an autistic spectrum disorder); (c) a 
neurological disorder; (d) dementia; (e) a severe mental illness; (f) a brain injury. 
150  Ibid s 306ZK(2). 
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an impairment or a disability, or for the purpose of providing the vulnerable person 
with other support’.
151
 
7.128 The ALRC proposes that the Crimes Act should be amended to include more 
comprehensive provisions giving witnesses who need support the right to have a 
support person present while giving evidence. It should be made clear that such a 
person may act as a communication assistant, assisting the person with any difficulty in 
giving evidence associated with a disability. 
7.129 There may be concerns about the effect of supporters on the fairness of 
proceedings—including perceptions that evidence is essentially being communicated to 
the court by the support person, rather than the witness, and about the opportunities for 
undue influence on the evidence. However, as with other rules of procedure and 
evidence, the permissible role of a supporter in the giving of evidence should be 
subject to judicial discretion and the overriding duty of the judicial officer to ensure 
that court proceedings are fair.  
7.130 The ALRC acknowledges that the proposal does nothing to ensure that support 
is actually available. In South Australia, the Attorney-General has proposed that the 
Evidence Act 1929 (SA) be amended to ‘give people with complex communication 
needs a general entitlement to have a Communication Assistant present for any contact 
with the criminal justice system’; and to ‘increase access to appropriate support 
persons for vulnerable witnesses’. For these purposes, a service, available throughout 
the criminal justice process, is proposed to be established in the non-government 
sector.
152
 
7.131 In its 2013 report on the justice system and people with intellectual disability, 
the Parliament of Victoria’s Law Reform Committee
153
 highlighted the witness 
intermediary scheme in the UK, established under the Youth Justice and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1999 (UK).  
7.132 Under this scheme, the function of an intermediary is to assist intellectually 
disabled and other vulnerable witnesses by effectively acting as a ‘go-between’ to 
facilitate communication between the witness and the court. An Intermediary 
Registration Board oversees registration and standards for intermediaries.
154
  
                                                        
151  Ibid s 306ZK(3). 
152  Government of South Australia Attorney-General’s Department, ‘Draft Disability Justice Plan 2014-
2016’ (2014) Priority Actions 2.1–2.2.  
153  Parliament of Victoria Law Reform Committee, ‘Access to and Interaction with the Justice System by 
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Guidance for judicial officers 
Proposal 7–11 Federal courts should develop bench books to provide 
judicial officers with guidance about how courts may help to assist and support 
people with disability in giving evidence. 
7.133 The Evidence Act and Crimes Act contain a range of other provisions that may 
be used to assist people who need support in giving evidence. In addition to those 
discussed above, the Evidence Act includes provisions protecting witnesses from 
improper questioning, and allowing the giving of evidence in narrative form.
155
  
7.134 The Crimes Act also contains protective provisions that, among other things, 
may disallow inappropriate or aggressive cross-examination of vulnerable and special 
witnesses;
156
 allow for the use of alternative arrangements for giving evidence, such as 
closed-circuit television
157
 and the exclusion of members of the public from the 
courtroom;
158
 and ensure vulnerable persons are not compelled to give further evidence 
unless it is necessary in the interests of justice.
159
 
7.135 Legislative provisions are, however, only part of the solution to facilitating the 
participation of people with disability in the justice system. For example, Victoria 
Legal Aid observed that flexibility should be encouraged in Commonwealth court and 
tribunal proceedings to adapt procedures. In addition: 
It is important for courts and tribunals to recognise and be sensitive to the 
challenges that people with disabilities face when interacting with the justice 
system. Procedural breaches by a person with an intellectual disability should be 
met with inquiry into the circumstances behind that breach. Registry staff, 
judicial officers and tribunal members should be educated about the difficulties 
facing those with a disability and encouraged to exercise discretion in excusing 
trivial breaches and dispensing with standard protocols where appropriate.160 
7.136 The law may be flexible enough to allow support and assistance to be provided 
but, in practice, the willingness or ability of courts to respond is likely to be 
circumscribed by limited resources and lack of awareness in the court and community 
about available options.
161
 
7.137 Greater awareness of the measures that courts and judicial officers may take to 
assist witnesses who need support giving evidence may be desirable. One model is the 
Judicial Commission of NSW Equality before the Law Bench Book.
162
 The Bench 
Book contains a section on people with disability and, among other things, discusses 
                                                        
155  Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ss 41, 29(2). 
156  Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 15YE. 
157  Ibid ss 15YI, 15YL. 
158  Ibid s 15YP. 
159  Ibid s 15YNC. 
160  Legal Aid Victoria, Submission 65. 
161  ‘Equal Before the Law: Towards Disability Justice Strategies’, above n 3, 23. 
162  ‘Equality before the Law Bench Book’, above n 127. 
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the implications of different types of disability for people involved in court 
proceedings, examples of the barriers for people with disabilities in relation to court 
proceedings, and making adjustments for people with disability.
163
 
7.138 The Bench Book is intended primarily to provide guidance for NSW judicial 
officers in performing their duties. Bench books may, however, serve a broader 
educative function within the justice system, as lawyers and parties may also refer to 
them as a guide to the available options. 
Forensic procedures 
Question 7–3 Should Commonwealth, state and territory laws be amended 
to avoid delays in obtaining consent to the taking of forensic samples from 
people who are incapable of giving consent, and who have been victims of 
crime? If so, how? 
7.139 Barriers to obtaining consent for the taking of DNA and other forensic samples 
under Commonwealth, state and territory forensic procedures legislation,
164
 may 
prejudice the investigation and prosecution of crimes against people with disability.   
7.140 In particular, some legislation regulating the taking of intimate forensic samples 
from people deemed unable to provide consent may result in undue delay, which may 
compromise the value of DNA samples as evidence. This may be of particular concern 
where people with disability are victims of sexual assault. 
7.141 Forensic procedure legislation generally provides that, where forensic samples 
are needed from a person who is not a suspect, and who is incapable of giving consent, 
the starting point is that the consent of a parent or guardian is required. However, the 
taking of DNA samples may be outside the scope of ‘medical treatment’ for the 
purposes of a guardian’s decision-making powers.  
7.142 Problems in obtaining forensic samples from victims may arise where: 
 there is no guardian, and parents are unable or unwilling to consent; and 
 there is a guardian, but the guardian does not have authority to authorise consent 
to the forensic procedure. 
7.143 At a Commonwealth level, forensic procedures are regulated by pt ID of the 
Crimes Act.
165
 Under the Crimes Act, a magistrate may order the carrying out of a 
forensic procedure on an ‘incapable person’
166
 if the consent of a guardian cannot 
                                                        
163  Ibid s 5. 
164  Eg, Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) pt ID; Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) ch 17; Forensic 
Procedures Act 2000 (Tas). 
165  Eg, Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) pt ID. 
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reasonably be obtained; or the guardian refuses consent and the magistrate is satisfied 
that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the parent or guardian is a suspect and 
the forensic procedure is likely to produce evidence tending to confirm or disprove that 
he or she committed an offence.
167
 In determining whether to make the order, the 
magistrate must take into account, among other things, the seriousness of the alleged 
offence; the ‘best interests’ of incapable person; and ‘so far as they can be ascertained, 
any wishes’ of the incapable person with respect to the forensic procedure.
168
 
7.144 Procedures in other jurisdictions may require investigators to obtain an 
emergency order from the state or territory guardianship tribunal, resulting in 
significant delay.  
7.145 The existing Commonwealth provisions may help to address problems with the 
timeliness of obtaining consent, by allowing a magistrate to order a forensic procedure. 
Other approaches might involve amending: 
 forensic procedures legislation to adopt a hierarchy of decision-makers similar 
to that found in some guardianship legislation dealing with medical treatment.
169
 
 guardianship legislation dealing with consent to medical treatment to include 
reference to the taking of forensic samples. 
Jury service 
7.146 Trial by jury is an important element of the justice system in Australia. Juries 
are made up of citizens randomly chosen from the electoral role. They serve as a means 
for members of the community to participate in the administration of justice, and to 
ensure that the application of the law is fair and consistent with community standards. 
7.147 An essential characteristic of juries, as an institution, is that they be 
representative of the wider community.
170
 Their representative nature depends on all 
those capable of serving, whatever their individual characteristics, having an 
opportunity to serve, unless there are defensible reasons for excluding them from jury 
membership.
171
 There are longstanding concerns that, in practice, people with disability 
are prevented from serving on juries in Australia without sufficient reason: 
The exclusion of people with disability from jury service means that juries are 
not composed of the full diversity of the Australian community. This means that 
                                                        
167  Ibid s 23XWU(1).   
168  Ibid s 23XWU(2).   
169  That is, consent may be given for a person incapable of doing so, by a ‘responsible person’—including a 
spouse or de facto partner; a parent; public advocate or guardian; or ‘another person who has 
responsibility for the day-to-day care of the incapable person’. An example of this approach is found in 
Western Australian legislation dealing with ‘identifying procedures’: Criminal Investigation (Identifying 
People) Act 2002 (WA) s 20(1)(b). 
170  NSW Law Reform Commission, Jury Selection, Report No 117 (2007) 49, citing the High Court in 
Cheatle v The Queen (1993) 177 CLR 541, 560. 
171  See Ibid 9–10. 
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the experience of disability is not available to the jury for consideration during 
trials, and defendants with disability cannot face a trial by peers.172 
7.148 State and territory legislation generally refers to disability as a ground for 
disqualification from serving as a juror; or implies that people with disability may be 
disqualified on the grounds that they are not capable of performing the duties of a 
juror. 
7.149 These legislative and other barriers to jury service have been examined as part 
of a number of inquiries, including by the NSWLRC, the Law Reform Commission of 
Western Australia (LRCWA), and the Queensland Law Reform Commission 
(QLRC).
173
 In South Australia, the Attorney-General has proposed ‘further research 
and investigation on identifying and overcoming barriers to jury duty for people with 
disability’.
174
 
7.150 Inquiries have recommended various legislative changes to facilitate jury service 
by people with disability and, in particular, amendments to provisions that implied 
disqualification on the basis of physical disability. For example: 
 The NSWLRC recommended that people who are blind or deaf should be 
qualified to serve on juries, and not prevented from doing so on the basis of that 
physical disability alone; but that the Court should have power to stand aside a 
blind or deaf person if the person is unable to discharge the duties of a juror 
notwithstanding provision of reasonable adjustments.
175
 
 The LRCWA recommended that a person should not be disqualified from 
serving on a jury on the basis that he or she suffers from a physical disability; 
but a physical disability that renders a person unable to discharge the duties of a 
juror should constitute a sufficient reason to be excused under the Juries Act 
1957 (WA).
176
 
 The QLRC recommended that Jury Act 1995 (Qld) should be amended to 
remove the ineligibility of persons with a physical disability, and should instead 
provide that prospective jurors should inform the Sheriff of any physical 
disabilities and special needs that they have; but that a person who has an 
intellectual, psychiatric, cognitive, or neurological impairment that makes the 
                                                        
172  Disability Rights Now, Civil Society Report to the United Nations on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, August, 2012 81. 
173  NSW Law Reform Commission, Blind or Deaf Jurors, Final Report No 114 (2006); Law Reform 
Commission of Western Australia, Selection, Eligibility and Exemption of Jurors, Report No 99 (2010); 
Queensland Law Reform Commission, A Review of Jury Selection, Report No 68 (2011). 
174  ‘Draft Disability Justice Plan 2014-2016’, above n 152, Priority Action 1.5.  
175  NSW Law Reform Commission, Blind or Deaf Jurors, Final Report No 114 (2006) rec 1(a)–(c). These 
recommendations have not been implemented. 
176  Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, Selection, Eligibility and Exemption of Jurors, Report No 
99 (2010) rec 56.1. This recommendation has been implemented. 
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person incapable of effectively performing the functions of a juror is ineligible 
for jury service.
177
 
7.151 More recently, Disability Rights Now has recommended to the United Nations 
that, in Australia, ‘all people with disability be made eligible for jury service’
178
 and an 
Individual Communication has claimed that law and practice concerning jury 
qualification constitutes a violation of rights guaranteed under the CRPD, including 
rights to equal recognition under the law and access to justice.
179
  
7.152 Submissions have highlighted this issue as being of continuing concern,
180
 and 
expressed support for earlier law reform commission recommendations for change.
181
 
The Disability Discrimination Legal Service, for example, stated that: 
current national and state jury laws should be reformed to avoid exclusion of 
people with disabilities from participating in jury duty … the law should allow 
potential jurors with disabilities to participate in jury duty where such disabilities 
can be reasonably accommodated. This should replace the current legal position 
where prospective jurors with auditory and visual disabilities are readily 
challenged or stood down from a panel.182 
Juries in the Federal Court 
7.153 At the Commonwealth level, only the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) 
has provisions dealing with jury qualification and membership, and it is the focus of 
the discussion below. 
7.154 Historically, juries have not been constituted in Federal Court proceedings. As 
discussed above, most federal offenders are tried in state and territory courts, and the 
Federal Court has not dealt with indictable criminal offences. 
7.155 This position changed, however, with the criminalisation of ‘serious cartel 
conduct’ in 2009,
183
 when jurisdiction to try indictable cartel offences by jury was 
conferred on the Federal Court. A procedural framework for the Federal Court to 
exercise jurisdiction over indictable offences—including jury provisions—was 
enacted.
184
 
                                                        
177  Queensland Law Reform Commission, A Review of Jury Selection, Report No 68 (2011) recs 8–8, 8–9, 
8–14. These recommendations have not been implemented. 
178  Disability Rights Now, Civil Society Report to the United Nations on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, August 2012, 82. 
179  Alastair McEwin, Individual Communication under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities, Communication to Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 
McEwin v Australia G/SO 214/48 AUS (1) 12/2013. (Referring to CPRD arts 12, 13, 21, 29). 
180  See, eg, Disability Discrimination Legal Service, Submission 55; Qld Law Society, Submission 53; Public 
Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 41; Centre for Rural Regional Law and Justice and the National 
Rural Law and Justice Alliance, Submission 20; The Illawarra Forum, Submission 19. 
181  Supporting NSWLRC recommendations: Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 41. Supporting 
consideration of QLRC recommendations: Qld Law Society, Submission 53. 
182  Disability Discrimination Legal Service, Submission 55. 
183  Introduced by the Trade Practices Amendment (Cartel Conduct and Other Measures) Act 2009 (Cth)— 
now Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) pt IV, div 1, subdiv B.  
184  Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) pt III, div 1A, subdiv D. 
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7.156 The Federal Court also has the power, in civil proceedings to direct trial of 
issues with a jury.
185
 However, this would only occur in an exceptional case, because 
the ordinary mode of trial is by judge alone,
186
 and state or territory law relating to the 
qualification of jurors applies in Federal Court civil proceedings.
187
 
7.157 Even though juries remain rare in Federal Court proceedings, the ALRC 
proposes that reform of jury qualification provisions be modelled in Commonwealth 
law through amendments to the Federal Court of Australia Act. 
Qualification to serve on a jury 
Proposal 7–12 The Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) should 
provide that a person is qualified to serve on a jury if the person can, in the 
circumstances of the trial for which that person is summoned: 
(a) understand the information relevant to the decisions that they will have to 
make in the course of the proceedings and jury deliberations; 
(b) retain that information to the extent necessary to make these decisions; 
(c) use or weigh that information as part of the jury’s decision-making 
process; and 
(d) communicate the person’s decisions to the other members of the jury and 
to the court. 
Proposal 7–13 The Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) should 
provide that decision-making support should be taken into account in 
determining whether a person is qualified to serve on a jury. 
7.158 Under the Federal Court of Australia Act, the Sheriff must remove a person’s 
name from the jury list
188
 if satisfied that: the person is not qualified to be a juror; or 
the Sheriff would excuse the person from serving on the jury if the person were a 
potential juror.
189
  
7.159 The Sheriff may, either on application or on his or her own initiative, excuse a 
potential juror from serving on the jury, if satisfied that they are, ‘in all the 
circumstances, unable to perform the duties of a juror to a reasonable standard’.
190
 In 
coming to a conclusion about a person’s ability to perform the duties of a juror, the Act 
                                                        
185  Ibid s 40. 
186  Ibid s 39. The exercise of this power has been considered in Federal Court defamation proceedings: 
Steven Rares, ‘The Jury in Defamation Trials’ (Paper Presented at the Defamation & Media Law 
Conference, Sydney, 25 March 2010). 
187  Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 41(1). 
188  A jury list is prepared for particular proceedings and contains the names and addresses of persons that the 
Sheriff selects from the jury roll for the applicable jury district, see, eg Federal Court of Australia Act 
1976 (Cth) s 23DM.  
189  Ibid s 23DO.  
190  Ibid ss 23DQ, 23DR.  
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requires that the Sheriff must have regard to the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 
(Cth).
191
  
7.160 On their face, the jury provisions of the Federal Court of Australia Act are an 
advance on most state and territory legislation because they do not identify disability 
specifically as a ground for disqualification. 
7.161 For example, the Juries Act 2000 (Vic) disqualifies people who are unable to 
‘communicate in or understand the English language adequately’ or who have a 
‘physical disability that renders the person incapable of performing the duties of jury 
service’.
192
 The Disability Discrimination Legal Service observed that while ‘this is not 
an express exclusion of persons with sensory disabilities’ there have been no instances 
of blind or deaf jurors in the history of the Victorian justice system.
193
  
7.162 Similarly, under the Jury Act 1977 (NSW) persons who are ineligible to serve as 
jurors include ‘a person who is unable, because of sickness, infirmity or disability, to 
discharge the duties of a juror’.
194
 The practice appears to be that information 
indicating a potential juror is blind or deaf is considered sufficient to ground a 
determination that a person is ineligible to serve as a juror.
195
 In particular, blind and 
deaf jurors may be excluded from serving on juries because of concerns about 
comprehension and the presence of a 13th person in the jury room where an interpreter 
is used.
196
 
7.163 It is not clear whether similar results would occur under the Federal Court of 
Australia Act. However, the fact that the Act provides little guidance on standards for 
juror qualification may work against the participation of people with disability. That is, 
people with disability may still be prevented from serving on a jury, depending upon 
the Sheriff’s interpretation of the duties of a juror and factors considered in assessing 
whether these duties can be performed to a ‘reasonable standard’. 
7.164 The ALRC recognises there is likely to be ‘some difficulty establishing a more 
specific objective standard’ for determining juror qualification.
197
 However, an 
approach consistent with the National Decision-Making Principles may facilitate a 
more inclusive approach to jury service, and help ensure that people with disability are 
not automatically or inappropriately excluded from serving on a jury. That is, the 
qualification of jurors should be assessed by reference to a person’s actual decision-
                                                        
191  Ibid s 23DQ (Note). See, in particular, Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) s 29 (Administration of 
Commonwealth laws and programs). 
192  Juries Act 2000 (Vic) sch 2, cl 3(a),(f). 
193  Disability Discrimination Legal Service, Submission 55. 
194  Jury Act 1977 (NSW) s 6(b), sch 2. 
195  NSW Law Reform Commission, Blind or Deaf Jurors, Final Report No 114 (2006); Alastair McEwin, 
Individual Communication under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, Communication to Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in McEwin v 
Australia G/SO 214/48 AUS (1) 12/2013. 
196  See, eg, Alastair McEwin, Individual Communication under the United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities, Communication to Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 
McEwin v Australia G/SO 214/48 AUS (1) 12/2013.  
197  Law Council of Australia, Submission 83. 
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making ability. Clearly, there should be no presumption that any particular physical or 
mental disability should be a disqualifying factor.  
7.165 In particular, people who require communication devices or communication 
support workers to ‘expressively communicate’ may be subject to assumptions about 
their ability to serve on juries.
198
 The Disability Discrimination Legal Service 
observed:  
With today’s technology and continuing product development that addresses or 
alleviates sensory limitations, it is neither reasonable nor necessary to permit 
arbitrary exclusion from jury service on grounds of disability, English incapacity, 
or an imputed inability to discharge their duties as a juror, or satisfaction of the 
Sheriff.199 
7.166 At present, the fact that a person may be supported in performing the duties of a 
juror does not seem to be able to be taken into account in determining whether a person 
is eligible to serve. The ALRC proposes that the Federal Court of Australia Act—
consistently with the National Decision-Making Principles—should expressly provide 
that qualification to serve as a juror be determined in the context of the available 
support. Again, the proposal may be criticised on the basis that, unless support is 
actually available, there will be no change in jury selection practices. 
7.167 Nor does the proposal deal with jury challenges on the basis of perceived 
disability (that is, peremptory challenges and challenges for cause). No reason need be 
stated for peremptory challenges, and where a person with a disability is challenged 
because of that disability, this will be subject to a ruling from the judge, who would 
have regard to the legislative provisions concerning qualification. 
Assistance for jurors 
Proposal 7–14 The Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) should be 
amended to provide that the trial judge may order that a communication assistant 
be allowed to assist a juror to understand the proceedings and jury deliberations. 
7.168 The National Decision-Making Principles require that people should be 
provided with the support necessary for them to make, communicate and participate in 
decision-making. In some cases, this support will include the involvement of an 
assistant in the courtroom and in the jury room. 
7.169 The 2006 recommendations of the NSWLRC referred to ‘interpreters and 
stenographers’ being allowed to assist a blind or deaf juror, including in the jury room 
during jury deliberations.
200
 ‘Interpreter’ in this context was intended to extend to sign 
                                                        
198  Disability Discrimination Legal Service, Submission 55. 
199  Ibid. 
200  NSW Law Reform Commission, Blind or Deaf Jurors, Final Report No 114 (2006) rec 1(d)–(e). 
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languages, such as AUSLAN, and other communication support, and ‘stenographer’ to 
include a person providing ‘computer-aided real time transcription’.
201
 
7.170 The ALRC’s proposal uses a more open-ended term, introducing the concept of 
a ‘communication assistant’. The exact parameters of the permissible role of a 
communication assistant would need to be defined in the Act. 
7.171 There is research suggesting that communication assistants would be able to 
effectively facilitate the participation of some deaf jurors. The NSWLRC and 
Macquarie University jointly funded a short pilot study to investigate whether people 
who are deaf could access court proceedings through sign language interpreters.
202
 The 
2007 report of the study concluded that it had demonstrated that: 
 legal facts and concepts can be translated into Auslan; 
 Auslan interpreting can provide effective access to court proceedings for a deaf 
juror; 
 hearing people misunderstand court proceedings without being disadvantaged by 
hearing loss; and  
 deaf people are willing and able to serve as jurors.
203
 
Jury secrecy 
Proposal 7–15 The Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) should be 
amended to provide: 
(a) that communication assistants allowed by the trial judge to assist a juror 
should swear an oath faithfully to communicate the proceedings or jury 
deliberations; 
(b) that communication assistants allowed by the trial judge to assist a juror 
should be permitted in the jury room during deliberations without 
breaching jury secrecy principles, so long as they are subject to and 
comply with requirements for the secrecy of jury deliberations; and 
(c) for offences, in similar terms to those arising under ss 58AK and 58AL of 
the Act, in relation to the soliciting by third parties of communication 
assistants for the provision of information about the jury deliberations, 
and the disclosure of information by communication assistants about the 
jury deliberations.  
                                                        
201  Ibid 17–18. 
202  The study used a judge’s summing up in a criminal trial to determine the accuracy of the interpretation 
and the level of comprehension of potential deaf jurors as compared with a control group of hearing 
jurors: Ibid 14–15. 
203  Jemina Napier, David Spencer and Joseph Sabolec, ‘Deaf Jurors’ Access to Court Proceedings via Sign 
Language Interpreting: An Investigation’ (Research Report 14, NSWLRC and Macquarie University, 
2011) 62. 
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7.172 A common reason given for excluding people who require support from jury 
service is that an assistant may be seen as an ‘additional’ or ‘thirteenth’ member of the 
jury, in breach of the secrecy of jury deliberations.
204
 
7.173 The rule of jury secrecy, also known as the exclusionary rule, prohibits a juror 
from discussing the deliberations in the jury room, based on public policy 
considerations requiring that the verdict of the jury should be final, ensuring that jurors 
are not subjected to pressure or harassment. However, the rule is a convention or rule 
of conduct rather than a rule of law,
205
 and it is reinforced by statutory provisions that 
make it an offence to disclose or solicit information about jury deliberations.
206
 
7.174 Although there are concerns about maintaining the secrecy of the jury room and 
allowing a thirteenth person (that is, a communication assistant) to be present, these 
concerns can be addressed.
207
  
7.175 The NSWLRC recommended new legislative provisions requiring the taking of 
oaths by interpreters and stenographers, extending duties of secrecy to them, and 
creating new offences. The ALRC proposal above adapts these recommendations in the 
context of the Federal Court of Australia Act. 
 
                                                        
204  Deaf Australia referred to a 2013 case in Queensland, in which a deaf person lodged a discrimination 
complaint against the Queensland Government after being excluded from jury duty. The Queensland 
Civil and Administrative Tribunal dismissed the complaint because of the ‘thirteenth person’ objection: 
Deaf Australia, Submission 37. 
205  See R v K (2003) 59 NSWLR 431, [16]. The position is otherwise in the United States: see Peter 
McClellan ‘Looking Inside the Jury Room’ (Paper Presented at the Law Society of NSW Young Lawyers 
2011 Annual Criminal Law Seminar, Sydney, 5 March 2011 ). 
206  Eg, Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 58AK, 58AL. 
207  Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 41. 
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Summary 
8.1 Restrictive practices involve the use of interventions and practices, such as 
restraint or seclusion, that have the effect of restricting the rights or freedom of 
movement of a person with disability.  
8.2 Significant concerns have been expressed about the use of restrictive practices in 
Australia. While regulation of restrictive practices primarily occurs at a state and 
territory level, a combination of initiatives at a national level provide a timely 
opportunity to consider a national approach to reform of restrictive practices in a range 
of settings. 
8.3 In this chapter, the ALRC proposes that the Australian Government and Council 
of Australian Governments (COAG) develop such a national approach, which should 
apply the National Decision-Making Principles and provide for supported decision-
making in relation to consent to the use of restrictive practices, to the extent such 
practices are permitted. 
Restrictive practices in Australia 
8.4 Restrictive practices involve the use of interventions and practices that have the 
effect of restricting the rights or freedom of movement of a person with disability. 
These primarily include restraint (chemical, mechanical, social or physical) and 
seclusion.
1
 People with disability who display ‘challenging behaviour’ or ‘behaviours 
                                                        
1  See, eg, definitions in: Australian Government, National Framework for Reducing and Eliminating the 
Use of Restrictive Practices in the Disability Service Sector, (2014) 4. Disability Act 2006 (Vic) s 3(1). 
However, see also: Philip French, Julie Dardel and Sonya Price-Kelly, ‘Rights Denied: Towards a 
National Policy Agenda about Abuse, Neglect and Exploitation of Persons with Cognitive Impairment’ 
(People with Disability Australia, 2010) [2.48]—[2.51]. See also stakeholder submissions in relation to 
proposed changes to the definitions under the Proposed National Framework: NMHCCF and MHCA, 
Submission 81; NSW Council for Intellectual Disability, Submission 33; Physical Disability Council of 
NSW, Submission 32. 
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of concern’
2
 may be subjected to restrictive practices in a variety of contexts, 
including:  supported accommodation and group homes; residential aged care facilities; 
mental health facilities; hospitals; prisons; and schools.
3
 
8.5 While restrictive practices may be used in some circumstances there are 
concerns that such practices can also be imposed as a ‘means of coercion, discipline, 
convenience, or retaliation by staff, family members or others providing support’.
4
  
Such practices may infringe a person’s human rights.
5
 As a result, there are significant 
concerns about the use of restrictive practices in Australia. For example, the United 
Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) has stated 
that it  
is concerned that persons with disabilities, particularly those with intellectual 
impairment or psychosocial disability, are subjected to unregulated behaviour 
modification or restrictive practices such as chemical, mechanical and physical 
restraints and seclusion, in various environments, including schools, mental health 
facilities and hospitals. 
The Committee recommends that the State party take immediate steps to end such 
practices, including by establishing an independent national preventive mechanism to 
monitor places of detention—such as mental health facilities, special schools, 
hospitals, disability justice centres and prisons—in order to ensure that persons with 
disabilities, including psychosocial disabilities, are not subjected to intrusive medical 
interventions.6 
8.6 The Australian Civil Society Parallel Report Group Response to the List of 
Issues as part of Australia’s appearance before the UNCRPD in 2013 expressed 
concern that people with disability, especially cognitive impairment and psychosocial 
disability, are ‘routinely subjected to unregulated and under-regulated behaviour 
                                                        
2  The ALRC acknowledges that these terms are subjective and that in many circumstances such behaviour 
can be understood as ‘adaptive behaviours to maladaptive environments’ and may be a ‘legitimate 
response to difficult environments and situations’: Paul Ramcharan et al, ‘Experiences of Restrictive 
Practices: A View from People with Disabilities and Family Carers’ (Research Report, Office of the 
Senior Practitioner, 2009) 2. See also: Physical Disability Council of NSW, Submission 32. 
3  See, eg, Office of the Public Advocate (Qld), Submission 05; Office of the Public Advocate (Vic), 
Submission 06; Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 41; Central Australian Legal Aid Service, 
Submission 48; Children with Disability Australia, Submission 68; National Association of Community 
Legal Centres and Others, Submission 78. See also Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, 
Final Report No 24 (2012) 318. 
4  Disability Rights Now, Civil Society Report to the United Nations on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, August 2012, 241.  
5  Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3 (entered 
into force 2 September 1990) arts 3, 14—17, 19; Juan E. Mendez, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment’ (A/HRC/22/53, 1 February 
2013). Several stakeholders called for ratification of the Optional Protocol on the Convention Against 
Torture: Central Australian Legal Aid Service, Submission 48; Public Interest Advocacy Centre, 
Submission 41. See also, Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, ‘Concluding Observations 
on the Initial Report of Australia, Adopted by the Committee at Its Tenth Session (2–13 September 
2013)’ (United Nations, 4 October 2013) [35]—[36]; Michael Williams, John Chesterman and Richard 
Laufer, ‘Consent vs Scrutiny: Restrictive Liberties in Post-Bournewood Victoria’ (2014) 21 Journal of 
Law and Medicine. 
6  Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, above n 5, [35]–[36]. 
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modification or restrictive practices such as chemical, mechanical and physical 
restraint and seclusion’.
7
  
8.7 The regulation of restrictive practices in Australia primarily arises under state 
and territory disability services and mental health legislation, and under a range of 
policy directives, statements and guidance materials. There is significant inconsistency 
in the regulation of restrictive practices across jurisdictions, and the numerous 
frameworks ‘conspire to make the legal framework in this area exceedingly complex’.
8
 
8.8 Restrictive practices regulation in jurisdictions such as Victoria, Queensland and 
Tasmania occurs through disability services legislation.
9
 The approach in other 
jurisdictions includes policy-based frameworks, voluntary codes of practice, and 
regulation through the guardianship framework.
10
 There is also relevant reform activity 
in relation to disability services legislation in a number of jurisdictions.
11
 
8.9 In the context of the mental health system, jurisdictions such as Victoria and 
Queensland have detailed provisions relating to restrictive practices, combined with 
minimum standard guidelines
12
 and a policy statement.
13
 Legislative provisions are less 
detailed in other jurisdictions.
14
 In NSW, the use of restrictive practices is regulated by 
a lengthy policy directive.
15
 Mental health legislation is, however, an area of ongoing 
review and reform, with implications for the regulation of restrictive practices.
16
 
                                                        
7  Disability Rights Now, ‘Australian Civil Society Parallel Report Group Response to the List of Issues, 
CRPD 10th Session Dialogue with Australia, Geneva’ (September 2013). 
8  Michael Williams, John Chesterman and Richard Laufer, above n 5, 1.  
9  Disability Act 2006 (Vic); Disability Services (Restrictive Practices) and Other Legislation Amendment 
Act 2014 (Qld); Disability Services Act 2011 (Tas).  
10  For example, in NSW, guidelines govern the use of restrictive practices in relation to adults: NSW 
Department of Family and Community Services, Behaviour Support Policy, Version 4.0 (March 2012). In 
addition, the use of a distinct number of restrictive practices requires completion of a documented plan, 
involving authorisation by an internal Restricted Practices Authorisation mechanism. Guardians 
appointed under the Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW) may be authorised to consent to the use of restrictive 
practices for people over 16 years of age. Restrictive practices in relation to children are governed by 
Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 (NSW) and Children and Young Persons 
(Care and Protection) Regulation 2012 (NSW). The WA Disability Services Commission is reviewing its 
2012 Voluntary Code of Practice for the Elimination of Restrictive Practices in 2014. 
11  For example, in NSW, consultation in relation to a draft of the Disability Inclusion Bill 2014 (NSW) 
which would replace the Disability Services Act 1993 (NSW), concluded in February 2014. In December 
2013, amendments to the Disability Services Act 1993 (SA) contained in the Disability Services (Rights, 
Protection and Inclusion) Amendment Act 2013 (SA) took effect, requiring prescribed disability service 
providers to have in place ‘appropriate policies and procedures for ensuring the safety and welfare of 
persons using the service’, which may include policies and procedures addressing restrictive practices. 
12  Mental Health Act 1986 (Vic) ss 81–82; Victorian Chief Psychiatrist’s Guideline, Seclusion in Approved 
Mental Health Services (2011).  
13  Mental Health Act 2000 (Qld) pt 4A; Queensland Health Department, Policy Statement on Reducing and 
Where Possible Eliminating Restraint and Seclusion in Queensland Mental Health Services (2008). See 
also, Queensland Health Department, Mental Health Act 2000 Resource Guide (2012). 
14  See, eg, Mental Health Act 2009 (SA) ss 7(h), 90, 98; Mental Health Act 1996 (WA) ss 116–124;  Mental 
Health and Related Services Act 1998 (NT) ss 61-62; Mental Health (Treatment and Care) Act 1994 
(ACT). 
15  NSW Health, Aggression, Seclusion & Restraint in Mental Health Facilities in NSW, Policy Directive 
(June 2012).  
16  In Tasmania, the new Mental Health Act 2013 (Tas) which regulates restrictive practices commenced on 
17 February 2014; and the new Mental Health Act 2014 (Vic) commences on 1 July 2014. There are also 
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8.10 At a national level, in March 2014, Commonwealth, state and territory disability 
ministers endorsed the National Framework for Reducing and Eliminating the Use of 
Restrictive Practices in the Disability Service Sector (the National Framework). The 
National Framework outlines high-level principles and core strategies to reduce the use 
of restrictive practices in the disability services sector. It represents a commitment ‘to 
the high-level guiding principles and implementation of the core strategies to reduce 
the use of restrictive practices in the disability service sector’.
17 
8.11 There are also relevant guidelines at a national or Commonwealth level 
including guidelines released by the Royal Australian and New Zealand College of 
Psychiatrists and the Australian Psychological Association,
18
 and the Australian 
Government Department of Health.
19
   
Opportunity for national reform 
8.12 Stakeholders expressed significant concern about the use of restrictive 
practices.
20
 The ALRC accepts that the overall objective of reform to laws and legal 
frameworks with respect to restrictive practices should be to reduce, and where 
possible, eliminate the use of restrictive practices.
21
  
8.13 Regulation of restrictive practices primarily occurs at a state and territory level. 
However, a combination of recent initiatives at a national level—the National 
Framework; the development of a national quality and safeguards system for the 
National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS); and the National Seclusion and 
Restraint Project—provide a timely opportunity to consider a national approach to 
reform of restrictive practices in a range of settings. 
8.14 The National Framework contains high-level principles and strategies designed 
to reduce the use of restrictive practices in the disability services sector. In March 
2014, the COAG Disability Reform Council indicated that ‘the core strategies 
                                                                                                                                             
several reviews of mental health legislation in a number of jurisdictions: ACT— the second exposure 
draft of the Mental Health (Treatment and Care) Act 1994 (ACT) was drafted in 2013; WA—the Mental 
Health Bill 2013 (WA) was adopted by the Legislative Assembly on 10 April 2014; review of the Bill in 
the Legislative Council is pending; SA—the Department of Health has completed public consultation on 
the Mental Health Act 2009 (SA) and its report to Parliament is expected in June 2014; Queensland—
submissions to a review focusing on areas for improvements to the Mental Health Act 2000 (Qld) closed 
in August 2013; NSW—a report was tabled in Parliament in May 2013: ‘Review of the NSW Mental 
Health Act 2007: Report for NSW Parliament, Summary of Consultation Feedback and Advice’ (NSW 
Ministry of Health, May 2013). 
17  Australian Government, National Framework for Reducing and Eliminating the Use of Restrictive 
Practices in the Disability Service Sector, (2014) 2.  
18  ‘Evidence-Based Guidelines to Reduce the Need for Restrictive Practices in the Disability Sector’ 
(Australian Psychological Society, 2011). 
19  See, eg, Department of Health, Decision-Making Tool: Supporting a Restraint Free Environment in 
Residential Aged Care (2012).  See also: Senate Committee on Community Affairs, Parliament of 
Australia, Care and Management of Younger and Older Australians Living with Dementia and 
Behavioural and Psychiatric Symptoms of Dementia (2014).  
20  See, eg, National Association of Community Legal Centres and Others, Submission 78; Central 
Australian Legal Aid Service, Submission 48; NSW Council for Intellectual Disability, Submission 33; 
Physical Disability Council of NSW, Submission 32; Office of the Public Advocate (Vic), Submission 06; 
Office of the Public Advocate (Qld), Submission 05. 
21  Australian Government, National Framework for Reducing and Eliminating the Use of Restrictive 
Practices in the Disability Service Sector, (2014) 1–2.  
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embodied in the National Framework will guide governments in development of 
national quality and safeguards system for the NDIS’.
22
  
8.15 Another factor is the proposed development of a national quality assurance and 
safeguards system in the context of the NDIS. During the roll-out of the NDIS, state 
and territory quality assurance and safeguards frameworks will apply.
23
 However, as 
the NDIS is fully implemented and states and territories reduce or cease funding for 
disability services,
24
 and in the light of the move away from block funding to 
individualised funding, there will be a need for a national approach to quality assurance 
and safeguards.  
8.16 In developing the national quality assurance and safeguards system for the 
NDIS, the intention appears to have been to use the National Framework to shape the 
restrictive practices-related elements of that system.  
8.17 Stakeholders discussed and highlighted a number of challenges in developing 
such a system, including for example, the need for registration and regulation of all 
service providers who receive NDIS funding. In particular, while the focus of the NDIS 
on participant control over funding is a positive change, the potential for new and 
unregistered services to enter the market poses challenges for maintaining standards 
and safeguards, particularly in relation to the use of restrictive practices.
25
 
8.18 In addition, given the variety of settings in which restrictive practices are used, 
there is a need for a national or nationally consistent approach to regulation beyond the 
disability services sector and the NDIS. The ALRC suggests that rather than simply 
including regulation of restrictive practices within a broader national quality assurance 
and safeguards system for the NDIS, the Australian Government and COAG should 
also facilitate the development of a national or nationally consistent approach separate 
from the NDIS system. 
8.19 The third notable development is the National Seclusion and Restraint Project, 
which aims to identify best practice in reducing or eliminating seclusion and restraint 
and may help produce an important evidence base upon which a national approach to 
reducing and eliminating the use of restrictive practices could be developed.
26
 
                                                        
22  COAG Disability Reform Council, Meeting Communique, 21 March 2014.  
23  Australian Government, National Framework for Reducing and Eliminating the Use of Restrictive 
Practices in the Disability Service Sector, (2014) 2–3; Intergovernmental Agreement on the NDIS 
Launch, 7 December 2012. 
24  See, eg, statement by NSW Department of Family and Community Services that from 1 July 2018, ‘the 
NDIS will fund all disability supports in NSW’: NSW Department of Family and Community Services, 
Disability Inclusion Bill 2014: Consultation Draft, Information Booklet 6. 
25  See, eg, Office of the Public Advocate (Qld), Submission 05. 
26  The Project was established by the National Mental Health Commission in partnership with the Mental 
Health Commission of Canada and a number of key Australian bodies, including the Australian Human 
Rights Commission. The National Mental Health Commission has also ‘engaged an interdisciplinary 
team of researchers from the University of Melbourne to look at best practice in reducing and eliminating 
the use of seclusion and restraint in relation to mental health issues and help identify good practice 
treatment approaches. The research team aims to identify what factors drive current practice in service 
delivery to evaluate how these factors can lead to best practice’: National Seclusion and Restraint Project, 
Project Information <www.socialequity.unimelb.edu.au/seclusion-and-restraint/project-information/>. 
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8.20 A number of stakeholders expressed their support for a national regulatory 
approach or framework in relation to restrictive practices.
27
  For example, the Public 
Interest Advocacy Centre (PIAC) submitted that it  
agrees that national regulation or framework for the regulation and reduction of 
restrictive practices is needed. PIAC considers that any regulation must ensure higher 
standards of treatment and very tight regulation of restrictive practices. PIAC notes 
that any regulation needs to reflect the principles reflected in the CRPD and the UN 
Principles.28  
8.21 The National Mental Health Consumer and Carer Forum and the Mental Health 
Council of Australia (NMHCCF and MHCA) recommended the development and 
adoption of  
nationally consistent legislation governing restrictive practices, of which seclusion 
and restraint are included, be developed and adopted across all states and territories. 
This legislation should include standardised terminology and definitions and set clear 
and effective practice standards.29 
8.22 The development of a national approach to the regulation of restrictive practices, 
separate from the NDIS system, could take a number of forms. It could, for example, 
build upon the foundation provided by the existing National Framework to provide 
further detail in addition to the high level principles and core strategies to guide state 
and territory approaches. It might involve the development of a new national 
framework and arrangements.  
8.23 A number of stakeholders emphasised the need for binding regulation. For 
example, the Disability Discrimination Legal Service (DDLS) submitted that it would 
be ‘insufficient’ to simply have a framework and hope that the relevant organisations 
will abide by its ‘guidelines’.
30
 Instead, a binding form of regulation is necessary. 
Stakeholders such as the DDLS and the National Association of Community Legal 
Centres (NACLC) recommended that a national framework or approach ‘be binding on 
organisations that receive federal funding, via inclusion in service agreements’.
31
 
Consistent with the NMHCCF and MHCA suggestion, regulation could also take 
legislative form.  
8.24 The ALRC does not intend to make a specific proposal about the form any 
national or nationally consistent approach should take. Such a proposal would extend 
beyond the scope of this Inquiry.
32
 Broadly, however, it is likely that an approach 
which incorporates legislation and national guidelines, codes of practice or policy 
                                                        
27  Central Australian Legal Aid Service, Submission 48; Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 41; 
Office of the Information Commissioner, Queensland, Submission 20; Carers Queensland Australia, 
Submission 14.  
28  Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 41. 
29  NMHCCF and MHCA, Submission 81.  
30  Disability Discrimination Legal Service, Submission 55 attachment 1.  
31  Ibid. See also: National Association of Community Legal Centres and Others, Submission 78; Carers 
Queensland Australia, Submission 14. 
32  See Ch 1.  
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directives, as well as education, training and guidance material would be appropriate.
33
 
Such an approach may address the concerns of stakeholders about the focus of the 
National Framework being  
more on when and how to use restrictive practices rather than seeking to prevent their 
use, or looking at the environmental factors that may be causing an individual to 
behave in a way which introduces restraint as an option. The Framework is not 
premised on changing services, systems and environments as the starting point for 
changing individual behaviour, but remains focused on changing the person 
themselves.34 
8.25 The interaction between the National Framework, the proposed NDIS national 
quality assurance and safeguards system, state and territory legislation, and any new 
national approach also needs to be considered.
35
 Disability Rights Now suggested that, 
given the use of restrictive practices in a range of contexts, ‘any framework on 
restrictive practices needs to recognise this, and be part of a wider overarching strategy 
addressing violence and abuse of people with disability in general’.
36
 
8.26 A national or nationally consistent approach may provide a vehicle through 
which some of the systemic concerns of stakeholders, for example in relation to data 
collection, might be addressed. 
A national approach to regulation of restrictive practices 
Proposal 8–1 The Australian Government and the Council of Australian 
Governments should facilitate the development of a national or nationally 
consistent approach to the regulation of restrictive practices. In developing such 
an approach, the following should be considered:  
(a) the need for regulation in relation to the use of restrictive practices in a 
range of sectors, including disability services and aged care;  
(b) the application of the National Decision-Making Principles; and 
(c) the provision of mechanisms for supported decision-making in relation to 
consent to the use of restrictive practices. 
8.27 While not making a specific proposal about the exact form any national or 
nationally consistent approach should take, the ALRC considers that in developing 
such an approach, a number of key issues should be considered.  
                                                        
33  See, eg, S Kumble and B McSherry, ‘Seclusion and Restraint: Rethinking Regulation from a Human 
Rights Perspective’ 17 Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 551–561. 
34  Disability Rights Now, above n 7. 
35  See, eg, Australian Psychological Society, Submission 60. See also Michael Williams, John Chesterman 
and Richard Laufer, above n 5. 
36  Disability Rights Now, above n 7. 
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Broad application 
8.28 In order to be effective, the regulation of restrictive practices needs to cover the 
use of restrictive practices in a range of settings.
37
  This is particularly important given 
that people with disability may be subjected to restrictive practices in a variety of 
contexts, including:  supported accommodation and group homes; residential aged care 
facilities; mental health facilities; hospitals; prisons; and schools.
38
 Broad application 
of any national or nationally consistent approach would address one of the key 
shortcomings of current approaches to restrictive practices, including the National 
Framework, which is limited to the disability services context.   
8.29 A key additional area of Commonwealth law to which a national or nationally 
consistent approach should apply is aged care.
39
 Concerns about restrictive practices in 
aged care were highlighted by a number of stakeholders. For example, the Office of the 
Public Advocate (Vic), highlighted concern about ‘the high use of restrictive 
interventions on residents of aged care facilities’ and stated that it ‘would like to see 
greater regulation and on-site auditing of this practice’.
40
 Similarly, in March 2014, the 
Senate Community Affairs References Committee recommended (in the context of 
aged care), that ‘the Commonwealth develop, in consultation with dementia advocates 
and service providers, guidelines for the recording and reporting on the use of all forms 
of restraints in residential facilities’.
41
  
Encouraging supported decision-making 
8.30 The ALRC proposes that any national or nationally consistent approach to the 
regulation of restrictive practices should reflect the National Decision-Making 
Principles and make provision for supported decision-making.  
8.31 While limited to disability services, the National Framework incorporates 
guiding principles, including reference to a ‘Person-Centred Focus’ which states that  
people with disability (with the support of their guardians or advocates where 
required) are the natural authorities for their own lives and processes that recognise 
this authority in decision making, choice and control should guide the design and 
provision of services.42 
                                                        
37  See, eg, Disability Discrimination Legal Service, Submission 55 attachment 1. See also P French, J 
Dardel and S Price-Kelly, ‘Rights Denied: Towards a National Policy Agenda about Abuse, Neglect and 
Exploitation of Persons with Cognitive Impairment’ [2009] People with Disability Australia. 
38  See, eg, National Association of Community Legal Centres and Others, Submission 78; Children with 
Disability Australia, Submission 68; Central Australian Legal Aid Service, Submission 48; Public Interest 
Advocacy Centre, Submission 41; Office of the Public Advocate (Vic), Submission 06; Office of the 
Public Advocate (Qld), Submission 05. 
39  In relation to aged care, see, eg, John Chesterman, ‘The Future of Adult Guardianship in Federal 
Australia’ (2013) 66 Australian Social Work 26. 
40  Office of the Public Advocate (Vic), Submission 06; Office of the Public Advocate (Qld), Submission 05.  
41  Senate Committee on Community Affairs, Parliament of Australia, Care and Management of Younger 
and Older Australians Living with Dementia and Behavioural and Psychiatric Symptoms of Dementia 
(2014) rec 14. 
42  Australian Government, National Framework for Reducing and Eliminating the Use of Restrictive 
Practices in the Disability Service Sector, (2014) 7. 
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8.32 The National Framework also provides for ‘maximum respect for a person’s 
autonomy, including’: 
i.  recognising the presumption of capacity for decision making;  
ii.  seeking a person’s consent and participation in decision making (with support if 
necessary) prior to making a substitute decision on their behalf; and  
iii.  engaging the appropriate decision maker and seeking consent where appropriate, 
where a decision must be made on behalf of a person.43 
8.33 The corresponding core strategy states that one of the key implementation areas 
is the ‘availability of tools to assist people with disability and their guardians or 
advocates (where appropriate) to participate in decision making’.
44
 
8.34 The ALRC considers that the National Framework provides a useful starting 
point for the potential application of the National Decision-Making Principles and 
supported decision-making in the context of restrictive practices.  
8.35 People with disability have the right to make decisions about matters which 
affect their life, including in relation to the use of restrictive practices. As a result, any 
national approach must ensure that decisions about, and consent to, restrictive practices 
are ultimately those of the person on whom the practice is being used.  In 
circumstances where the person requires decision-making support there should be 
provision for decision-making which incorporates a person-centred focus and provides 
for supported decision-making. For example, a person may require support to make 
decisions about, or consent to, the use of restrictive practices under a behaviour support 
plan. In the context of aged care, it may be necessary for a representative who has been 
appointed to fully support the person in relation to restrictive practices-related 
decisions, including expressing or constructing the will and preferences of the person 
with disability, or considering the human rights relevant to the situation. 
8.36 Importantly, in Chapter 10, the ALRC proposes review of state and territory 
guardianship, mental health and disability services legislation—the key legislation 
under which restrictive practices are currently regulated. One aim of such review, in 
ensuring legislation is consistent with the National Decision-Making Principles, would 
be to encourage supported decision-making, and a shift from an objective best interests 
test to one relating to will, preferences and rights.  As a result, in circumstances where 
a decision in relation to restrictive practices is made at a state or territory level by a 
substitute decision-maker, such as a guardian, ideally they should have regard to the 
will, preferences and rights of the person with impaired decision-making ability.
45
 
8.37 Finally, consistent with the Safeguards Guidelines under the National Decision-
Making Principles, restrictive practices must be least restrictive of the person’s human 
                                                        
43  Ibid.  
44  Ibid 10. 
45  For prior consideration of the role of state and territory appointed decision-makers in relation to 
restrictive practices, see, eg, Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 
(2012); P French, J Dardel and S Price-Kelly, above n 37; Michael Williams, John Chesterman and 
Richard Laufer, above n 5. 
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rights; appealable; and subject to regular, independent and impartial monitoring and 
review. 
8.38 This approach is consistent with that recommended by a number of stakeholders. 
NACLC, for example, expressed its support for the proposed National Framework but 
suggested that it could be strengthened by reference to guiding principles.
46
 PIAC 
submitted that any national or nationally consistent approach should ensure that 
restrictive practices:  
are only implemented as a last resort;  are implemented for the least amount of time 
possible; are recorded, monitored and reviewed; have tight safeguards in place that are 
focused on minimising risk to staff, patients, carers and family; and are undertaken with a 
focus on ensuring decency, humanity and respect at all stages.47 
Other issues 
8.39 A number of stakeholders raised systemic issues in relation to the use and 
regulation of restrictive practices, including: the lack of facilities and resources; 
positive behaviour management; the role of psychologists and others in mitigation of 
‘challenging behaviours’ and multi-disciplinary interventions; the need for education, 
awareness raising and training of relevant staff; the need for penalties and criminal 
sanction; and the need for a national approach to data collection.
48
 While these 
concerns are important, the issues do not related directly to concepts of legal capacity 
or decision-making ability and the ALRC does not intend to make proposals in these 
areas. 
                                                        
46  National Association of Community Legal Centres and Others, Submission 78. 
47  Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 41. See also: Senate Committee on Community Affairs, 
Parliament of Australia, Care and Management of Younger and Older Australians Living with Dementia 
and Behavioural and Psychiatric Symptoms of Dementia (2014) recs 14, 15. 
48  See, eg, NMHCCF and MHCA, Submission 81; Australian Psychological Society, Submission 60; 
Disability Discrimination Legal Service, Submission 55; Central Australian Legal Aid Service, 
Submission 48; Physical Disability Council of NSW, Submission 32. See also: National Mental Health 
Commission, ‘A Contributing Life, the 2013 National Report Card on Mental Health and Suicide 
Prevention’ (2013). 
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Summary 
9.1 Australia has obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) to guarantee that people with disability can 
‘effectively and fully participate in political and public life on an equal basis with 
others, directly or through freely chosen representatives, including the right and 
opportunity’ to vote and be elected.
1
 
9.2 This chapter discusses issues which arise in relation to Commonwealth electoral 
law for people who may require decision-making support. It has three parts. The first 
part focuses on the sections of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) which 
relate to entitlements to enrol and vote and objections to enrolment. The ALRC 
proposes amendment to s 93(8)(a), commonly referred to as the ‘unsound mind’ 
provision, to provide that the relevant threshold is whether a person has decision-
making ability with respect to enrolment and voting at the relevant election. The ALRC 
also proposes the introduction of a statutory test for determining whether a person 
meets the relevant threshold, focusing on the decision-making supports available; the 
development of additional guidance in relation to the determination; and that the 
Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) collect and make publicly available 
information about the new provisions. The ALRC asks a question about the evidence 
required to support an objection to enrolment. 
                                                        
1  UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 999 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 2008) art 29. See also Ibid arts 4, 12; International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered 
into force 3 January 1976) arts 2, 25, 26; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976); 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 art 21.  
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9.3 The second part of the chapter relates to supported decision-making and voting. 
The ALRC proposes amendment to s 234(1) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 
which provides a form of supported decision-making, and asks what further changes, if 
any, are required to the Act or relevant legal frameworks to facilitate the provision of 
support to people who may require decision-making support, including by secret ballot. 
9.4 The third part of the chapter discusses compulsory voting and fines for failure to 
vote. There is a concern that people with disability who are on the electoral roll may be 
fined disproportionately for failing to vote. An elector may avoid a fine if they had a 
‘valid and sufficient reason’ for failing to vote. The ALRC proposes that the Australian 
Electoral Commission develop guidance material to assist Divisional Returning 
Officers to determine whether a person with disability has a valid and sufficient reason 
for failing to vote. 
Entitlement to enrolment and to vote  
9.5 This first part of the chapter focuses on s 93(8)(a) and pt IX of the 
Commonwealth Electoral Act which relate to persons entitled to enrolment and to vote 
and objections to enrolment. The ALRC makes a number of proposals. First, the ALRC 
proposes amendment to the threshold under s 93(8)(a) which deals with circumstances 
in which a person’s name may not be placed or retained on the electoral roll. The 
ALRC then proposes amendment to the approach to and determination of voting 
eligibility and the need for research and data collection with respect to these 
provisions. The ALRC also discusses issues relating to the range of professionals 
entitled to provide a certificate required to support an objection to enrolment. 
9.6 The combined effect of the ALRC’s proposals in this section is that, even where 
an objection is made to the enrolment of an elector with disability: 
 the threshold under s 93(8)(a) would be more appropriate and relevant to the 
particular election—whether the person has decision-making ability with respect 
to enrolment and voting at the relevant election; 
 there would be a focus on the available decision-making assistance and supports 
in determining whether the person meets the necessary threshold; 
 further guidance incorporating the National Decision-Making Principles would 
be available for medical practitioners and others undertaking assessments and 
providing medical certificates which must accompany a written objection; and 
 there would be greater data about the operation and use of s 93(8)(a) of the 
Commonwealth Electoral Act.  
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Threshold  
Proposal 9–1 Section 93(8)(a) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 
(Cth) provides that a person of ‘unsound mind’ who is ‘incapable of 
understanding the nature and significance of enrolment or voting’ is not entitled 
to have their name on the electoral roll or to vote in any Senate or House of 
Representatives election. This should be amended to replace the current wording 
with: ‘does not have decision-making ability with respect to enrolment and 
voting at the relevant election’. 
9.7 In this section, the ALRC proposes amendment to s 93(8)(a) of the 
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth), which contains the threshold relevant to 
determining whether a person is entitled to have their name placed or retained on the 
electoral roll and to vote.   
9.8 Section 93(8)(a) provides that a person is not entitled to have their name placed 
or retained on the electoral roll, or to vote at any Senate or House of Representatives 
election, where they are a person ‘who by reason of being of unsound mind, is 
incapable of understanding the nature and significance of enrolment and voting’. 
9.9 To remove a person from the electoral roll based on this provision there are a 
number of steps:  
 a written objection must be lodged by an enrolled elector;
2
  
 the objection must be supported by a medical certificate;
3
  
 the AEC must give the individual an opportunity to respond to the written 
objection;
4
 and  
 the Electoral Commissioner will determine the objection.
5
  
9.10 There are a variety of avenues to challenge a decision to remove a person’s 
name from the electoral roll.
6
  
9.11 People with Disability Australia and the Australian Centre for Disability Law 
highlighted that provisions of this type ‘all too often’ seek to remove or limit a person’s 
legal agency to exercise their rights:  
                                                        
2  Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) ss 114–116. The AEC cannot object on the grounds specified in 
s 93(8)(a). 
3  Ibid s 118(4). 
4  Ibid ss 116–118. 
5  Ibid s 118. The Electoral Commissioner may make any inquiries he or she considers necessary to 
ascertain the facts relevant to the objection.  
6  Including internal review and review by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal under the Commonwealth 
Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) pt X, and under the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth); the Administrative 
Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth); and by the Commonwealth Ombudsman.  
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Frequently, this is due to a conflated understanding of legal capacity with mental 
capacity. For example, provisions which make exception for people with ‘unsound 
mind’, ‘disability’, ‘mental incapacity’ or ‘incompetence’ are expressing the view that 
the existence of a cognitive impairment permits a limitation on the exercise of legal 
agency and thus recognition of legal capacity as a whole.7 
9.12 The United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(UNCRPD) has recommended that Australia ‘enact legislation restoring the 
presumption of the capacity of persons with disabilities to vote and exercise choice; 
and to ensure that all aspects of voting in an election are made accessible to all citizens 
with a disability’.
8
 
9.13 Section 93(8)(a) itself has attracted a range of criticism.
9
 For example, The 
Human Rights Law Centre stated that ‘the exclusion of persons of “unsound mind” 
from the franchise is vague, stigmatising and overly broad, and does not reflect the true 
capacity of people with disabilities to make decisions about voting’.
10
 Stakeholders 
also expressed the view that the provision is ambiguous.
11
  
9.14 The Public Interest Advocacy Centre (PIAC) highlighted that, in some 
circumstances, ‘people of “sound mind” do not understand the “nature and significance 
of enrolment and voting”’,
12
 but are still entitled to vote.
13
 
9.15 The Australian Government Electoral Reform Green Paper highlighted that, 
while there are some concerns about the provision, as it makes provision for removal of 
a person’s right to vote, it is a necessary provision in order to protect the integrity of 
the electoral system. It also emphasised that  
in practice however, no test for ‘soundness of mind’ is conducted when a person seeks 
to enrol or approaches a polling booth on election day. In practice the provision is 
‘used’ when a person raises a concern with the AEC ... These concerns are generally 
raised by persons close to the elector in question.14 
                                                        
7  PWDA, ACDL and AHRC, Submission 66.  
8  Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, ‘Concluding Observations on the Initial Report of 
Australia, Adopted by the Committee at Its Tenth Session (2–13 September 2013)’ (United Nations, 
4 October 2013). 
9  See, eg, PWDA, ACDL and AHRC, Submission 66; The Human Rights Law Centre, Submission 54; 
Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 41; Physical Disability Council of NSW, Submission 32. 
See also People with Disability Australia and Australian Centre for Disability Law, Submission 90 to the 
Minister of State, Electoral Reform Green Paper: Strengthening Australia’s Democracy, 2009. 
10  The Human Rights Law Centre, Submission 54. 
11  Ibid; Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 41; Physical Disability Council of NSW, Submission 
32. See also People with Disability Australia and Australian Centre for Disability Law, Submission 90 to 
the Minister of State, Electoral Reform Green Paper: Strengthening Australia’s Democracy, 2009. 
12  Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 41.  
13  See also, People with Disability Australia and Australian Centre for Disability Law, Submission 90 to the 
Minister of State, Electoral Reform Green Paper: Strengthening Australia’s Democracy, 2009. 
14  Australian Government, Electoral Reform Green Paper—Strengthening Australia’s Democracy, (2009) 
42.  
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9.16 There has also been Parliamentary consideration of the provision.
15
 At a 
Commonwealth level, in 2012 the Electoral and Referendum Amendment (Improving 
Electoral Procedure) Bill 2012 (Cth) contained amendments to the provision. However, 
the Government accepted the recommendation of the Joint Standing Committee on 
Electoral Matters, which expressed the view that it was not satisfied that there was any 
‘pressing need to remove or substitute the phrase “unsound mind” or that it breaches 
any international obligations in relation to rights to electoral participation’.
16
 
9.17 There are two key elements of s 93(8)(a). The first relates to removal of 
entitlement to enrolment and to vote because of disability (‘by reason of being of 
unsound mind’). The second relates to the relevant threshold of mental or intellectual 
capacity required (‘incapable of understanding the nature and significance of enrolment 
and voting’). This threshold is broad and is neither context nor time-specific. There is 
no statutory articulation of what the threshold requires, appearing to apply a global and 
once-off assessment of a person’s mental or intellectual capacity, and as a result the 
provision is inconsistent with the approach taken by the CRPD and the National 
Decision-Making Principles. 
Options for reform 
9.18 There are a number of possible options for amendment of s 93(8)(a). First, the 
phrase ‘unsound mind’ could be removed, but the second part of the formulation, ‘is 
incapable of understanding the nature and significance of enrolment and voting’ could 
be retained. The removal of the phrase ‘unsound mind’ is important in light of the 
challenges of language discussed in chapter 2, to comply with Australia’s obligations 
under art 8 of the CRPD,
17
 and to remove a phrase that stakeholders consider 
‘derogatory, judgemental and stigmatising’.
18
 However, stakeholders have indicated 
this amendment alone is insufficient and that the rewording of only this phrase may 
broaden the disqualification.
19
 
9.19 Secondly, it would be possible to replace the entire phrase with ‘does not have 
decision-making ability with respect to enrolment and voting’ or some other similar 
phrase. For example, People with Disability Australia and the Australian Centre for 
Disability Law have argued that the provision should be amended to include the 
                                                        
15  At a state level, in relation to the equivalent provision, the Victorian Electoral Matters Committee stated 
that it ‘encourages the [Victorian Electoral Commission] to work directly with the Department of Justice 
and Chief Parliamentary Counsel (Department of Premier and Cabinet) to develop an appropriate 
terminology’: Electoral Matters Committee, ‘Inquiry into the Conduct of the 2010 Victorian State 
Election and Matters Related Thereto’ (May 2012) [7.49].  
16  Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, ‘Advisory Report on the Electoral and Referendum 
(Improving Electoral Procedure) Bill 2012 (Cth)’ (August 2012). The Bill was amended to exclude the 
provisions relating to unsound mind and subsequently passed and given Royal Assent on 27 March 2012. 
17  Article 8 contains a duty to undertake to adopt immediate, efficient and appropriate measures to combat 
stereotypes and prejudice in relation to people with disability in all areas of life: UN Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 999 UNTS 3 (entered into force 
3 May 2008) art 8. 
18  The Human Rights Law Centre, Submission 54.  
19  Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, above n 16, [2.89]. 
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threshold ‘a lack of capacity to exercise choice’ in relation to electoral questions,
20
 
reflecting the reasoning of Gleeson CJ in Roach v Electoral Commission:  
the rationale for excluding persons of unsound mind is obvious, although the 
application of the criterion of exclusion may be imprecise, and could be contentious in 
some cases. The rationale is related to the capacity to exercise choice.21   
9.20 A third option may be to replace the entire phrase with ‘does not have decision-
making ability with respect to enrolment and voting at the relevant election’. The 
inclusion of ‘at the relevant election’ recognises that capacity can fluctuate and is 
context and time-specific and the threshold should make provision for that by requiring 
consideration of the specific decision-making ability required to be enrolled and vote at 
a particular election. This formulation incorporates the views of stakeholders such as 
PIAC, which submitted that ‘any determination as to whether a person lacks capacity 
to vote should be decision-specific, and only apply to voting at a particular election as 
opposed to a blanket disqualification from the electoral process’.
22
  
9.21 Finally, an option suggested by some stakeholders would be to remove the 
provision entirely and allow all people to remain on the electoral roll, but make 
provision for impaired decision-making ability to be considered as a valid and 
sufficient reason for failure to vote under s 245(4) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act, 
and for waiver of the associated fine.
23
 Waiver of fines is an important mechanism to 
ensure that people with disability do not accumulate debts. This mechanism allows 
people with fluctuating capacity to remain on the electoral roll and not be penalised if 
they fail to vote, but can do so if they are able. However, this needs to be balanced with 
the fact that voting is compulsory and there is a need to ensure the integrity of the 
electoral system.  The joint judgment of Gummow, Kirby and Crennan JJ in Roach v 
Electoral Commission states that s 93(8)(a) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act  
plainly is valid.  It limits the exercise of the franchise, but does so for an end apt to 
protect the integrity of the electoral process.  That end, plainly enough, is consistent 
and compatible with the maintenance of the system of representative government.24  
9.22 Concern about the integrity of the electoral system if such an approach was 
taken has also been expressed by the AEC and the Joint Standing Committee on 
Electoral Matters.
25
 
9.23 Further, voting is compulsory in Australia (unlike in Canada which is the 
jurisdiction highlighted by stakeholders in support of this approach) and such a 
                                                        
20  People with Disability Australia and Australian Centre for Disability Law, Submission 90 to the Minister 
of State, Electoral Reform Green Paper: Strengthening Australia’s Democracy, 2009. See also: Public 
Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 41. 
21  Roach v Electoral Commissioner [2007] HCA 43, 9.  
22  Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 41. See also People with Disability Australia and Australian 
Centre for Disability Law, Submission 90 to the Minister of State, Electoral Reform Green Paper: 
Strengthening Australia’s Democracy, 2009. 
23  See, eg, Nina Kohn, ‘Cognitive Impairment and the Right to Vote: Rethinking the Meaning of Accessible 
Elections’ (2008) 1 Canadian Journal of Elder Law 29. 
24  Roach v Electoral Commissioner [2007] HCA 43, 88. 
25  Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, above n 16, [2.93]. 
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controversial proposal would change the nature of voting and voter exclusion in 
Australia with implications beyond this Inquiry. Most democratic countries have some 
capacity-related qualifications for voting. In light of this, the ALRC does not consider 
it appropriate to remove s 93(8)(a) entirely.  
9.24 The ALRC’s view is that the third approach is the most appropriate. The ALRC 
considers it is necessary to amend the provision to remove the reference to ‘by reason 
of being of unsound mind’. While it has a particular historical evolution,
26
 this phrase 
is inconsistent with the CRPD and the National Decision-Making Principles. As the 
ALRC is asked to provide a model in Commonwealth laws, it is not appropriate to 
retain such a phrase in Commonwealth legislation. Further, any test for capacity with 
respect to enrolment and voting should be based on a person’s decision-making ability 
in the context of the particular electoral decision which they face, in a particular 
election. As a result, the ALRC also proposes to substitute ‘incapable of understanding 
the nature and significance of enrolment and voting’, with ‘does not have decision-
making ability with respect to enrolment and voting at the relevant election’. This 
ensures the threshold is not a status-based assessment, and is consistent with the 
National Decision-Making Principles, to the extent that the threshold relates to ability 
with respect to a particular decision, at a particular time, rather than more broadly.  
There would need to be a number of ancillary changes to the Commonwealth Electoral 
Act to reflect this amendment.  
9.25 The ALRC recognises the proposed new threshold raises many issues that may 
need to be resolved before implementation. For example, requiring consideration of 
decision-making ability with respect to enrolment and voting at a relevant election 
requires consideration of how such a threshold would operate in practice, including for 
example to take account of fluctuating capacity.  
Test and assessment  
Proposal 9–2 The Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) should be 
amended to provide that a person lacks decision-making ability with respect to 
enrolment and voting at the relevant election if they cannot: 
(a) understand the information relevant to decisions that they will have to 
make associated with enrolment and voting at the relevant election;  
(b) retain that information for a sufficient period to make the decision;   
(c) use or weigh that information as part of the process of making decisions; 
and   
(d) communicate their decision in some way.  
                                                        
26  See discussion in Ch 2. 
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Proposal 9–3 The Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) should be 
amended to provide that decision-making assistance and support should be taken 
into account in determining whether a person has decision-making ability with 
respect to enrolment and voting at the relevant election.  
Proposal 9–4 The Australian Electoral Commission should develop a 
guide to assessing ability for the purposes of determining whether a person ‘does 
not have decision-making ability with respect to enrolment and voting at the 
relevant election’ consistent with the National Decision-Making Principles. 
9.26 In addition to amending the threshold or standard under s 93(8) of the 
Commonwealth Electoral Act, the ALRC also considers it is necessary to amend the 
Act to introduce a statutory test for the purposes of determining whether a person has 
reached the relevant threshold, but that the focus of any assessment must be on the 
decision-making supports available, rather than capability. In addition to the statutory 
test, the ALRC proposes that the AEC develop guidance to assist medical practitioners 
and others in determining whether a person has or does not have decision-making 
ability with respect to enrolment and voting at the relevant election. 
Test 
9.27 Currently, there is no statutory test for determining whether a person has 
decision-making ability with respect to enrolment and voting at the relevant election. In 
the ALRC’s view, there should be a statutory test and that test should be based on a 
person’s decision-making ability in the context of the relevant election and the 
available decision-making assistance and support.  
9.28 The proposal would introduce a new test into the Commonwealth Electoral Act, 
the key elements of which reflect the National Decision-Making Principles.  
Assistance and support 
9.29 The existing test of whether a person is of ‘unsound mind’ and ‘is incapable of 
understanding the nature and significance of enrolment and voting’ does not consider 
the possible role of assistance and support for electors.  
9.30 The ALRC proposes that in addition to a new threshold and test, the available 
decision-making assistance and supports must be taken into account in determining 
whether a person has decision-making ability with respect to enrolment and voting at 
the relevant election.
27
  
9.31 Decision-making support and assistance and supported decision-making are 
discussed further in the next part of this chapter.  
                                                        
27  This proposal reflects a key element of the National Decision-Making Principles: Ch 3.  
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Guide to assessment  
9.32 Under the current law, an objection must be supported by a certificate from a 
medical practitioner stating that, in the opinion of the medical practitioner, the elector, 
because of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of understanding the nature and 
significance of enrolment and voting.
28
  
9.33 The ALRC asks a question about the categories of professionals who should be 
entitled to provide such evidence later in this chapter. Regardless of which 
professionals undertake this assessment, the ALRC proposes that the AEC, in 
consultation with its Disability Advisory Committee and others, develop a guide to 
assessing ability for the purpose of determining whether a person has decision-making 
ability with respect to enrolment and voting at the relevant election. The guide should 
be aimed at medical practitioners and AEC employees. The guide or guidance material 
should incorporate and have regard to the National Decision-Making Principles and 
associated principles for determining decision-making ability. The NSW Capacity 
Toolkit also provides a useful model.
29
 
Evidence  
Question 9–1 Section 118(4) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 
(Cth) provides that a person’s name cannot be removed from the electoral roll 
unless an objection is accompanied by a certificate of a medical practitioner. 
Should this be amended to provide that an objection may also be accompanied 
by a statement from a range of qualified persons, including a psychologist or 
social worker, concerning an elector’s decision-making ability with respect to 
enrolment and voting? 
9.34 Section 118(4) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act provides that a person’s 
name cannot be removed from the electoral roll unless an objection is accompanied by 
a certificate of a medical practitioner stating that, in the opinion of the medical 
practitioner, the elector, because of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of understanding 
the nature and significance of enrolment and voting. 
9.35 It has been suggested that this provision should be broadened to provide that 
other professionals who may be associated with the care or support of a person with 
impaired decision-making ability may provide a certificate in support of an objection.  
9.36 In 2012, the Electoral and Referendum Amendment (Improving Electoral 
Procedure) Bill 2012 (Cth) contained an expanded list of qualified persons similar to 
the one outlined in Question 9–1 above. The AEC explained the reasoning behind the 
amendment was to remove the ‘impost on individuals or their families by requiring 
them to go to a medical practitioner, particularly if they already had a relationship with 
                                                        
28  Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) s 118(4). 
29  New South Wales, Attorney General’s Department, Capacity Toolkit: Information for Government and 
Community Workers, Professionals, Families and Carers in New South Wales (2008).  
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a psychologist, a psychiatrist or a social worker ... We wanted a process that was going 
to be relatively inexpensive, that was still going to have some security about it’.
30
  
9.37 However, the Joint Standing on Electoral Matters that inquired into the Bill said 
that it was ‘not satisfied that there is any pressing need ... that professions other than 
medical practitioners should be able to make determinations about a person’s capacity 
to understand the nature and significance of enrolment and voting’.
31
  
9.38 On the one hand, in light of moves away from the medical model of disability, 
and given the relationship people with disability may have with a range of medical and 
other professionals who are in a strong position to assess the true decision-making 
ability of the person, it may be beneficial to expand the category of professionals 
entitled to provide evidence in support of an objection. On the other hand, the evidence 
required for removing a person from the electoral roll should be of a high standard 
given the significance of removal,
32
 and the regulation and registration of medical 
practitioners adds an additional safeguard with respect to the assessment process that 
should be mirrored with respect to any additional categories of professionals. As a 
result, the ALRC is interested in stakeholder feedback on the appropriate categories of 
professionals who should be entitled to provide evidence in support of an objection. 
Research and data collection  
Proposal 9–5 The Australian Electoral Commission should collect, and 
make publicly available, information about the operation of s 93(8)(a) of the 
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth), including the number of people 
removed from the electoral roll, the reason, and whether they responded to the 
objection. 
9.39 In 2008–09, 5735 electors were removed from the electoral roll under s 93(8)(a) 
of the Act. This number peaked in 2010–11 at 13,082 (an election year), and in 2011–
12 it was 5445.
33
 However, information about removals from the electoral roll is 
limited and not readily publicly available. For example, there is no publicly available 
information about the number or nature of objections, or responses to objections, or the 
reasons for people being removed from the roll.
34
  
9.40 As a result, there is stakeholder concern about the lack of data available in 
relation to s 93(8)(a) of the Act. For example, the Human Rights Law Centre 
                                                        
30  Evidence to Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, House of Representatives, 16 July 2012, 
18 (Paul Pirani); Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, above n 16, [2.86]; Evidence to Joint 
Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, House of Representatives, 16 July 2012, 18 (Paul Pirani). 
31  Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, above n 16. 
32  Evidence to Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, House of Representatives, 16 July 2012, 16 
(Ngila Bevan, People with Disability Australia). 
33  Australian Electoral Commission, Submission 2.1 to Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, 
Advisory Report on the Electoral and Referendum (Improving Electoral Procedure) Bill 2012 (Cth), 
(2012) 5. 
34  See, eg, The Human Rights Law Centre, Submission 54. 
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recommended that research be commissioned to ‘better understand who is 
disenfranchised by the provision and the circumstances in which their names are 
removed from the electoral roll’.
35
  
9.41 The ALRC considers that this type of data would assist in informing policy 
development in this area and so proposes that the AEC collect and publicise 
information about the operation of s 93(8)(a) of the Act.  
Supported decision-making and voting  
Proposal 9–6 Section 234(1) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 
(Cth) should be amended to provide that ‘if any voter satisfies the presiding 
officer that he or she is unable to vote without assistance, the presiding officer 
shall permit a person appointed by the voter to enter an unoccupied 
compartment of the booth with the voter, and mark, fold, and deposit the voter’s 
ballot paper’. 
Question 9–2 What further changes, if any, are required to the 
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) or relevant legal frameworks to 
facilitate the provision of assistance and support to people who require decision-
making support to vote, including by secret ballot?   
9.42 Australia’s obligations under the CRPD include ensuring the accessibility of 
voting procedures, facilities and materials; protecting the right to vote by secret ballot; 
and where necessary, and at their request, allowing people with disability assistance in 
voting by a person of their choice.
36
 
9.43 In light of these obligations, and the proposal above requiring decision-making 
assistance and support to be taken into account in determining whether a person has 
decision-making ability with respect to enrolment and voting at the relevant election, 
there is a need to ensure the Act contains provision for appropriate decision-making 
assistance and support.  
9.44 Section 234(1) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act currently provides that ‘if 
any voter satisfies the presiding officer that his or her sight is so impaired or that the 
voter is so physically incapacitated or illiterate that he or she is unable to vote without 
assistance’, the presiding officer shall permit a person appointed by the voter to enter 
an unoccupied compartment of the booth with the voter, and mark, fold, and deposit 
the voter’s ballot paper’. 
                                                        
35  Ibid. 
36  UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 999 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 2008) arts 29, 4, 12. See also International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 
1976) arts 2, 25, 26; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for 
signature 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976); Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights 1948 art 21.  
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9.45 This provision already provides for a form of supported decision-making. 
However, in order to ensure consistency with the ALRC’s approach and the use of 
appropriate language, and to expand the category of people who may rely on the 
provision, the ALRC proposes that the provision be amended. It may be possible to 
include a more appropriately worded example in the Act. Specifically, the ALRC 
proposes the section be amended to provide that ‘if any voter satisfies the presiding 
officer that he or she is unable to vote without assistance, the presiding officer shall 
permit a person appointed by the voter to enter an unoccupied compartment of the 
booth with the voter, and mark, fold, and deposit the voter’s ballot paper’. 
9.46 In addition to assistance in marking and depositing the ballot paper, people may 
require additional assistance in relation to enrolment and voting. For example, a person 
may require support to complete enrolment forms, update their address, or to obtain 
and understand information about candidates or voting procedures.  
9.47 While the AEC and relevant state and territory electoral commissions have 
introduced a range of measures to increase electoral accessibility,
37
 there remains a 
need for Australia to ‘adopt concrete measures to support people with disabilities to 
exercise their right to vote on an equal basis with others’.
38
  
9.48 In addition, the difficulty with any support related to the voting procedure is 
respecting the right to a secret ballot. PIAC submitted that ‘ensuring a secret ballot is 
an essential element of Australia’s democracy, yet this is not readily available to 
people with disability’.
39
  
9.49 A number of stakeholders suggested support mechanisms that would allow 
people with disability to vote independently and in secret, including the use of logos or 
symbols; templates; assisted voting; electronically assisted voting; and outreach 
models.
40
 
9.50 The ALRC is interested in what further changes, if any, are required to the 
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) or relevant legal frameworks to facilitate the 
provision of such decision-making assistance and support to people, including by 
secret ballot.  
Fines for failure to vote  
Proposal 9–7 The Australian Electoral Commission should develop or 
amend guidance for Divisional Returning Officers to assist them to determine if 
a valid or sufficient reason for failing to vote exists in circumstances where an 
elector is a person with disability.  
                                                        
37  See, eg Australian Electoral Commission, Submission 10. 
38  The Human Rights Law Centre, Submission 54.  
39  Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 41.  
40  Ibid.  
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9.51 There is a concern that people with disability who are on the electoral roll may 
be fined for failing to vote because they did not understand when or where booths were 
open, could not get to a polling station, or for some other reason associated with their 
disability.
41
  
9.52 Section 245 of the Commonwealth Electoral Act relates to compulsory voting. 
Section 245(4) provides that a Divisional Returning Officer (DRO) is not required to 
send or deliver a penalty notice if he or she is satisfied that the elector: is dead, was 
overseas, was ineligible to vote or ‘had a valid and sufficient reason for failing to vote’.  
9.53 Some stakeholders have advocated for inclusion of disability as a specific 
criterion excusing failure to vote. In particular, PIAC and People with Disability 
Australia and the Disability Discrimination Legal Centre have argued that s 245(4) 
should be amended to ‘include people with an intellectual or psychiatric disability who 
are unwell at election time’ as a valid and sufficient reason for failing to vote.
42
 
9.54 The ALRC’s view is that status-based approaches to disability—even where 
they operate in favour of the person with disability, for example to waive a fine— 
should be avoided. Accordingly, the ALRC does not consider it appropriate to amend 
the section to specifically include disability as a separate criterion, or a statutorily 
defined valid and sufficient reason for failing to vote.  
9.55 However, determining what constitutes a valid and sufficient reason for not 
voting is at the discretion of the DRO for each electorate to determine. The AEC states 
that 
the original decision of the DRO as to whether a reason for not voting is valid and 
sufficient is based on the merits of each individual case, in accordance with the law as 
previously interpreted by the courts, and within the boundaries of administrative 
guidelines developed by the AEC to assist DROs.43  
9.56 Administrative guidelines developed by the AEC, in consultation with the AEC 
Disability Advisory Committee,
44
 may provide a useful document in which to provide 
additional guidance to DROs in relation to the potential impact of disability on an 
electors’ ability to vote. As a result, the ALRC proposes that the AEC amend existing 
administrative guidelines, or develop new guidance for DROs in determining what 
constitutes a valid and sufficient reason for failure to vote, including examples relating 
to disability.  
Other issues 
9.57 The Issues Paper highlighted a number of broad issues affecting people with 
disability in relation to voting, including the lack of easily understood information 
                                                        
41  See, eg, Ibid; People with Disability Australia and Australian Centre for Disability Law, Submission 90 to 
the Minister of State, Electoral Reform Green Paper: Strengthening Australia’s Democracy, 2009. 
42  People with Disability Australia and Australian Centre for Disability Law, Submission 90 to the Minister 
of State, Electoral Reform Green Paper: Strengthening Australia’s Democracy, 2009. See also The 
Human Rights Law Centre, Submission 54. 
43  Australian Electoral Commission, Electoral Backgrounder: Compulsory Voting (April 2010) [30].  
44  Australian Electoral Commission, Submission 10. 
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about candidates, voting and preferences; difficulties enrolling; and access to voting 
(though noting this has improved somewhat with wheelchair accessible polling 
stations, telephone voting and postal voting).
45
  
9.58 In submissions to the Issues Paper, stakeholders raised a range of systemic 
issues concerning enrolment and voting: for example, the need to ensure the AEC 
provides accessible information in a variety of formats and does so in a timely way 
prior to an election.
46
 The AEC’s National Disability Strategy includes actions and 
target outcomes relevant to improving the accessibility of websites and publications, 
which may go some way to addressing these concerns.
47
  
9.59 Stakeholders also suggested that in addition to imposing obligations on the AEC 
in relation to provision of information, obligations should also be imposed on political 
parties and that receipt of electoral funding should be conditional upon the provision of 
accessible information.
48
  
9.60 To an extent these issues are broadly relevant to the issue of decision-making 
assistance and support. While these are important issues in the lives of people with 
disability, they do not relate directly to individual decision-making, and the ALRC 
does not intend to make proposals in these areas. 
9.61 Finally, there is some inconsistency between jurisdictions with respect to the 
matters discussed in this chapter. Given this, the ALRC suggests it may be useful for 
the AEC, and state and territory governments and electoral commissions, to consider 
ways to increase uniformity and introduce best practice approaches to electoral matters 
across jurisdictions consistent with ALRC proposals.  
                                                        
45  Australian Law Reform Commission, Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws, Issues 
Paper No 44 (2013) [166].  
46  See, eg, Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 41; People with Disability Australia and Australian 
Centre for Disability Law, Submission 90 to the Minister of State, Electoral Reform Green Paper: 
Strengthening Australia’s Democracy, 2009.  
47  Australian Electoral Commission, National Disability Inclusion Strategy 2012–2020, (February 2013). 
48  See, eg, Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 41. A candidate or Senate group is eligible for 
election funding if they obtain at least 4% of the first preference vote in the division or the state or 
territory they contested. Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) ss 294, 297. 
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Summary 
10.1 This chapter discusses the implications of the ALRC’s proposals for state and 
territory laws that have an impact on the exercise of legal capacity. The Terms of 
Reference for the Inquiry focus on Commonwealth laws and legal frameworks, but also 
ask the Inquiry to consider how maximising individual autonomy and independence 
could be ‘modelled’.  
10.2 Modelling a new approach to individual decision-making at the Commonwealth 
level provides an opportunity to guide law reform at the state and territory level. 
Reform at the state and territory level is critical to the implementation of the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) because many 
important areas of decision-making are governed by state and territory law—including 
in relation to guardianship, administration, financial management, powers of attorney 
and consent to medical treatment. 
10.3 The key elements of the ALRC’s approach include the proposed National 
Decision-Making Principles and the Commonwealth supporter and representative 
scheme (‘Commonwealth decision-making model’), which reflects them.  
10.4 The ALRC proposes that state and territory governments should facilitate review 
of legislation that deals with decision-making by people who need decision-making 
support to ensure laws are consistent with the National Decision-Making Principles and 
the Commonwealth decision-making model. This chapter explains some of the 
implications of this proposal and how the ALRC’s proposals might be applied in 
specific areas of state and territory law. 
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Review of state and territory legislation  
Proposal 10–1 State and territory governments should review laws that deal 
with decision-making by people who need decision-making support to ensure 
they are consistent with the National Decision-Making Principles and the 
Commonwealth decision-making model. In conducting such a review, regard 
should also be given to: 
(a)  interaction with any supporter and representative schemes under 
Commonwealth legislation; 
(b)   consistency between jurisdictions, including in terminology; 
(c)  maximising cross-jurisdictional recognition of arrangements; and 
(d)  mechanisms for consistent and national data collection.  
Any review should include, but not be limited to, laws with respect to 
guardianship and administration; informed consent to medical treatment; mental 
health; and disability services. 
10.5 The practical outcomes of the ALRC’s Inquiry will depend, in significant part, 
on whether it serves as a catalyst for review of state and territory laws. This is mainly 
because guardianship and administration laws are state and territory based, and remain 
the primary mechanism in which others are vested with power to make decisions on 
behalf of people who need decision-making support.
1
  
10.6 Further, many Commonwealth agencies and Commonwealth funded services, 
such as aged care service providers, rely on state and territory appointed substitute 
decision-makers in managing their relationships with individuals. In some areas—such 
as disability services under the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS)—while 
states and territories will continue to play the major role in providing or overseeing the 
provision of services, ‘federal authorities … will likely exercise more direct federal 
regulation of, and prescription of, the way states and territories administer disability 
funding’.
2
 Such federal regulation might include encouraging supported decision-
making. 
                                                        
1  In 2007, there were over 4,000 people under public guardianship in Australia: NSW Office of the Public 
Guardian, Submission No 7 to the NSW Legislative Council Standing Committee on Social Issues, 
Substitute Decision-Making for People Lacking Capacity, 2010. At the end of August 2009, the NSW 
Trustee and Guardian was directly managing the affairs of 9,182 individuals and overseeing the work of a 
further 2,795 Private Managers: NSW Trustee and Guardian, Submission No 13 to the NSW Legislative 
Council Standing Committee on Social Issues, Substitute Decision-Making for People Lacking Capacity, 
2010. The Victorian body, State Trustees protects the legal and financial interests of over 9,500 people: 
State Trustees, Did You Know? <https://www.statetrustees.com.au/our-story/did-you-know>. 
2  John Chesterman, ‘The Future of Adult Guardianship in Federal Australia’ (2013) 66 Australian Social 
Work 26, 33. 
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10.7 As discussed in Chapter 3, the proposed National Decision-Making Principles 
and associated Guidelines are intended to be consistent with the terms of art 12 of the 
CRPD. By reviewing guardianship and other laws in the light of the proposal, states 
and territories will advance fuller implementation of the CRPD in Australia. 
10.8 This is important as, under international law, parties to treaties undertake to 
ensure that the terms of the treaty are applied in all parts of federal states. This is a 
requirement of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which Australia is a 
party,
3
 and is an obligation required expressly by art 4(5) of the CRPD.
4
 
10.9 In the Australian context, although it is the Australian Government that entered 
into the CRPD, the provisions of the Convention are binding not only upon the 
Australian Government, but also upon each state and territory government.
5
 
10.10 The proposal indicates to states and territories that, in light of the ALRC’s 
approach and its application in areas of Commonwealth law, similar state and territory 
laws also should be reviewed. 
10.11 The intention is that states and territories would examine relevant legislation to 
see how the approaches represented by the National Decision-Making Principles and 
associated guidelines might be incorporated—most fundamentally by facilitating a shift 
from substitute to supported decision-making. 
10.12 This would involve review of legislation that deals with decision-making by 
people who require decision-making support to ensure, among other things, that:  
 legislative tests of decision-making capacity do not provide that people are 
assumed to lack capability on the basis of having a disability, and that ability is 
assessed by reference to the decision to be made and the available supports; 
 supported decision-making is facilitated by appropriate legislative recognition of 
supporters; 
 laws providing for the appointment of representative decision-makers do so only 
as a last resort and not as a substitute for appropriate support;  
 laws providing for the appointment of representative decision-makers provide 
for appointments that are limited in scope, proportionate, and apply for the 
minimum time; and 
 laws providing for supported and representative decision-making ensure that a 
person’s ‘will, preferences and rights’ are respected—including by imposing 
appropriate duties on supporters and representative decision-makers. 
                                                        
3  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331, 8 ILM 679 (entered into force 27 January 
1980) art 27. 
4  ‘The provisions of the present Convention shall extend to all parts of federal states without any 
limitations or exceptions’: UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for 
signature 30 March 2007, 999 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 2008) art 4(5). 
5  See Philip French, Julie Dardel and Sonya Price-Kelly, ‘Rights Denied: Towards a National Policy 
Agenda about Abuse, Neglect and Exploitation of Persons with Cognitive Impairment’ (People with 
Disability Australia, 2010) 14–15. 
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10.13 To some extent, states and territories have already commenced this process—at 
least with regard to guardianship, the legislative area of most obvious relevance. For 
example: 
 the Victorian Law Reform Commission (VLRC), in its review of the 
Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (Vic), was asked to have regard to 
‘the principle of respect for the inherent dignity, individual autonomy including 
the freedom to make one’s own choices, and independence of persons, and the 
other General Principles and provisions’ of the CRPD;
6
 and 
 the Queensland Law Reform Commission has recommended that the General 
Principles in the Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) be amended 
to ‘reflect more closely the relevant articles’ of the CRPD.
7
 
10.14 The Law Council of Australia suggested that 
a co-operative approach with States and Territories, in the form of mirror legislation 
or for the State and Territories to adopt model Commonwealth legislation, is the most 
practical way to achieve consistency across jurisdictions.8 
10.15 The NSW Public Guardian submitted that ‘[a] uniform approach should fit with 
the Nation Disability Insurance Scheme’.
9
  
10.16 A more comprehensive national review process might be coordinated through 
the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) or its ministerial councils, such as the 
Disability Reform Council, Law Crime and Community Safety Council or Health 
Council, in consultation with peak bodies such as the Australian Guardianship and 
Administration Council. The ALRC would be interested in comment on the best way to 
ensure that the agenda suggested by its proposals is advanced nationally. 
Application of the National Decision-Making Principles 
10.17 The following material discusses, in general terms, how the National Decision-
Making Principles and associated Guidelines might be used to guide review and 
amendment of state and territory laws in the particular areas of: 
 guardianship and administration; 
 consent to medical treatment; and 
 mental health. 
                                                        
6  Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) xi. 
7  Queensland Law Reform Commission, A Review of Queensland’s Guardianship Laws, Report No 67 
(2010) i, rec 4–1. 
8  Law Council of Australia, Submission 83. 
9  NSW Public Guardian, Submission 50. 
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Guardianship and administration  
10.18 As discussed in Chapter 2, one of the key debates of central importance to this 
Inquiry concerns the extent to which art 12 of the CRPD permits ‘substitute’ or ‘fully 
supported’ decision-making. 
10.19 A major implication of this debate concerns the extent to which the CRPD 
permits decision-making in the form of guardianship and administration, as currently 
provided for under state and territory laws. 
10.20 However, regardless of the lack of consensus with respect to the status of 
guardianship laws in relation to the CRPD, there is ‘a general acknowledgement’, 
underpinned by the paradigm shift heralded by the CRPD that ‘the focus must move 
from what a person with disability cannot do to the supports that should be provided to 
enable them to make decisions and exercise their legal capacity’.
10
 
10.21 There should remain some room for fully supported decision-making. This 
conclusion is, in part, dictated by the reality that some people will always need 
decisions made for them.  
10.22 The AGAC submitted that there needs to be ‘careful development of supported 
decision making practices’, but supported decision-making cannot ‘completely replace 
substitute decision making and there will be an ongoing need for substitute decision 
making in limited circumstances’.
11
 The Caxton Legal Centre noted: 
given the projected exponential increase in the ageing population and the consequent 
increase in the incidence of terminal cognitive diseases such as dementia and 
Alzheimer’s, coupled with the factor of social isolation and sparse or non-existent 
support networks for many older people, the retention of a process of formal 
substituted decision making may be essential.12 
10.23 Guardianship and administration laws need to be reviewed to ensure, among 
other things, that guardianship and administration are: 
 invoked only as a last resort and after considering the availability of support to 
assist people in decision-making; 
 as confined in scope and duration as is reasonably possible;
13
 
                                                        
10  Office of the Public Advocate Systems Advocacy (Qld), ‘Autonomy and Decision-Making Support in 
Australia: A Targeted Overview of Guardianship Legislation’ (February 2014). 
11  Australian Guardianship and Administration Council, Submission 51.  
12  Caxton Legal Centre, Submission 67. 
13  The Office of the Public Advocate (SA) highlighted that ‘there are different rates of full (plenary) 
appointments as opposed to limited appointments (limited to one area of decision making) between 
jurisdictions, and different rates for the appointments of private guardians’: Office of the Public Advocate 
(SA), Submission 17. 
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 subject to accessible mechanisms for review; and 
 consistent with decision-making that respects the will, preferences and rights of 
the individual.  
10.24 For example, the provisions of state and territory guardianship legislation differ 
in the extent to which decision-making that respects the will, preferences and rights of 
the individual is expressly promoted. In New South Wales, Western Australia and the 
Northern Territory, there is an overriding duty of guardians and administrators to act in 
the ‘best interest’ of the person.
14
 In Victoria and Tasmania, the ‘best interest’ of the 
person is an equal consideration along with the wishes of the person and the least 
restrictive alternative.
15
 In the ACT and Queensland, guardians are obliged to act in a 
way that least interferes with a person’s right to make a decision,
 16
 or to give effect to 
a person’s wishes, so far as they can be determined.
17
 South Australia provides for 
substitute judgment, where the paramount consideration is the guardian’s opinion of 
what the wishes of the person would have been if they were not mentally 
incapacitated.
18
  
10.25 Recent reviews give important leads on how guardianship and administration 
laws may change. For example, the VLRC review recommended the development of a 
supported decision-making and a co-decision-making structure.
19
  
10.26 Briefly, this would provide recognition to supporters—trusted persons providing 
support and assistance to an adult who needs help in making a decision—and external 
oversight by the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT). The co-decision 
maker would act jointly with the adult, and decisions would have to be with the 
consent and authority of the represented person, and would be treated as if they were 
the acts of the represented person with capacity.  
10.27 Appointments would be made by the VCAT and the range of decisions specified 
for which the person needs support, which, in principle, could range across the areas 
previously covered by guardians and administrators. Safeguards against exploitation 
are detailed and include registration of co-decision-making orders, regular review on a 
range of grounds and the options to renew, amend or revoke the order. 
10.28 Stakeholders in this Inquiry expressed support for continuing review of 
Australian guardianship laws,
20
 and this has also been called for by the UNCRPD.
21
 
10.29 In addition to highlighting the desirability of reviewing state and territory laws 
to ensure consistency with the National Decision-Making Principles and the 
                                                        
14  Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW) s 4; NSW Trustee and Guardian Act 2009 (NSW) s 39; Guardianship and 
Administration Act 1990 (WA) s 4; Adult Guardianship Act 1988 (NT) s 4.  
15  Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (Vic) s 4, (WA) s 6.  
16  Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) ss 5–7, sch 1.  
17  Guardianship and Management of Property Act 1991 (ACT) ss 4, 5A. 
18  Guardianship and Administration Act 1993 (SA) s 5. 
19  Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) chs 8–9. 
20  See, eg, National Seniors Australia, Submission 57. 
21  United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No 1 (2014) on 
Article 12 of the Convention—Equal Recognition before the Law. 
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Commonwealth decision-making model, the ALRC’s proposal also highlights a 
number of particular considerations that should inform such review. These are briefly 
discussed below, with particular reference to guardianship laws. 
Interaction with Commonwealth supporter and representative schemes  
10.30 As discussed in Chapter 4, the ALRC proposes that a Commonwealth decision-
making model, including ‘supporters’ and ‘representatives’ should be introduced into 
relevant Commonwealth legislation, including that relating to the NDIS, social 
security, aged care, eHealth and privacy.
22
 
10.31 If implemented, the interaction of these Commonwealth schemes with state and 
territory guardianship and administration laws may need to be taken into account in 
review of the latter. 
10.32 Chapter 4 highlights some of the issues involved. The nature of these issues will 
vary depending on what approach is taken in Commonwealth laws. For example, if it is 
possible to have both a Commonwealth supporter or representative and a state or 
territory appointed decision-maker with power to make decisions in the same area, 
there may need to be a mechanism to resolve any conflict between the two. 
10.33 If Commonwealth schemes provide for separate assessment of a person’s 
decision-making capabilities and support needs for Commonwealth purposes, even 
where a guardian or administrator has already been appointed, other interaction issues 
will arise.  
Consistency 
10.34 It is clearly desirable for there to be consistency between Commonwealth, state 
and territory legislation dealing with individual decision-making, including in relation 
to terminology. At present, no such consistency exists:  
Terminology varies considerably between state/territory jurisdictions, including terms 
such as guardian, manager, administrator, which are inconsistently defined. Powers 
held under these appointments may also vary—noting that they are often specified by 
orders of a tribunal, within the scope of powers outlined in legislation; and cross-
recognition is, at best, arbitrary.23  
10.35 Such inconsistency causes problems, in particular because the criteria and scope 
of state and territory appointments vary; and appointments may not be recognised in 
other jurisdictions. 
10.36 Stakeholders supported a nationally consistent approach. National Disability 
Services, for example, said that unless there are ‘nationally consistent definitions, 
processes and safeguards around legal capacity assessment and decision support’, 
people with disability and their families can experience inconsistent and additional 
administrative hurdles across different jurisdictions or areas of their lives. These 
hurdles can be more than just a logistical burden. The lack of recognition of a 
                                                        
22  See Chs 5 and 6. 
23  B Arnold and Dr W Bonython, Submission 38. 
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supported decision-making arrangement across a jurisdictional boundary has the 
potential to undermine key relationships, support networks and the autonomy of 
people with disability.24  
10.37 The problem of inconsistency and its consequences was also noted by the Office 
of the Public Advocate (SA): 
Because these appointments are made under different laws, with different definitions 
of incapacity, the rights of people to make decisions, or to be supported to make their 
own decisions, will depend on which state they live. For example, there are significant 
differences in the population rate of guardianship appointments between jurisdictions, 
reflecting different laws, and also different interpretation of laws by tribunals at 
different times depending on the prevailing rights-based or welfare-based view at the 
time. There can be considerable ‘bandwidth’ in how laws are read, and whether or not 
an appointment is necessary in the circumstances contributing to variation.25 
10.38 It suggested that a nationally consistent approach to mental incapacity would be 
helpful as  
it would be an effective way to ensure that rights are upheld according to the 
UNCRPD across all jurisdictions. The law could not only define mental incapacity, 
but also define a range of measures for supporting a person’s incapacity that are 
recognised nationally.26 
10.39 National Seniors Australia said that a nationally consistent approach to capacity 
would ‘inform the initiation of further decision making supports’, but cautioned that: 
A national approach to capacity should only take place following a review of 
Guardianship and Administration Acts and precedent in each state and territory. This 
will ensure that an appropriate mechanism for measuring decision making capacity 
will be evidence-based, supportive of individual circumstances and secure against 
forms of elder abuse or exploitation of power of attorney status.27 
10.40 The Queenslanders with Disability Network (QDN) highlighted the opportunity 
the NDIS may provide to promote a more consistent approach to the appointment and 
powers of decision-makers, in order to prevent ‘confusion in the appointment of 
nominees with regard to disability supports for the NDIS’. That is, where the 
appointment of NDIS nominees may not correlate with existing guardianship 
arrangements at a state level, the ‘NDIS should be used as a catalyst for systemic 
change in this area’.
28
 
                                                        
24  National Disability Services, Submission 49. With respect to the impact on movement interstate, see also: 
AFDS, Submission 47; Office of the Public Advocate (SA), Submission 17. 
25  Office of the Public Advocate (SA), Submission 17. The submission includes a state-by-state comparison 
of the rate of public guardianship as at 30 June 2013, for states in which data could be obtained from 
online annual reports. 
26  Ibid. The OPA (SA) also noted that it would aid monitoring and data collection in implementing the 
National Disability Strategy’s area of policy action in rights protection and that there ‘could be 
meaningful comparisons across jurisdictions’. 
27  National Seniors Australia, Submission 57. 
28  QDN, Submission 59. 
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Cross-jurisdictional recognition  
10.41 A related issue is the need to maximise cross-jurisdictional recognition of 
appointments and other decision-making arrangements.  
10.42 A number of stakeholders emphasised the need for cross-jurisdictional 
recognition of appointments—especially as people commonly travel between 
jurisdictions or live in towns which straddle jurisdictional boundaries.
29
 The QDN, for 
example, stated that: 
One of the great advantages of the NDIS will be that it will allow people with 
disability more freedom to move interstate, without having to be concerned with 
different support systems across jurisdictions. It would be a terrible shame for such 
significant reforms to be undermined by other inter-jurisdictional hurdles such as legal 
capacity definitions.30 
10.43 Academics Bruce Arnold and Dr Wendy Bonython submitted that the ‘rise of 
yet another class of substitute decision-makers or power-holders’ appointed under 
Commonwealth legislation may lead to problems if it 
creates uncertainty about the validity of pre-emptive appointments made by people in 
anticipation of future loss of capacity, particularly if they lose capacity outside the 
jurisdiction the appointment was made in, or if they hold assets in multiple 
jurisdictions. 
In the event that this occurs, and an instrument is not recognised, the default is 
appointment of a guardian by the tribunal under the relevant jurisdictions’ 
guardianship frameworks—a process which contributes a significant burden to all 
involved, including family members, healthcare and social workers, and the tribunal 
itself.31 
10.44 There are some provisions permitting cross-jurisdictional recognition. However, 
these arrangements are not comprehensive and should be improved. For example, 
while the Victorian legislation makes provision for the recognition of interstate 
guardianship and administration orders,
32
 Queensland has no corresponding law. 
Data collection 
10.45 Stakeholders raised concerns about difficulties associated with obtaining 
consistent data in relation to the appointment of substitute decision-makers. A range of 
stakeholders emphasised the need for improved data collection to facilitate 
comparisons across jurisdictions and inform policy development.
33
 Arnold and 
Bonython observed that  
                                                        
29  See, eg, Office of the Public Advocate (SA), Submission 17. 
30  QDN, Submission 59. 
31  B Arnold and Dr W Bonython, Submission 38.  
32  Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (Vic) pt 6A. 
33  See, eg, B Arnold and Dr W Bonython, Submission 38; Office of the Public Advocate (SA), Submission 
17.  
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although data is often collected by service providers, regulatory bodies and third 
parties that data is often held within institutional silos and is not readily accessible. 
That inaccessibility militates against informed policy-making.34  
10.46 State and territory review of guardianship and administration legislation may 
provide an opportunity to promote mechanisms for consistent and national data 
collection about supported and fully supported decision-making. 
Informed consent to medical treatment 
10.47 At common law, all competent adults can consent to and refuse medical 
treatment. If consent is not established, there may be legal consequences for health 
professionals. Under the law of trespass, patients have a right not be subjected to an 
invasive procedure without consent or other lawful justification,
 
such as an emergency 
or necessity. At the international level, the CRPD expresses this in terms of a ‘right to 
respect for his or her physical and mental integrity on an equal basis with others’.
35
 
10.48 ‘Informed consent’ refers to consent to medical treatment and the requirement to 
warn of material risk prior to treatment. As part of their duty of care, health 
professionals must provide such information as is necessary for the patient to give 
consent to treatment, including information on all material risks of the proposed 
treatment. Failure to do so may lead to civil liability for an adverse outcome, even if 
the treatment itself was not negligent.
36
 
10.49 The common law recognises that there are circumstances where an individual 
may not be capable of giving informed consent (for example, due to impaired decision-
making ability) or where consent to treatment may not be required, as in the case of 
emergency. However, except in the case of children—where the High Court has 
recognised the courts’ parens patriae jurisdiction in authorising treatment
37
—it does 
not provide significant guidance on supported decision-making in health care settings. 
10.50 State and territory guardianship and mental health legislation (discussed below) 
does provide detailed rules for substitute decision-making concerning the medical 
treatment of adults who are deemed incapable of giving consent.
38
 
10.51 Guardianship legislation outlines criteria for appointing substitute decision-
makers, the hierarchy of possible decision-makers and the scope of their powers, which 
depend on the age of the patient and the type of treatment proposed.  
10.52 In all jurisdictions, except the Northern Territory, guardianship legislation 
provides for a decision-maker who is chosen (for example, an enduring guardian), 
assigned by the legislation (for example, a spouse, close friend or relative) or appointed 
                                                        
34  B Arnold and Dr W Bonython, Submission 38.  
35  UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 999 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 2008) ART 17. 
36  Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479. 
37  Secretary, Department of Health and Community Services v JWB and SMB (Marion’s case) (1992) 175 
CLR 218. 
38  Eg, Guardianship and Management of Property Act 1991 (ACT) ss 32B, 32D; Mental Health Act 2009 
(SA) ss 56, 57. 
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(for example, by a court) to make health decisions for an adult who is not capable of 
giving consent.
39
 
10.53 In exercising their powers, substitute decision-makers are required to adopt one 
of two tests (or a combination of both in some jurisdictions) in reaching their decision 
for the person with impaired decision-making capacity. One is the best interests test, 
which requires a balancing of the benefit to the patient against the risks of the proposed 
treatment, and the other is the substituted judgment test, which involves making a 
decision which is consistent with what the person would have decided if they had the 
capacity to do so. Evidence of such wishes may be provided by advance care 
directives, religious beliefs and previous history of treatment.
40
  
Supported decision-making in health care 
10.54 Stakeholders expressed opposition to existing substitute decision-making 
mechanisms in health care.
41
 The NCOSS argued for supported decision-making and 
stated that ‘quality of life decisions should be made by the affected person’;
42
 and the 
Illawarra Forum, stated that ‘every effort should be made to support people to make 
informed decisions and choices’.
43
 
10.55 Stakeholders suggested that a supported decision-making framework would be 
more likely to result in health care decisions that accord with an individual’s personal 
beliefs and values.
44
 The Carers Alliance asserted the primacy of the family in 
supporting people with disability to exercise capacity.
45
 Family Planning NSW 
considered that encouraging supported decision-making may help overcome a lack of 
understanding about what constitutes informed consent in reproductive and sexual 
health. 
A supported decision making framework needs to encompass the requirement for 
clinicians, other health and support workers to take on the role of assisting a person to 
make decisions. This means that they need to develop the skills necessary to talk 
about reproductive and sexual health in ways that encourage the person to make their 
own decisions.46  
10.56 A number of stakeholders expressed concerns about informed consent in the 
specific context of sterilisation procedures. Women with Disabilities Australia 
                                                        
39  In the NT, there is no provision for consent to medical treatment without an appointment being made. SA 
has legislation specific to informed consent, which provides for medical powers of attorney: Consent to 
Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA). 
40  See, eg, Hunter and New England Area Health Service v A [2009] NSWSC 761. The Supreme Court of 
NSW confirmed a person’s advance care directive to refuse medical treatment is valid if it is made by a 
capable adult, is clear and unambiguous and applies to the situation at hand. 
41  See, eg, NCOSS, Submission 26; The Illawarra Forum, Submission 19; Office of the Public Advocate 
(SA), Submission 17. 
42  NCOSS, Submission 26. 
43  The Illawarra Forum, Submission 19. 
44  Office of the Public Advocate (Qld), Submission 05. 
45  Carers Alliance, Submission 84. It was suggested that there is currently insufficient recognition of the role 
and contribution of carers and family members who possess ‘intimate knowledge and understanding of 
the cognitively impaired person’: N Widdowson, Submission 31. 
46  Family Planning NSW, Submission 04. 
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submitted the ‘best interest’ approach to the sterilisation of women and girls has been 
used in a discriminatory way and the lack of education and accessible services can 
prevent women from making choices regarding their fertility and conception.
47
  
10.57 Children with Disability Australia submitted that the criminalisation of forced 
sterilisation may be justified, as existing requirements for court authorisation have 
failed to protect the rights of people with disability, under the CRPD, to be free from 
violence and to retain their physical integrity.
48
 Several other stakeholders supported 
legislative prohibition of sterilisation without informed consent.
49
  
Review of the law 
10.58 The law on decision-making in health care is complex. Inconsistency in 
language, and different tests of decision-making capacity and processes across the 
jurisdictions may cause difficulties for health service providers and consumers.  
10.59 A number of recent reports have suggested reforms. The VLRC’s guardianship 
report recommended consolidating existing laws into new legislation distinguishing 
‘health decision makers’ from ‘guardians’, and ‘significant’ from ‘routine’ medical 
procedures.
50
 In the context of developing a national code of conduct for unregistered 
health care workers, the Australian Health Ministers’ Advisory Council (AHMAC) has 
queried whether a national ‘minimum enforceable standard’ for informed consent 
should be introduced.
51
 
10.60 In 2011, AHMAC developed a national policy framework for advance care 
directives to address challenges posed by divergent laws affecting consent to medical 
treatment,
52
 and the ALRC received submissions noting the desirability of nationally 
consistent and enforceable laws on advance care directives.
53
  
10.61 The Mental Health Council of Australia and the National Mental Health 
Consumer and Carer Forum expressed support for a legal framework for assessing 
health care decision-making ability in line with developments in the United Kingdom 
under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK).
54
 This would place a focus on the ability of 
people to understand information relevant to a health care decision; retain that 
                                                        
47  WWDA, Submission 58. 
48  Children with Disability Australia, Submission 68. 
49  Law Council of Australia, Submission 83; Women’s Legal Services NSW, Submission 76; ADACAS, 
Submission 29. 
50  Victorian Law Reform Commission, Guardianship, Final Report No 24 (2012) recs 12, 199–219, ch 13. 
51  ‘Consultation Paper: A National Code of Conduct for Health Care Workers’ (Australian Health Ministers’ 
Advisory Council, March 2014) 16. Most state and territory health departments issue guidelines on 
consent to health care. 
52  Australian Health Ministers’ Advisory Council, National Framework for Advance Health Care 
Directives, September 2011. 
53  Mental Health Coordinating Council, Submission 07; ADACAS, Submission 29; Law Council of 
Australia, Submission 83. 
54  NMHCCF and MHCA, Submission 81. 
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information; use or weigh that information as part of a decision-making process; and 
communicate the decision.
55
 
10.62 The ALRC proposes that state and territory governments review legislation 
relating to informed consent to medical treatment, including in relation to advanced 
care directives, with a view to reform that is consistent with the National Decision-
Making Principles and the Commonwealth decision-making model. 
10.63 For example, reform encouraging a supported decision-making model might 
involve recognition that a person may be able to give informed consent to medical 
treatment with the assistance of a supporter. The implications of such a change, 
including in relation to the legal liability of health practitioners, would need to be 
carefully assessed. 
10.64 Any new approach to informed consent would need to be reflected in guidance 
such as the Australian Charter of Rights in Healthcare, the National Safety and Quality 
Health Service Standards, the National Framework on Advance Care Directives, 
publications on communication with patients
56
 and the national codes of conduct of 
health practitioners.
57
 
Mental health  
10.65 All states and territories have mental health laws that regulate consent to 
medical treatment, including the involuntary detention and treatment of people with 
severe mental illness. Generally, mental health laws have provided for treatment based 
on a person’s need for treatment and the risk of harm posed to themselves and others.
58
  
10.66 New mental health legislation in Tasmania and Victoria has changed the focus 
of criteria for the involuntary detention and treatment from the risk of harm to a 
person’s capacity to consent to treatment;
59
 and there are active mental health reviews 
and legislative initiatives in other jurisdictions.
60
 
10.67 The Mental Health Coordinating Council (MHCC) submitted that the Mental 
Health Act 2007 (NSW) is ‘problematic’ because there is little detail about the basis of 
decisions made by doctors on the treatment of detained psychiatric patients, 
particularly those who retain decision-making capacity in relation to certain treatment 
                                                        
55  See Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK) s 3. This approach is reflected in the ALRC’s proposed 
Representative Decision-Making Guidelines: see Ch 3. 
56  ‘General Guidelines for Medical Practitioners on Providing Information to Patients’ (National Health and 
Medical Research Council, 2004); ‘Communicating with Patients: Advice for Medical Practitioners’ 
(National Health and Medical Research Council, 2004). 
57  The codes of conduct for the 14 national boards of health practitioners are available at Australian Health 
Practitioner Regulation Agency, National Boards <http://www.ahpra.gov.au/National-Boards.aspx>. 
58  See, eg, Mental Health and Related Services Act (NT) s 14; Mental Health Act 2007 (NSW) s 14. 
59  The Mental Health Act 2013 (Tas) factors in a person’s decision-making capacity, and not just the mental 
illness or a risk of harm in the assessment criteria: s 8; the Mental Health Act 2014 (Vic) defines ‘capacity 
to give informed consent’ and provides a statutory presumption of capacity: (Vic) ss 68, 70. 
60  See, eg, ACT second exposure draft bill to amend the Mental Health (Treatment and Care) Act 1994; 
Mental Health Bill 2013 (WA); SA Department of Health review of the Mental Health Act 2009 (SA); 
Queensland review of the Mental Health Act 2000 (Qld); NSW review of the Mental Health Act 2007 
(NSW). 
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decisions and who have a view about the preferred treatment or wish to forgo certain 
treatments.
61
  
10.68 The MHCC stated that the law should outline the rights of patients to refuse and 
receive treatment and deal with how patients’ preferences can be taken into account in 
medical decisions—including by way of advance care directives—to ensure that 
doctors override patients’ preferences only in limited circumstances, where a patient 
lacks capacity to make that decision, and the proposed treatment is ‘manifestly in the 
person’s best interests’.
62
 
10.69 New legislation in Tasmania and Victoria protects the rights of mental health 
patients through statements of rights. In Tasmania, the rights of involuntary patients are 
outlined in statute and whenever a person is admitted to, or discharged from, an 
approved facility, its controlling authority must give the person a statement of their 
rights.
63
 In Victoria, a statement of rights must be explained to people being assessed 
or receiving treatment in relation to their mental illness.
64
  
10.70 A person’s rights under the Mental Health Act 2014 (Vic) include the right to 
communicate, make advance statements and have a nominated person to support them 
and help represent their interests.
65
 The role of a nominated person is to receive 
information about the patient; be one of the persons who must be consulted in 
accordance with the Act about the patient’s treatment; and assist the patient to exercise 
any right under the Act.
66
 A person can only nominate another person in writing and 
the nomination must be witnessed.
67
 A nomination can be revoked in the same manner 
by the person who made the nomination or if a nominated person declines to act in the 
role.
68
 
10.71 A similar model for supported decision-making in mental health services is 
contained in the Mental Health Bill 2013 (WA) (the WA Bill).
69
 Under the proposed 
legislation, mental health services are obliged to comply with a charter of mental health 
care principles. The charter recognises the involvement of other people such as family 
members and carers.
70
 In addition, the WA Bill would give effect to a carers’ charter 
provided for in the Carers Recognition Act 2004 (WA).
71
  
10.72 The WA Bill provides for a ‘nominated person’, someone chosen by the person 
with mental illness to assist them in ensuring their rights under the Act are observed 
and their interests and wishes are taken into account by medical practitioners and 
                                                        
61  Mental Health Coordinating Council, Submission 07. 
62  Ibid. 
63  Mental Health Act 2013 (Tas) ss 62, 129, sch 1. 
64  From 1 July 2014: Mental Health Act 2014 (Vic) ss 12, 13.  
65  Ibid pt 3. 
66  Ibid s 23. 
67  Ibid s 24. 
68  Ibid ss 25–27. 
69  The Mental Health Bill 2013 (WA) was adopted by the WA Legislative Assembly in April 2014 and is 
expected to progress to the Legislative Council for review. If enacted, it will replace the Mental Health 
Act 1996 (WA). 
70  Mental Health Bill 2013 (WA) sch 1. 
71  Ibid cl 319(2)(g), 332(3)(e). 
 10. Review of State and Territory Legislation 233 
mental health workers.
72
 A nominated person is entitled to ‘uncensored’ 
communication with the person with mental illness, and to receive information related 
to the person’s treatment and care.
73
  
10.73 Under the WA Bill, a nominated person may exercise the rights of the person 
with mental illness under the legislation, but is not authorised to apply for the 
admission to or discharge by a mental health service.
74
 Unless the provision of 
information is not in the best interests of the patient, a nominated person has a right to 
be involved in matters relating to the treatment and care of the patient, including the 
consideration of the options that are reasonably available for the patient and the 
provision of support to the patient.
75
 
10.74 The ALRC proposes that state and territory governments review mental health 
legislation, with a view to reform that is consistent with the National Decision-Making 
Principles and the Commonwealth decision-making model. This might involve, for 
example, moving towards supported decision-making models similar to those 
contained in the Victorian legislation and in the WA Bill. 
10.75 COAG’s Standing Council on Health has long overseen developments in mental 
health laws, and may be able to advance such an initiative. The AHMAC, a component 
committee of the Standing Council, commissioned a national project on model mental 
health legislation, which was completed in 1994.
76
 This project propelled review of 
mental health laws in every state and territory in Australia in the late 1990s.
77
  
Disability services 
10.76 State and territory disability services legislation provides the statutory basis for 
the provision of supports and services to people with disability.
78
 
10.77 The role of disability services legislation in regulating restrictive practices is a 
major focus of Chapter 8, where the ALRC proposes the development of a national or 
nationally consistent approach that considers, among other things, the need for 
regulation of restrictive practices in disability services. 
                                                        
72  Ibid cl 263. 
73  Ibid cl 264(2). This includes information about the grounds on which an involuntary treatment order was 
made, the treatment provided to the patient and the patient’s response to that treatment, and the seclusion 
of, or use of bodily restraint on, the patient: Ibid cl 266(1)(a). 
74  Mental Health Bill 2013 (WA) cl 264(5)–(6). 
75  Ibid cl 266(1)(b). 
76  The University of Newcastle, ‘Model Mental Health Legislation’ (Australian Health Ministers’ Advisory 
Council, 1994). 
77  Chris Sidoti, ‘Mental Health for All: What’s the Vision?’ (Speech delivered at the National Conference 
on Mental Health Services, Policy and Law Reform in the Twenty First Century, Newcastle, 13–14 
February 1997). 
78  Disability Act 2006 (Vic); Disability Services Act 2006 (NSW); Disability Services Act 2006 (Qld); 
Disability Services Act 1993 (SA); Disability Services Act 1993 (WA); Disability Services Act 1993 (NT); 
Disability Services Act 1991 (ACT). NSW concluded public consultation on the Disability Inclusion Bill 
2014 (NSW) to replace the Disability Services Act 1993 (NSW). 
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10.78 More generally, disability services legislation is another area where state and 
territory governments should facilitate review to ensure laws are consistent with the 
National Decision-Making Principles and the Commonwealth decision-making model.  
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Summary 
11.1 This chapter discusses a number of other issues that are relevant to the focus of 
the Inquiry on Commonwealth laws and legal frameworks that have an impact on the 
exercise of legal capacity. These involve: 
 the common law relating to incapacity to contract; 
 consumer protection laws; 
 consent to marriage; 
 the nomination of superannuation beneficiaries; and  
 acting as a member of a board and in other corporate roles. 
11.2 In addition, the ALRC received submissions on a number of areas which are not 
the focus of the Inquiry. While the ALRC does not intend to make recommendations in 
these areas, some of the key concerns are outlined. 
Incapacity and contract law 
11.3 The assumption underlying any contract is that each party has freely entered into 
a binding agreement, having assessed whether or not the terms are in their best 
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interests. Some categories of person—including minors and people with impaired 
mental capacity—have traditionally been regarded by the law as being incapable of 
looking after their own interests, and through various rules, a ‘legal disability’ has been 
imposed on them.
1
 
11.4 Generally, if people under a legal disability attempt to make a contract, that 
contract can be declared ineffective.
2
 Contract law does not, however, require a 
person’s ability to understand the implications of a contract to be assessed. Instead, the 
common law developed a complex set of rules categorising transactions, especially by 
minors, in terms of whether there is a legal disability. 
11.5 In practice, the existing law of contract may work for the benefit of persons with 
impaired decision-making ability. A contract may be avoided on the ground that a 
person lacked the capacity to understand the consequences of entering into it. It has 
been said that: 
This rule (probably by accident), reflects the modern realisation that mental incapacity 
has a wide variety of forms with very different degrees of impairment. The idea that 
people should be presumed to be capable unless shown to be otherwise enhances their 
dignity and capacity to manage their affairs. The treatment of contracts as binding 
unless avoided complements this approach.3 
11.6 In order to avoid the contract on the ground of incapacity, the onus is on the 
party seeking to have the contract avoided to first establish that: (a) the contracting 
party was unable, due to mental impairment, to understand the contract at the time of 
formation; and (b) that the other party either knew or ought to have known of the 
impairment. This is said to be very similar to the law relating to unconscionable 
conduct
4
—which is given statutory recognition in the Australian Consumer Law 
(ACL).
5
  
11.7 Effectively, the common law recognises a presumption of capacity and treats 
contracts as binding unless avoided. Arguably, any reform that required more scrutiny 
of capacity may work against the interests of persons with impaired decision-making 
ability to enter into contracts.  
11.8 For example, introducing any new test of decision-making ability (as proposed 
in other areas of law) into contract law may be counterproductive—it would not 
necessarily assist people, and may deprive them of the ability to contract, or make 
contracting so risky for the other party that they will refuse to enter into contractual 
relations. 
                                                        
1  See Thomson Reuters, The Laws of Australia [7.3.160]. Much of the background discussion of 
contractual incapacity below is taken from the ‘Contract Law’ title of The Laws of Australia, edited by 
Dr Nicholas C Seddon (1994–2003) and Emeritus Professor JLR Davis (1994–). See also Ch 2. 
2  There are exceptions to the general rule, under which persons who lack legal capacity to contract may 
contract for the necessities of life, such as food, clothing, shelter and education or training for work: see 
Ibid [7.3.230]–[7.3.260]. 
3  Ibid [7.3.580]. 
4  Ibid [7.3.590]–[7.3.600]. 
5  Australian Consumer Law (Cth) s 20 (Unconscionable conduct within the meaning of the unwritten law). 
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11.9 There are arguments for abolishing the common law relating to contractual 
incapacity in its entirety. Arguably, this would have no adverse consequences, as 
questions about the validity of a contract could be dealt with satisfactorily by the laws 
relating to unfair and unconscionable contracts, undue influence and 
misrepresentation.
6
 
11.10 However, in practice, such a reform may have limited benefit as the likely 
outcomes of legal disputes about the validity of contracts would be the same. Any 
reform would be constitutionally problematic as there is no head of Commonwealth 
legislative power dealing specifically with contract law. Reform covering all contracts 
would likely require the cooperation of states and territories either under a referral of 
power to the Commonwealth Parliament (s 51(xxxvii)) or through the enactment of 
model laws in all jurisdictions.
7
 
Consumer protection laws 
Question 11–1 Should provisions similar to the responsible lending 
provisions of the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) apply to 
other consumer contracts? That is, should businesses have obligations to ensure 
that a consumer contract is suitable for the consumer, including making all 
reasonable inquiries and ensuring that the consumer fully understands the 
contract terms? 
11.11 There are a range of consumer protection laws that allow contracts to be 
challenged, including under the ACL and the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 
2009 (Cth).  
11.12 The ACL contains provisions under which contracts or contractual terms may be 
avoided. These include provisions in relation to misleading or deceptive conduct, 
unconscionable conduct, unfair contract terms and unsolicited consumer agreements.
8
  
11.13 Legal Aid Queensland submitted that the existing consumer law framework 
‘effectively encourages people with a disability to participate in society to the fullest 
extent possible without being denied goods or services because it might be more 
difficult to ensure they are aware of their legal obligations’ and reflects the CRPD 
approach to capacity. That is, applying this to consumer law specifically, ‘a person 
may have the ability and understanding to engage with simple consumer products or 
transactions but may not have the capacity to understand or engage with more complex 
consumer products’.
9
 
                                                        
6  Thomson Reuters, The Laws of Australia [7.3.180]. 
7  ‘Improving Australia’s Law and Justice Framework: A Discussion Paper to Explore the Scope for 
Reforming Australian Contract Law’ (Discussion Paper, Australian Government Attorney-General’s 
Department, 2012). 
8  See, eg, Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sch 2, ss 18, 20, 22–24; pt 3–2, div 2. 
9  Legal Aid Qld, Submission 64. 
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11.14 The National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) contains provisions on 
responsible lending conduct.
10
 These essentially require credit providers to assess the 
capability of all consumers—not only consumers with disabilities—and assist them to 
understand consumer credit and financial products being offered.  
11.15 Legal Aid Queensland submitted that the consumer credit provisions offer 
‘adequate protections for people with disabilities without the need to adopt an 
overarching definition of capacity or disability in the legislation’—an approach, it said, 
that may serve as a useful model for other legislation in the Commonwealth 
jurisdiction.
11
  
11.16 For example, the National Association of Community Legal Centres submitted 
that, to improve protection for people with disability entering into contracts, companies 
and retailers should be subject to regulations requiring them to ‘ensure that consumers 
have the capacity to understand and fulfil the terms of contracts’—for example, 
through asking a ‘mandatory list of questions to ensure that a consumer has understood 
the contract’.
12
 
11.17 Similarly, the Public Interest Advocacy Centre suggested that there is a need for 
‘greater protection of people with disabilities in signing up for consumer contracts, 
particularly when this is done over the phone and through door-to-door sales’.
13
 
11.18 On the other hand, reforms that place undue focus on assessment of a person’s 
abilities, including by imposing positive obligations to make inquiries about the 
understanding consumers have of particular transactions, may end up disadvantaging 
some people because goods and services may not be made available to them. 
11.19 However, the ALRC is interested in further comment on possible reform. For 
example, should provisions similar to those requiring responsible lending conduct 
apply to other consumer contracts, such as telephone or door-to-door sales? That is, 
should businesses have obligations to ensure that a consumer contract is suitable for the 
consumer, including making all reasonable inquiries and ensuring that the consumer 
fully understands the contract terms? 
Marriage 
11.20 Article 23 of the CRPD recognises the right of people with disability to marry 
and found a family.
14
 Persons with disability face a range of difficulties in exercising 
the right to marry and form intimate relationships. However, the focus of this section is 
on the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) and the Guidelines on the Marriage Act 1961 for 
Marriage Celebrants (the Guidelines).  
                                                        
10  National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) ch 3. 
11  Legal Aid Qld, Submission 64. 
12  National Association of Community Legal Centres and Others, Submission 78. 
13  Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 41. 
14  UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 999 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 2008) art 23.  
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11.21 The ALRC asks whether amendment is required to the threshold under the 
Marriage Act for ‘real consent’ to marriage,
15
 to provide that the consent of either of 
the parties may not be real consent where that party did not have decision-making 
ability with respect to the marriage. 
11.22 In addition, the ALRC proposes that existing guidelines for marriage celebrants 
be amended to ensure they are consistent with the National Decision-Making Principles 
so that people who may have impaired decision-making ability are not unnecessarily 
prevented from entering a marriage. 
Real consent to marriage  
Question 11–2 Should s 23B(1)(d)(iii) of the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) be 
amended to provide that, instead of a test of mental incapacity, a party who did 
not have the decision-making ability with respect to the marriage, does not give 
‘real consent’?  
11.23 The Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) provides that a marriage will be void in a number 
of circumstances. Specifically, s 23B(1)(d)(iii) of the Marriage Act provides that a 
marriage is void where ‘the consent of either of the parties was not a real consent 
because ... that party was mentally incapable of understanding the nature and effect of 
the marriage ceremony’.
16
  
11.24 As a result, before a marriage is entered into, the person solemnising the 
marriage must determine that the parties to the marriage are mentally capable of 
understanding the nature and effect of the marriage ceremony.
17
 It is an offence for a 
celebrant to solemnise a marriage where he or she has reason to believe that one of the 
parties does not meet this standard.
18
 
11.25 Disability Rights Now has expressed the view that these provisions effectively 
exclude ‘some people with disability, particularly those with cognitive impairments 
from entering into marriage’.
19
 Similarly, the Illawarra Foundation submitted that 
‘terminology must be reviewed to reflect a clear distinction between intellectual 
disability and mental capacity ... people with disability should be assessed on their 
mental capacity as opposed to their disability ’.
20
 
                                                        
15  Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) s 23B(1)(d)(iii). 
16  Ibid. 
17  A number of categories of people are authorised celebrants for the purpose of solemnising marriages 
under the Marriage Act. Ministers of Religion are registered with states and territories to solemnise 
marriages for a recognised denomination. Certain state and territory officers are also entitled to solemnise 
marriages; for example, officers of the relevant registry of births, deaths and marriages. There are also 
Commonwealth registered marriage celebrants, who are registered under the Commonwealth Marriage 
Celebrants program: Ibid pt IV div 1. 
18  Ibid s 100.  
19  Disability Rights Now, Civil Society Report to the United Nations on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, (2012).  
20  The Illawarra Forum, Submission 19.  
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11.26 However, academics Bruce Arnold and Dr Wendy Bonython submitted that,  
as a binding legal agreement, inherent with responsibilities as well as rights, it is of 
fundamental importance that parties entering a marriage understand what it is they are 
binding themselves to. For people who lack the capacity to understand this, marriage 
should not be available.21 
11.27 Section 23B(1)(d)(iii) reveals a tension between the need to protect people with 
disability from exploitation or forced marriage, while ensuring that any person with 
disability who is able to understand and consent should be entitled to marry freely. 
11.28 This formulation of the test was first introduced in the Matrimonial Causes Act 
1959 (Cth).
22
 There have only been three reported decisions with respect to this test.
23
 
Most recently in Oliver and Oliver, Forster J concluded that the test  
not only required a capacity to understand ‘the effect’ but also refers to ‘the marriage’ 
rather than ‘a marriage’ ... taken together the matters require more than a general 
understanding of what marriage involves.24  
11.29 Foster J also expressed the view that ‘the relevant point of time proving mental 
incapacity is the time of the marriage ceremony’.
25
  
11.30 This interpretation of the provision reflects the ALRC’s approach to capacity 
being context and time specific, and relevant to the particular decision to be made. 
However, in order to ensure clarity, and consistency with the ALRC’s approach to 
language in this Inquiry and the one taken in relation to a similar provision under the 
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth),
26
 it may be necessary to amend 
23B(1)(d)(iii).  
11.31 Therefore, the ALRC seeks stakeholder comment on possible amendments 
including, for example, whether the provision should provide that ‘the consent of either 
of the parties was not a real consent because ... that party did not have decision-making 
ability with respect to the marriage’. 
11.32 The ALRC does not intend, however, to make proposals to include a statutory 
test of decision-making ability in the Marriage Act, or to require consideration of the 
available decision-making supports. This is largely because of concerns that such 
inclusions may have the unintended consequence of making the test under the 
                                                        
21  B Arnold and Dr W Bonython, Submission 38.  
22  The Matrimonial Causes Act 1959 (Cth) was then repealed by the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), and the 
test was later incorporated into the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth). See, eg, Oliver and Oliver [2014] FamCA 
57, [241]–[243]. 
23  Brown and Brown (1982) 92 FLC 232; AK and NC (2003) 93 FamCA 178; Oliver and Oliver [2014] 
FamCA 57. 
24  Oliver and Oliver [2014] FamCA 57, [255].  
25  Ibid [201]. 
26  Section 23B(1)(d)(iii) is similarly worded to the second part of s 93(8) of the Commonwealth Electoral 
Act 1918 (Cth) which provides that people are not entitled to have their name placed or retained on the 
Electoral Roll, or to vote, where they are a person ‘who by reason of being of unsound mind, is incapable 
of understanding the nature and significance of enrolment and voting’.  
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Marriage Act, which currently only requires ‘a very simple or general understanding ... 
of the marriage ceremony and what it involves’,
27
 more difficult to satisfy. 
Guardians and consent  
11.33 In some jurisdictions, under guardianship legislation, a guardian of a person 
with disability cannot consent or refuse to consent to a marriage, but may give an 
opinion as to whether the guardian thinks the marriage should proceed.
28
  
11.34 Disability Rights Now has suggested this may give guardians ‘undue influence 
over the extent to which a person with disability can realise their right to freely 
marry’.
29
 Similarly, Family Planning NSW expressed the view that ‘the opinion of a 
person with disability’s guardian should not be taken into account when determining a 
person’s capacity to consent to marriage’.
30
 This may be an issue that could be 
considered in the course of review of state and territory guardianship legislation.  
Guidelines on the Marriage Act 
Proposal 11–1 The Guidelines on the Marriage Act 1961 for Marriage 
Celebrants should be amended to ensure they are consistent with the National 
Decision-Making Principles.  
11.35 Commonwealth registered marriage celebrants may solemnise marriages under 
the Marriage Act and Marriage Regulations 1963 (Cth) and must comply with the 
Code of Practice for Marriage Celebrants and ongoing professional development 
obligations.
31
 There are a number of guidelines for celebrants;
32
 and celebrants must 
undergo performance reviews by the Registrar of Marriage Celebrants.
33
  
11.36 As outlined above, it is an offence for a celebrant to solemnise a marriage where 
he or she has reason to believe that one of the parties does not meet the standard 
contained in s 23B(1)(d)(iii).
34
 The Guidelines state that if a celebrant believes the 
                                                        
27  Australian Government Registrar of Marriage Celebrants, Guidelines on the Marriage Act 1961 for 
Marriage Celebrants, 2012 [8.6]. 
28  See, eg, The Illawarra Forum, Submission 19; Family Planning NSW, Submission 04. 
29  Disability Rights Now, Civil Society Report to the United Nations on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, (2012) 152. 
30  Family Planning NSW, Submission 04. See, also, The Illawarra Forum, Submission 19. 
31  Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) s 39G.  
32  Australian Government Registrar of Marriage Celebrants, Guidelines on the Marriage Act 1961 for 
Marriage Celebrants, 2012; Australian Government Registrar of Marriage Celebrants, Guidelines on 
Advertising for Commonwealth-Registered Marriage Celebrants, (2012); Australian Government 
Registrar of Marriage Celebrants, Guidelines on Conflict of Interest and Benefit to Business for 
Commonwealth-Registered Marriage Celebrants, (2012). Note, at the time of writing the Guidelines on 
the Marriage Act 1961 were under review.  
33  Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) s 39(H).  
34  Ibid s 100.  
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consent of one or both parties is not a real consent, they ‘should refuse to marry the 
couple, even if the marriage ceremony has commenced’.
35
  
11.37 The Guidelines suggest that to determine whether a party’s consent is real, a 
celebrant should speak to the party in the absence of the other party, speak to third 
parties and keep relevant records.
36
 The Guidelines state: 
in cases of mental capacity to understand the nature and effect of the marriage 
ceremony, a very simple or general understanding will be sufficient. A high level of 
understanding is not required. The authorised celebrant should ask questions of the 
person about whom they have concerns in order to gauge the level of their 
understanding of the marriage ceremony and what it involves.37 
11.38 The Guidelines also provide a list of questions to assist celebrants to identify 
situations where consent issues may arise.
38
  
11.39 Stakeholders expressed a number of concerns about the Guidelines. The 
Physical Disability Council of NSW, for example, submitted that it did not consider 
that a celebrant who may not have any knowledge of disability should be authorised 
to base this judgement. Issues could potentially arise where for example, a person 
with physical disability who has issues with their speech be incorrectly classed as 
‘incapable’.39  
11.40 Similarly, The Illawarra Forum submitted that the Act needs to be amended so 
that the marriage celebrant does not have the right or responsibility to ascertain ‘mental 
capacity’.
40
 
11.41 The Physical Disability Council of NSW highlighted that the Guidelines do not 
‘consider communication needs and augmented communication used by people with 
disability’.
41
 The Council recommended amendment to clauses of the Guidelines which 
relate to obtaining a translator or interpreter
42
 in order to ensure compliance with art 21 
of the CRPD, which requires acceptance and facilitation of the use of ‘sign languages, 
Braille, augmentative and alternative communication, and all other accessible means, 
modes and formats of communication of their choice by persons with disabilities in 
official interactions’.
43
 
11.42 The ALRC recognises stakeholder concerns about the expertise of a marriage 
celebrant in determining whether a person has decision-making ability with respect to 
the marriage and the need for consideration of the communication needs of people with 
                                                        
35  Australian Government Registrar of Marriage Celebrants, Guidelines on the Marriage Act 1961 for 
Marriage Celebrants, 2012 79. 
36  Ibid [8.6]. 
37  Ibid. 
38  Ibid. 
39  Physical Disability Council of NSW, Submission 32. 
40  The Illawarra Forum, Submission 19.  
41  Physical Disability Council of NSW, Submission 32. 
42  Australian Government Registrar of Marriage Celebrants, Guidelines on the Marriage Act 1961 for 
Marriage Celebrants, 2012 [4.1.2], [5.9].  
43  UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 999 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 2008) art 21(b).  
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disability. It may be necessary to amend the Guidelines to provide additional guidance 
for marriage celebrants in relation to potential issues relating to decision-making ability 
and communication needs and requirements. The ALRC proposes amendment to the 
Guidelines to incorporate and have regard to the National Decision-Making Principles 
and guidelines. The NSW Capacity Toolkit also provides a useful model.
44
 
Other concerns 
11.43 In Australia, many persons with disability experience discrimination or 
difficulties in exercising their rights to marry, form intimate relationships, and sexual 
expression. In particular, persons with disability  
experience paternalistic and moralistic attitudes from support staff and service 
providers and their needs for assistance in developing and maintaining relationships 
and friendships and their decisions to enter into marriage or partnerships receive little 
or no support at a policy or service delivery level.45 
11.44 The ‘subject of sexuality and intimate relationships are generally silent, ignored 
and invisible aspect of the lives of people with disability’.
46
 Some stakeholders 
emphasised that many people with disability may be denied the right to engage in 
intimate relationships. Stakeholders emphasised a range of difficulties including: 
legislative barriers under state and territory law;
47
 attitudes of family, carers and 
service providers;
48
 risk management processes and policies;
49
 limited access to 
information;
50
 difficulty accessing sex workers;
51
 and the need for education and 
awareness raising in relation to people with disability and sexual and reproductive 
health.
52
  
11.45 While important, some of these issues arise at a state or territory level and the 
key to addressing many of the others extends beyond the limits of law or legal 
                                                        
44  New South Wales, Attorney General’s Department, Capacity Toolkit: Information for Government and 
Community Workers, Professionals, Families and Carers in New South Wales (2008).  
45  Disability Rights Now, Civil Society Report to the United Nations on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, (2012) 15–16. See also: Family Planning NSW, Submission 04. 
46  Family Planning NSW, Submission 04. See also, Family Planning NSW, ‘Love & Kisses: Taking Action 
on the Reproductive and Sexual Health and Rights of People with Disability 2014-2018’ (December 
2013) <http://www.fpnsw.org.au/disability_advocacy.pdf>.  
47  For example, provisions that make it an offence to have sexual intercourse with a person who, for 
example, does not have the capacity to consent to sexual intercourse because of ‘cognitive incapacity’: 
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 61HA(4)(a) and the broad definition of cognitive impairment under s 61H(1A), 
Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) ss 50–52. See, also, Touching Base, Submission 40. 
48  See, eg, Queenslanders with Disability Network, Submission 59; B Arnold and Dr W Bonython, 
Submission 38; Family Planning NSW, Submission 04. See, also, Disability Rights Now, Civil Society 
Report to the United Nations on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, (2012) 158.  Michael Kirby, 
‘Adult Guardianship: Law, Autonomy and Sexuality’ (2013) 20 Journal of Law and Medicine 866, 873.  
49  Disability Rights Now, Civil Society Report to the United Nations on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, (2012) 158. 
50  Vicdeaf, Submission 56.  
51  Queenslanders with Disability Network, Submission 59; Touching Base, Submission 40; Physical 
Disability Council of NSW, Submission 32. 
52  Family Planning NSW, Submission 04. See more generally: The Illawarra Forum, Submission 19; Senate 
Standing Committee on Community Affairs, ‘The Involuntary or Coerced Sterilisation of People with 
Disabilities in Australia’ (Commonwealth of Australia, 2013). 
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frameworks, the focus of the ALRC’s work.
53
 The ALRC does not intend to make 
proposals in relation to these issues.  
Superannuation 
11.46 Many decision-making issues in relation to superannuation concern the 
operation and power of state and territory appointed decision-makers, including powers 
of attorney. As they arise under state and territory law, these issues go beyond the 
scope of this Inquiry. The focus of this chapter is confined to decision-making issues 
that may require amendment to Commonwealth legislation and legal frameworks.  
11.47 The Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) (SIS Act) and the 
Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulations 1994 (Cth) (SIS Regulations) 
govern the operation of superannuation funds in Australia.
54
 The Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission (ASIC), the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 
(APRA) and the Commissioner of Taxation supervise superannuation funds.
55
 
Individual superannuation funds are also governed by their trust deeds and governing 
rules.  
11.48 This section discusses two specific questions with respect to superannuation and 
binding death benefit nominations. The first question is whether the SIS Act and SIS 
Regulations should be amended to provide for supported decision-making when a 
member of a superannuation fund nominates a beneficiary. The second question relates 
to whether, when a member of a superannuation fund has appointed a state or territory 
decision-maker, that decision-maker should be able to nominate a beneficiary on behalf 
of the member. 
Binding death benefit nominations  
Question 11–3 Should the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 
(Cth) and Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulations 1994 (Cth) be 
amended to provide: 
(a) for supported decision-making regarding a binding death nomination of a 
beneficiary; 
(b) that a state or territory decision-maker (such as under an enduring power 
of attorney) may nominate a beneficiary on behalf of the member? 
                                                        
53  See, eg, B Arnold and Dr W Bonython, Submission 38. 
54  The SIS Act makes provision for the prudent management of certain superannuation funds and applies to 
all private sector funds and certain public sector funds that have elected to be regulated by the SIS Act: 
Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) s 3(1). 
55  Ibid.  
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Question 11–4 If a person acting under an enduring power of attorney may 
make a binding death nomination on behalf of a person holding a 
superannuation interest under the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 
1993 (Cth) and Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulations 1994 (Cth), 
should they be required to have regard to the will, preferences and rights of the 
member in making the nomination? What safeguards need to be in place? 
11.49 Superannuation is generally provided through a trust structure in which trustees 
hold the funds on behalf of members. The SIS Act and SIS Regulations provide 
mechanisms to allow superannuation fund rules to permit a member of the 
superannuation fund to complete a binding notice nominating a beneficiary.
56
 A 
member can nominate a legal personal representative, or a dependant or dependants as 
their beneficiary.
57
 Nominations are generally only binding for three years, but can be 
renewed.
58
 On or after the member’s death, the trustee of the fund must then provide 
the member’s benefits to the person or people mentioned in the notice.
59
 
11.50 ‘Legal personal representative’ is defined under the SIS Act to mean ‘the 
executor of the will or administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the trustee of 
the estate of a person under a legal disability or a person who holds an enduring power 
of attorney granted by a person’.
60
 The ALRC is interested in stakeholder feedback on 
whether amendment may be required to this definition.  
11.51 The SIS Regulations require that the notice nominating a beneficiary must: 
 be in writing; 
 be signed and dated by the member in the presence of two witnesses, each of 
whom have turned 18 and neither of whom is mentioned in the nomination; and 
                                                        
56  Ibid s 59(1A); Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 6.17A. There is also 
provision for a non-binding death benefit nomination which is not binding on the trustee of the 
superannuation fund, however the trustee will take the member’s wishes into consideration when making 
a decision as to whom to pay the benefit: Ibid reg 6.22. 
57  Superannuation law restricts who is an eligible dependant to receive a death benefit payment to a spouse 
(including same-sex and de facto), child, or person with whom the member has an interdependency 
relationship: Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) ss 10, 10A. 
58  Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 6.17A(7). When a binding nomination 
lapses there is some confusion about whether the death benefit becomes part of the estate or the 
nomination just becomes non-binding. Although it is outside the terms of reference this has been raised as 
an issue of concern. 
59  This is subject to a trustee of the entity complying with any conditions contained in the regulations, and 
the member’s notice being given in accordance with the regulations. See Superannuation Industry 
(Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) s 59; Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulations 1994 (Cth) 
reg 6.17A. A dependant is defined to include the spouse, child or any person with whom the person has 
an interdependency relationship: ss 10, 10A.  
60  Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) s 10.  
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 contain a declaration signed and dated by the witness stating that the notice was 
signed by the member.
61
 
11.52 The Law Council of Australia submitted that 
some funds accept nomination by a person holding an enduring power of attorney 
granted by the member, generally without inquiring as to the wishes of the member. 
Some funds do not accept a nomination by a person holding an enduring power of 
attorney, with the result that binding nominations cannot be made by these 
members.62  
11.53 Subject to the scope of the appointment of a state or territory decision-maker, 
such as a power of attorney, there does not appear to be any restriction in the SIS Act 
or SIS Regulations that would prevent a person acting under a power of attorney from 
completing and signing a binding death benefit nomination. The Superannuation 
Complaints Tribunal has held that an enduring power of attorney would have permitted 
such an action.
63
  
11.54 The Law Council of Australia has suggested that superannuation funds would 
adopt a more consistent approach if there were greater clarity in legislative provisions 
governing superannuation death benefits.
64
  
11.55 There appear to be key three issues. First, if persons with disability are being 
prevented from nominating a beneficiary because they require decision-making 
support, the SIS Act and SIS Regulations may need to be amended to remedy this 
situation. The ALRC is interested in stakeholder feedback in relation to this issue.  
11.56 Secondly, should the SIS Act and SIS Regulations be amended to limit the 
provision of a binding death nomination to persons with disability who are able to 
make the decision, with support? For example, should a person acting for a person with 
disability, under an enduring power of attorney, be restricted from making a binding 
death nomination? While a nomination is a lifetime act, the effect is will-like in 
nature—as it affects property after the death of the person who holds the 
superannuation interest.
65
  
11.57 Under strict conditions, wills can now be authorised by the court in some 
jurisdictions (‘statutory wills’), where a person is regarded as having lost, or never 
having had, legal capacity.
66
 In the succession context it is a relatively new jurisdiction 
and exercised cautiously, given the importance accorded to testamentary freedom as a 
valued property right. Generally speaking, the conditions for such statutory wills reflect 
the changes in emphasis in approaches to legal capacity and support for those who may 
                                                        
61  Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 6.17A. 
62  Law Council of Australia, Submission 83. 
63  Superannuation Complaints Tribunal, Decision D07–08\030 (3 September, 2007) [34]. 
64  Law Council of Australia, Submission 83. 
65  See, eg, Rosalind Croucher and Prue Vines, Succession: Families, Property and Death (LexisNexis 
Butterworths, 4th ed, 2013) [3.10]–[3.12]. 
66  Succession Act 2006 (NSW) ss 18–26; Succession Act 1981 (Qld); ss 21–28; Wills Act 1936 (SA) s 7; 
Wills Act 2008 (Tas) ss 21–28; Wills Act 1997 (Vic) ss 21–30; Wills Act 1970 (WA) s 40; Wills Act 1968 
(ACT) ss 16A–16I; Wills Act 2000 (NT) ss 19–26. 
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require decision-making assistance discussed in Chapter 2. The legislation also reflects 
the time of its introduction in the standard applied by the courts.
67
 For example, the 
courts have to ask whether the proposed will would ‘accurately reflect the testator’s 
likely intentions’; is a will that is ‘reasonably likely’ to be one that the testator would 
have made; ‘is or may be a will ... that the person would make’; or ‘is one which could 
be made by the person’.
68
  
11.58 For the purposes of this Inquiry, the key question is whether a similar approach 
should be taken in relation to binding death nominations. This would require strict 
provisions for testing whether the nomination is one that the person would really want: 
that is, does it express their will and preferences? If it is considered that binding death 
nominations should only be made by the person whose superannuation interest is 
affected, with appropriate support in making that decision, then the SIS Act and SIS 
Regulations should be clarified to this effect. 
11.59 Thirdly, if a person acting under an enduring power of attorney is to be 
permitted to make a binding death nomination for the person, then the SIS Act and SIS 
Regulations need, similarly, to be clarified. The standard by which such nomination 
should be made and the scrutiny made of the nomination by way of safeguards should 
also be made clear.  
11.60 Accordingly, the ALRC asks whether legislative change is required to clarify 
whether a binding death nomination may be made by a person acting on behalf of 
another (such as by an enduring power of attorney), and, if so, what standard should be 
used to guide such action and what safeguards are necessary in relation to it.  
Board membership and other corporate roles 
11.61 Board participation is one of the areas listed in the Terms of Reference. In the 
Issues Paper, the ALRC asked in what ways the Commonwealth laws and legal 
frameworks relating to membership of, or participation on, boards diminish or facilitate 
the equal recognition of people with disability before the law and their ability to 
exercise legal capacity. Stakeholders expressed concern about under-representation of 
people with disability on corporate, government and non-government boards; and 
about the operation of legal provisions allowing the removal of directors or board 
members because of intellectual disability or mental illness.
69
 
11.62 The Mental Health Coordinating Council submitted that the language of laws 
should change to ‘eradicate any stigmatising and discriminating practice towards 
                                                        
67  See the discussion in Croucher and Vines, above n 65, [6.11]–[6.20]; R Croucher, ‘“An Interventionist, 
Paternalistic Jurisdiction”? The Place of Statutory Wills in Australian Succession Law’ (2009) 32 
University of New South Wales Law Journal 674. 
68  Croucher and Vines, above n 65, [6.11]. 
69  See eg, Hobsons Bay City Council, Submission 44; Mental Health Coordinating Council, Submission 07; 
The Illawarra Forum, Submission 19; Centre for Rural Regional Law and Justice and the National Rural 
Law and Justice Alliance, Submission 20; J Meagher Submission 79. 
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people with a mental health condition’—including in relation to some provisions 
concerning board membership.
70
  
11.63 For example, the Associations Incorporation Act 2009 (NSW) applies model 
rules to the constitutions of associations, if appropriate provision is not otherwise 
made.
71
 These default rules provide that a casual vacancy in the office of a member of 
the committee occurs if the member ‘becomes a mentally incapacitated person’.
72
 In 
turn, the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) defines the term ‘mentally incapacitated 
person’ to mean a person who is ‘an involuntary patient or a forensic patient or a 
correctional patient within the meaning of the Mental Health Act 2007, or a protected 
person within the meaning of the NSW Trustee and Guardian Act 2009’.
73
 
11.64 Such a broad provision seems inconsistent with the National Decision-Making 
Principles because it makes status-based assumptions about decision-making ability, 
and does not recognise that ability may fluctuate over time.
74
 The fact that someone is 
briefly an involuntary patient, or is subject to some form of administration or 
guardianship order, should not automatically require them to vacate a position on an 
association’s committee.
75
 In this Inquiry the ALRC proposes to move away from a 
status-based approach. 
11.65 At a Commonwealth level, a number of provisions in the Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth) apply tests of capacity in relation to acting in various corporate roles, 
including as a director, auditor, liquidator and financial services licence holder: 
 Directors. If a person who is the only director and the only shareholder of a 
proprietary company ‘cannot manage the company because of the person’s 
mental incapacity’, the person’s personal representative or trustee may appoint 
another person as director.
76
 
 Auditors and liquidators. The Companies Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinary 
Board must, on an application by ASIC or APRA, cancel the registration of an 
auditor or liquidator if the person ‘is incapable, because of mental infirmity, of 
managing his or her affairs’.
77
 
 Financial services licence holders. ASIC may suspend or cancel an Australian 
financial services licence held by a person who ‘becomes incapable of managing 
their affairs because of mental or physical incapacity’.
78
 
                                                        
70  Mental Health Coordinating Council, Submission 07. 
71  Associations Incorporation Act 2009 (NSW) s 25. 
72  Associations Incorporation Regulation 2010 (NSW) sch 1, cl 18(2)(f). 
73  Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) s 21. 
74  See, eg, the Representative Decision-Making Guidelines. 
75  The Mental Health Coordinating Council proposed that the wording should be changed to ‘permanently 
incapacitated’ rather than ‘mentally incapacitated’: Mental Health Coordinating Council, Submission 07. 
76  Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 201F(2). 
77  Ibid s 1292(7)(b). 
78  Ibid s 915B. 
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Proposal 11–2 Sections 201F(2), 915B and 1292(7)(b) of the Corporations 
Act 2001 (Cth) should be amended to provide that a person is incapable of acting 
in the particular role if they cannot: 
(a) understand the information relevant to the decisions that they will have to 
make in performing the role; 
(b)   retain that information to the extent necessary to make those decisions;  
(c) use or weigh that information as part of the process of making decisions; 
and 
(d)  communicate the decisions in some way. 
11.66 The existing tests of a person’s capacity to act in roles regulated by the 
Corporations Act are inconsistent with the principles of supported decision-making. In 
particular, they are status-based—referring to concepts such as ‘mental infirmity’ and 
‘mental incapacity’. Further, the functional aspect of some of the tests refers broadly to 
a person’s ability to manage ‘their affairs’ rather than to make particular categories of 
decision or perform particular duties. 
11.67 Such tests, to the extent they are necessary, should be based on a person’s 
decision-making ability in the context of a particular role or duties. In the ALRC’s 
view, the Corporations Act should be amended to introduce provisions based on the 
National Decision-Making Principles and Guidelines. 
Other issues 
Employment 
11.68 There are many concerns about the employment of people with disability in 
Australia, including those arising from lower levels of labour force participation and 
higher unemployment as compared to others;
79
 and the lowest employment 
participation rate for people with disability among OECD countries.
80
  
11.69 In addition, in response to the Issues Paper, stakeholders raised concerns about:  
 the relationship between employment and social security systems; 
 the operation of the Job Services Australia and Disability Employment Services 
system, including the conduct of employment services assessments; 
 the operation of Australian Disability Enterprises; 
                                                        
79  See, eg: Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘Australian Social Trends’ (Cat No 4102.0).  
80  Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Directorate for Employment, Labour and 
Social Affairs, Sickness, Disability and Work, Background Paper for High-Level Forum, Stockholm,  
14–15 May 2009.  
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 the operation of the supported wage system and business service wage 
assessment tool (and proposed changes); and 
 the declining rate of employment of people with disability in the 
Commonwealth public service.
81
 
11.70 While these are important issues in the lives of persons with disability, the issues 
do not relate directly to concepts of legal capacity or decision-making ability, and the 
ALRC does not intend to make proposals in these areas. 
Anti-discrimination 
11.71 The nature and operation of Commonwealth anti-discrimination legislation 
raises a range of significant issues for people with disability. These issues relate 
especially to factors which may limit the ability of people with disability to access the 
system, including:  
 the individualised nature of the complaint system;  
 issues of standing;  
 failure to cover intersectional discrimination;  
 costs associated with proceeding past conciliation;  
 reliance on, and the operation of, exceptions;  
 coverage;  
 positive duties;  
 remedies and enforcement; and  
 the role, powers and resourcing of the Australian Human Rights Commission.
82
  
                                                        
81  See, eg, Legal Aid Qld, Submission 64; Redfern Legal Centre, Submission 46; Deaf Australia, Submission 
37; Centre for Rural Regional Law and Justice and the National Rural Law and Justice Alliance, 
Submission 20. 
82  See, eg, Law Council of Australia, Submission 83; National Association of Community Legal Centres and 
Others, Submission 78; Women’s Legal Services NSW, Submission 57; Anti-Discrimination 
Commissioner (Tasmania), Submission 71; Children with Disability Australia, Submission 68; 
Coordinating Committee of Women’s Legal Services Australia, Submission 70; Legal Aid Victoria, 
Submission 65; Legal Aid Qld, Submission 64; Spinal Cord Injuries Australia, Submission 63; 
Queenslanders with Disability Network, Submission 59; National Seniors Australia, Submission 57; 
Vicdeaf, Submission 56; Disability Discrimination Legal Service, Submission 55; Mental Health Council 
of Australia, Submission 52; National Disability Services, Submission 49; Central Australian Legal Aid 
Service, Submission 48; Redfern Legal Centre, Submission 46; MDAA, Submission 43; Public Interest 
Advocacy Centre, Submission 41; B Arnold and Dr W Bonython, Submission 38; Cairns Community 
Legal Centre, Submission 30; Equal Opportunity Commission of South Australia, Submission 28; Deaf 
Society of NSW, Submission 24; Carers NSW, Submission 23; Centre for Rural Regional Law and Justice 
and the National Rural Law and Justice Alliance, Submission 20; Insurance Council of Australia, 
Submission 08; Mental Health Coordinating Council, Submission 07; Office of the Public Advocate 
(Qld), Submission 05; Family Planning NSW, Submission 04.  
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11.72 These are systemic concerns about anti-discrimination law and practice and, in 
the light of this, and the significant work that has been undertaken in this area in recent 
years,
83
 the ALRC does not intend to make proposals in this area. 
Insurance 
11.73 In the Issues Paper, the ALRC asked what changes, if any should be made to the 
insurance exemption under the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) (DDA), and 
for submissions on other issues relating to insurance. The key concerns expressed by 
stakeholders with respect to people with disability and insurance relate to: 
 the availability of, information about, and the cost of insurance; 
 the operation of policy exclusions, including for example in relation to pre-
existing conditions and mental illness; 
 the relevance, transparency and accessibility of the actuarial and statistical data 
on which disability-based insurance underwriting and pricing occurs; and 
 reliance on the insurance exemption under the DDA.
84
 
11.74 Conversely, some stakeholders submitted that ‘laws and legal frameworks 
concerning insurance do not reduce the equal recognition of people with disability’ and 
that the operation of the underwriting process or the operation of the exemption under 
the DDA are appropriate.
85
 
11.75 Again, some of the issues highlighted by stakeholders do not relate directly to 
concepts of legal capacity or decision-making capability, and the ALRC does not 
intend to make proposals in these areas. 
11.76 There have been a number of recent inquires which have dealt with these 
matters. For example, in many respects the concerns mirror those expressed in the 
ALRC’s Age Barriers to Work Inquiry. The conclusions reached in the report Access 
All Ages—Older Workers and Commonwealth Laws
86
 may also be applicable in the 
context of disability, including in relation to: 
 the need for clear and simple information about available insurance products; 
 the desirability of an agreement between the Australian Government and 
insurers requiring the publication of data upon which insurance offerings based 
on age rely; 
                                                        
83  See, eg, Exposure Draft Human Rights and Anti-Discrimination Bill 2012 (Cth); Senate Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs Committee, Review of Exposure Draft Human Rights and Anti-Discrimination Bill 
2012 (Cth), February 2013 (and submissions to the Senate Committee); Attorney-General’s Department, 
Consolidation of Commonwealth Anti-Discrimination Laws, Discussion Paper (2011) and submissions in 
response to the Discussion Paper.  
84  See, eg, Anti-Discrimination Commissioner (Tasmania), Submission 71; Mental Health Council of 
Australia, Submission 52; Physical Disability Council of NSW, Submission 32.  
85  Insurance Council of Australia, Submission 08. See, also, Financial Services Council, Submission 35. 
86  Australian Law Reform Commission, Access All Ages—Older Workers and Commonwealth Laws, Report 
No 120 (2013). 
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 review of insurance exceptions under Commonwealth, state and territory anti-
discrimination legislation as they apply to age as well as the development of 
guidance material about the application of any insurance exception under 
Commonwealth anti-discrimination legislation; and 
 amendment of the General Insurance Code of Practice and the Financial 
Services Council Code of Ethics and Code of Conduct to include diversity 
statements or objects clauses that encourage consideration of the needs and 
circumstances of a diverse range of consumers, including mature age persons.
87
 
Parenthood and family law  
11.77 The Terms of Reference identify parenthood and family law as an area for 
consideration in this Inquiry. Some of the issues which arise are referred to in other 
parts of the Discussion Paper. For example, issues concerning the appointment of case 
and litigation representatives and protecting vulnerable witnesses often arise in family 
law proceedings and are discussed in Chapter 7. Similarly, issues relating to 
sterilisation are discussed in Chapter 10.  
11.78 Another issue raised by stakeholders was concern about the removal of children 
from parents with disability, particularly through the operation of the child protection 
system in states and territories.
88
 However, as outlined in Chapter 1, the focus of the 
ALRC’s work is on Commonwealth laws and legal frameworks, and examination of 
the operation of state and territory child protection systems extends beyond the Terms 
of Reference for this Inquiry.  
11.79 Some stakeholders also raised issues relating to the effect that a parent having 
disability may have on parenting proceedings in the Family Court.
89
 However, the Hon 
Chief Justice Diana Bryant AO expressed the view that: 
insofar as it is being suggested that the Act discriminates against parents with an 
intellectual disability, or that the presence of an intellectual disability is of itself a 
disqualifying factor in an application in which a parent is seeking to spend substantial 
time with their child, I believe those views are misconceived.90  
11.80 In any event, these concerns focus on the application by judges of the primary 
and secondary considerations in parenting matters under ss 60CC(2) and 60CC(3) of 
the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) and are outside the scope of this Inquiry.  
                                                        
87  Ibid. 
88  See, eg, G Llewellyn, Submission 82; Anti-Discrimination Commissioner (Tasmania), Submission 71; 
ADACAS, Submission 29; Office of the Public Advocate (Vic), Submission 06. See also Office of the 
Public Advocate (Vic), ‘What Even Happened to the Village? The Removal of Children from Parents 
with a Disability’ (Report 1: Family Law—Hidden Issues, December 2013).  
89  See, eg, Office of the Public Advocate (Vic), above n 88. See also ADACAS, Submission 29; The 
Illawarra Forum, Submission 19. 
90  D Bryant, Submission 22.  
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Holding public office 
11.81 People with disability are significantly under-represented in public office.
91
 The 
main barrier to holding public office for persons with disability may be the negative 
assumptions about their ability to perform the functions in a role of trust. The Law 
Council of Australia acknowledged that this social disadvantage, rather than any legal 
restriction, affects the capacity of people to hold public office, as well as to engage in a 
profession, vocation or other activities.
92
 
11.82 The qualifications of members of the House of Representatives and Senators are 
set out in the Australian Constitution.
93
 They include eligibility as an elector under the 
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth).
94
 As discussed in Chapter 9, the ALRC 
proposes amendment of the ‘unsound mind’ provision contained in the Commonwealth 
Electoral Act.
95
 
11.83 Under the Australian Constitution, a Commonwealth judicial officer may be 
removed on an address from both Houses of the Parliament on the ground of ‘proved 
misbehaviour or incapacity’.
96
 A statutory process for assisting the Parliament to 
consider removal has been established by the Judicial Misbehaviour and Incapacity 
(Parliamentary Commissions) Act 2012 (Cth). Under this Act, the Parliament may 
establish a commission to investigate and report on an allegation of misbehaviour or 
incapacity, so that the Parliament is well-informed about the decision at hand. 
11.84 The Courts Legislation Amendment (Judicial Complaints) Act 2012 (Cth) 
modified various related laws such as the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) and the Federal 
Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) to provide a statutory basis for the heads of 
jurisdiction
97
 to deal with complaints about judicial officers, including establishing a 
conduct committee.  
11.85 The ALRC does not propose any change to these laws because they appear to 
provide for an impartial and considered approach to the assessment of decision-making 
ability. These 2012 laws have also not yet been tested. In time, the ALRC’s National 
Decision-Making Principles may inform the decisions of Parliament and the heads of 
jurisdictions of Commonwealth courts. 
                                                        
91  In 2010, the Hon Kelly Vincent MLC, South Australia, from the ‘Dignity for Disability’ party was the 
first member of parliament in Australia to be elected on a disability platform. 
92  Law Council of Australia, Submission 83. 
93  Australian Constitution ss 16, 34. 
94  Similar provisions exist at state level and, in Victoria, the constitution itself explicitly provides that a 
person who ‘by reason of being of unsound mind, is incapable of understanding the nature and 
significance of enrolment and voting is not entitled to be enrolled’: Constitution Act 1975 (Vic) 
s 48(2)(d).  
95  Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) s 93(8). 
96  Australian Constitution s 72. Similar grounds apply for the removal of Commissioners of the ALRC: 
Australian Law Reform Commission Act 1996 (Cth) ss 17, 17A. 
97  The heads of jurisdiction are the Chief Justices of the Federal Court and the Family Court and the Chief 
Federal Magistrate. 
 
